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Chapter 1
Introduction: General Description of the Study,  
Key Issues, and Provisional Conclusions
Laura Zanfrini
1 Migrants and Religion: a Challenging Couple for European 
Contemporary Societies
There has been an extraordinary surge in international migration in recent 
years, both in the volume of flows and in their composition.1 Within this com-
plex scenario, Europe has become the first destination in the world in terms of 
migrants’ arrivals and, in the last years, it has faced the most dramatic refugee 
crisis since the end of World War ii. In a more patent way than ever, newcomers 
are obliging Europe to confront with the multi-faceted religious landscape of 
migrants’ sending countries. Dramatic circumstances such as the growing influ-
ence of Boko Haram in Nigeria –and of its foolish attempt to “purify Islam” and 
society as a whole–, the increasing intolerance towards Christians in Egypt –a 
sort of “spill-over” effect of terrorism in Iraq and Syria (Open Doors, 2019)–, or 
the upsurging of religious nationalism in India are now irrupting in European 
society, through the arrival of people claiming protection or, at times, accused 
of corrupting “our” –European– religious identity, or even of importing the vi-
rus of religious intolerance and religious radicalism to Europe.
While forcing European societies to become aware of the tremendous 
 religious-based violations and persecutions that are characterizing the con-
temporary global scenario, new arrivals are challenging the main distinction 
on which European migration regimes have been traditionally based: the dis-
crimination between voluntary and forced migrants. For this reason, all along 
the book we will put the adjective “forced” within brackets, in order to empha-
size the porous and disputable character of this concept. More deeply, para-
phrasing Sayad’s well-known concept (1999), new arrivals “disturb” Europe and 
its systems of refugee protection, whereas asylum seekers’ religious affiliations 





 weaknesses and pitfalls of these systems, since the latter were built in a geo-
political context that was very distant from the contemporary one.
As a matter of fact, religious-based claims mirror the extraordinary enlarge-
ment of the concept of forced mobility, once circumscribed by the definition 
provided by the Geneva Convention. However, today it has been progressively 
extended to include new categories of individuals, situations, and agents of 
persecution. Yet, because of their nature, both complex and intimate, this kind 
of claim easily feeds the suspect of the recurrence of “bogus” requests (as we 
will describe in Chapter 11), thus contributing to the delegitimization of the 
asylum institute. Finally, asylum’s procedures and practices face while being 
influenced by them, preconceptions and distorted convictions about the dif-
ferent religious groups, and about the relations among them. As is shown by 
the Middle Eastern region –the cradle of the three main monotheistic faiths, 
chosen as one of the focuses of the present study–, current analyses are often 
dominated by opposite understandings, unable to comprehend the “turbu-
lent” situations of Europe’ peripheries, but also unable to grasp what is really at 
stake.
To cite one example, while accusing humanitarian channels and reception 
services of becoming an instrument for the attraction of (Muslim) (fake) refu-
gees, European public opinion seems to disregard how these same channels 
provide a possibility of survival for many Christians currently “under attack”.2 
Not to mention the case of those migrants –Muslims and not  Muslims– preju-
dicially perceived as “enemies” only because they come from given “Islamic” 
undemocratic countries. Ultimately, a debate dominated by concerns 
of a cultural and security nature ends up obscuring the other implications of 
the migration-religion link; first of all, the importance of the religious factor in 
the genesis of migration. In this context, European religious identity has been 
repeatedly evoked as a vessel to be wielded in order to protect “Europe” from 
arrivals, depicted as a menace. One of the most shocking examples was the 
Rozaniec do Granic, the Rosary on border boundaries: a collective prayer that 
took place on October 7, 2017, involving an impressive number of people along 
the over-3,100-kilometre Polish borders, creating an ideal human chain. The 
official motivation of the event was that of imploring the intercession of the 
Mother of God “to save Poland and the world”, on the occasion of the feast of 
Our Lady of the Rosary, “established after the great battle of Lepanto, where 
2 As a matter of fact, according to the reports produced every year by “Aiuto alla Chiesa che 
soffre”, the persecution of Christians has been producing significant outflows of people try-
ing to escape, to the extent of putting into question the very survival of some of the oldest 
Christian churches of the world, thus compromising the multi-religious composition of the 
sending societies (Aiuto alla Chiesa che soffre, 2019).
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the Christian fleet defeated the much larger fleet of Muslim society, thus sav-
ing Europe from Islamization”.
Finally, European public opinion looks at current migration as something 
from which “to defend itself”, and is worried about not only the economic, but 
also the cultural impact of incoming flows, particularly when they are com-
posed of migrants presumed to be Muslims (Mavelli, Wilson, 2016). Both eco-
nomic and humanitarian migrations are perceived as an “identity challenge”, 
since they are forcing the symbolic borders of European nations, shaped by 
their “Christian roots”. In this manner, they “miss” the key point: policies for the 
granting of asylum and other forms of humanitarian protection represent a 
conscious way of affirming principles, values and worldviews. In the end, they 
should be an opportunity for societies to reflect on the values on which they 
are based and deserve to be handed down as a legacy to future generations, 
and an extraordinary –if not prophetic– opportunity of self-reflection and of 
display of “our” own culture. The goal of contributing to raising the general 
awareness of this concept is one of the main reasons behind the present study: 
as it often happens, migration proves to be a “mirror” that permits to grasp and 
discuss key issues and emerging challenges.
Indeed, as exemplified by the experience of (forced) migrants intercepted 
thanks to the research on which the present book is based, religious rights and 
religious freedom represent a “litmus test” of the quality of a democracy. On 
the one hand, their systematic violation dramatically gives evidence of the lack 
of democracy in many sending countries, and marks the limit beyond which it 
is not possible to accept any abuses, thus forcing victims to opt for the “exit 
strategy” represented by migration. On the other hand, they offer European 
citizens the opportunity to realize the importance of religious rights at both 
individual and collective level, shaking them from the inertia that sometimes 
seems to characterize European societies, not to mention the temptation to 
encourage authoritarian turns. Finally, the experience of people who have mi-
grated for religious motives, which encourages reflection about the impor-
tance of religion in both private –individual and family– life and public life; 
particularly in Europe, where this dimension has been traditionally expulsed 
from the public sphere and it is now more and more reduced to its “identitari-
an” dimension (Roy, 2019). As we will analyze in depth, the contemporary 
“post-secular” scenario proves to be particularly stimulating for this kind of 
reflection since, alongside the insistent secularization, a more composite, not 
easily defined picture is emerging. Religion today is closely connected with cul-
tural and social transformations involving contemporary Europe, but it is also 
the borderline where contradictory pressures and, in some cases, thorny ques-




At the same time, since contemporary (forced) migrations are perceived as 
more and more unpredictable in their dimension and internal composition, 
they are obliging Europe to come to terms with the full and long-standing 
legacy represented by its relationship with immigration and the “diversity” – 
including religious – that immigration brought with it. According to our inter-
pretation (Zanfrini, 2019), as institutionalized during the post-war period, the 
European migration regime contained in itself the reasons for cultivating the 
illusion of the temporary nature of migration, discouraging the stable settle-
ment of immigrant families and communities, and defining migration as a 
pure economic phenomenon; that is a phenomenon unable to change the po-
litical and identity borders of European national communities. Nevertheless, 
the unpredicted settlement of the post-World War ii “guest workers” and their 
progressive inclusion in the citizens’ community, the huge number of family 
reunions, the implosion of the Soviet empire and the subsequent redefinition 
of the internal States’ borders, as well as the arrival of millions of asylum seek-
ers following the crises in various regions of the world (from Latin America to 
South-East Asia, from the Balkans to the Middle East) have contributed to the 
formation of ethnic and religious minorities. Their presence and their “visibil-
ity”, also in the public space, represent an unexpected –if not an unwelcomed– 
phenomenon; a phenomenon definitely inconsistent with the myth of the eth-
nic, cultural and religious homogeneity on which the European nations have 
been founded.
Indeed, in recent times, the main societal institutions have been profoundly 
challenged by the settlement of people with different cultural and religious 
background (Vilaça et al., 2014); even more so when these people not only ex-
pect to be treated as “equals”, but ask to be acknowledged as “diverse”. National 
school systems –another of the topical issues chosen by the present study–, 
invested by the task of socializing new generations to the role of future citi-
zens, have therefore become a key actor: the presence of students with a (mi-
nority) religious background challenges them through the request of recogni-
tion; what is more, it offers a unique opportunity to grasp the concepts of 
democracy and citizenship, without avoiding the confrontation with the di-
mension of conflict inevitably present in every pluralistic and truly democratic 
context. Finally, among the other consequences, the permanent settlement of 
migrant families and migrant communities has transformed European States 
into multi-religious societies, thus offering them the opportunity “to test” the 
principle of religious freedom.3
3 For a brief review of the issues and possible solutions concerning the governance of post-
immigration religious diversity see: Modood, Sealy, 2019.
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Another point deserving our attention is that the migrants’ condition of 
structural disadvantage –in its turn, a “natural” inheritance of a migratory re-
gime that has traditionally attracted a “poor” migration, useful to enter the 
lowest ladders of the occupational stratification (see again Zanfrini, 2019)– has 
amplified the perception of a social and cultural distance between migrants 
and natives. In other words, it has fed anxiety about the “diversity” embedded 
in the population with a migratory background, starting exactly from their re-
ligious diversity. Religious affiliations, particularly Islamic affiliations, have 
therefore turned to be viewed as an element of vulnerability, if not as a barrier 
inhibiting the integration process and the relations with the native popula-
tion. Not to mention that, according to available data, low levels of socio-eco-
nomic inclusion tend to be correlated with a higher involvement in religious 
practices. Lastly, the transformation of an economic process –as immigration 
was originally conceptualized– into a political process, has catapulted at the 
core of the political agenda issues and problems related with the “identity” 
(included the “religious identity”) of European societies. Not surprisingly, the 
religion of refugees has become a noticeable issue (Schmiedel, Smith, 2018), 
definitively denying the prophecy of a decline in the importance of religion in 
the public sphere that has accompanied the modernization of European soci-
eties. At the height of the refugee crisis, religion has even been identified as a 
useful filter to select, among potential asylum seekers, those individuals who 
should be able to cross the symbolic and cultural boundaries of European na-
tional communities. “Anti-migrants” actors make an open and sometimes vio-
lent use of religion in order to endorse securitarian and selective approaches 
in the management of migratory flows. What is even more embarrassing, “pro-
migrants” narrative sometimes evokes the low percentage of Muslim migrants 
as a supposed reassuring argument for public opinion, thus implicitly reaffirm-
ing the problematic character of religious diversity. All this is in line, after all, 
with the historical European approach to the subject, which has been tradi-
tionally shared by both policy makers and social researchers. As is well known, 
once confronted with the “ideal-type” of immigration country (the US), Europe 
not only has a different migration history, but it has also suffered from the dif-
ferent role and meaning traditionally attributed to religious affiliations. In the 
seminal volume Protestant, Catholic, Jew (1955), W. Herberg stated that it is pre-
cisely through religion that immigrants, and even their children and grandchil-
dren, have found an identifiable place in American life; even today, in a much 
more diversified scenario, many immigrants “become Americans” thanks to 
the participation in the religious and the community activities of churches, 
mosques and Jewish temples (Alba, 2009). Furthermore, the American popula-
tion is much more “religious” than the European population (according to 
available statistics), so as to perceive less distance from the  immigrant 
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 communities,  usually more inclined (or supposed to be more inclined) to reli-
gious practice. However, even more than the actual data, it is the interpreta-
tion that social sciences have provided that illuminates the different meaning 
of religious practice. Until recently, religiosity has been eventually depicted, by 
European social researchers, as a “refugee” and a balm for the soul, an instru-
ment to enforce intra-community solidarity and to contrast individual frustra-
tion and isolation, but also as a possible source of self-segregation, reactive 
identification, and potential conflict with the mainstream institutions. Thus, 
while in the American context many sociologists are inclined to see in reli-
gious affiliations a factor supporting integration, in Europe religiosity has often 
been described as the indicator of a lack of integration in the framework of an 
a prioristically-defined secularized society –as well as a factor negatively af-
fecting interethnic relations (the French experience is indeed typical in this 
regard)–. The same public discourse has often tended to underestimate the 
role that religious affiliations and organizations can play not only in support-
ing integration, but also in the process of identity building, by favoring the in-
ternalization of values oriented towards the common good and some peaceful 
coexistence. Finally, by reflecting the common tendency to confine religion in 
the private sphere, European studies have tended to emphasize the “bonding” 
component of the religious capital of migrants; that of the “bridging” type, 
more emphasized in the American tradition, in Europe has a potential that is 
not only underused, but also largely neglected by academic research. Just as 
much evidence of how the role of religion –and of the migrant religion nexus– 
is socially constructed.
Finally, there are several reasons behind both the misunderstanding and the 
underestimation of the role of religion in migratory and integration processes. 
However, as it will be deeply analyzed, migrants’ religious affiliations have be-
come increasingly visible also in the public space and, despite religion’s mar-
ginality in the mainstream analysis of the integration processes, religion today 
has being more and more acknowledged as a significant component in the 
construction of migrants’ individual and collective identity, in (peaceful or 
conflicting) interconnection with the other actors of society. In this way, the 
religion of migrants is set to be one of the relevant themes in the debate on the 
so-called post-secularized society.
Given this background, the study-project on which this book is based – 
Migrations and religious belongings. From the periphery to the core, for a new 
humanism– supported by Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore of Milan and 
developed in 2016–2018, has aimed to contribute to filling significant knowl-
edge gaps, and to provide both theoretical analysis and empirical evidence on 
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the relationship between migrants and religion. This phenomenon has been 
studied by using the concept of religion in its broader meaning, including:
a) individual and collective religious affiliations, belongings, beliefs, identi-
ties, and practices;
b) religious-based organizations and institutions, as well as interreligious 
initiatives;
c) religious rights’ violation, religious-based discriminations and conflicts.
Furthermore, it has been inquired by different disciplinary perspectives –from 
philosophy to law, from sociology to psychology, from political sciences to 
theology– and has been focusing on different levels of analysis –macro, meso 
and micro–. Finally, from a methodological point of view, as subsequently il-
lustrated, the study has made use of a variety of methods –including literature 
review, key-informants’ interviews, and focus groups discussion (FGDs)– de-
scribed in detail within each thematic part.
While ensuring a scientific approach to the subject, the study has been 
based on a clear cultural and ethical option: the need to acknowledge and il-
lustrate how religious-based belongings, identities, and institutions affect both 
the genesis of contemporary migrations and the development of migration 
and integration processes – and, as a further implication, the opportunity to 
activate religion-related potential in order to support migrants’ integration 
and social cohesion, as well as in order to improve the global governance of 
(forced) migrations and the efficacy of the protection system.
More in detail, two key hypotheses have encouraged the present study, and 
guided both the speculative analysis and the collection of empirical evidence.
First of all, the denial of religious rights –in its overall meaning– is one of 
the main drivers of contemporary ( forced) migration, usually in interconnec-
tion with other social, political and economic factors. The current global sce-
nario witnesses a dramatic recurrence of situations of religious rights’ viola-
tion and even of open persecution towards minority groups or single 
believers. Just to cite one of the most dramatic examples, during the time-
span of this study, the international community has helplessly witnessed the 
forced expulsion from Myanmar of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya, a 
long-standing discriminated Muslim minority. This is only one of the many 
emergencies involving religious minorities and single believers –or non-be-
lievers escaping from “pre-secularized” States–, which have been producing 
millions of displaced people, asylum seekers, and “voluntary” migrants. All 
this notwithstanding, the relationship between religion and migration choic-
es and strategies has still been studied insufficiently. More precisely, our 
 hypothesis was that the factors connected with religious affiliations and 
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 belongings play a much more significant role than what is shown by avail-
able data on refugees for religious reasons, not to mention the common (im-
proper) perception of their effective importance. Indeed, despite the growing 
concern for the religion of migrants and refugees, there is scarce evidence on 
the role it played and plays in the life of people who try to penetrate the 
European Fortress. Besides the possible shortfalls of the legislation in force, 
our hypothesis was that a multiplicity of factors concurs to a general under-
evaluation of this issue, including the existence of religious-based biases and 
anti-religious sentiments. In order to analyze this point, we have closely 
studied the situation of the contemporary Middle Eastern region, chosen as 
a representative to investigate the processes which generate (forced) migra-
tions (Part 2); as well as a clear example of how current analyses are often 
dominated by opposite understandings, unable to comprehend the “turbu-
lent” situations of Europe’s peripheries (but also unable to grasp what really 
is at stake, as suggested above). Moreover, we have collected plenty of evi-
dence from migrants who have escaped because of religious-based persecu-
tions (or, in more general terms, from migrants for whom religion has played 
a significant role both in the decision to migrate and in its subsequent devel-
opments) and from different kinds of key informants (Part 3). Finally, a se-
lected group of families, adolescents and children have been included in the 
study in order to grasp the relationship between religion and migration cul-
ture also along intergenerational links (Part 5).
Related to this latter point, the second key hypothesis at the basis of the 
study was that religious institutions, religious affiliations and religious values are 
crucial factors not only in structuring migration patterns and practices, but also 
in supporting the adaptation of newcomers –particularly in the case of ( forced) 
migrants and asylum seekers– and the integration processes of first- and second-
generation migrants –especially through the mediation of the family and faith-
based organizations (from now on: fbos)–, thus positively impacting on the 
social cohesion and the common good. Recent contributions, from sociological 
(Part 4), psychological (Part 5) and theological (Ahn, 2019) studies, offer new 
insights that help us to grasp the (positive) role of spirituality, religious belong-
ings and interreligious dialogue, thus contributing to fill the traditional knowl-
edge gap on the issue. Besides providing a systematic review of this literature, 
our study emphasizes how the emerging “post-secularized” Europe offers a re-
vitalized scenario in which to analyze their role and their future evolutionistic 
prospects. This hypothesis has been tested through different kinds of analyses, 
focused on migrants and asylum seekers (Part 3), families (Part 5), fbos 
(Part 4) and public schools (Part 6).
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As explained in detail in the remaining chapters of Part 1, the discussion on 
these two hypotheses has been conducted in the light of a philosophical, socio-
logical, and judicial theoretical framework which provides suggestions for:
a) a perspective to “deinstrumentalize religion” and to “rehumanize” mi-
grants and asylum seekers (Chapter 2);
b) the unexpected vitality of the religious phenomenon currently emerging 
as a result of a continuous intersection of long processes and secularizing 
influences, as well as of responses reacting to those processes and those 
influences, not without new dilemmas and conflict (Chapter 3);
c) the opportunities and the limitations that follow the interpretation of 
the relationship between the violation of religious rights and the status 
of protection granted by international judicial and quasi-judicial organs 
(Chapter 4).
2 The Book’s Content
The book is articulated in six parts, each composed of four chapters (except for 
Part 6, which is composed of five chapters).
Part 1 (Migrations and Religious Belongings: from Periphery to Core, for a New 
Humanism), after the general description of the study’s aims and contents, and 
the presentation of its provisional conclusions (object of the present Chapter 1), 
illustrates the philosophical, socio-cultural, and legislative frames that consti-
tute the research background.
Chapter 2 starts with a description of the unethical ambivalence of the dom-
inant narratives about migration and (forced) displacement. On the one hand, 
refugees are criminalized and targeted as a threat to border security. On the 
other hand, counter-narratives portray refugees as innocent, vulnerable vic-
tims. The paradox is that these two stereotyped images of (forced) displace-
ment are two faces of the same unethical process of dehumanization: in both 
cases, refugees are the objects of other people’s interpretations and actions. 
Moreover, in this process of dehumanization, religion is often politicized and 
plays an instrumental role in justifying two opposite narratives and political 
solutions. Given this picture, the author develops the proposal of a new “ethics 
of hospitality”, based on two conditions: (a) de-instrumentalizing religion, in 
order to analyze the real, multi-dimensional role of religion in refugees’ experi-
ence (as both a root cause of displacement and as a source of resiliency and 
support); (b) returning refugees their human subjectivity, which means en-
abling them to express their subjective outlook on their own experience of 
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(forced) displacement and on the importance of their religious belonging. The 
political effect of this “post-secular” hospitality is a discursive act that creates a 
public space, where social ties can be (re-)built. Religion, in this context of re-
humanization, can be an integral part of refugees’ public space making, along 
four main lines of research:
1) identity, which focuses on the individual and collective processes of (re-)
shaping some forms of self-definition, based on religious beliefs and 
values;
2) religious freedom, which legitimizes the pluralistic involvement of (reli-
gious) identities in public life;
3) citizenship, which is not tied to rigid national territoriality, but includes 
fluidity of borders and multiple (religious) identities and loyalties;
4) common good, i.e. a multi-religious social capital, generated by the new 
citizens and their desire to participate in their new society of 
settlement.
Moving from the perspective of the sociology of religion, Chapter 3 intends to 
outline the main characteristics of the so-called (European) “post-secular soci-
ety”. Although a vast literature from the second half of the 20th century an-
nounced the imminent end of the religious phenomenon, in Europe –as well 
as in other regions of the world– a different scenario has been unfolding: reli-
gion is still present, even if it is in crisis, as it has increasingly been relegated to 
the intimate sphere and set free from institutional set-ups, reinvented in con-
tent and contaminated by secularization factors. Moreover, in many cases, this 
presence is strengthened precisely in relation to the migration phenomenon.
Consequently, the European scenario cannot be explained by simply choos-
ing between two options: “secularization versus non-secularization”. There is a 
much more articulated and complex picture, certainly from a geographical 
and national point of view, but in general also because of the singular forms it 
assumes: these elements are the result of a continuous intersection of secular-
izing thrusts and responses that oppose them –not without this leading to new 
dilemmas and, sometimes, to real conflicts–. It is therefore evident that we are 
living in a different time than that defined as completely “secularized”. As a 
matter of fact, the post-secular society constitutes the socio-cultural context 
which migrants enter when arriving in Europe, often bearing forms of religious 
belonging considered to be significant for the construction of their identity in 
interconnection with the other actors of society, whether it is a peaceful or 
conflictual interconnection.
Finally, Chapter 4, authored by two law scholars, aims to verify the relation-
ship between the right to freedom of religion and the status of refugee consid-
ering, in particular, the applications of these institutes given by the interna-
tional judicial and quasi-judicial organs.
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Freedom of religion is a fundamental right recognized in many acts within 
international and European law. It includes the right for everyone to have, to 
change and to manifest one’s religion. Serious violations of this right could be 
ascertained as a form of persecution, thus giving rise to the possibility, for 
those who escape from places where this right is not respected, to obtain the 
recognition of the status of refugee, according to the Geneva Convention of 
1951, and to the EU directive 2011/95/EU concerning the recognition of interna-
tional protection to refugees. However, following the pronouncements of the 
European Court of Human Rights and of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, a violation of freedom of religion or belief does not automatically grant 
the right to receive protection, which is obligatorily reserved only to those in-
dividuals who are exposed to serious breaches of their fundamental rights. Fi-
nally, as clearly illustrated by the empirical study presented in Part 3, the 
“space” of religion within the system of international protection is subject of 
different interpretations and negotiations.
Part 2 (Where (Forced) Migrations Are Generated) focuses the attention on 
one of the most turbulent word-wide regions, which is particularly explanato-
ry with reference to the study’s main topics.
The multiple crises that, especially from 2001 onward, inflamed the wider 
Middle East dramatically altered the geopolitical equilibriums of a region that 
has always played a crucial role in the international arena. Affected by height-
ening levels of violence and widespread destabilization, the area became in-
creasingly associated with processes of radicalization and socio-political frag-
mentation destined to redefine the very foundations of a system whose roots 
can be traced back to the end of the Great War. The arch of crises that came to 
bisect the region largely contributed to project the image of a Middle Eastern 
region “endemically” marred by divisions and instability and destined to be 
partitioned according to apparently undeniable ethno-sectarian fault lines. In 
this framework, Middle East ethno-linguistic and religious diversity has be-
come the focal point of two different and opposite arguments. On the one 
hand, diversity has been considered as the victim of the rising polarization, 
manipulated and politicized in order to impose a specific political agenda. On 
the other, it has been listed as one of the drivers or sources of present instabil-
ity in a region experiencing its own Thirty Years’ War, as Europe did in the 16th 
century.
The authors of Chapter 5, thanks to their specific background as experts in the 
contemporary history of the Middle East, aim to maintain distance from both 
understandings, reconsidering the contemporary history of the Middle East and 
of state- and nation-building process in the region according to the image of 
multiple geographies. Instead of proposing once again the idea of the Middle 
East as a mosaic, the chapter aims to offer an account of the role of  diversity 
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in the region. Through the idea of multiple geographies, the chapter explains 
why diversity in the Middle East has always played a crucial role. Middle East 
does not stand out only for its diversity per se, but because the features that com-
pose and define its diversity and “multi-vocality” often strongly intertwine and 
overlap, thus giving birth to social fabrics that are far more complex and 
branched than usually represented. In this spirit, the analysis ends by showing 
how a more precise understanding of the Middle East’s diversity, of its signifi-
cance and its role can help to demystify today’s sectarian narratives and tackle 
instability and violence in the region.
This perspective is paradigmatically developed in Chapter 6, whose aim is to 
offer a dynamic account of Christians’ presence in the Middle East, of their con-
tribution and position in the contemporary history of the region. In this regard, 
the historical vicissitude of the Coptic community is helpful to focus more 
clearly on the challenges, issues and ambitions that have influenced Christians’ 
historical vicissitudes from the beginning of the contemporary state- and 
nation- building process in the contemporary Middle East until today. Firstly, 
the chapter focuses on the multi-vocal dimension of the Christian presence in 
the Middle East – a feature that needs to be taken into account to fully under-
stand its position and condition within the different States in the region; the 
study helps to reconsider how the interplay between international, regional and 
local interests affected and shaped the political and institutional presence of 
Christians within the region. Then the authors analyze the dynamics of sectar-
ian violence and persecution of Christians in the Middle East. In particular, they 
focus on contemporary Egypt, from the 1950s until the 2011 Uprisings, taking the 
specific case of the Egyptian Christian Copts (also the subject of the qualitative 
study presented in the Part 5 of the book) as a case study.
The remaining chapters of Part 2 offer a general picture of cultural orienta-
tions in the Middle East and a special focus on attitudes about women’s role.
Chapter 7, authored by a researcher with long experience in the study of 
societal values and world-views, provides a sociological analysis of data pro-
duced by the Arab Barometer. This latter constitutes an important source for 
monitoring the cultural and social dynamics in the countries of the region, 
since it provides longitudinal surveys supporting comparisons over a long time 
frame (from 2006 to 2018) in 14 Arab-speaking countries. The data that emerges 
shows what the heterogeneous Arab public thinks about key issues related to 
social coexistence, among which religious beliefs and belongings have a funda-
mental relevance. Beyond the official representations of the strong relations 
between religion and the political system inside the Arab countries, the focus 
of this contribution is to check how people perceive their religious affiliations, 
in order to understand their level of openness toward different religious 
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 identities, and so far toward a more tolerant and pacific coexistence. Some 
people’s attitudes give support to this desirable transition, but many other 
changes ought to happen inside civil laws and political system.
Chapter 8 focuses on the interpretation of Shariʿa law in relation to women’s 
rights in countries of the Middle East and North Africa (mena). In particular, 
the study deals with the transformation of people’s beliefs and values as far as 
the role of women over the Arab Uprisings of 2011 is concerned. These have of-
ten been considered, especially by Western observers, as drivers of social 
change leading to democratization processes that would enhance the value of 
equality. In addition to the theoretical review of the topic, the study provides 
empirical evidence of different forms of feminism existing in this region. By 
using data from the Arab Barometer (2010, 2018) and the Arab Transformation 
Project (2014), the study combines elements of secularization versus radicaliza-
tion in people’s support for Shariʿa and for women’s rights. It also aims to define 
four typologies of feminism, which are differently distributed across countries: 
Islamism, Islamic Reformism, Islamic feminism, and Secular Feminism.
Parts 3–6 are devoted to presenting and discussing the empirical evidence 
collected during the study. With few exceptions, the data presented refer to It-
aly. Two major aspects make the country an interesting place in which to ana-
lyze the role of religion in migratory and integration processes. Firstly, as it is 
well known, the country is one of the most involved in the recent refugee crisis, 
as well as in the violent debate based on the two opposite narratives described 
above. Since it is one of the main European countries of first arrival, according 
to the highly disputed “Dublin agreement”, it plays a very critical role in the 
evaluation of asylum demands, that is on defining the distinction between vol-
untary and forced migrants. Incidentally, that the assessment procedures are 
presumed to be highly discretionary has contributed to the recent –and vio-
lently discussed– frequent and opposing legislative reforms. Secondly, Italy is 
commonly portrayed as a Catholic country, and until recently it has had a rela-
tively homogeneous population from a religious point of view; this circum-
stance makes it the ideal place to analyze the transition towards an increas-
ingly heterogeneous society, also population from a religious point of view. The 
same reception system is here described as a space strongly challenged by this 
evolution; a space in which it is possible to detect the emergence of prejudices 
on a religious basis, but also to experience the coexistence of people of differ-
ent religions; to analyze individual spiritual needs, but also the importance of 
educating people about  religious pluralism, understood as a constitutive con-
dition of a democratic society.
The aim of Part 3 (The Religion’s Dimension in the Trajectories of (Forced) Mi-
grants Directed to Italy) is to explore the role of religion as a root cause of 
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(forced) migrations addressed to Italy, as well the “place” of religion in the con-
text of the Italian asylum seekers’ reception system.
Chapter 9 –written by an influential member of the Italian association of 
immigration lawyers–, traces the legislative and procedural framework in force 
in Italy, which was the object of recent significant changes, some of which di-
rectly impact on the issues here discussed. Moreover, it examines the disci-
pline of the religious dimension of everyone’s life, which can also be applied to 
the foreigners who have been forced to migrate to Italy (and, of course, who 
have voluntarily chosen to migrate). In particular, in addition to the descrip-
tion of the legislation on the prevention and combating of discrimination, the 
chapter focuses on the legislative rules about the State’s relations with the dif-
ferent religious denominations, as well as on some crucial aspects of family 
law, school legislation –for the part that concerns the teaching of religion (a 
topic that will then be deepened in the empirical study presented in Part 6 of 
the volume)–, and the discipline of religious assistance in health facilities and 
prisons. Throughout the chapter, the presentation of current legislation is en-
riched by the reporting of pertinent jurisprudential judgments.
Chapters 10, 11 and 12 present the results of original research, based on data 
and suggestions from different sources: five fgds, which have globally involved 
around 40 key informants (selected among executives, officials and operators 
of the reception system for asylum seekers; spiritual leaders and pastoral 
agents of different religions; representatives of Italian and international orga-
nizations and associations involved in the reception of asylum seekers; manag-
ers and members of the assessment commissions for asylum applications; lo-
cal administrators; executives and officials of police stations and prefectures); 
six semi-structured interviews with religious leaders and pastoral operators 
belonging to different Catholic organizations involved in the reception of mi-
grants and asylum seekers; 20 in-depth interviews with migrants and asylum 
seekers who, regardless of the entry channel and of their current legal status, 
have been significantly influenced by their religious belongings, with regard to 
both their decision to migrate and the development of migration and insertion 
processes.
Chapter 10, after a general introduction to the role of religious belongings 
and institutions as both push and pull factors in the Italian immigration ex-
perience, focuses on the role of religion as a factor contributing to defining 
the distinction between forced and voluntary migrations. Moving from the 
current political and ethical debate about the increasing “porosity” of this 
distinction, the author –thanks to her rich experience in the field of migra-
tion studies– discusses how the evidence from the fieldwork can help to de-
scribe and understand the role of the two key concepts represented by 
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 Religious Identity and Religious Liberty. Furthermore, on the basis of the tes-
timonies provided by the interviewed migrants and the key experts, the 
chapter offers a classification of cases in which religion turns out to be a di-
rect or indirect cause of migration.
Chapter 11 is devoted to analyzing the role of religion within the procedure 
for the scrutiny of asylum applications. Given the legislative framework in 
force in Italy, the author discusses how the actual implementation of rules and 
procedures allows (or does not allow) for the emergence and the acknowledg-
ment of those aspects variously connected with asylum seekers’ religious be-
longings. Here, religiosity has emerged as both an obscured and a sensitive 
issue.
Thirdly, Chapter 12 explores the “space” dedicated to the religious dimension 
and to the spiritual needs of migrants, also during the delicate phase of first 
reception and re-elaboration of the migratory distress. Thanks to the involve-
ment of a theology scholar as co-author, the chapter also investigates the 
“functions” and meanings that (forced) migrants for religious reasons attribute 
to religion and spirituality, seen both in their individual and communitarian 
declinations. Finally, following the approach suggested in Chapter 2, through a 
de-instrumentalization of religion and the acknowledgment of migrants’ hu-
man subjectivity, the authors discuss the results of the study through the con-
cepts of identity, religious freedom, citizenship, and common good.
Part 4 (Religion, Faith-Based Organizations, Integration and Social Cohesion) 
is devoted to exploring the relationship among religion, fbos, migrants’ inte-
gration and social cohesion through different levels of analysis: a critical re-
view of European social research on this subject; a qualitative sociological 
study on a selected sample of fbos; a theological reflection about the role of 
interreligious dialogue; and a “chronicle” of the Synod recently launched by 
the world’s largest Catholic Diocese, solicited by its demographic transforma-
tion into a multi-ethnic and multi-religious social space.
Chapter 13 provides a critical review of the international sociological litera-
ture, focusing the attention on the role of religion as a factor that hampers or 
fosters migrants’ integration. As it is largely acquired –and as we have already 
observed–, this issue has been tackled through rather opposite perspectives in 
Europe and in the US – taking the latter as a paradigmatic immigration coun-
try. Moving from the analysis of this divergent path and of its historical and 
social reasons, the chapter focuses on the European approach, which has tra-
ditionally understood religion as a barrier to integration. The authors examine 
how migrants’ religion has been approached by European social researchers, 
and highlight the circular dynamic interlinking this approach with public 
opinion’s concerns. Finally, the chapter hints at some recent trends in the 
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 European discourse on religion and integration. These trends mostly regard 
policy-making practices and, to a certain extent, applied social sciences – also 
as an answer to recent phenomena of religious radicalization, which has en-
couraged a rethink of the role of religion and fbos in integration processes.
Chapter 14 –authored by sociologists with expertise in the field of non-profit 
organizations and civil society’s initiatives– focuses on the migrants’ reception 
practices offered by a selected sample of fbos, mainly located in Italy. The 
analyses, performed on four qualitative case studies, show the difficulty of 
bringing out the theme of religious persecution as one of the explicit motives 
that led to the migration choice. Despite such critical point, the authors show 
how the empirical findings lend support to the claim that the religious dimen-
sion affects the migratory processes in different modes.
Chapter 15, authored by the Under-Secretary of the Refugees and Migrants 
Section, Dicastery for the Promotion of Integral Human Development of the 
Holy See, offers a series of suggestions concerning the potential role of religion 
in the governance of human mobility. Mainly based on the analysis of docu-
ments produced by Catholic Church’s teaching and on the personal experience 
of the author –who has performed his pastoral mission in different regions of 
the world–, this chapter moves from a basic assumption: because of the very 
fact that a vast majority of the world population declare adherence to a given 
religion, the governance of human mobility, as well as any other political pro-
cess, should include religion as an essential component of human well-being 
and self-achievement. The presumed superiority of laicism and the political-
ideological instrumentalization of religion have helped to dispute the rele-
vance of religion in human achievement, and to expel it from the public sphere. 
While facing this scenario, it is imperative that religion regains its fundamental 
role. Moreover, according to the author, since different religious traditions of-
fer an inestimable patrimony of values and principles, it would be desirable to 
look into them in order to build a common platform for a global ethic. Finally, 
beyond the role that religions and fbos play in supporting migrants in their 
processes of mobility and integration, the inclusion of religions in the public 
space and debate can help to identify and disseminate principles and values 
indispensable to guarantee peaceful cohabitation.
Chapter 16 (co-authored by the book’s editor and the president of the commis-
sion in charge of the coordination of the 2018 “Synod from the Peoples”), pro-
vides a selection of the suggestions that emerged from the consultative phase of 
this pioneer initiative promoted by the Archdiocese of Milan. The empirical 
base of the analysis, then, consists of reports, consultations, fgds, and bottom-
up contributions collected from the local Church and its various institutions and 
stakeholders (among which are parishes, religious orders, associations, chari-
ties, public schools, and individual citizens, including non-believers).
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Launched immediately after the peak of the refugee crisis, which invested 
Milan with the arrival of thousands of asylum seekers, the Synod aimed to sup-
port an evolution of the local Church, in line with the tremendous transforma-
tion of the demographic composition of the diocesan space. As stressed by the 
authors, from a Catholic perspective the Synod can be understood as a “pro-
phetic enterprise”, as much as the social transformation of the city can be ap-
proached as a “prophetic challenge”.
More in detail, the growing presence of Muslims represents both an iden-
tity challenge and a chance for the development of interreligious dialogue, 
just as the presence of many Christian Orthodox believers constitutes a spiri-
tual challenge and a chance for the development of ecumenism; lastly, the 
significant number of Catholics with a migratory background embodies both 
a pastoral challenge and a chance to develop a self-reflective ability. To sum it 
up, it is by managing these challenges and chances that the Milanese Church 
– as well as any other local Church– will be able to fulfill its authentic “catho-
licity”, while positioning itself in the global society and in the universal 
Church.
As previously reported, according to the study’s initial assumptions, the 
family represents –together with fbos– a crucial medium through which reli-
gion contributes to structuring migration and integration practices. Part 5 of 
the book (Migrations, Intergenerational Relations and Families), deals with this 
topic, once again through both theoretical and empirical contents.
Chapter 17 provides a critical review of the sociological and psychological 
literature devoted to religion in families’ migratory history, and more specifi-
cally to the intergenerational transmission of (religious) values and practices. 
Two macro-themes emerge from international literature and empirical inqui-
ries: the relationship between family and society and the dynamics within gen-
erations. The main themes that emerge, and the challenges migrant families 
face in the relationship with the younger generation, are then re-proposed.
The following chapters of this part (Chapters 18, 19, and 20) focus on the par-
adigmatic case of Coptic families belonging to the Diaspora community “es-
caped” from Egypt to Italy. Indeed, despite the relevance of the Christian Dias-
pora in the world, little scholarly attention has been paid to Middle Eastern 
Christians’ migration to Europe, in particular to the Coptic Diaspora in Europe. 
This circumstance makes the study particularly suggestive.
Chapter 18, substantially based on a literature review and a desk analysis (and 
on the research background of the author, who is an expert in the field of Afri-
can and Diaspora studies), provides the basic information and analysis regard-
ing the history and the characters of the Coptic Diaspora in Italy, which today 
is supposed to represent around 70,000 people scattered along the  territory – 
the exact number remains quite obscure partly because of the  religious 
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 menaces and attacks received by those who migrated from Egypt. The majority 
are concentrated around the Milan area, where our study has been developed. 
The role of this religious community is very important: the Copts not only give 
aid to their parishioners, but they also offer shelter to local communities, valo-
rizing the churches and the territories where they pray and live. The chapter 
tries to give a short overview of the presence of this religious community, with 
testimonies from its exponents.
Chapter 19, authored by two experts in the field of social psychology of the 
family, aims to explore how Coptic Orthodox families who migrated from Egypt 
to Italy define and negotiate their identity within the resettlement society. Ten 
households and 30 people (10 fathers, 10 mothers, and 10 adolescent children) 
were involved in the study and gave their views through in-depth semi- 
structured interviews. Thematic analysis carried out on the interview tran-
scripts allowed several themes to be identified, thus revealing the complexity 
that characterizes Coptic families’ post-migration experience in Italy: the ac-
culturative challenges faced by parents and children, parental norms and ex-
pectations, the role played by the Churches in sustaining heritage identity and 
faith across generations, not to mention the meaning associated with Chris-
tians’ persecution, martyrdom, and migration.
Even rarer are studies specifically addressed to minors with a (forced) mi-
gratory background. Trying to fill this gap, Chapter 20 illustrates and dis-
cusses the results of a qualitative study based on four fgds with Coptic 
minors living in Milan, both Orthodox and Catholic. A total of 18 adoles-
cents were involved in the research, daughters and sons of Egyptian parents 
who migrated to Italy because of harsh conditions in their home country, 
characterized –according to their storytelling– by discriminations, inequity 
and violence against Christians. Moving from the developmental and inter-
cultural psychology’s perspective, the authors depict a portrait of their psy-
chological needs, expectations, and hitches. The condition of being a mi-
grant child is often burdensome, especially in the case of (forced) migration, 
and the combined effects of this experience can lead to problematic conse-
quences for the mental health of minors and for the parent–child interac-
tion. The study aims to identify the acculturative challenges faced by these 
minors, and the role played by Churches in sustaining heritage identity and 
faith across generations.
Part 6 (Religious Diversity in Italian Schools) deals with the multi-ethnic 
and multi-religious transformation of Italian public schools, and with the 
role of religious education. Religious diversity is a largely neglected topic in 
educational studies, despite the fact that education is one of the most sen-
sitive fields engaged with religion. The latter represents a crucial resource 
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for many  immigrants, but can also be a source of conflict, and is sometimes 
perceived –as we have already observed– as a threat for European cohesion 
and identity, with an intuitive impact on the school space. Drawing from 
this ambivalent scenario, this part investigates the role of religion in multi-
cultural schools.
By exploring the nexus immigration-religion-education, the study has 
aimed to update our understanding of the Italian situation, often stereotypi-
cally depicted as a mono-confessional environment, fairly reluctant to recog-
nize pluralism. The whole study, authored by experts in the field of sociology 
of education, was based on 14 fgds, globally involving 69 adults (teachers, 
schools’ managers and students’ parents) and 74 minor students. The partici-
pation of different generations and ethnic groups has offered the opportunity 
to compare diverse points of view on religious diversity, religious belonging, 
and religious freedom in public school, and to identify strategies to prevent 
and resolve religious conflicts.
Chapter 21 discusses some institutional, relational and strategic issues re-
lated to the religious dimension in so-defined “plural” schools. The role of 
 religions within public schooling is presented, together with the “space” of reli-
gion education in the contemporary frame of multi-ethnicity. The chapter also 
includes a general appraisal of the European and Italian legislative and cultur-
al frame on the subject. Finally, the author presents the different approaches 
to prevent and contrast religious conflicts involving students and parents with 
different religious backgrounds, and the methods for enhancing intercultural 
and interreligious dialogue.
In Chapter 22, by focusing on the basic concepts of religious freedom and 
citizenship, the author explores youth religious beliefs, spirituality and athe-
ism in a context of “weak secularization” and illustrates how the school can be 
deemed a public space to test religious plurality. The latter is portrayed as a 
deep challenge to the school, intended as a secular and open place, and as 
producing opposite reactions, from neutralization of religion to the promotion 
of its cultural dimensions. Finally, interreligious and intercultural dialogue are 
proposed as a training ground for democratic citizenship, since issues that 
were thought to have been secularized –finding a peaceful solution in the dif-
ferentiation of private, civil and religious spheres– come back in the school 
debate (e.g.: how protecting the right to freedom of expression, which are the 
boundary of parental authority over children’s education).
Chapter 23 faces the issue of interreligious conflicts and integration in multi-
cultural schools. After a description of the state of art emerging from the inter-
national literature, the author illustrates the hypotheses of the research and 
then describes and discusses the study’s results related to some specific topics. 
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Interreligious conflicts are analyzed from the point of view of adults (teachers, 
school managers, parents), as well as from the students’ point of view. School 
narrative about religious radicalism is also analyzed, together with the role of 
religion in the integration process in schools.
The last section of this part, compiled thanks to the involvement of re-
searchers based in France and Spain, explores the question of religions and 
laïcité in the French republican school (Chapter 24) and the manner through 
which Spanish public schools cope with the multi-religiosity and religious 
freedom of students and school professionals (Chapter 25).
3 From the Periphery to the Core: Key Issues and Provisional 
Conclusions
As can be gleaned from the description of the content of the single chapters, 
our study has provided a rich collection of both speculative analysis and em-
pirical evidence in order to improve our knowledge of the role of religion in 
the genesis of contemporary (forced) migrations and as a relevant (supportive) 
variable in the processes of migration and integration in the society of destina-
tion, particularly through the mediation of the family, the school, and fbos. In 
this section, we will discuss some of the key issues emerging from the whole 
project, and we will offer some provisional conclusions, articulating them ac-
cording to the theoretical schema described in Chapter 2, that is assuming re-
ligion as an integral part of migrants’ and refugees’ public space making, along 
four main concepts: identity, religious freedom, citizenship, and common 
good.
Confirming our initial hypotheses, the study has revealed that not only does 
the understanding of these issues suffer from their extraordinary complexity 
and from still insufficient research investments; but a widespread ideological 
bias has traditionally prevented adequate analysis of and understanding of 
the role of religion within migration and interethnic coexistence. If this is true 
at general level, it is even more pertinent in the case of Europe, for reasons re-
lated to both its historical relationship with immigration and its self-represen-
tation in terms of a secularized society.
Concerning the first point, an initial option for the “temporary labor model” 
–characterized by a “reluctance” toward accepting the prospective of migrants’ 
stable settlement– has marked European attitudes toward migration (Zanfrini, 
2019). To the point that the contemporary multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
society can be understood as an unexpected (and largely unwelcomed) out-
come, due to the normative and institutional foundations of the European 
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 democracies, which impose serious limits on governments’ ability to restrict 
immigration and immigrants’ rights (including the right to settle permanently, 
to reunite family members, and to ask for asylum) (see, among others: Corne-
lius et al., 1994; Hampshire, 2013).
Concerning the second point (Chapter 3), the concept of secularization –
which since the late 1800s, was strongly endorsed by European sociologists– 
has until recently benefited from an undisputed hegemony. The theses of a 
progressive decline (and of a final disappearance) of the religious phenome-
non has strongly influenced both the scientific and the political approach to 
the issue, particularly encouraging religion retreat from the public sphere. 
What is more, this assumption has deeply affected the manner in which both 
social sciences and politics have approached the issue of migrants’ religiosity 
(Chapters 3, 13, and 17).
As analytically described in the following parts of the book, in the context 
of contemporary “post-secular” Europe, renewed attention to the role of reli-
gion, even within the public sphere, characterizes the social sciences and en-
courages civil society’s activism. Across European countries, both institutions 
(at different levels) and civil society have started considering religious leaders 
and communities as potential allies in facilitating integration and in promot-
ing social cohesion, thus possibly getting past the idea that religion is intrinsi-
cally an obstacle to integration. This, in turn, may open further directions for 
research, producing a rapprochement with the American experience, tradi-
tionally more attentive to the bridging function carried out by religion and 
religious organizations (Chapter 13), as we have already pointed out. Within 
this promising scenario, our study –conceived to enhance academic and po-
litical debate on the ethical implications of contemporary migratory policies 
and practices– has actually been based on a clear cultural option: the opportu-
nity to give evidence and illustrate how religious-based belongings, identities, 
and institutions affect both the genesis of contemporary migrations, and the 
development of migration and integration processes. As a further implication, 
the researchers involved share the belief about the opportunity to activate re-
ligions-related potential in order to manage migrations and support migrants’ 
integration and social cohesion. This clear set of values has not invalidated the 
academic nature of the results, although it has certainly guided the choice of 
themes, problems and possible developments on which to focus attention.
The study was conceived in 2015, at the height of the largest refugee crisis 
that Europe has had to face since the end of World War ii. Besides other con-
sequences, our continent has been challenged by the question of (re)defining 
the “borders” of forced mobility (Chapter 10), in order to distinguish between 
“true” and “bogus” asylum seekers – this operation, in its turn, is fundamental 
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in order to guarantee the political and financial sustainability of the reception 
system, which faces mounting public concern. As described in Chapter 4, in-
ternational and European law clearly establishes that the right of freedom of 
religion or belief covers a very wide number of situations and can be limited 
only in few cases; however, this legislation does not automatically protect ev-
erybody who cannot effectively exercise this right in the country of origin, and 
who decides, for this reason, to migrate abroad. Therefore, to choose who must 
be welcomed and protected represents an extraordinary challenge, in both po-
litical and ethical terms. What is more, religious-based claims (or potential 
claims) are an extraordinary litmus test for analyzing the capacity of our pro-
tection systems to remain faithful to the principles on which European democ-
racies are funded.
This study makes clear that (see in particular Part 3) reception and protec-
tion systems are certainly ruled by a detailed legislative discipline, as meticu-
lously described in Chapter 9. However, these systems are also embedded in a 
particular socio-cultural and political context, which results to be strongly in-
fluenced by negative and positive bias about the role of religion, particularly 
when the latter is related to the migration phenomenon.
Today, dominant narratives about religious seekers are prisoners of anti-
thetical ambivalences, as illustrated in Chapter 2: on one hand, migrants and 
refugees are criminalized and targeted as a dangerous threat to border security, 
particularly if they are “religiously others”. On the other hand, they are por-
trayed as helpless and passive victims, particularly if they are allegedly perse-
cuted for religious (anti-Christians) motives. According to our interpretation, 
these two stereotyped narratives are the two faces of the same unethical pro-
cess of dehumanization; what is more, in this process of dehumanization, reli-
gion is often politicized and plays an instrumental part in justifying the oppo-
site narratives. In order to overcome this unethical paradox, two conditions are 
needed.  Firstly, we need to de-instrumentalize religion and analyze the real, 
multi- dimensional role of religion in refugees’ experience: the role as a root 
cause of displacement, in the countries of departure; and the role as a source 
of resiliency and as a key factor, which can both facilitate (and eventually ham-
per) integration processes in the countries of arrival. Secondly, we need to give 
back to the refugees their human subjectivity, which means enabling them “to 
enter the discourse” and express their subjective outlook on their own experi-
ence of (forced) displacement and on the importance of their religious 
belonging.
As we have already illustrated, these conditions have been tested through 
both theoretical analysis and a rich spectrum of original empirical evi-
dence collected thanks to this study. In what follows, we will anticipate and 
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discuss some of the key points emerged, organizing the examination around 
our four main lines of research.
3.1 Identity
As we have already illustrated, during the recent and dramatic refugee crisis, 
the issue of religious identity has been frequently evoked as a reason to protect 
“Europe” from arrivals depicted as a menace for “our way of life”. While millions 
of (Christian) faithful are everyday engaged in welcoming asylum seekers and 
migrants, “anti-migrants” actors, in a more and more explicit manner, use reli-
gious symbols as strong argument to endorse securitarian migration policies, 
as well as discriminatory schemes for the access to welfare provision and to 
religious rights (for example, when it comes to hindering the construction of 
mosques and minarets). As a matter of fact, their arguments are in line with 
the contemporary tendency to “culturalize” religion, intended here as a strate-
gy to restrict rights and opportunities of non-Christian groups, while formally 
maintaining the liberal State’s commitment to neutrality in religious matters 
(Chapter 3, §4.2; Brubaker, 2016).
All this sounds paradoxical: not only because this kind of solution is difficult 
to reconcile with basic Christian principles (epitomized in the expression “I 
was a stranger and you welcomed me”); but also because, according to existing 
estimations,4 Europe is the only continent in which the number of Christian 
faithful is expected to decrease in the coming years. More than the growing of 
the Muslim community –through new arrivals and new births–, it is the de-
creasing percentage of “native” Europeans who define themselves as Chris-
tians that will provoke a new equilibrium in the religious composition of the 
European population. In this landscape, the concept of religious identity clear-
ly risks being emptied of its religious content, and reduced to a cultural con-
struct and an instrumental argument (Roy, 2019).
Academic reflection on this topic is clearly aware of this tendency, which is 
not really resolved by the emerging post-secular scenario (Chapter 3). Our 
study offers a complementary perspective from which to analyze the phenom-
enon, looking at asylum seekers and migrants as subjects able to challenge the 
concept of religious identity, in both its individual and collective declination.
In line with the first theoretical premise, our study has illustrated the pros-
pect of de-instrumentalizing religion, by choosing the Middle East region as a 
representative place to analyze a “super-diverse” society from an ethno- 
linguistic and a religious point of view; as well as a region endemically 




 plural composition. The regional socio-political spectrum is here described 
(Chapter 5) as the result of multiple geographies of power which have histori-
cally subordinated the role of civic society and of any form of autonomous or-
ganizations. According to our interpretation, the entropic spread of violence 
that destabilizes today’s Middle East, threatening the survival of its popula-
tions beyond religious or ethnic affiliations –and producing large flows of 
(forced) migrants–, can be understood without the need for subscribing to a 
culturalist approach, that is the idea of an intrinsically anarchic Middle East 
shaped by primordial identities. On the contrary, it is the most recent manifes-
tation of a matrix, established at the turn of the 20th century, which has fos-
tered a struggle for authority and legitimacy taking place at intra- and inter-
state levels. In this framework, the controversial spread of sectarian violence 
and its destructive effects over the wider Middle East have to be considered as 
an integral part of an historical continuum whose roots cannot be tracked to 
the beginning of the 21th century alone, and that have further been exacerbat-
ed by competing geopolitical agendas. Accordingly, the exploitation of sectar-
ian forms of violence represents other forms of struggle for supremacy within 
national and supranational political fields, where the religious, along with 
other features, have become particularly manipulated for developing new po-
litical meaning out of the regional multiple geographies. Egypt, the sending 
country of the Coptic Diaspora in Italy studied in the Part 5 of the book, is a 
case in point. Indeed, within the multi-vocal character of this country, even 
Christians are not at all a homogenous subject, not even where they suffer a 
condition of minority and oppression (Chapter 6). Local, regional and denomi-
national distinctions make them a plural presence, as well as a living testimony 
of a two-thousand history of a religion embodied in the true life of peoples and 
communities. By renouncing to acknowledge this plural composition – and 
essentializing their condition of fragility and discrimination (and their inevi-
table emigration)– we risk stereotyping their faith as an impediment to full 
integration into a socio-political fabric inspired by Islam. On the other hand, 
according to a second type of common narrative, Christians are invested with 
the role of mediators in conflicts and crisis, thus making their Muslim neigh-
bors aware of the usefulness of their presence. In both cases, Christians’ iden-
tity is denied, together with its “multi-vocal” character, which implies that each 
voice possesses a distinctive ecclesiastical identity, biography and local history 
to tell. On the contrary, it is exactly their presence that expresses the history, 
and the identity, of their countries; to the point that some components of the 
Christian population exactly refuse to be identified as a “minority”, since they 
consider themselves as a constitutive part of historic Egypt. Moreover, since 
the 1980s, Christians in Egypt have elaborated new theological thinking and 
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understanding about their minority condition and conflict and crisis in the 
region, bringing them to the conclusion that they are not religions that have 
provoked Middle Eastern instability, but the lack of social justice and the po-
litical struggle.
In line with the second basic theoretical premise –that is, the need to give 
back to the migrants their human subjectivity– a central part of our study has 
consisted in the collection of a significant number of interviews with (forced) 
migrants. This prospect is also in line with the Global Approach on Migration 
and Mobility (gamm) –the overarching framework of the European Union’s 
external migration policy– and its migrant-centered approach thus synthe-
sized: “In essence, migration governance is not about ‘flows’, ‘stocks’ and 
‘routes’, it is about people. In order to be relevant, effective and sustainable, 
policies must be designed to respond to the aspirations and problems of the 
people concerned” (European Commission, 2011: 6).
“From flows to people”: we have decided to take this fundamental shift seri-
ously, and that is why our study has strongly emphasized the role of migrants’ 
narratives – as well of a “lived religion”, unavoidably shaped by a multiplicity of 
biographical variables (Cadge, Howard Ecklund, 2007). We are aware of the 
methodological and ethical problems involved in “listening” to migrants’ voic-
es. As Bhabha suggests, “it’s never adequate to say their voices must be heard as 
voices, because none of their voices is just an innocent voice, their voices are 
mediated through the dialogue they have with the questioner, through their 
own sense of what it means to represent themselves, through their own ideolo-
gies, so they are also framed voices, if you like, and produced voices. But, in just 
that sense, they are testimonies of the construction of a changing identity, of a 
changing polity, of a changing transnational community” (Bhabha, 1994: 199). 
This kind of testimonies are exactly the concrete empirical results arising from 
the fieldwork: biographical journeys marked by sufferance and oppression, but 
also by resilience and hope, where religious belonging plays a vital role, as a 
factor of either empowerment or disempowerment during the process of mi-
grations, asylum application and its aftermath.
From the interviewed migrants’ perspective, religious identity represents a 
source of resistance and resilience, but it is also the limit beyond which it is not 
possible to accept any violations. The concept of religious identity provides a 
meaning to the decision to migrate – even for those who have discovered this 
concept only after having migrated to another country, where they first experi-
enced a context of religious freedom. Therefore, together with this latter con-
cept (religious freedom), religious identity provides the lexicon through which 
to understand migratory choices and strategies (Chapter 10), well beyond what 
emerges from the common perception of the quantitative importance of 
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 religious-based asylum demands, and offers new elements to be considered 
when it comes to trace the distinction between voluntary and forced migration 
(we will return on this point later). Finally, migrants are often “more religious” 
compared to non-migrants, not only because most of them come from pre-
secularized States (with all the ambivalences that this circumstance may in-
volve), but also because they often find in religion a source of self-identity and 
a balm for the soul.
Given the extraordinary relevance of this concept in the experience of 
(forced) migrants, it is easy to understand that one of their main expectations, 
once landed in a democratic context, is that of being acknowledged as mem-
bers of a given religious community, and witnesses of its history and of its tur-
bulences. This point too has clearly emerged from the migrants’ narratives. As 
we could expect, Muslim migrants suffer from what they perceive as a stereo-
typed representation of Islam, and even more so from the destructive image 
produced by “Islamic” terrorism and attacks. Asylum seekers asking for protec-
tion towards persecutions carried out by religious authorities, regardless of 
what their religious affiliation is, lament the incapacity of the commissioners 
to grasp the complexity of the religious landscape of their sending community, 
particularly in the case of Muslims escaping from what in Italy are commonly 
depicted as Islamic countries (Chapter 11). But even more thought-provoking is 
the experience of Christian migrants, who remark with sufferance and resent-
ment the widespread unfamiliarity of Italian people with regard to traditions 
different from (Roman) Catholicism. Proud of their identity –particularly in 
the case of migrants belonging to “religious enclaves”–, they find themselves 
dealing with those who do not know the variety of ritual and religious tradi-
tions. Copts are a case in point: while their presence constitute an ancient real-
ity in Italy, today the majority of Italians are substantially ignoring them; the 
striking lack of recent sources and information, compared to the richness of 
Middle Eastern sources of such a lively religious reality, is a symptom of the 
need for further research (Chapter 18), but also of the social invisibility of this 
community, which does not create any problems (surely, and paradoxically, 
also thanks to its strong religiosity).
Particularly when they had been victims of persecutions because of their 
religious affiliation, and after having accepted to be persecuted in the name of 
their Christianity –according to the concept of martyrdom (Chapter 19)– it is 
easy to understand the frustration that migrants feel every time they encoun-
ter misconceptions among the hosting society. The Coptic teenagers described 
in Chapter 20 are used to experiencing that not only their schoolmates, but 
also their teachers, label them as “Muslims” just because they (or their  parents) 
come from Egypt, thus realizing Italians’ ignorance about the very  existence of 
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Christians in Egypt. Their experience is similar to that of many others, who 
are depicted as “Muslims” (or as “Arabs”, that in the contemporary Italian 
milieu is virtually a synonymous of Muslims), after having escaped from an 
Islamic country that harassed them in the name of religion. This wide-
spread “confusion” is clearly perceptible in the school environment, where 
young students tend to attribute improper affiliations to their foreign class-
mates, while parents and teachers rather tend to “neutralize” religious iden-
tities, reducing them to socio-economic data (Chapter 23), thus depriving 
migrants of a fundamental element of their individual and communitarian 
identity.
To a certain degree, this widespread misinterpretation seems to reproduce 
the stereotypical way in which we portray the religious scenario of the send-
ing country. Our multi-situated study has provided interesting insights on 
this regard, particularly through the analysis of one of the regions in which 
contemporary (forced) migrations are generated (Part 2). As clearly illustrat-
ed, once more, by the experience of Christians in Egypt, it is very easy to 
stereotype faiths and religious-based identities. On the contrary, the analysis 
provided in Chapter 6 suggests that, through their theological reflection, 
they have elaborated a sort of lexicon that can be applied to the same Euro-
pean context, in order to contrast the misleading use (and abuse) which of-
ten is made of the concept of Christian identity (see again Roy, 2019). The 
risk that we have to avoid is that of reproducing what has happened in Egypt 
in the last decade, where religion has replaced nationalism; and where mat-
ters that should be governed by the law have been managed as identity poli-
tics. We are speaking of the kind of risk that has materialized during the last 
refugee crisis, when the need to protect European identity has been repeat-
edly evoked in order to hide the lack of effective migration management 
(Zanfrini, 2019).
Finally, a fundamental indication emerging from the research is that the rec-
ognition of the (religious) identity of migrants is an essential condition for the 
process of re-humanization on which to build a new ethics of hospitality (and, as 
it is easy to understand, for allowing them to take part in a virtuous manner to 
the building of the common good). However, to satisfy this condition, it is nec-
essary to deal with a sort of “educational emergency” represented by a situa-
tion of widespread illiteracy on religious matters; not only about “other” reli-
gious traditions, made visible through the presence of migrants coming from 
abroad; but also about “our” religious tradition.
As suggested by the international literature, the actual acknowledgment 
of the right to freedom of religion represents one of the basic conditions in 
order to create a favorable context where to reconfigure one’s own religious 
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identity, thus avoiding reactive solutions and behaviors (Chapter 2). Our study 
suggests that, before and beyond the formal recognition of the freedom to be-
lieve and practice one’s religious belief, what migrants experience is the lack of 
recognition, both at the cultural level and through daily interactions, of their 
religious identity. Italians’ “religious illiteracy” ends up constituting a factor – 
invisible and certainly undervalued– hindering the processes of integration 
and mutual acculturation. What’s more, religious leaders and pastoral opera-
tors are also involved in the problem. According to what has emerged from 
the key experts involved in the study, during their education career, not even 
Catholic pastors receive an adequate preparation regarding the richness of 
Christians’ and Catholics’ history, since school programs are focused on the 
Latin Church; not to mention the lack of knowledge about non-Christians reli-
gions. A fortiori, those who cover key roles in the processes of integration and 
cohabitation –teachers, public officials, cultural animators, etc. –, often perceive 
precisely through the presence of faithful from elsewhere how the knowledge 
they possess, sometimes reduced to stereotypical descriptions, is  completely 
inadequate to interpret the complex contemporary religious scenario.
In the same line of thinking, the evidence provided by the study suggests that 
“regaining” the awareness of “our” religious identity –here intended as the majori-
tarian religion in Italy (as in Europe)– is a precondition to meet and confront with 
the “others”, and to manage possible conflicts produced by the cultural distance. 
Not incidentally, Italian and European (Christian) scholars sometimes openly 
speak of the challenge of Europe’s “rechristianization” (see Chapter 16). As a 
matter of fact, plenty of data coming from our research prove the tendency to 
reduce religion to a mere type of culture, losing the connection with both its 
transcendent dimension and with the essence of a religion “embodied” in the 
lives of Christians. This clearly emerges within the school context, also through 
the vantage point of religion teachers (Chapter 22). Significantly, this socio-cul-
tural framework even influences the setting of the interviews with asylum seek-
ers: still reflecting its invisibility in the public sphere, the religion dimension 
turns out to be largely “invisible” in the interview’s setting; worried about the 
possible reactions of the commissioners, aprioristically perceived as agnostic, 
some asylum claimants declare that they tend to gloss over the elements of their 
personal and migratory trajectory linked with their religious belonging, and 
even denounce a positive discrimination favoring migrants who declare other 
kinds of “diversity”, such as homosexuality; sometimes, and even more para-
doxically, the hegemony attributed to Islam in the public discourse inhibits the 
concern towards other religious traditions (and towards the variety of Islamic 
traditions as well), through a game of mutual “compliance” between commis-
sioners and asylum seekers (Chapter 11). Finally, this aspect is also clearly 
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 apparent from a  critical analysis of the current global governance system of mi-
gration which, as we will explore later, radically underestimates how the reli-
gious/spiritual  dimension is constitutive of every human being (Chapter 15).
In this context, migration proves to be a sort of “prophetic” challenge for a 
 society –such as the European and the Italian one– which would claim to be 
founded on Christian roots. Migrants often perceive themselves as more “reli-
gious” than the hosting society, which is sometimes recognized as even anom-
ic and threatening (Chapter 12). Migrant families with a strong religious 
 identity –as in the case of the Copts– look at the Italian environment with 
apprehension, since religion and faith seem to be forgotten by many people 
(Chapter 19); even their children suffer the charm of a society that they de-
scribe as without any beliefs or ethics: the deep sense of belonging to a reli-
gious tradition contributes to the lack of apparent signs of psychological dis-
tress and to the gratitude for the parents’ efforts to give them a better future, 
but it makes them distant from the society in which they grow up (Chapter 
20). By explicitly using the concept of martyrdom, these migrants proudly af-
firm their belonging to a thousand-year-old Church, and identify in suffering a 
constitutive element of their religious identity: the furthest from the loose and 
tepid ways in which we live today, in Italy, the experience of an increasingly 
intimate faith (Chapter 3). Sometimes this kind of perception is shared by the 
same religious leaders and pastoral operators, who represent migrants as those 
who recall them the true substance of their faith and spiritual essence (Chap-
ter 12) and who challenge pastoral and liturgical practices (Chapter 16). Finally, 
school teachers discover that pupils belonging to minority groups and recently 
arrived migrants have more familiarity with the religious sphere compared 
with the increasingly agnostic manifestation of the (Spanish) indigenous pop-
ulation (Chapter 25).
As it can be read between the lines in various chapters of the present book, 
Christian people (and, in a certain way, the entire “Christian” Italian society) 
could decidedly gain from a valorization of the typical feature of Christianity, 
represented by “reflexivity” (Magatti, 2018). Just to cite some example, local 
communities of faithful can even rediscover the essence of their spiritual lives, 
when confronted with the faithful of other religions, or with the faithful of 
their own religion who have come from elsewhere, custodians of other liturgi-
cal and spiritual traditions (Chapter 16). Migrant (and not migrant) families 
involved in the transmission of their faith to the younger generation end up 
being an exception in contemporary Europe, where it is exactly the declining 
religious socialization leading to the phenomenon of religious disaffiliation, in 
its turn, the main driver of the new religious scenario. But they can also offer 
an important example for parents (believers and agnostics), called to educate 
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their children in an “ethically neutral” society, as contemporary society is per-
ceived and described by social scientists (Chapter 18). Teachers in charge with 
religion education –among the other teachers– can find in Christianity and in 
its cultural heritage a lever for curriculum enrichment and for promoting con-
structive dialogue skills among pupils (Chapter 22). However, teachers feel 
definitely not prepared to manage interreligious classes and classroom discus-
sions about all the topics and issues related to religion(s) within the legal sys-
tem and the cultural context of reference. Grown up within a context com-
monly represented as mono-religious, they have firstly “met” the religion issue 
through the arrival of migrant students, and therefore they have tended to 
overlap the intercultural dynamics with the interreligious ones. Socialized in 
the 1960s, most Italian teachers mainly emphasize the material socio-econom-
ic nature of the conflicts between students, since they grew in a political era in 
which the main reference was class or gender conflict (Chapter 23). In their 
view, religion is downgraded as a pretext for the conflict, that is the most visi-
ble aspect, legitimized and culturally accepted, to justify the division between 
groups: thus doing, they underestimate the question of the religious identity, 
its relevance in the process of the students’ identity development, but also its 
potential in terms of religious agency to be activated for the common 
well-being.
Finally, and once again, migrants prove to be a “mirror” through which to 
grasp critical processes and risks involving society as a whole. The vicissitudes 
of migrants in search of emancipation tell us of how religion can become op-
pressive also for the majority group, when it marries a fundamentalist interpre-
tation of religious dictates, or even incoherent with the sacred texts them-
selves. On the other side of the Mediterranean –that is in Italy–, growing 
discrimination and intolerance are among the possible outcomes of marginal-
ization of Christians in the public sphere. Marginalization impacts on their 
civil rights, thus inhibiting their freedom to express their thoughts, to exercise 
conscientious objection, and to contest, within the democratic deliberative 
process, solutions aprioristically defined as “progressive” although conflicting 
with religious values. Also for this reason it is important to take the rights of 
religious minorities seriously, since they are nothing but the other side of the 
coin of the “majority” rights (for a deeper analysis of the phenomenon of the 
erosion of religious freedom see: Durhan, Thayer, 2019). Ultimately, as it will 
emerge throughout the book, there is a strict link between religious liberty and 
liberty more generally; that is between religious liberty and human dignity.
3.2 Religious Freedom
The prospect of rehumanization of asylum seekers and migrants, that is the 
willingness to listen to their voices and narratives, has also made it possible to 
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grasp the strict link between religious freedom and personal freedom, between 
the respect for religious rights and the concept of democracy. Moreover, it has 
made clear that these concepts are not only a theoretical argument, but they 
are embodied in the real lives of people, different from each other (Chapters 
10–12; 19–20).
In many cases, the experience of migrating –particularly for those who mi-
grate for religious motives, but also in all the cases in which the religious di-
mension breaks the scene before, along, and after the migration process–, is 
exactly linked to the need to protect the human openness towards the tran-
scendent, in front of the possible absorption operated by political, social, and 
familial structures; sometimes even by religious structures, when they instru-
mentally pursue goals far from their own nature. So, the concept of religious 
freedom, once applied to the (forced) migrants’ experience, shows how “free-
dom” is a necessary attribute of religion, i.e. an intimate expectation of any 
believer, which therefore mirrors individual characters and feels.
As a matter of fact, not only religious diversity intermingles with other “di-
versities”, relating to the political, cultural, linguistic, spatial, and kin-family 
background, and reflecting the “multi-vocal” character of the sending societies 
(Chapter 5), as well as the socio-economic status acquired in the destination 
society (Chapters 20 and 23). These variables also combine with personal char-
acters such as gender, age, and cohort. Once again, this plurality can be grasped 
by hearing migrants’ voices and narratives.
Gender, intended in its sociological meaning –that is as a product of a pro-
cess of social construction– has emerged as a crucial variable, particularly in 
the case of migrants coming from Muslim-majority countries. As it is well 
known, the relationship between Islam and the concept of gender equality (or 
more precisely the woman condition) is currently intended as crucial. Accord-
ing to a common Western perspective, Islamic countries are characterized by 
patriarchal gender norms, to the point of making their women in need “to be 
saved”, exactly because they are supposed to be deprived of their personal free-
dom. Actually, evidence collected during this study seems to prove a positive 
discrimination toward female asylum seekers when they come from given 
countries, perceived as prey to Islamist regimes (Chapter 11). On this regard, 
the analysis provided in Chapter 8 endorses the hypothesis that Islamist au-
thoritarian drifts tend to associate with a patriarchal reading of Shariʿa, but it 
also introduces the variety of gender cultures existing in Muslim-majority 
countries, the different levels of gender equality in the domestic legislations, 
and the different way in which people conceive the influence that religion 
should have in politics and legislation. Furthermore, it discusses how, along-
side a secular perspective that considers theocracy as a limit for gender equal-
ity, forms of feminism combining the quest for women’s rights with the  support 
Zanfrini34
<UN>
for the Shariʿa law are possible (or, in any case, envisaged by a significant per-
centage of the population). Here again, the choice of giving back to migrants 
their own subjectivity has proved to be profitable in permitting the emergence 
of new insights. Among the many testimonies collected, there are Muslim 
women who do not contest the Shariʿa’s influence on the everyday life of men 
and women, but the way in which the Islamic law is (mis)understood and im-
posed in their country of origin. As a matter of fact, the process of radicaliza-
tion, which currently involves various countries, implies a regression in the 
field of women’s rights and condition, often interpreted as an opposition to the 
Western model of life. Revolving this kind of reading, some (female) migrants 
have described the “true” essence of Islam, that some of them declare having 
discovered only in Italy (Chapter 12), thus realizing the misleading interpreta-
tion of religion by religious leaders who had transformed it into an instrument 
to exercise power and social control.
Passing to consider another biographical character, the same commission-
ers in charge with the assessment of asylum demands are aware of the differ-
ent meanings assigned to religion by people of different ages, particularly if 
coming from countries recently involved in radical political and social changes 
(Chapter 11). So, together with the chronological age, cohort’s belonging is an-
other crucial variable influencing the way in which to interpret and live reli-
gion, as well as the concept of religious freedom. Basing on this circumstance, 
we can try to understand some bizarre data emerged from the study. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 7 –based on the analysis of the last Arab Barometer  surveys–, 
the relationship between the individual age and the way of understanding re-
ligion and its role in the public sphere is ambivalent; in other words, youngest 
interviewed are not necessarily less “traditionalist” than the older ones. Passing 
to consider a completely different context, within the Italian school system, 
interreligious relations and religious-based conflicts are read and interpreted 
in very different ways by young students and adults. For the latter, religion is 
just a pretext for a conflict that has to do with a socio-economic divide, result-
ing from the migrants’ weak economic fragility. For the students, instead, the 
question of (religious) identity and belonging to the (religious) group is the 
most important, and the religious dimension is the bullet that deeply hurts 
identity dimensions linked to personal, familial, and communitarian elements 
(Chapter 23).
The individual way of experiencing the faith, as a consequence of the per-
sonal and family background, is another relevant variable. The study of Coptic 
families and their children (Chapters 19 and 20) describes a completely unique 
way of experiencing faith also through the succession of generations, making 
it a fundamental anchor of identity and a protective resource in the process of 
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adaptation, but also a possible obstacle to full membership in the destination 
society. However, it also happens that, through the teaching and the example 
of parents, the faith becomes the catalyst for a feeling of openness, capable of 
transforming the experience of suffering into a motivation for the commit-
ment to the common good, and the sense of captivity in something that sets 
the real religious sentiment free (Chapter 12). Finally, it also happens that one’s 
faith is hardly declared as one of the main reasons to escape, for fear of retali-
ation against family members left behind or threats and pressures internal and 
external to their groups (Chapter 14), thus making it difficult to elaborate one’s 
own experience in a context of religious freedom.
Significantly, in the personal biographies of (forced) migrants, the link be-
tween religious freedom and individual freedom has emerged, from time to 
time, as a crucial node in the decision to migrate, or as an awareness acquired 
ex post, once arrived in a democratic context. This awareness is the yardstick 
with which migrants measure the gap between the country of origin and Euro-
pean democracy; but also the gap between their expectations and real life con-
ditions in the destination country –in this case, Italy– which are not always up 
to the promises of freedom and equality on which the European democracies 
claim to be founded. As a matter of fact, these concepts represent a sort of 
 litmus-test of the quality of a democracy.
On the one hand, migrants asking for protection “vote with their foots”, by 
opting for an exit strategy in front of the violation of their (religious) rights, or 
of the counterfeit interpretation of religious duties imposed to the same ma-
jority members. For those who escape from places where religious rights are 
not guaranteed, the possibility to obtain a status of protection because of this 
is a first and crucial test. On this regard, the research has revealed the existence 
of both technical-procedural and cultural-political biases which, more or less 
deliberately, influence the relationship between commissioners and asylum 
seekers, giving opacity to the treatment of religious arguments (Chapter 11). 
The emergence of this issue suffers from various aspects: the instrumental re-
cur to religious motives, particularly in the context of reiterated chronicles, 
which concurs to delegitimize all religious-based claims; the complexity of the 
contemporary religious scenario in many sending countries, which makes it 
very arduous for the commissioners to mature an adequate level of knowledge 
and competence; the tendency to negatively or positively “pre-categorize” on 
the basis of well-known situations; the role of the media, which defines the 
semantic framework within which, in a less or more deliberate way, the differ-
ent actors involved in the process construct their personal perceptions; the 




On the other hand, European democracies are challenged by the heteroge-
neity of individual experiences, which provide many insights useful to think 
about the distinction between voluntary and forced migrants. Indeed, reli-
gious-based claims are particularly useful to illustrate the difficulty to process 
through standardized procedures –such as the procedures regulating the ac-
knowledgment of a status of protection– the extraordinary complexity of 
contemporary (forced) human mobility. The stories of our interviewees (Chap-
ter 10) illustrate how the violation of individual rights and dignity often passes 
through subtle practices, which hide behind the appearance of legality. Since 
vulnerability is part of the everyday life of some religious minorities’ members – 
regardless of whether or not they directly suffered persecution–, once adopt-
ing a humanistic perspective (that is a perspective targeted to the governance 
of “migrants”, not of “flows”) it becomes quite impossible to clearly distinguish 
between voluntary and forced migration; particularly when this distinction is 
linked to the dimension of religion and its relationship with personal identity 
and personal freedom. Should the concept of forced migration be limited to 
the situations in which individual survival and integrity is seriously in danger? 
Or should it be extended to every situation of serious limitation of individual 
freedom and lack of democracy?
State-borders have a clear political dimension, strongly emphasized by cur-
rent debate. However, through the adoption of a prospect of rehumanization 
of asylum seekers, another critical dimension of borders has clearly emerged: 
the ethical one. The management of borders, often reduced to a security lan-
guage, has appeared here as a “filter” through which we decide the right to 
move and cross national boundaries; to obtain protection; to fly from a condi-
tion of subordination and dearth –or eventually of “captivity”– variously inter-
mingled with religions variables; to freely benefit from individual freedom and 
manifest one’s religious beliefs; to make visible, also in the European public 
space, particularistic belongings, particularly those connected with different 
religious background.
Defining the contours of involuntary mobility is an indispensable operation 
to guarantee the sustainability of protection systems, as we have had the op-
portunity to anticipate. However, listening to the voices of migrants should 
make us more aware of the possible effects, on the real life of human beings, of 
certain political choices, such as the policies of externalization of borders’ con-
trol, that leave the responsibility to “play rough” with extra-EU countries (Zan-
frini, 2019). Significantly, exactly in the days in which we are closing this book, 
the Italian government has approved a new list of “Safe Third Countries”, which 
includes States that do not offer, according to our study (Chapter 9), a suffi-
cient level of protection towards the risk of being persecuted and  discriminated 
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because of religious motives. Finally, in the light of the narratives we have gath-
ered, the arbitrary character of this type of operation appears to be evident 
more than ever.
What is more, through the experiences of asylum seekers and migrants 
coming from countries that deny both religious freedom and religious plural-
ism, European societies can appreciate the importance of these concepts, and 
their strict link with the concept of democracy (Chapter 10); ultimately, they 
have given the opportunity to test if their everyday functioning is coherent 
with the promises of equality and inclusion. In this regard, a first focus of at-
tention is represented by the gap separating fundamental principles asserted 
by their constitutional codes and the rules and procedures regulating specific 
matters, besides those specifically addressed to process religious-based protec-
tion’s demands. Among the many concerned fields, our research has concen-
trated on the role of religion and religious pluralism in the context of the re-
ception system (Chapter 11) and on the role of religion teaching within the 
public school (Chapter 22). In both cases, what has emerged is, on the one 
hand, an inclusive attitude –which shapes the professional cultures of many 
operators and teachers, and sometimes stimulates their creativity in experi-
menting innovative practices and solutions– and, on the other hand, the per-
sistence of weaknesses at both legislative and organizational level. As a matter 
of fact, in the context of contemporary (post)secularized society, religious free-
dom seems to be acknowledged and proclaimed more than an evidence-based 
experience: since the migrants often represent the main religious minorities in 
their receiving country, it is exactly their arrival that has permitted to gain the 
awareness of this gap. The fulfilment of personal needs (including the spiritual 
ones) by respecting the individual cultural and religious traditions is in prin-
ciple guaranteed within the asylum seekers’ reception system, although with 
some limitations (particularly when it comes to the centers for repatriation) 
(Chapter 9). However, despite the importance quite unanimously attributed, 
by our experts and key informants, to the religious/spiritual sphere in the pro-
cess of adaptation, the solutions adopted are different, reflecting the heteroge-
neity of approaches that distinguish the Italian reception system –largely en-
trusted with the initiative of the actors of the civil society– and producing a 
situation of clear lack of homogeneity in the access to spiritual assistance and 
in the possibility of participating in religious rites and interreligious initiatives 
(§12.2). In its turn, the fieldwork conducted within public schools provides 
significant evidence of this gap, starting from the students’ scarce ability to 
identify moments and  contexts in which they take advantage from this free-
dom. What is more, this  phenomenon is common to both Italian (Catholic) 
students and foreign ( non-Catholic) ones. Among the minority groups there 
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could be the habit to keep religion belonging to the foreground, in order to re-
duce  contrasts and possible stigmatizations, if not the risk to be excluded. 
Whereas among Italian students who claim to be Catholics there is little aware-
ness that religious belonging may represent a means for their self-affirmation 
or self-definition (Chapter 22). Finally, they are exactly the migrants –
particularly if they emigrated for reasons linked to the violation of their reli-
gious rights–, who can provide the importance of religious rights and –as re-
peatedly highlighted– their connection with the concept of personal freedom 
and the quality of the democracy.
In this regard, a substantially neglected aspect in the interventions that ac-
company the path of reception of migrants and asylum seekers is education to 
religious pluralism. Within the framework of European democracies, this con-
cept tends to be considered as self-evident, and therefore not problematized. 
Educating for mutual recognition and respect between religious groups is instead 
of particular importance if we are to lay the foundations for peaceful and con-
structive coexistence. All the more so, if we consider that immigration is com-
posed to a significant extent by citizens of countries still far from the principles 
of authentic democracy and who have mainly experienced their religious 
identity as an antagonistic marker. Countries in which, if not the law, at least 
the practice acts in a discriminatory manner towards certain religious groups, 
and disavows their equal dignity. In this regard, differently from what one can 
sometimes think –and although religious freedom and religious pluralism are 
sometimes represented as Western constructs–, it cannot be said that there is 
a priori hostility towards them in the Muslim world. Significantly, indeed, in 
the course of our research work, the urge to promote education in religious 
pluralism for newcomers derived precisely from a Muslim Imam (Chapter 11): 
this is one of the areas in which it would be desirable to strengthen coopera-
tion between government institutions and fbos. Here, again, it emerges the 
need to invest in training initiatives directed both to religious leaders and opera-
tors and to public officials (Chapter 15). The former must be made more aware 
of all the facilities and opportunities that can be activated to support migrants, 
but also of the legal framework that is expected to regulate both migrants’ ar-
rivals and integration, and must be solicited to diffuse correct information to 
both migrants and would-be migrants (thus discouraging them, for example, 
from improper and instrumental exploitation of the protection’s measures).5 
5 See, on this regard, the project report realized by the iom – International Organization for 
Migration, Integration: A Multi-faith Approach, aimed at working with migrant religious lead-
ers to help migrant communities better understand the expectations and norms of host com-
munities in relation to their own cultural and religious values.
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The latter, in turn, need to be trained on the characters and contents of each 
individual religion, especially with regard to those aspects that can have a 
greater impact on social life, or that can be activated in integration and inter-
religious programs. Furthermore, the provision of education programs ad-
dressed to religious leaders and pastoral agents of different religions can be a 
way to promote the mutual confidence and the common engagement, and 
possibly to encourage the launch of shared programs.
Concerning these points, it is acknowledged that the social and political 
context of the host country has an important influence on making religion a 
divisive cleavage or, alternatively, a source of unity and solidarity. At the same 
time, different religions and religious groups exhibit different approaches, not 
necessarily oriented to support a full integration and a sense of belonging to 
the new society. Consistent with some classical contributions of sociological 
thought on migration and integration pathways (Chapter 3), the collected evi-
dence proves that religious affiliation, by its cosmopolitan nature, allows the 
migrants to adapt to the new context while maintaining its cultural specificity, 
and passing it on to new generations (Chapter 20). However, it also shows how 
the perception of the outside world as threatening can produce the risk of an 
introverted tendency and of displaying reactive solutions and behaviors, thus 
making it more complicated to identify the common good that human migra-
tion can promote (Chapter 19).
On this regard, the study directed to analyze the “space” of religion within 
the reception system (Chapter 11) suggests that the first phases of the recep-
tion and settlement process are definitely crucial in shaping newcomers’ feel-
ings and behaviors, as well as the evolution of interreligious relations. Within 
the framework of a holistic approach in the reception of asylum seekers –that 
is the mostly envisaged approach by both academic experts and institutional 
 statements–, religion and spirituality must be officially acknowledged as basic 
human needs, as well as a lever able to support the individual adaptation, the re-
spect for the other people, and the personal engagement in the common good. 
The insights emerged from the qualitative study on fbos (Chapter 14) suggest, 
in this regard, the crucial importance of the operators’ ability to establish with 
(forced) migrants reciprocal, trusting and stable relationships, based on a per-
sonalized approach and contiguous under the cultural and symbolic profile.
One last aspect to be mentioned concerns the relationship between the mi-
gration of believers persecuted because of their faith and the future of minor-
ity communities in various sending countries. Religious organizations some-
times play as push and pull actors, facilitating the transnational mobility 
of their affiliated (Chapter 10). However, sometimes they are also worried 
about the departure of their members, and engaged in the attempt to prevent 
their emigration, appealing to an effort of resilience. As a matter of fact, the 
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 international dimension of the problem must be taken into serious account: 
all kinds of religious rights’ violations must be covered by systems of protec-
tion (Chapter 15); but we must also be aware that the asylum system can be-
come the instrument to facilitate the expulsion of religious minorities, thus 
paving the way to realize the criminal goal of a monoreligious society (Aiuto 
alla Chiesa che soffre, 2019). As it easy to grasp, we are dealing with a topic that 
solicits a stronger direct involvement of fbos, following the very important 
steps already taken along the road of interreligious dialogue (see below), to 
aim at the construction of a society which, together with the equal dignity of 
every human being, also recognizes the right to freedom of faith in all its forms.
3.3 Citizenship
In the tradition of many European States, based on a principle of isomorphism 
between the people, the nation, and the territory in which sovereignty is 
 exercised –in turn, delimited by state boundaries–, and belonging defined by 
citizenship (Wimmer, Glick Schiller, 2003), religion is one of the elements that 
contribute to defining the homogeneity of the population of a nation-State. 
Not by chance, as it has already been pointed out, migrants’ “religious diversi-
ty” is one of the main factors used in the representation of immigration as an 
identity challenge (or even as an identity threat), although this implies the dis-
avowal of religious pluralism as a constitutive trait of the European popula-
tion, present well before the arrival of immigrants in the last decades. Still, this 
circumstance would be enough to understand how suggestive it is to investi-
gate the relationship between immigration, religion and citizenship. Moreover, 
as it is well known today, the process of invention of the nation-States took 
advantage of the concept of “methodological nationalism”, that is the tendency 
to assume national borders as the “natural” ones, within which to analyze soci-
etal phenomena. Thus disregarding both the existence of transnational pro-
cesses and links and the various kinds of transnational belongings, particularly 
those connected with the membership to ethnic/religious groups and diaspor-
ic communities. As a matter of fact, as it is illustrated in Chapter 2, in the expe-
rience of (forced) migrants, citizenship is “naturally” not tied to rigid national 
territoriality, but includes fluidity of borders and multiple (religious) identities 
and loyalties. This point makes migrants a paradigmatic subject to rethink the 
concept of citizenship –by definition, a national and “closed” institution– in 
the context of contemporary globalized and interconnected society (see, 
among others: Carens, 2013; Kymlicka, 2001; Walzer, 1983; Zanfrini, 2007).
In general terms, it is easy to understand that religion, in the migrants’ 
 experience –and even more so for those who escaped for reasons related 
to their religious affiliations– often becomes a marker of demarcation and 
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 distinction, sometimes in a racialized and antagonistic way, sometimes in a 
 dialectical and potentially cooperative way (Chapter 2). Our research has ac-
tually provided examples of both outcomes. Interviewed (forced) migrants 
(Chapter 12) sometimes are able to transform their experience of sufferance 
and discrimination in a generative way, engaging themselves in the social, 
cultural and political life of the hosting society, according to a participative 
idea of the citizenship. Significantly, in some cases, it is exactly the spiritual 
rethinking of their experience that, by breaking down the logic of rancor, pro-
vides the (forced) migrants with the emotional and psychological resources 
useful to support their pro-active and altruistic engagement, and their feeling 
part of the hosting society – without this signifying the renunciation of other 
forms of affiliation and belonging, even of a transnational or universal type, as 
is typical of religious affiliations. However, it also happens that migrants culti-
vate a very negative attitude towards other religious groups, and they interpret 
the possibility of living in a democratic country as a sort of “compensation” for 
the wrongs suffered in the past, in any case a possibility not able to alleviate 
wounds that are still open, and which seem to prevent them from really feeling 
like citizens of the polis and citizens of the world.
In this regard, a very interesting case is offered by Copts coming from Egypt. 
As a mirror of their condition in the homeland –where suffering had become 
an “ordinary” character of their daily-life, the only possible destiny which rel-
egate the Christians to this marginal minority status (Chapter 6)–, Coptic mi-
grants risk to reproduce, also in Italy, a passive and sometimes rancorous pos-
ture. Their strong religious identity is self-portrayed as an indelible marker, and 
perfectly functions as an instrument of resilience and of intergroup cohesion; 
however, it does not endorse neither the sense of belonging to the Italian soci-
ety, nor the motivation to get out of the boundaries of the ethnic community. 
At the opposite, their strong sense of belonging to a minoritarian community 
seems to work as boundary marker, thus reproducing the condition of (self)
isolation experienced in Egypt (Ha, 2017). Unilaterally insisting on their condi-
tion of sufferance and exclusion in the home country, and of subalternity in 
the hosting one (where many of them have experienced downward mobility), 
Coptic migrants renounce to trespass the borders of their protective commu-
nity. As discussed in Chapter 19, this option may become challenging for 
younger generations born in Italy, invested with a mandate which requires 
them to preserve their cultural and religious heritage, prioritizing the latter 
over the opening towards the new society. At the same time, it involves the risk 
of an introverted tendency and of displaying reactive solutions and behaviors.
We have already pointed out that the lack of preparation of Italians in rec-
ognizing the specificity of this religious tradition (and its full membership in 
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Christianity) is a factor that negatively influences Coptic migrants’ sense of 
belonging to the Italian society. At the same time, we have to point out the 
critical role of the religious leaders and of the Coptic Church (both Orthodox 
and Catholic) in the hosting society. As a matter of fact, according to what 
emerged from the study (Chapter 20), the latter supports a form of transna-
tionalism and selective acculturation, by keeping Egyptian and Coptic identity 
alive among the Diaspora’s members (included the youngest) and facilitating 
the adaptation to the host society, perceived as very different in terms of values 
and customs. But current adaptation’s outcomes –surely facilitated by the high 
adaptability of the first generation, who “sacrifice” themselves in order to offer 
their offspring the possibility to leave Egypt– would need to be re-examined –
as suggested by the chapter’s authors– after a long period of time, through 
third and fourth generations. Ultimately, this community, strongly linked to its 
bounding function, lacks a bridging function, that is of the ability to really sup-
port its members in “entering” the new society and feeling part of it.6
Actually, it is exactly through the “intrusion” of religious identities and prac-
tices within public space that we are solicited to shift our focus from citizen-
ship as a legal status, to performances of citizenship, i.e. creative enactments 
that negotiate membership, re-inventing ways of living together (see again 
Chapter 2). This shift is today acknowledged also at institutional level. The 
same European Integration Agenda7 has encouraged, since 2005, migrants’ in-
volvement in mainstream institutions through various kinds of “active citizen-
ship” (Vogel, Triandafyllidou, 2006) intended to stimulate migrants to take part 
in the participative and deliberative processes (e.g.: Morales, Giugni, 2011). 
However, besides the legal provisions and the EU recommendations, the ini-
tiative promoted and supported by the civil society are of particular relevance. 
All across Europe, actors such as voluntary associations, Unions, and cultural 
organizations have been engaging in the promotion of a “generative” form of 
citizenship. The latter is intended as a participative citizenship, linking all 
those people living in the same polis –notwithstanding their nationality or 
their migratory status– meeting their desire of belonging, and enhancing their 
contribution for the common well-being.
6 An interesting analysis of the relation between religious practices and group’s identity is pro-
vided by Stroup, 2017. Here the author distinguishes among a universalizing role, a negotiat-
ing role, and a differentiating role. In the case of the Copts we studied, religion seems play a 
differentiaging role, by setting apart on ethno-religious group from an “outsider other”.
7 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Common Agen-
da for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union, com (2005) 389 
final.
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In this perspective, initiatives sustained by FBOs are particularly relevant. If 
not because they defy the idea that religious affiliations are likely to obstacle 
migrants’ integration and social cohesion. Indeed, religious organizations are 
surely important agents in supporting migrants’ inclusion in the new society, 
and in offering them the possibility to recover from the migration trauma and 
to “feel at home”. What is more, in many occasions they have proved to be able 
to involve newcomers in common projects, emphasizing the mutual enrich-
ment gained by reciprocity and cooperation. As has been repeatedly stated, 
the image of a secularized Europe –in which religion is relegated to the private 
sphere– and the same concern about the religious diversity embodied in im-
migration, have contributed to overshadowing the potential of the binomial 
“religion–integration”. This has strengthened, on the one hand, the tendency to 
make (one’s) religion (more or less practiced) a bulwark of identity for those 
who are “in-group” with respect to “others”, whose religion constitutes a desta-
bilizing threat; on the other hand, the tendency to consider religion as a sec-
ondary factor for the purposes of integration and “citizenship’s construction”. 
However, today there are signs that show a different attitude in considering the 
potential of this couple of concepts. They go in the direction of both contain-
ing fundamentalist thrusts, adopting measures not only to combat them, but 
also assisting migrants and promoting interreligious dialogue, and to highlight 
the positive aspects of the role of religion in the processes of integration of 
migrants (as emerges, for example, from various special programs adopted by 
some European countries and/or coordinated by the European Commission as 
well as by international bodies).
The qualitative study contained in the book (Chapter 14) –albeit in an em-
bryonic/limited form and, however, significant for the processes indicated by 
the interested stakeholders themselves (whether they are migrants and refu-
gees and/or referents of established organizations and groups)–, identify some 
paths along which the role of the fbos unfolds disseminating actions that sup-
port social integration in the broad sense. In particular, their main and first 
task is that of taking care of the needs and problems migrants and refugees are 
facing in the new context. This action concerns both the answering to their 
material needs of first necessity and, together with them, the need for a more 
integral accompaniment of the person (to cure invisible wounds on a psychic 
and spiritual level), and the implementation of actions which concern support 
for religious freedom, especially when faced with forced migration which, 
among push factors, include religious persecutions. This last element is often 
intertwined with others, such as the existence of serious social and political 
conditions, the spread of violence and conflicts, existential precariousness, so 
that the religious factor becomes –as underlined by different operators– “an 
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additional factor”. In any cases, among the needs of migrants, there is also the 
spiritual one (this point is deeply analyzed in Chapter 12). In this sense, the 
fbos are also the context within which spiritual support is offered that allows 
migrants to continue to live their faith together with others, both compatriots 
and/or belonging to the same religion, and autochthonous where local reli-
gious communities start walking of encounter and mutual knowledge. In many 
cases, these places are characterized by a strong transnational configuration 
(maintaining close ties with the same diasporic communities). However, the 
long-term outcomes of these processes are influenced by the orientations of 
host societies: where migrations are seen as a merely transitory phenomenon 
and religion is considered as a parallel element with respect to personal expe-
riences, vicious circles are triggered whose repercussions can lead to identity 
closures and to the instrumentalization of religion.
Here we meet a second basic task played by fbos, that is that of providing 
capacity building for the integration and the acceptance of diversity. When 
they place the person of the migrant/refugee at the center of their actions, 
fbos can facilitate their empowerment, by enabling the abilities of each one 
and awakening, in particular, the constructive orientation towards the destina-
tion society, thus contributing to triggering the processes of positive integra-
tion. At the same time, these organizations work on the reception field, in such 
a way as to broaden the meaning of “integration” well beyond its unilateral 
reading that only engages the immigrant component. The religious theme of-
fers a particularly significant starting point in this regard, recalling, both on the 
side of migrants and on the side of those who are expected to welcome them, 
aspects of personal and social life that require everyone a renewed awareness 
of the role and contribution that religions can offer not only to the formation 
of personal identity, but also to the civil coexistence of a democratic country. 
In this way, they try to overcome emerging hostility and intolerance both from 
fundamentalist positions, often associated with immigrant religious groups 
(but, nevertheless, to closed indigenous groups), and from forms of “exclusive 
humanism” characterizing the secularized context of Western countries 
(Chapter 3).
More generally, the intervention on the front of personal capacity refers, on 
both fronts, to the work (wide-ranging cultural and educational) for the accep-
tance of the diversity of each person: in fact, the religious element often be-
comes the catalyst for other aspects considered problematic and less explicit. 
A suggestive illustration of all these processes –and of their both complex and 
“prophetical” nature– is provided in Chapter 16, through the analysis of the 
first steps of the “Synod from the people”, launched in January 2018 by the Dio-
cese of Milan – the largest Catholic Church world-wide. The aim of the 
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 consultative phase described in the chapter was that of collecting suggestions 
in order to improve foreign migrants’ inclusion in the everyday life of the local 
Church, together with the capacity of the latter to answer the needs of a multi-
ethnic and multi-religious population. Going well beyond these expectations, 
emerged results clearly show how this challenge mirrors many other critical 
issues involving the life of the Church and of the local society. According to a 
theological perspective, this challenge constitutes an extraordinary opportu-
nity to test –and possibly achieve– the true meaning of the “catholicity”, de-
scribed in the Scriptures as “unity in diversity”. But in this way, the Church 
can contribute to provide the lexicon, the semantic framework, and the proce-
dures through which redefining the concept of citizenship –in its multiple 
 dimensions– in a more and more pluralistic society, while maintaining a strong 
attachment to those basic values which define this concept as it has been 
forged in the European democracies.
In the end, our study confirms the need to rethink, besides the current citizen-
ship regimes –in most cases still based on an ethnic conception of the  membership–, 
the very idea of citizenship, going beyond the “contractualistic” approach fol-
lowed by many countries through different kinds of “integration agreements” 
(Joppke, 2007) and according to a new prospective that gives particular em-
phasis to its participatory dimension. All this in order to valorize the contribu-
tion of each person to the construction of citizenship “from below”, through 
the confrontation of different –cultural, ideological, religious, experiential– 
perspectives, giving new life to the basic principles of European civilization: 
the principle of the indissoluble dignity of each human being and the principle 
of institutionalized solidarity, intended also as an expression of the human 
anthropological vocation to build relations of reciprocity and solidarity (Zan-
frini, 2013).
In this framework, one of the basic issues concerns the safeguarding and 
support of pluralism which constitutes a social value within Western demo-
cratic societies. Moreover, pluralism in its more specific declination of the 
“ religious”, on the one hand belies the classical hypotheses of an extinction of 
religion in secularized contexts, on the other it constitutes a challenge for 
the religions themselves, with respect to their vocation to the encounter with 
the other. In this regard, among some other topics, our research has deeply 
explored (Chapter 22) how the Italian school copes with religious plurality, and 
finds strategies to deals the challenge that it poses to the school day life, cur-
riculum, and family-school relationships: to protect the freedom of expression 
with regards to religious plurality, in compliance with the school’s “laïcité” and 
the rules (and limits) of the democratic, liberal society. Here again, beyond 
the description of the legislative and institutional framework and of its 
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 ambivalences (Chapters 9 and 21), our study has mainly focused on the direct 
experience of migrants’, migrants’ offspring, and the (Italian) people they meet 
in the everyday life, according to the prospect of returning them their own 
subjectivity. One of the most relevant issues emerged from the analysis con-
cerns the blurring borders between the private and the public spheres at 
school, due to the students’, families’ and teachers’ daily behaviors and choices. 
The legal protection of religious freedom assured by the Italian (and Europe-
an) laws and citizenships rights, while providing a crucial leverage for social 
integration, triggers claims for the recognition of the legitimacy of each reli-
gious belief and practice within the school life. Hence, religious and civic loyal-
ties may come into conflict. The request from some students (and their fami-
lies) to different treatments (in order to meet the values, the customs, and the 
practices relating to their religion affiliation) prove the inner “power dimen-
sion” of school relationships and the religion’s role in shaping people’s “world 
vision”, that is an idea of what constitutes a good citizen, of how it should be 
the “right order” of society. Hence, it is difficult to establish, once and for all, 
the boundaries between different orders of law, and between beliefs and prac-
tices. In other words, the request for recognition of religious freedom (to be-
lieve and practice one’s own faith) at school turns out to have, not only a cul-
tural and religious dimension, but also a political one. Compelled to face these 
challenges, students, families, and teachers find a profitable way to overcome 
barriers and to build reciprocal trust through practices of dialogue, negotia-
tions, argumentations: in so doing, their self-reflexivity and awareness of being 
part of a pluralistic scenario increases. What’s more, the interreligious and in-
tercultural dialogue developed within the school become a training ground for 
democratic citizenship, ensuring the school not to be a “neutral space”, but a 
“safe space” for dialogue (Jackson, 2014), where inclusion and mutual respect 
are promoted within a given framework of rules, rights and duties. In this wake, 
religious education reveals an extraordinary “learning potential”, for curricu-
lum enrichment and for promoting constructive dialogue skills among pupils 
(Chapter 22).
3.4 Common Good
This final point introduces us to the fourth main line of research, represented 
by the common good, that is by the idea that migrants and refugees can con-
tribute, through their competences, abilities, sensitiveness, and experiences, to 
build the social fabric of the communities in which they live. Here, again, the 
prospect is that of the emergence of a “new-generation” citizenship: a genera-
tive form of citizenship linking citizens as they live together within the polis 
intended as a shared space and a shared time which becomes, in turn, a place 
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of reciprocity of rights and duties (Martinelli, 2013). We are speaking about a 
type of “responsible” citizenship, which manifests itself within a scenario of 
freedom, the latter conceived according to a relational perspective, thus con-
necting the creativity and innovation potential of social actors with their aspi-
ration to belong and feel included.
As a matter of fact, this prospect implies, first of all, a paradigmatic shift 
with respect to the economistic model on which the European approach has 
been traditionally based, in order to valorize the “Diversity Value” (Zanfrini, 
2015) which migration bring with it. Instead of enhancing migrants’ adjust-
ment to European society and labor market (by means of selective migration 
schemes and of standardized procedures defined from the top), this new para-
digm is focused on how to valorize migrants’ competences and experiences in 
view of promoting European economic, social and institutional development – 
with a special focus on those skills acquired thanks to migratory trajectories 
and to the migrants’ condition of dual belonging. In addition, according to this 
perspective, the emphasis on the dimension of self-realization and personal 
achievement –stressed by the current individualistic culture and targeted by 
most policies and programs–, must be complemented by a renewed attention 
to the dimension of individual responsibility for the construction of the com-
mon well-being. Furthermore, together with that of governments and local ad-
ministrations, the role of civil society’s actors must be acknowledged and valo-
rized, since it is crucial in determining the “quality” of the integration processes 
and of interethnic cohabitation. Finally, this shift requires the willingness to 
recognize pluralism –including religious pluralism– as a constitutive character 
of contemporary and future European democracies, overcoming not only na-
tionalistic narratives which pretend to affirm a strictly ethnic conception of 
the political community, but also a pro-migrant discourse which recur to argu-
ments such as the low share of Muslim migrants (thus implicitly restating the 
problematic character of Muslims’ presence) or “our” need for the migrants’ 
cheap labor force (thus reaffirming the image of a dualistic society, which as-
sign to migrants a subordinate position). As a matter of fact, according to this 
perspective, the real challenge is not to welcome migrants, but to portray them 
as full members of a pluralistic society in which the opportunity is acknowl-
edged to keep transnational links and multiple identities and belongings.
Within this picture, in this study we have focused the attention on those 
migrants’ contributions linked to their religious affiliations; that is, on their 
potential in terms of “religious agency” as part of (forced) migrants’ public 
space making, here intended both as an individual resource and as a resource 




Starting from the individual level (Chapter 12), interviewed migrants offer a 
lot of examples about the role of religion in providing the spiritual and psycho-
logical resources able to transform past sufferance into a generative behavior. 
Many migrants –particularly in the case of (forced) ones, strongly stained by 
their religious background–, often cultivate a form of transnational member-
ship, and self-represent them as the members of an international (if not a uni-
versal) community; a community to which they are bound by obligations of 
mutual support (Baháʾi are a case in point). Therefore, the transnational or dia-
sporic characters of many religious communities offer the migrants the possi-
bility to experience a concept of brotherhood that translates into a form of 
mutual support and protection able to reproduce itself in every place, over-
coming the barriers represented by socio-economic status, States’ borders, 
geographic and time distance. Finally, the activating power of religion also op-
erates through the testimonies of many believers that, through their involve-
ment in migrants’ reception and welcoming, instill in newcomers the motiva-
tion to engage themselves, in their turn, in helping other people in need and 
work for the common good (Chapter 12).
This point introduces as to the role of fbos. As illustrated in Chapter 10, the 
social capital embedded into religious-based institutions and networks often 
turns out to be a driver of migration, permitting people to escape from intoler-
able conditions and gain the opportunity to achieve personal and family 
 well-being – although its role sometimes feeds disputable migratory cultures 
and patterns. Furthermore, from our analysis it has emerged that, beyond the 
institutional apparatus in charge with the reception of asylum seekers and 
the evaluations of their claims, fbos play a crucial role not only in welcoming 
new comers and support their adaptation, but also in preparing and accompa-
nying them all along the official procedure. In so doing, they contribute to re-
humanizing asylum seekers, and to humanizing the reception system, thus 
stimulating a positive attitude toward the new society. Spirituality can also 
have a “therapeutic” impact, when it comes to dealing with traumatized peo-
ple; therefore, spiritual assistance can be of crucial importance in order to re-
cover an emotional balance and a working capacity, to the point that spiritual 
and religious assistance is often mixed up with different forms of social assis-
tance and empathetic sustain. Not only many fbos have implemented, inde-
pendently from the official reception system, various initiatives specifically 
addressed to (forced) migrants and refugees; what is more, every step of the 
migration journey is supported by fbos that are engaged in answering mi-
grants’ basic everyday needs. Often, fbos provide the possibility to attend the 
celebrations in the migrants’ mother tongue, to meet and spend free time in 
spaces provided by their places of worship, and to implement initiatives to 
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support the inclusion process (language courses, matching with the labor de-
mand, social assistance…). By taking care of migrants without any kind of 
selection or discrimination based on the religious affiliation, fbos fuel their 
attitude to “give back” what one has been given for free –without expecting 
anything in return–, to “assist” instead of just “being assisted”, and to commit 
to the common good. Finally, fbos are involved in the building of a coordi-
nated interreligious dialogue and cooperation. This line of action involves spe-
cific activities –particularly the support offered to the victims of religious 
 intolerance–, as well as the promotion of religious freedom and of solidarity 
relations among communities of different religions – for example, through the 
provision of initiatives of civic education and peace.
This point deserves specific attention. As deeply discussed in Chapter 3, cur-
rent global scenario provides unexpected conditions for a recovery of the pres-
ence of religion(s) in the public sphere, and the search of (transcendent) ethi-
cal norms that must be placed at the basis of socio-economic and political life. 
Following the fundamental contribution of J. Habermas (2005), the idea that 
religion is a public good, not just a private good (Modood, Sealy, 2019), is now 
increasingly acknowledged. Moreover, cooperation between religious groups 
and traditions has become increasingly common, so much so to speak of a 
“multi-religious approach to integration” (Lick-Bowen, Owen, 2019). As a mat-
ter of fact, the aforementioned contribution proves that multi-religious col-
laboration can help counter some of the problems associated with religion act-
ing as a barrier to integration, by expanding social networks, countering 
negative stereotypes and perceptions through opportunities for engagement, 
and encouraging migrants to look beyond potentially exclusive religious and 
ethnic communities and identities. The pressures and fears on host societies 
and communities should also not be lightly dismissed; and there is good indi-
cation that multi-religious collaborations can also benefit existing inhabitants 
in many ways. Given this picture, our study has developed this suggestive per-
spective by investigating in particular the role of interreligious dialogue – 
 intended as a confrontation among different conception of values, but also as 
the search of those principles which made up a heritage of values for all and 
for the common good, thus formulating a sort of “global ethics” (Chapter 15). In 
particular, among the principles largely shared by the different religions, the 
study has identified the following: the primacy of the common good towards 
the individual one; the universal destination of the hearth’s resources, and 
consequently the duty of solidarity; the duty of welcoming foreigners and 
hosting them; the good administration of the planet and the environment’s 
protection; the concept of a transnational citizenship. Contrasting the com-
mon tendency to neglect how any law and rule is always embedded in a given 
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structure of values –be the latter explicitated or not–, this approach identifies 
in different religions the custodians of the values that are most closely-related 
to human nature; at the same time, overcoming the ambiguities and prejudic-
es that accompanied the secularization process, this approach recognizes how 
religiosity must become a qualifying component not only of the “human”, but 
also of the “social” (Chapter 14). Finally, it envisages the rediscovery of the es-
sence of the European Christian roots (Roy, 2019), by refocusing the attention 
on the issue of values, and on the need to inscribe them in the society and its 
main institutions.
In recent times, despite the aggravation of conflicting issues –such as the 
Ukrainian crises–, significant steps have been taken in the field of interreli-
gious dialogue at institutional level, following the meeting (Havana, February 
2016) between Pope Francis and the Patriarch of Moscow and all the Russias, 
Kiril. Just to cite an example, the European Orthodox-Catholic Forum involves 
representatives of both local Catholic Churches and Orthodox Churches with 
the aim of solving common social problems, such as poverty, the crisis of the 
family and the need to ethicize economic behaviors. Christians’ persecution in 
the Middle East is one of the topics of common interest –as strongly empha-
sized by the final declarations of the Havana meeting–, which will be able to 
gain from this new era of cooperation: exactly this problem was the focus of 
the yearly conference organized in 2018, again following the Cuba event. As 
stressed in Chapter 7, another crucial divide is represented by the recent meet-
ing (4 February 2019) between Pope Francis and the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar 
Ahamad al-Tayyib, which ended with the signing of the Document “Human 
Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together”, encouraging all persons who 
have faith in God to work together for promoting a culture of mutual respect, 
tolerance, coexistence and peace, and warn from any political manipulation of 
religion, particularly as a means to perpetrate violence, hostility, extremism, 
oppression. Following these institutional steps, we can expect a further devel-
opment of the initiatives launched at both national and local level. As a matter 
of fact, well beyond its concrete outcomes and realizations, interreligious dia-
logue offers a methodology useful for the identification of new ways of living to-
gether and for the construction of the well-being of the entire human family. Fi-
nally, relegated to the private sphere by the secularization’s narrative and the 
secularization’s ideology, religion today reappears a resource that can be acti-
vated for the common good.
What we have discussed in this introductory chapter certainly cannot give 
reason for the richness of this wide and articulated research. However, we 
think it is sufficient to give evidence of how the religious dimension can play a 
crucial role not only in enriching the analysis of migratory and integration 
 processes, but also in stimulating profound processes of social transformation, 
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through the provision of creative principles and an enriched awareness 
( Chapter 3). There is one last point which deserves our attention: recognizing 
and promoting the role that religiosity –in both its individual and community 
declinations– and religious organizations can play in the governance of hu-
man mobility and in planning paths of peaceful coexistence goes exactly in 
this same direction. As stressed in Chapter 2, the “intrusion” of religious identi-
ties and practices within public space –through the activism of different 
fbos– stimulates us to shift our focus from citizenship as a legal status to 
“ performances of citizenship”, able to reinvent ways to live together while fac-
ing the major challenges that are unfolding on the horizon of European and 
Italian society. Among these challenges, there is certainly the search of sustain-
able ways to manage human mobility, in front of the strong and growing in-
equalities at global level.
As a matter of fact, as the refugee crisis has dramatically shown, this issue 
suffers from the lack of sufficiently shared and ethically founded criteria. Hav-
ing reduced migration and border management to a technocratic task, mea-
sured in terms of economic costs and efficiency, and substantially aimed to 
restrain migration flows and reduce the number of refugee/asylum applica-
tions, Europe has discovered that it lacks convincing, persuasive and ethically 
based criteria through which to manage the complexity of contemporary hu-
man mobility (Chapter 11); that is for distinguishing between “authentic” and 
“fictitious” refugees. People with different national and religious backgrounds, 
together with fbos, have to be involved in the debate, which is exactly a mani-
festation of a “performing” citizenship, anchored in participatory and negotia-
tion practices, and aimed at giving shape to an inclusive and integrated society. 
As I have suggested elsewhere (Zanfrini, 2019), the need to identify new criteria 
and solutions through which to manage asylum seekers’ reception, the exam of 
asylum applications, and the initiatives in support of their integration could 
represent a remarkable test-bench for experiencing this kind of participative 
agora. In a certain degree, this wish was endorsed also by the final text of the 
recent “Global Compact on Refugees”,8 which has included fbos among the 
relevant stakeholders to be considered in the sharing of responsibilities. Not to 
mention that the shared moral values by different religious traditions provide 
strong arguments for the legal empowerment of migrants and asylum seekers. 
Despite all this, the reference to the religious and faith dimension in the 
major documents enacted by international organizations about migration pol-
icies and programs is quite scarce, if not inexistent. In this way, a substantial 
 dimension of the migratory and integration processes is neglected, as well 




 ingredient for both personal and social life which should be included in all the 
policies and actions involved in the migration governance.
Religion has historically offered a valuable contribution to various civiliza-
tions, as demonstrated by the numerous achievements in the economic, cul-
tural, educational and artistic fields, which arose precisely thanks to the values, 
ideals and religiously connoted actions of individuals and groups. However, 
contrary to the tendency to reduce religion to a cultural construct, it refers to 
something that distinguishes the human being: that is, his/her constitutive 
openness to the mystery, to the transcendent, to beyond what is immediately 
controllable. For this reason, the religious dimension cannot be excluded from 
the debate that intends to consider social life in its properly human dimension. 
Furthermore, as we have repeatedly remarked, religion is combined with free-
dom, which derives from the very high dignity with which every human being 
is endowed, who, despite being social, is never fully assimilable and/or deduc-
ible from the social context in which he/she is inserted (Martinelli, Magatti, 
2016). Significantly, in many cases, the experience of migrating is linked pre-
cisely to the need to protect the openness of the man/woman to the transcen-
dence from the possible absorption by the political, social, familial and some-
times even religious structures – when the latter pursue aims far from their 
own nature (Chapter 10). Only by taking seriously the prospect of focusing on 
migrants, not on flows, it is possible to grasp the regenerative function that reli-
gion can play not only for the single believers, but also for society as a whole. As it 
has clearly emerged from this study, the religious dimension, in fact, brings 
into play the crucial importance of the meaning of collective coexistence: the 
latter does not stand only on instrumentality and functionality, saturating ev-
ery space of personal and social life by means of efficient technical devices and 
reassuring bureaucratic procedures – thus reinforcing the individualization 
and isolation of the subjects, on the one hand, and the absolutization of the 
techno-economic systems, on the other, and pushing for a merely technical 
integration at the expense of the social and cultural one (Martinelli, forthcom-
ing). Repositioning at the center of attention the meanings (cultural, social, 
personal) that nurture collective coexistence is good for all, believers (of vari-
ous religions) and non-believers, since this option safeguards the human and 
social values that constitute the heritage of every culture and set in motion the 
most vital dimension of the human flourishing. For this reason, the challenge 
that confronts local societies as well as the international community and its 
institutional bodies concerns the correct consideration of the religious dimen-
sion within the debates, documents and actions undertaken in relation to the 
migration phenomenon. Since the latter is not merely constituted by “flows”, 
but by persons.
© PAOLO GOMARASCA, ���� | doi:10.1163/97890044�9604_003
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
<UN>
Chapter 2
The Uncanny “Religious” Refugee: a Post-Secular 
Perspective on Ethics of Hospitality
Paolo Gomarasca
The aim of this chapter is to show and analyze the unethical ambivalence of 
the dominant narratives about the events of migration, especially in the case 
of (forced) displacement. On the one hand, refugees are criminalized and tar-
geted as a dangerous threat to border security. Refoulement practices and con-
centration camp-like conditions in some refugee camps are the “zoopolitical” 
effect of this paranoid rhetoric. On the other hand, counter-narratives portray 
refugees as helpless, passive victims. The effect of this idealized rhetoric is as-
sociated with a wide range of relief actions, such as safe zones, humanitarian 
entry visas, resettlement in solidarity, residency permits and other forms of 
what some theorists call biopolitical care. The paradox is that these two stereo-
typed imaginaries of forced displacement are the two faces of the same unethi-
cal process of dehumanization: in both cases, refugees are objects of other 
people’s interpretations and actions. But the key point is that, in this process of 
dehumanization, religion is often politicized and plays an instrumental part in 
justifying the two opposite narratives: the dangerous refugee is a (bad) Muslim, 
which threatens Christian civilization; the vulnerable refugee is a (good) vic-
timized Christian or a (good) poor Muslim, who wait patiently in camps for 
Western salvation.
An ethics of hospitality is possible only under two conditions. Firstly, we 
need to de-instrumentalize religion and analyze the real, multi-dimensional 
role of religion in refugees’ experience: the role as a root cause of displace-
ment, in the countries of departure; and the role as a source of resiliency and 
as a key factor, which can both facilitate and impede integration processes in 
the countries of arrival. Secondly, we need to give back to the refugees their 
human subjectivity, which means enabling them to enter the discourse and 
express their subjective outlook on their own experience of forced displace-
ment and on the importance of their religious belonging.
The political effect of this post-secular hospitality is a discursive act that 
creates a public space, where social ties can be (re-)built. Religion, in this con-
text of re-humanization, can be an integral part of refugees’ public space mak-
ing, along four main lines of research:
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1) identity, that focuses on individual and collective processes of shaping 
and reshaping some forms of self-definition, based on religious beliefs 
and values;
2) religious freedom, which legitimizes the pluralistic involvement of (reli-
gious) identities in public life;
3) citizenship, which is not tied to rigid national territoriality but includes 
fluidity of borders and multiple (religious) identities and loyalties;
4) common good, i.e. a multi-religious social capital, generated by the new 
citizens and their desire to participate in their new society of settlement.
1 Agents of Transgression
The first ethical step to be taken when talking about refugees is to acknowl-
edge the transgressive character of their arrival: displaced persons, especially 
in the case of religious refugees, cross the border by force, they try all they can, 
they negotiate (with borders guards, smugglers, fishermen, and other actors 
(Mainwaring, 2016)) and finally break in, under the effect of the terror of per-
secution. Their sudden appearance on the European scene unleashes anxiety. 
Religious refugees embody danger, they are perceived as carriers of trauma, 
which is associated with “a simplistic trope about violence: yesterday’s victim 
may become tomorrow’s perpetrator” (Varvin, 2017: 360). The Syrian flux in 
2015 is emblematical: an incredibly effective right-wing message has framed 
the immigration crisis as a “Muslim threat” (Forlenza, Turner 2018: 28), perhaps 
because too many Europeans (and Americans) know that most of isis’s vic-
tims are Muslim, not only Shia, as would have seemed logical (Flescher, 2017: 
175).1 It is not by chance that the vast majority of the refugees registered by 
unhcr are Sunni Muslims (Eghdamian, 2015). Sure, it could be argued that 
Sunni are not, in a strict legal sense, religious refugees.2 Besides, they are not a 
1 With respect to the Syrian conflict, it is worth pointing out that it is precisely a conflict with 
ancient religious roots, as Tomass argued: “for more than a millennium, the tradition of at-
tributing infidelity (takfīr) and apostasy (irtidād) to religious communities that did not con-
form to the dominant Sunni orthodoxy led, in the best case, to the marginalization of those 
communities” (Tomass, 2016: 5).
2 It is worth mentioning that, while the law is clear that religious persecution constitutes 
grounds for asylum, applications on these grounds are very few. Partly because religious mi-
norities are generally reluctant to denounce religious discriminations: “fearing for their safe-
ty, they often hide their identities to avoid reprisal attacks based on sectarian tensions” (Egh-
damian, 2015). Partly because unhcr tends to prioritize refugee claims based on basic 
human neEds Things do not change, even if the Muslim “invaders” decide to convert to Chris-
tian faith: when applying for asylum, they may be treated with suspicion, because “the 
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minority, as in the case of Christian, Druze, Ismaili and other Muslim and non-
Muslim minority religious people and families fleeing Syria. But the truth is 
that religious persecution is following them and waiting for them at Europe’s 
borders. An interesting case-study relates to Bulgarian vigilantes, patrolling the 
borders of the EU, between 2014 and 2016. Among these far-rights activists and 
defenders of Europe, there was an unexpected “hero”, a Bulgarian Muslim who 
explained his rationale, during an interview: “we want to stop an Islamic inva-
sion” (Rexhepi, 2018: 2223).
All this seems to confirm our starting point: the religious refugee is insepa-
rable from the theme of the (unexpected) trespasser, which materializes as an 
“illegal body”, to be carefully controlled (Ajana, 2013; Lindskov Jacobsen, 2017). 
As Nancy would point out, this trauma of intrusion is intrinsically bind to the 
stranger in general: “there must be something of the intrus in the stranger; oth-
erwise, the stranger would lose its strangeness” (Nancy 2002: 1). However, this 
evidence is not as simple as it appears at first sight and that is why it deserves 
a further inquiry.
2 Too Much Like Us
Let us consider now the famous scene of intrusion in The uncanny guest, an 
early tale by Hoffmann, originally published in 1819:
Into a quiet happy group of friends, just when supernatural matters were 
forming the subject of conversation, there suddenly came a stranger, who 
struck everyone as being uncanny and terrifying, notwithstanding his ap-
parent everydayness, and seeming belonging to the common level. (Hoff-
mann, 1892: 141)
In his analysis, Freud explained the shocking effect triggered by the Hoffman-
nian guest with the ambivalence of his entrance, reaching the conclusion that 
the uncanny (Unheimlich) is in some way or another a sub-species of familiar 
 genuineness of their conversion is often called into question” (Bielefeldt et al., 2016: 62). 
Christian convert asylum-seekers (but also Christians) are asked detailed factual “Bible triv-
ia” questions, such as: “Can you name the twelve apostles?” “When is Pentecost?” “What fruit 
did Adam eat?” (appg and aag, 2016: 3) Moreover, “extraditions of converts to their countries 
of origin, even in the face of obvious risks of persecution, have at times been justified with 




(Heimlich) (Freud, 1919: 232). More specifically, the unexpected visitor arouses 
horror because of the uncomfortable sense of the unfamiliar within the famil-
iar. This blurring of the boundaries between everydayness and strangeness 
makes the uncanny especially applicable to debates on forced displacement. 
Symptomatically, the refugees’ arrival involves a creeping feeling of familiarity 
Source: Pew Research Center analysis of external data (Pew Research, 2016)
Table 2.1  Countries where nationalist political parties or politicians targeted religious 
groups in 2016, and religious groups that were targeted
Country Region Targeted religious group
United States Americas Muslims
Burma (Myanmar) Asia-Pacific Muslims
India Asia-Pacific Christians, Muslims, Hindus
Nepal Asia-Pacific Christians
New Zealand Asia-Pacific Muslims
Philippines Asia-Pacific Jews, Christians








Germany Europe Muslims, Jews




Poland Europe Muslims, Jews, 
Non-Christians
Slovakia Europe Muslims
Sweden Europe Muslims, Jews
Switzerland Europe Muslims
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with people whose lives are distant from our own. Briefly, they are people just 
like us – “perhaps too much like us” (Macdonald, 2015).
What happens, then? The answer depends on the direction of oscillation 
between the familiar and the unfamiliar. If the “too much” prevails, repug-
nance arises. For example, when refugees are perceived and judged to be ex-
cessively similar, to the point of becoming “more like ourselves than we” (Žižek, 
2008: 72), an unconscious claim of superiority will try to “refoul” the stifling 
commonalties with them. That sounds remarkably close to what our Muslim 
vigilante claimed: “We, the Bulgarian Muslims, cannot accept jihadist and is-
lamists, people who violate our culture; we are used to living by European stan-
dards and by Bulgarian standards” (Rexhepi, 2018: 2223). This narcissistic de-
fense against the perceived excess of equality can be paraphrased like this: all 
things considered, they should really not be like us, perhaps they are not even 
human (and then inhumane behavior and cruelty may be justified).
On the contrary, when refugees are interpreted as “just” like us, thus neutral-
izing the shock of intrusion, a sense of romantic closeness can prompt a reac-
tion of compassion and care. Take, for example, the first executive order of 
Trump’s presidency, the travel ban, that barred citizens of seven mostly Mus-
lim nations from entering America: many protesters expressed solidarity by 
carrying placards bearing such messages as “We Are All Muslims Now” and 
“Let Them In” (The Economist, 2017: 15).
We can explain this unconditional sympathy as follows: all things consid-
ered, we are all foreigners. And we can go further, as Kristeva has done: “If I am 
a foreigner, then there are no foreigners” (Kristeva, 1991: 192).3
As we can easily imagine, this repugnance/compassion dialectic results in 
the current ambivalence of narratives about religious asylum seekers: on the 
one hand, religious refugees are demonized and targeted as a dangerous threat 
to border security; on the other hand, counter-narratives portray religious refu-
gees as innocent victims. Religion, properly manipulated, plays therefore a piv-
otal role in reinforcing these two stereotypes, and in justifying two opposite 
3 We agree with Kristeva in arguing that the antidote of xenophobia can occur when we recog-
nize our “internal uncanniness”. Freud’s discovery of unconscious can be explained with the 
idea that the constituent portion of the human psyche amounts to a sort of “strangeness” 
within ourselves. Nevertheless, her idealistic claim of disappearance of strangeness by self-
effacement (“there are no foreigners”) seems to contradict the premise (“I am a foreigner”). 




policies: in one case, refoulement practices and concentration camp-like con-
ditions in some refugee camps or detention centers; in the other case, humani-
tarian camps, safe zones, resettlements in solidarity and other forms of relief 
actions. This oscillation between aggressive closure and humanitarian open-
ness has been emblematically visible in Europe’s Janus-faced handling of the 
2015 refugee crisis, as argued by Zanfrini (2019).
Let’s start by investigating the demonizing narrative: first of all, we will ex-
amine the zoopolitics, i.e., the use of animalized metaphors and imagery that 
pervade the rhetoric of “irregular” migrants and the violent de-humanization 
of refugees (§3); secondly, our focus will be on Islamophobia (§4); thirdly, we 
will delve into the experience of discrimination in aid, suffered by Christian 
asylum seekers (§5).
3 Caged Animals
Yarl’s Wood is the UK’s main immigration detention center. In 2014, the treat-
ment of detainees was revealed in exclusive footage obtained by a Channel 4 
News investigation. The 15-minute video revealed racism and animalization, 
combined with sexist objectification: to give an insight, one guard refers to 
detained women as “beasties” and “caged animals”, suggesting that his col-
league “take a stick in with you and beat them up”. In another scene, a guard 
states nonchalantly that “these Black women… they’re fucking horrible” (Can-
ning 2017: 56).
How is it possible to imagine this de-humanization of persecuted4 people, 
in a country, by the way, which is often represented as a champion of human 
rights?
The Hoffmannian guest helps us to understand the case of Yarl’s Wood: the 
terrifying everydayness of detained women is their obvious precariousness. 
That does not mean that refugees are innocent, passive victims: this is, as we 
will see (§6), the typical Left-liberal litany, which stands in opposition to the 
demonizing narrative. Precariousness is simply the basic aspect of human con-
dition: life, all human life, is vulnerable and, therefore, ethics begins when we 
recognize that all lives are worth living and worth protecting.5
4 This is not to say that all refugee women have experienced sexual violence. Nevertheless, as 
Women for Refugee Women reported, out of 46 female interviewees who had been held in 
detention in the UK, 33 had been raped in their home country (Girma et al., 2014: 5–6).
5 As Butler rightly suggested, “precarity cuts across identity categories as well as multi-cultural 
maps” (Butler, 2009: 32).
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Conceived along these lines, it seems difficult to deny that precariousness is 
the truth that drives us to say: all things considered, “these Black women” are 
people just like us. The problem is when this radical familiarity becomes, for 
some people, “too much”. More specifically, the problem is when we try to re-
pudiate our own precariousness, this common truth that refugees, by just be-
ing there, remind us. If “these Black women” are nothing but the projective 
apparition of our disturbing, intolerable precariousness, then they must not be 
human like us.6 They are horrible caged animals.
This fetishist vilification is possible through an unconscious mechanism of 
abjection7 and usually takes the brutal form of control: Yarl’s Wood is a clear 
example of what Berlant has termed “hygienic governmentality” (Berlant, 1997: 
175), a defensive strategy underpinned by the narrative that an abject popula-
tion threatens the common good and must be rigorously governed and moni-
tored by all sectors of society.
This zoopolitics (Vaughan-Williams, 2015: 70)8 can be particularly aggres-
sive, especially when it is combined with the paranoid fantasy that “the only 
good Muslim is the bad Muslim” (Akil, 2016: 111). And that is how we arrive to 
measure the fear of the uncanny religious refugee: Islam is the “principal 
6 As Arendt noticed (Arendt, 1976: 190), this claim of superiority is well depicted in a famous 
passage from Conrad’s Heart of Darkness: “The earth seemed unearthly. We are accustomed 
to look upon the shackled form of a conquered monster, but there – there you could look at 
a thing monstrous and free. It was unearthly, and the men were… No, they were not inhuman. 
Well, you know that was the worst of it – this suspicion of their not being inhuman. It would 
come slowly to one. They howled and leaped and spun and made horrid faces, but what 
thrilled you was just the thought of their humanity – like yours – the thought of your remote 
kinship with this wild and passionate uproar. Ugly. Yes, it was ugly enough, but if you were 
man enough you would admit to yourself that there was in you just the faintest trace of a 
response to the terrible frankness of that noise, a dim suspicion of there being a meaning in 
it which you – you so remote from the night of first ages – could comprehend” (Conrad, 1988: 
37–38).
7 “The abject – Butler argues – designates here precisely those “unlivable” and “uninhabitable” 
zones of social life which are nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy the 
status of the subject, but whose living under the sign of the “unlivable” is required to circum-
scribe the domain of the subject. This zone of uninhabilitability will constitute the defining 
limit of the subject’s domain; it will constitute that site of dreaded identification against which 
–and by virtue of which– the domain of the subject will circumscribe its own claim to auton-
omy and to life. In this sense, then, the subject is constituted through the force of exclusion 
and abjection, one which produces a constitutive outside to the subjected, an abjected out-
side, which is, after all, “inside” the subject as its own founding repudiation” (Butler, 1993: 3).
8 Vaughan-Williams gives the shocking example of the transformation of the former zoo in 
Tripoli into a detention centre for predominantly Ghanaian, Nigerian, and Chadian migrants 
destined to Europe. Research undertaken by ngos in Tripoli zoo, but also across Libyan pro-
cessing centres, suggests the same animalization process that we have discovered in Yarl’s 
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 catalyst” (Wilson, Mavelli, 2017: 3) for increasingly harsh immigration policies 
and growing exclusionary discourses.
4 Muslim Intruders
A 2016 infamous cover of the Polish magazine wSieci showed a crude represen-
tation of what we can call a demonizing narrative of religious refugees, por-
trayed as hypersexualized predators (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2017): a naked white 
blond woman, wrapped in the flag of Europe and screaming in fear, being 
grabbed by dark-skinned hands, with the headline “Islamic Rape of Europe” 
(Hart, 2017: 32). According to Pew Research Centre, the use of such rhetoric is 
especially common in Europe: “about a third of European countries (33%) had 
nationalist parties that made political statements against religious minorities, 
an increase from 20% of countries in 2015”. (Pew Research Centre (2016: 7)9  
A clear example is what happened in 2015, when Hungary erected a 
170- kilometre razor-wire fence along its border with Serbia. This first act was 
later revealed as a part of a complex plan of hygienic governmentality: Hun-
gary further adopted two legal measures that created the category of “illegal 
migrant”.10 The Prime Minister Viktor Orbán explained in a commentary for 
Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung his line of argument: “those arriving have been 
raised in another religion, and represent a radically different culture. Most of 
them are not Christians, but Muslims. This is an important question, because 
Europe and European identity is rooted in Christianity. Is it not worrying in it-
self that  European Christianity is now barely able to keep Europe Christian? 
 Wood: “They (the guards) don’t even enter our room because they say that we smell and 
that we have illnesses. They constantly insult us, and call us: “you donkey, you dog”. When 
we are moving in their way, they look disgusted and slap us sometimes” (Amnesty, 2013: 14).
9 Obviously, anti-refugee views and ideologies are not limited to governments and politi-
cians. The number of European countries where nongovernmental nationalist organiza-
tions targeted religious groups also increased in 2016 (Pew Research Centre, 2016: 10).
10 “The first was an amendment to Hungary’s penal code, stating that persons entering the 
country without authorization –by forcing the frontier fence after September 15, 2015– are 
committing transgression liable to punishment by expulsion or imprisonment from one 
to three years. The second measure was taken by the Parliament of Hungary on Septem-
ber 12. At this time, a law was adopted which stipulated that military forces and police can 
use rubber bullets, teargas and various pyrotechnical devices to support action against 
migrants. Altogether, Parliament adopted a resolution providing that, in cases of emer-
gency, authorities are entitled to make use of any kind of available measure to protect the 
borders of Hungary” (Kantor, Cepoi, 2018: 156).
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There is no alternative, and we have no option but to defend our borders”. (Me-
tykova, 2016: 2)
Not surprisingly, this kind of Christian fundamentalism correlates strongly 
with right-wing authoritarianism (Koopmans, 2015: 38).11 As it is known, all 
four Visegrad countries refused EU quotas on refugees and proclaimed the de-
mise of Schengen (Matlary, 2018: 110–111). But the same paranoid rhetoric is 
pervasive across Europe. We only need to look at the list of countries where 
religious groups have been targeted (Pew Research, 2016: 7) to see the “elephant 
in the room” (Betts, 2016).
Perhaps this Islamophobic backlash can be statistically correlated (Pew Re-
search, 2018)12 to a sort of reactive Christianity, or, should we better say, “Chris-
tianist secularism” (Brubaker, 2016):13 because they are (bad) Muslims, they 
cannot be like us. And if they are bad, dangerous Muslims, then we, Europeans, 
must be, in some sense, Christians, and good Christians, perhaps not perfect, 
but superior to them.
That being the case, what happens to Christian refugees? Apparently, they 
are entitled to a better fate than that of Muslim invaders. However, the reality 
is quite different.
5 Christian Refugees = Muslim Terrorists
As we have just seen, the “violent Muslim invader” narrative reinforces a “toxic 
cocktail” (Hurd, 2017: 106) of nationalism, racism and anti-Muslim zoopolitics. 
During the 2016 US election, this cocktail was visible in Republican primary 
candidates’ demonizing rhetoric about a potential threat of Syrian refugees. 
Two candidates, Jeb Bush and Ted Cruz, suggested that the United States 
should admit only Christian refugees, because “there is no meaningful risk of 
Christians committing acts of terror”. (Meral, 2018: 5) Besides, they deserve 
11 As for the Polish clergy, we need to point out that the situation is more complex: some 
urge the Polish Catholic Church to follow the instructions of their Pope; but others are 
eager to align themselves with the right-wing government’s rhetoric around Muslim refu-
gees, invasion and fear of terrorism (Narkowicz, 2018: 363).
12 This is what emerges from a 15-country survey done by the Pew Research Centre, span-
ning 15 Western European: both church-attending and non-practicing Christians are 
more likely than religiously unaffiliated adults to express anti-immigrant views. This is 
not to say that most Christians in Europe oppose immigration or want to keep Muslims 
out of their countries: “the survey data show a statistical correlation – not a clear relation-
ship of cause and effect” (Pew Research, 2018: 78).
13 For a detailed account on the debate about secularism, see Chapter 3.
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 priority, if only we consider that “Christians are the most widely targeted reli-
gion”. And this is certainly true, although Muslims are not exactly that much 
better (Pew Research Centre, 2016: 26).
But the demonizing narrative claims that Christian’s suffering is deeper, and 
ultimately unique. Precariousness should be differentially allocated, because 
not all lives are worth protecting.14
An issue, however, arises whether the heralded “preference” for Christians 
involves a real intention to help the most persecuted religious group in the 
world or not. As rightly noticed by Song (2019: 124), Trump’s tough line on refu-
gees from mostly Muslim countries has also closed the door to Christians and 
other religious minorities. Not surprisingly, the number of Christian refugees 
granted entry into the U.S. has fallen dramatically, even though Christians ac-
count for a far larger share of refugees admitted than Muslims the first half of 
fiscal 2018 (63% vs. 17%), according to a Pew Research Centre analysis of State 
Department data (Konnor and Krogstad, 2018).
The situation in Europe is possibly worse than in US. Take, for example, the 
case of Pakistani Christians. A qualitative research conducted between June 
and December 2015 by Madziva and Lowndes (2018) gives us an understanding 
of Christian asylum seekers’ experiences in the UK, which is, by the way, a 
“Christian country”, if we believe the then pm Cameron (Oliva, Hall, 2017: 54). 
Among the interviewees, there was a male asylum seeker who explained:
As a Christian asylum seeker from a Muslim majority country you face 
many obstacles in putting forward your case. The major obstacle is the 
place where you come from and the way you look – these are things that 
you can’t change. Because of the way we look, immigration officials don’t 
trust us. (…) They don’t tell you openly that they are suspicious of you (…) 
but through their actions and body language, you can tell that you are a 
suspect. The problem is you can’t easily separate Christians from Mus-
lims, as we all look the same. (…) I am a Christian, but when people see 
me, they just conclude that I am a Muslim. So they think I have come to 
bomb their country. (Madziva, Lowndes, 2018: 80)
This equation of Pakistanis with bad Muslims makes it more difficult for 
Pakistani Christians to establish their Christian identity, and to prove their 
14 As Akil argued, this instrumentalization becomes a disavowal of the meaning of suffering 
itself, because it denies the universal and shared precariousness: “one could assert that 
the singularization of one’s suffering as unique and unrepeatable could also function as a 
repudiation of the suffering of all others” (Akil, 2016: 138).
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 well-founded fear of persecution.15 That means, once again, that the rhetorical 
bias for Christianity is instrumental to criminalize refugees, on the whole. And 
this is nothing compared to what happens when Pakistani Christians come to 
Thailand and seek UN protection from persecution. The problem here is that 
 Thailand has not signed the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and therefore con-
siders all refugees to be illegal immigrants. A bbc investigation has revealed 
that Thai officials routinely arrest and detain Christian asylum seekers, some-
times chaining them like dogs (Rogers, 2016).
And with this, we are back to where we started: how can we escape from the 
horrific dehumanization of zoopolitics?
An easy way is to mobilize compassion towards refugees, as opposed to de-
monization. (El Sheikh, 2017) But is this counter-narrative a real solution? That 
is what we need to address now. We begin with the left liberal litany “we are all 
human (refugees)” and its secularist indifference to the religious belonging of 
refugees (§6); we will proceed to show two dehumanizing effects of seeing 
refugees as helpless creatures and camping them in “humanitarian spaces”:
a) the underestimation of the risks of religiously motivated attacks in refu-
gee camps, especially against non-Muslim minorities (§7);
b) the “zombification” of refugees, or the underestimation of the “agency of 
refugees” (Parekh, 2017) (§8).
6 Beautiful Souls
During the so-called long summer of migration of 2015, a great variety of cam-
paigners16 have opposed human rights abuses and injustice against refugees. 
In explaining their decision to support the migrant cause, several activists 
framed it as a moral duty rooted in humanitarian motivations: “It is humanity. 
You cannot just pass by. We are all victims of a system. This feeling of injustice 
and insecurity harms all of us” (Milan, Pirro, 2018: 145).
As we can immediately see, “We are all victims” is the exact antithesis of 
“They are all Muslim intruders”. In this counter-narrative, the uncanny nature 
of intrusion has disappeared and refugees are romantically interpreted as “just 
like us”. Clearly, we are not arguing that mobilizations and protests, from civil 
disobedience to solidarity actions towards refugees (Lahusen, Grasso, 2018), 
15 The truth is that Home Office tends to paint “a broad picture of Pakistanis as fraudulent 
and opportunistic cheats, and hence potentially bogus claimants” (Madziva, Lowndes, 
2018: 87–88).
16 Supporters include many ngos, church-based charities, established migrant organisa-
tions, left-wing academics and artists, as well as some groups within trade unions and 
political parties (Ataç et al., 2015: 8).
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are purely rhetorical exhibitions. On the contrary, resistance and rebellion 
against injustice, as we will see (§8), is of crucial importance from an ethical 
point of view. The problem is that the “We are all victims” frame is easily ex-
ploitable, especially when it becomes a typical left-wing strategy against popu-
lism or the litany of the “greatest hypocrites”, as Žižek polemically likes to call 
those who advocate for open borders and unconditional hospitality:
secretly, they know very well this will never happen, for it would trigger 
an instant populist revolt in Europe. They play the Beautiful Soul, which 
feels superior to the corrupted world while secretly participating in it: 
they need the corrupted world as the only terrain where they can exert 
their moral superiority. (Žižek, 2016: 8)
What is relevant for our analysis is that this idealizing narrative is not only 
potentially hypocrite, but also indifferent to the religious dimension of forced 
displacement. We can identify this undervaluation of religion using the drama 
triangle,17 as shown in the version provided by Ruard Ganzevoort (2017: 19–20).
We have seen that the demonizing (typically right-wing) narrative frames 
Muslim refugees in the role of perpetrator, as a national security threat. Even if 
they are persecuted, their religious background takes precedence in the fram-
ing. Christian refugees are –in stark contrast– framed as innocent victims. And 
obviously the right-wing populists define themselves as the rescuers, claiming 
to be the only group that can offer the solution to stop the threat: the securiti-
zation and progressive closure of borders and the creation of detention centers 
to accelerate the deportation of irregular migrants.
In response, left-wing Beautiful Souls apply the drama triangle quite 
 differently. They see their right-wing opponents as the real perpetrators, threat-
ening and sometimes committing violence against refugees, which are now 
 considered as victims, whether they are Muslims or Christians: they are all suf-
fering from various discriminations, first from oppressive regimes and cruel 
opponents, then from traffickers and harsh immigration policies, and finally 
from the anti-immigration movements. The focus, therefore, is not on the reli-
gious dimension of displacement, but instead on the humanitarian one: “It is 
humanity”, said the previously mentioned activist. And as you would expect, 
the (left-wing) “Beautiful Souls” cast themselves in the same role as their (right-
wing) counterpart: the rescuer that takes the side of the sufferers. The relief 
strategy, in this case, is the production and management of hospitable spaces, 
such as humanitarian camps.
17 The “Drama triangle” is a model of social interaction and conflict, originally described by 
Karpman (1968), using the terms “perpetrator”, “rescuer” and “victim”.
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Paradoxically, though, this secularized humanitarian narrative, along with 
its humanitarian camping strategies, can have severe dehumanizing conse-
quences, thus proving that it is not a real alternative to the zoopolitical drift. 
Let us look at why this happens.
7 Re-persecuted (non-Muslim) Refugees
The ignorance of the importance of religious belonging in the humanitarian 
narrative and in the practice of refugee protection, is not difficult to identify. 
Eghdamian (2016), who conducts a research about the minority Syrians in Jor-
dan, has revealed a considerable lack of statistics on religious experiences, par-
ticularly those on religious minorities, in refugee camps. When he asked why 
the unhcr staff he interviewed in Jordan did not take religion seriously in 
their understanding and assessment of Syrian refugees’ needs, José Riera18 re-
ferred to the continued dominance of the secular line of thought among hu-
manitarian actors:
It’s my own view that because of the secular mind-set and the reality that 
many United Nations officials come from societies where faith has been 
pushed out of the public sphere and into a corner somewhere, we are 
supposed to be “blind” to faith. (Eghdamian, 2016: 453–454)
Interestingly, even a Caritas staff activist showed the same neutral position:
unhcr does not shed light on Christians because it’s a general crisis. 
Who is the most vulnerable? A refugee is a refugee. They (unhcr) are 
18 José Riera is senior advisor to the director of international protection, unhcr headquar-
ters, Geneva.
Table 2.2  The “Drama triangle”
Rescuer Perpetrator Victim
Right-wing populists Muslim intruders Persecuted Christians
Left-wing ‘Beautiful Souls’ Right-wing populists All refugees
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neutral. We should all be neutral. It’s what our work should be. (Eghda-
mian, 2016: 455)
So, where is the problem? The problem is that religious minorities could be 
vulnerable to reprisal attacks based on sectarian lines in refugee camps or asy-
lum centers. (uscirf, 2013: 6) Consequently, a religious-blind position is un-
able to assess needs and vulnerability among refugee population and to pre-
vent discrimination that can emerge in displacement contexts. The cases of 
Sweden and Germany are tragically emblematic: as reported by Kino,19 Chris-
tians are persecuted in the Middle East and re-persecuted in asylum centers by 
their Muslim counterparts:
Christians are slaughtered because of their faith in Syria and Iraq. The 
ones that are escaping to the neighboring countries cannot be in the refu-
gee centers because they are persecuted there as well. If they make it to 
Sweden and Germany they risk to be persecuted again, this time in the 
countries’ asylum centers. (quoted in Abdelhady and Malmberg, 2019: 120)
The situation in the rest of Europe is not much better and this motion for a 
resolution, tabled by Unhurian (2017) and other members of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, is a sign of serious concern:
(…) Regrettably, many refugees have continued to suffer from discrimina-
tion, violence and sometimes death because of their minority beliefs 
even after reaching Europe, in many cases at the hands of fellow refugees. 
In Resolution 2050 (2015), the Parliamentary Assembly highlighted cases 
where Christians have been thrown out of boats crossing the Mediterra-
nean. There are also widespread reports of cases where refugees have 
been attacked for their beliefs in reception centers and refugee camps 
across Europe – in a 2016 report, Open Doors for instance documented 
hundreds of religiously motivated attacks on Christians and Yazidis in 
German refugee shelters. As member States are working to implement 
best practices to care for refugees and migrants in accordance with the 
core values of the Council of Europe, including equality and the 
19 Nuri Kino is an award-winning Assyrian-Swedish journalist of Turkish origins who fo-
cuses on minority rights in the Middle East. In 2014, he started an organization, A De-
mand for Action, which attempts to provide aid to Christians in Iraq and Syria. He is also 
active in the Assyrian Orthodox Church.
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 protection of minorities, the Assembly should closely examine this chal-
lenging reality and propose recommendations aimed at effectively pro-
tecting minorities having fled religiously motivated violence, and up-
holding freedom of thought, conscience and religion in reception centers 
and refugee camps.
It seems therefore clear that, despite the commitment for non-discrimination 
and care for all migrants, a secular form of hospitality could turn out to be re-
ally harmful for some religious refugees. And this is not the only dehumanizing 
effect of the humanitarian narrative.
8 Zombipolitics
Let us consider now the representation of refugees as helpless creatures. This 
reduction of refugees to “Muselmänner”20 is obviously functional to empha-
size the moral superiority of humanitarian rescuers: if refugees are nothing but 
“zombies”21, they are definitely in need of a providential savior. Obviously, the 
sense of desperation and helplessness is not uncommon to most refugees.22 
20 The “Muselmann” appears in Primo Levi’s account of his experience of the concentration 
camp: this slang term was used by concentration camp inmates to categorize fellow in-
mates who were reduced to the status of zombie, having lost “all consciousness and all 
personality” (Agamben, 1998: 185).
21 The thought of describing the life of refugees in refugee camps as the life of the “living 
dead” occurred to Bauman in 2002: “Having abandoned or been forced out of their former 
milieu, refugees tend to be stripped of the identities that milieu defined, sustained and 
reproduced. Socially, they are “zombies”: their old identities survive mostly as ghosts – 
haunting the nights all the more painfully for being all but invisible in the camp’s day-
light” (Bauman, 2002: 347). Interestingly, such alignment of refugees and zombies eventu-
ally became a common trope in pro-migrant narratives and accusations of dehumanisation 
and disregard of fellow human beings, “to the point that these lives become disposable” 
(Oktem, 2016). And the same plot device is used even outside academic circles: a famous 
Slovenian comic, Klemen Slakonja, plays Angela Merkel in a YouTube video, where the 
German chancellor dances with refugees made up to resemble zombies. “Refugees com-
ing to Europe … don’t have the opportunities that they should get, so they are like the 
living dead here”, Slakonja explained to Reuters (Reuters, 2017).
22 It is known that “refugees experiencing long transitional periods in which they are re-
fused refugee status can develop disabling sociosomatic reaction, as exemplified by the 
Uppgivenhetssyndrom (“resignation syndrome”) that is observed in Sweden, where hun-
dreds of refugee children have fallen unconscious, after being informed that their families 
will be expelled from the country” (Ventevogel et al., 2019: 107).
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But the point is: are we sure that the life in humanitarian camps is perfectly 
equivalent to the life in concentration camps?
It is true that these temporary, exceptional spaces, where refugees are kept 
indefinitely in a “frozen transience” (Bauman, 2002: 345), come close to Goff-
mann’s ideal type of “total institution”. The ambivalent case of Zaatari camp in 
Jordan is telling. On the one hand, this camp typifies the negative conceptual 
representation of a camp: “it is an extraterritorial space of exclusion, excep-
tion, segregation, and control” (Kikano, Lizarralde, 2019: 39). On the other 
hand, its occupants cannot be considered as walking corpses. It is undeniable, 
indeed, that the camp has evolved into a city-like space, displaying a remark-
able resilience. There is even an office for employment, set up in coordination 
with the Government of Jordan, in order to facilitate access to formal work 
opportunities across Jordan for refugees living in the camp (ilo, 2017).
It is impressive, but let us not deceive ourselves, Zaatari is not a wonderful 
haven, certainly not for young girls, increasingly targets of harassment, sexual 
assault, and early forced marriages. Once again, however, even these young vic-
tims are not bodies in complete submission, or a voiceless “biopolitical mass of 
bare life” (Bulley, 2017: 40). The story of Omaima Hoshan, a teenage Syrian refu-
gee in Zaatari, proves it: this Malala-inspired girl is campaigning against child 
marriage in her refugee camp, encouraging other girls to fight the practice 
(Dunmore, 2016).
Briefly, it is true that humanitarian camps are sites in which refugees are 
closed and their bodies are potentially “abjected”; but camps are also sites of 
counter-conduct, in which forced displaced persons choose to stage protest 
activities and make use of a language of rights against the language of dehu-
manization.23 And fortunately, these fundamental processes of defiance are in 
place not only in humanitarian camps, but also in detention centers, where 
refugees –as we have previously commented (§3)– are exposed to horrific ani-
malization. Let us go back for a moment to Yarl’s Wood Immigration  Removal 
23 It is no coincidence that, for example, there is a right to appeal against a refused asylum 
application. Without this fundamental right, “the state may apply its coercive power arbi-
trarily since this application will not be critically examined” (Kritzman-Amir and Spijker-
boer, 2013: 26). In this context, the landmark case of mss v Greece and Belgium (2011) is 
instructive. In its verdict, the European Court of Human Rights ruled against Greece and 
Belgium for “inhuman and degrading treatment” in respect of their arrangements for the 
detention of asylum seekers, “the first time in legal history that an EU Member State was 
found in breach of international humanitarian law. Moreover, the ruling was used by the 
ECtHR to further warn all EU national governments of the need to comply with interna-
tional human rights legislation in respect of conditions of detention” (Vaughan-Williams, 
2015: 26).
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Centre: in February 2018, more than 100 women have gone on hunger strike 
over “inhumane” conditions at the facility (Bulman, 2018).24
These micro-tactics of resistance are decisive, because they are undeniable 
symptoms of subjectivity: refugees are not passive victims; sometimes, they 
prove to be agents of rebellion against their subaltern condition. And some-
times, this open dissent can assume a political vibrancy, especially when these 
acts of protest become “creative breaks” (Isin, Nielsen, 2008) that re-invent 
ways of living together. This participatory vitality rejects the double hegemon-
ic discourse of zoopolitics and zombipolitics, helping us to understand that 
the only good narrative is the narrative that refugees tell about themselves, i.e. 
a narrative that re-establishes their status as auctori and claimants of justice: 
as Bauman reminds us, refugees are “fully fledged actors in the life-drama; 
 people, like all of us, endowed with motives that reach beyond the instinct of 
survival and purposes that transcend the breadline, and who engage in interac-
tion or decline interaction, weave networks of social bonds or tear them apart” 
(Bauman, 2002: 343–344).
This anti-hegemonic narrative of engagement/decline of social bonds is not 
an easy task: it demands an ethics of “hostipitality” (Derrida, 2002: 356),25 
where the tension between the unfamiliar and the familiar of refugees is never 
finally resolved, neither in favor of violent repulsion, nor in favor of romantic 
compassion. Needless to say, this ethics is possible if, and only if, we proceed 
on a provisional hypothesis concerning the role of religion in refugees’ narra-
tive and in their political decision to reconfigure (Sennett, 2018: 288) a livable 
place in exile. Our hypothesis relies on the undeniable fact that the emergence 
of refugee question is inseparable from, and sometimes coextensive with, reli-
gion. Suffice it to consider, as argued by Hollenbach, that “humanitarian emer-
gencies fracture the taken-for-granted worlds of the displaced, shattering and 
reshaping the relationships that give meaning to the routines of ordinary life. 
Such crises also affect those seeking to help, who have to face the suffering of 
those they assist in a way that can lead to secondary trauma and burnout. Thus, 
humanitarian crises and forced migration–Hollenbach concludes–often raise 
questions about the ultimate meaning that are, in essence, religious. Is con-
tinuing to struggle pointless in the face of loss, or can one trust, however tenta-
tively, that there is a deeper source of hope?” (Hollenbach, 2014: 454).
24 Besides, this is not the first time: in 2007 more than 100 women were involved in a hunger 
strike at Yarl’s Wood centre and was “propelled by abusive treatment by detention centre 
stuff” (Conlon, 2016: 137).
25 Derrida invents the neologism of “hostipitalité” (hostipitality) in order to illustrate that 
hostility (which is, in Hoffmaniann terms, the structural aspect of intrusion of the “un-
canny guest”) is intimately intertwined with hospitality.
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Let us sketch, then, in conclusion, a four-dimensional frame for this post-
secular ethics of displacement.
9 Asylum Speakers
In 1981, on the occasion of forming the International Committee Against Pira-
cy, Foucault delivered a speech entitled Confronting Governments: Human 
Rights at the UN in Geneva. Addressing “all members of the community of the 
governed”, he argued that the “suffering of men must never be a silent residue 
of policy. It grounds an absolute right to stand up and speak to those who hold 
power” (Foucault, 2000: 474).26
If we agree that refugees have the fundamental right to be heard, we auto-
matically admit their ability to construct themselves as subjects through nar-
rative (Shemak, 2011: 3–4). Briefly, at stake here is their crafting of one’s self. 
Identity then is our first keyword that requires us to de-instrumentalize the role 
of religion.
Religious belonging is not reducible to a discriminatory label (bad Muslim/
good Christian refugee). When we really listen to life stories, we immediately 
realize that beliefs and religious affiliations are powerful signifiers for identity-
building strategies. Furthermore, religion, especially in the case of forced dis-
placement, becomes more and more important as a marker of demarcation 
and distinction from others, sometimes in a racialized and antagonistic way, 
sometimes in a dialectical and potentially cooperative way (Pickel, 2018: 35). 
That means that beliefs and religious values operate in competing ways, as 
they both facilitate and impede integration processes. It is therefore impossi-
ble to guarantee that religious refugees will avoid reactive solutions and behav-
iors, in the process of coping with uprooting and the additional burden of ad-
aptation to a new way of life (Goździak, Shandy, 2002: 131). However, what 
should be guaranteed, and fostered by the States, is the favorable context in 
which they can express, exercise and eventually reconfigure their religious 
identities. This legal context is formally opened by the right to freedom of reli-
gion, which is our second keyword.
True freedom of religion must protect the fundamental aspiration of per-
sons to gather and flourish in communities. As democratic theorists argue, the 
freedom of religious communities to operate in civil society serves as a crucial 
basis for democratic governance (Hertzke, 2013). It is also true that freedom of 
26 As it is known, Foucault was referring to the specific suffering of the Vietnamese asylum 
seekers who had left their country after the fall of Saigon.
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religion is subject to a diversity of interpretations in its meaning and applica-
tion, around the world. But from this complexity it does not follow that the 
concept is a Western construct, without universal meaning. The proof is that 
this human right is present in the Muslim world and Islam is not inherently 
hostile to it (Philpott, 2019).
Freedom of religion is obviously crucial in determining the refugee status. 
This is an interesting sentence, passed on 5 September 2012: the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union (cjeu, 2012) points out that, “given the concept of 
religion also includes participation in formal worship in public, the prohibi-
tion of such participation may constitute a sufficiently serious act within the 
meaning of Article 9(1)(a)”.27 What is important is that the Luxembourg Court 
rejects the common European practice of granting asylum for religious mo-
tives only in case of extreme persecution, and recognize that the freedom of 
religion includes the right to manifest one’s faith in public and collectively (see 
Chapters 4 and 9).
Finally, this fundamental religious agency is highly relevant in refugees’ so-
cial integration in the host society. Integration is a two-way process and can 
only be successfully pursued by refugees when the host society is truly hospi-
table to the impact of the uncanny (Robila, 2018: 2). It seems therefore clear 
that “government protections of religious freedom and social acceptance of 
diverse religious identities provide crucial leverage for inclusion of newcom-
ers” (Hertzke, 2018: 513–514).28 And that is how we arrive at the third keyword: 
citizenship.
If we accept that religious agency is an integral part of refugees’ public space 
making (Horstmann, Jung, 2015: 1), we must then ask ourselves: what happens 
when “non-citizens with extremely precarious status assert themselves as po-
litical by publicly making claims about rights and membership, freedom and 
equality?” (Nyers, 2008: 161). This “intrusion” of religious identities and  practices 
27 “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance” (European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 9(1)(a)).
28 From this inclusive point of view, the idea to prioritize the resettlement of certain reli-
gious refugees over members of other religious groups does not seem justifiable, as re-
cently stated by the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief: “States are 
reminded of their obligation to provide protection to refugees and migrants, regardless of 
their specific religion or belief. The pretext that refugees and migrants would erode the 
traditional religious make-up of a country amounts to a “territorialization” of religion, 
which violates the spirit and the letter of the universal right to freedom of religion or be-
lief” (Shaheed, 2018: 19).
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within public space forces us to shift our focus from citizenship as a legal status 
(which tends to neglect the importance of identities, participation and belong-
ing) to performances of citizenship, i.e. creative enactments that negotiate 
membership, re-inventing ways of living together (Isin, Saward, 2013). The case 
of religious communities of Muslim immigrants in Norway is emblematic. Im-
migrants bring with them religious faith and practice from their countries of 
origin, but “the Norwegian context offers them and their offspring the oppor-
tunity to develop and choose alternative forms of associational life” (Nyhagen 
Predelli 2008: 256). Consider, for example, Muslim women: they are increas-
ingly invited to participate in the mosque, which is traditionally considered as 
“men’s arena”. This new religious performance has visibly a political impact: it 
is no accident if Muslim women in Norway have made public calls for the rein-
terpretation of the Qur’an in ways that are more inclusive towards women.
It is not arbitrary, all things considered, to conclude by arguing that “migra-
tion is part of our cultural heritage” (EU, 2015: 14): “migratory peoples bring 
with them skills, knowledge, ideas, new approaches, entrepreneurship and 
cultural practices that enrich the social fabric of the communities they be-
come part of”. With this in mind, the fourth and final keyword stands out im-
mediately: common good.
In his 1963 letter Peace on Earth, Pope John xxiii argued that “civil authority 
exists not to confine men within the frontiers of their own nations, but primar-
ily to protect the common good of the State, which certainly cannot be di-
vorced from the common good of the entire human family”. (John xxiii, 1963: 
n. 98) That is why the Pontiff focuses on the unfairness and ill-treatment suf-
fered by refugees, because their “incredible sufferings” (John xxiii, 1963: n. 103) 
are bound to have impact on both the common good of the State and the com-
mon good of the entire human family. As Hollenbach rightly points out, the 
marginalization of refugees’ voice puts the common good in trouble: “when 
millions of people are forced to live under plastic sheeting and to face the dan-
gers of cholera and other serious diseases, oftentimes for years on end, indi-
vidual countries and the global human community itself are gravely wounded” 
(Hollenbach, 2008: 12).
Clearly, no one can offer ready-made solutions at hand. Perhaps, we need to 
review the assumptions of our global system. In the meantime, religious “asy-
lum speakers” claim to be heard, and challenge the limited horizons of a state-
based conception of citizenship. What is to be done? Hos(ti)pitality, surely. Not 
unconditionally, though. The common good criterion suggests here a neces-
sary counterbalance to the excessive claims of rights. Indeed, we know that 
refugees are obliged to comply with the laws of their host country, because –as 
Rawls would suggests– there is “a duty of fair play”: if refugees have accepted 
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and intend to continue to accept the benefits of just institutions, they must do 
their part and not take advantage of these benefits by not cooperating (Rawls, 
1999: 117). But that alone is not enough: our basic hypothesis forces us to rea-
sonably imagine requiring refugees to share civic burdens and responsibilities, 
with their creative religious agency.
Without this duty to contribute to the common good of their host country, 
their weak, suffering voices, with their indignant claims, would remain merely 
lyrical, bound to disappear once again in the realm of rhetoric. But, above all, 
they will never become truly human storytellers of a transformative, even po-
etic (Derrida, 2000), public space.
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Chapter 3
Religion in Secularized and Post-Secularized 
Europe
Monica Martinelli
1 Introduction: the Frame of Reference
Viewed by anyone wondering about the role of religion in Europe today, 
the phenomenon of migration cannot fail to arouse a certain degree of 
interest.
In the second half of the 1900s, when an extensive literature announced the 
imminent end of the religious phenomenon, in Europe –as in other parts of 
the world– a different scenario continued to unfold: a religiosity certainly in 
crisis, increasingly relegated to the personal sphere and detached from institu-
tional structures, reinvented in its content and influenced by some factors of 
secularization, but nevertheless present. In many cases the presence of reli-
gion, especially in its more traditional and collective forms, takes on significant 
characteristics precisely in relation to the migration phenomenon, since for 
many immigrants belonging to a religion is by no means a secondary dimen-
sion of their identity.
In itself, the European scenario is a composite, plural one, which cannot be 
explained simply by choosing between two options: “secularization” versus 
“non-secularization”. It is a much more articulated, complex phenomenon, 
certainly geographically and nationally but, more in general, for the vitality of 
the religious phenomenon and of the individual forms that it adopts: elements 
that are the result of a continuous intersection of long processes and secular-
izing influences as well as of responses reacting to those processes and those 
influences – not without new dilemmas and conflicts.
What seems evident is that we are living in a different epoch from the one 
defined as completely secularized. In it, new challenges are emerging; indeed, 
if we are not convinced of a definitive disappearance of religion, we cannot 
ignore the possibility that the process of moving away from religious practices 
and the mistrust or even neglect of the contents of faith can progressively in-
tensify. The end-point of this process is no longer only atheism as a strong posi-
tion taken up towards faith, but concerns all the alternative forms to believing 
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which qualify our times, ranging from interpretations of agnosticism and 
 laicism, which express a certain indifference towards questions of faith, to new 
forms of spirituality, up to the emergence of a fluctuating religiosity, often 
completely modelled and withdrawn into the subject, but sometimes main-
taining some reference to a traditional religion in the background. In this pan-
orama, however, we also find the more traditional expressions of the religious 
experience, connected with historic Churches or new groups, along with the 
emergence of the phenomenon of religious radicalization, which takes the 
form of fundamentalism in its multi-faceted expressions.
In the varied and stratified religious composition of society described as 
“post-secular”, new problems open up as do new opportunities for renewal for 
the religions themselves; the religious meaning continues to be spread, even if 
with profoundly different demands and according to profoundly different 
modes from the past.
In the present chapter we shall dwell first of all on the debate about secular-
ization, taking up its salient features: it developed, as is known, mainly in a 
western context and received a strong impulse from the European sociologists 
of the late 1800s and early 1900s. A polysemic concept, the term “seculariza-
tion” has lent itself to many different interpretations with the risk of not cap-
turing important nuances of reality, especially where its use has claimed to 
entirely represent an epoch, according to a subtractive view of history. From 
this point of view, the change in outlook within that debate provides an impor-
tant passage to understanding more about the complexity of western society 
and of individual life in terms of religious experience.
After tracing the main lines of this debate, we shall pinpoint some process-
es concerning religion within the context of post-secular society: alongside 
the insistent secularization a more composite, not easily defined picture 
emerges where, on the one hand, religion is closely connected with cultural 
and social transformations within the European countries, but on the other 
hand becomes the borderline where contradictory pressures and, in some 
cases, thorny questions relating to the coexistence between people with differ-
ent religious traditions interweave. These questions, well beyond the religious 
contents in the strict sense, threaten to bring about the collapse of these very 
contents onto problems of another kind, which would need to be treated 
differently.
Finally, we shall try, within the cross pressures to which the religious experi-
ence is subjected and from which it takes shape in post-secular society, to high-
light the challenge of pluralism and the role of religion within our time, also in 
relation to migratory phenomena.
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2 The Theses of Secularization
2.1 The “Prophecies” of the Classics of Sociology
In the debate that opened up in the social sciences, the long-dominant theses 
of secularization argued that a progressive advancement of modernity would 
inevitably be followed by a decline in the religious phenomenon, which would 
eventually disappear altogether. This religious eclipse was supposed to involve 
a progressive retreat of religion from the public sphere and social life and the 
exclusion of the dimension of transcendence from the domain of the personal 
conduct of life (Ferrara, 2009). In other words, secularization would be fol-
lowed by a single possible effect: the transformation of religion, following the 
processes linked to modernity, would coincide with the end of the religious 
experience, both in the forms of the associated living and in the subjective 
sphere, in the direction of a predominance of the immanent dimension of life.
Those theses of secularization start from an interpretation of the celebrated 
prophecies of Weber and Durkheim.
According to Weber, the unceasing advance of rationalization and disen-
chantment of the world –typical processes of western modernity– provokes, 
on the one hand, the emptying of the secular spheres of any religious reference 
and, on the other hand, the declassing of the religious sphere itself, deprived of 
any claim to truth and to definition of the meaning of collective living in rela-
tion to transcendence. The modern individual gradually becomes insensitive 
to what is sacred and religious. The progressive abandonment of what is magi-
cal and religious is accompanied by an ever-greater appropriation by man of 
the control of the forces of nature and of the ways in which he relates to them. 
The resulting dispersion of religion in the pluralism of faiths is further weak-
ened and deprives man of supreme values, condemning him to live in an age 
without God and without prophets (Weber, 2017).
E. Durkheim, unlike Weber, considers religion as a complex fact, of social 
origin and nature, with the function of stabilizing coexistence and integration, 
creating a homogeneous system of shared meanings within society. Like We-
ber, he nevertheless appears equally peremptory when he states that, with the 
advance of modernity, God abandons men and their controversies (Durkheim, 
1962). With traditional religion left behind, society ends up celebrating the cult 
of itself, becoming the creator of religion to guarantee, on its own, that connec-
tive tissue which is generated precisely by the religious phenomenon and en-
sures the widest social integration. It is as if society, having moved away from 
God, had to seek the foundations of its own existence within itself. Indeed, 
according to Durkheim, societies become creators of the divine by means of a 
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projective mechanism whereby religion comes onto the scene to justify the 
symbolic universe that a given society builds for itself. In this way, it avoids the 
danger of finding itself at the mercy of single individuals. In other terms, the 
absence of a religious framework leads to a veritable “cult of the individual” 
(Durkheim, 1972). For Durkheim it is a process, which presents some highly 
problematical aspects. He is aware that secularization and individualization 
are in certain respects inevitable. And he does not call for any return to the 
predominance of traditional religion. He rather fears that the liberation and 
emancipation of individuals from religious institutions, in the name of their 
autonomy, can go to the point of distancing oneself also from society, which he 
describes as a moral entity, a producer of solidarity.
Both these authors, each in one’s own particular outlook on the religious 
phenomenon, leave an indelible mark on subsequent theories of seculariza-
tion. The thesis of privatization of religion, for example, inherits both Weber’s 
considerations on the rationalization and the differentiation of the secular 
spheres from the religious sphere and Durkheim’s diagnosis as to the cult of 
the individual typical of modernity and the hypothesis that religion is a social 
(and, after Durkheim, individual) construct. Many scholars – although from 
different points of view – have shared the diagnoses of the two classical 
sociologists.
2.2 Subsequent Studies
The heirs of those prophecies have therefore sustained the thesis of seculariza-
tion as a loss in importance of religion in social life and have often exasperated 
the eclipse of the religious phenomenon, excluding the latter’s metamorphic 
character. In this view, religion tends to be made to coincide with one of the 
stages in the march of western civilization, a stage that is subsequently elimi-
nated by other phases, such as the advent of the scientific revolution. Within 
this approach, one concentrates above all on what, in secularization, has been 
lost, without explaining the complexity of the reality that bears witness, some-
times weakly and other times even violently, to the persistence of religion also 
within modern society. Modernity and religion are considered as mutually ex-
clusive realities: the prevailing of the former inevitably implies the exit of the 
latter (Yinger, 1957).
In this perspective we find an internally varied and articulated thread of 
studies that asserted itself especially from the 1960s in the western context. 
These studies developed different attentions and accentuations, but in the 
background of each was the common approach of the theses on seculariza-
tion. We can subdivide these analyses around the following paths:
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i)  there are studies that postulate a progressive privatization of religion;
ii)  others concentrate their attention on the desacralization and desecra-
tion of religion;
iii)  also the transposition of religion to the secular sphere is the subject of 
analysis of the theories of secularization, as
iv)  the interpretation of secularization as a process of liberation from re-
ligion and its binding dogmas.
We shall take up the essential features of these ramifications in summary 
form.
i) According to the hypothesis of the progressive privatization of religion, 
modernity is characterized by the passage of religion from the public sphere, 
where it constituted a shared interest of the community, to the private sphere, 
thus losing significance in social terms. Luckmann talks, in this connection, 
of “invisible religion” (1967; 1973), underlining with this adjective the non- 
institutionalized character of the religious phenomenon. For Luckmann, the 
subjective conscience acquires a greater centrality: the individual must learn 
to seek the ultimate meanings for himself. Religion thus becomes a “subjective 
construction” (1973) which is separate from every belonging and connection.1 
Hervieu-Léger (1986) is positioned on the same line when he talks of “de- 
institutionalization of religion”, while Davie (1994) uses the well-known 
 expression “believing without belonging” to reinforce the reduction of religion 
to an exclusively individual matter and the loss of any claim to truth by a sa-
cred cosmos and the social institutions correlated to it.
In agreement with Luckmann, Berger argues for the emergence of a subjec-
tive secularization, indicating also in this case the transfer of religion to the 
private sphere. He highlights the advent of pluralism given the “collapse in 
plausibility of the traditional religious descriptions of reality” (Berger, 1973: 
197). On the one hand, according to Berger (and also Luckmann) there is a 
progressive differentiation of the secular spheres from the religious sphere, as 
Weber had already indicated for that matter; on the other hand, in the intimate 
sphere religion continues to exercise an important role, even though “priva-
tized”, so that it becomes the subject of an individual choice or preference. 
However, it loses its function of social integration, until it is included in the 
dynamics typical of the modern market economy, becoming at most one of 
many possible objects of consumption.
1 Luckmann writes: “once religion is defined as a private matter, the individual can choose as 
best he pleases among an assortment of ultimate meanings – guided only by preferences 
determined by his social biography. An important consequence of this situation is that the 
individual builds not only his personal identity but also his own individual system of ulti-
mate significance” (1973: 139).
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Among the theorists of the privatization of religion we find, although in a 
different form, the idea of the end of religion in modernity: the religion that 
they trace in the private and “invisible” spheres no longer shapes the conduct 
of life in the social sphere and no longer touches the experience of the tran-
scendent or, as the historians of religion Otto and Eliade would say, of the sa-
cred. It is rather a question of a subjective religion – in Luckman’s sense – thus 
understood not so much because it is lived by the subject starting in any case 
from some shared collective reference (within a group or a Church) but be-
cause it is built by him/her to his/her liking.
ii) Another line of study has focused attention on the process of “desacral-
ization” (Wilson, 1969) and “desecration” (Acquaviva, 1992) to explain secular-
ization. With Weber, Wilson shares the theses of emancipation of the secular 
spheres from religion: the religious becomes, if anything, a refuge now at the 
margins of personal experience. The advance of the process of rationalization 
and technicalization contributes to this loss of monopoly of wide spheres of 
social life by religion, which, at that point, loses significance and credibility. 
A loss that concerns, more in general, the sense of the sacred at both an indi-
vidual and a social level: it is in this view that he speaks of “desacralization”.
Acquaviva insists on this loss stating that, more than secularization, we 
should speak of a process of “worldliness and desecration” already within the 
Churches (1973: 167), a typical process of industrialized societies.2 In this case, 
it is the Churches themselves that, in their wish to modernize, renounce the 
experiences of the sacred. Acquaviva looks on this road with concern, although 
he points to a positive aspect where the experience of the sacred is provoked to 
free itself from the scaffoldings that tend to suffocate it.
According to these authors, it is the experience of the sacred that withdraws 
from social and personal life. In this case, secularization invests not only the 
secular spheres, depriving them of a religious reference, but religion itself, go-
ing within it to empty the rites of their significance, with the failure of the 
central and indispensable element for every religion. Thus, once again, tradi-
tional religions lose their strength within modernity, significantly weakening 
their ability to aggregate around shared practices able to orient the individual 
conduct of life.
iii) In the multi-faceted sea of the theories of secularization, there is also a 
thread of studies that sustains the complete transposition of religion to the 
secular sphere. Bellah, who agrees with Weber (secularization is understood as 
2 The term “sacred” –notes Acquaviva– indicates the place where the meeting between the 




a differentiation of the secular spheres from the religious one), does not em-
brace the latter’s view of an inexorable decline. Following in the tracks of the 
American sociologist Parsons, who puts forward a view of secularization as the 
institutionalization of Christian values within modern society, religion – as 
Durkheim had already stated – is definable above all for its socially unifying 
and integrating function. Therefore, where such values are effective, that is 
where they are institutionalized in a positive manner, we have a “civil religion” 
(Bellah, 1967, 1970).
Civil religion is a shared set of values derived from the Christian tradition, 
although the former distinguishes itself from the latter. In fact, the god of civil 
religion refers much more to order, law and rights than to salvation and love 
(Ibidem, 1967).3
To place the branch of studies that has developed around civil religion 
among the theories of secularization would certainly require a more thorough 
in-depth analysis. It is enough to point out that what Bellah calls “religion” 
makes little reference to the experience of the sacred and the transcendent 
and is more connected to the “secular” dimension, thus once more reinforcing 
the perspective of the theories of secularization.
iv) We will now discuss the last branch of studies, which has gathered wide 
consensus. Secularization is here considered as a process of liberation of man 
from the yoke of religion, of its dogmas and worldviews. There are numerous 
scholars who fall within this branch, with reference to various disciplines.4 Let 
us remember that at the end of the 19th century, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Ethische Kultur (the German society that dealt with the Prussian government’s 
1892 Education Bill) proposed to create a technocratic view of social life, plac-
ing all its faith in the power of scientific reason, promoting a civil morality in-
dependent of religion. In the British context there had been the Secular Society 
founded by Holyoake in 1846, which called for the possibility that the rights of 
the citizen should not be conditioned by a Christian confession: the successors 
decidedly pursued the project of creating a society free of every theological 
and religious reference (Lübbe, 1965).
3 As is known, in particular in the United States, the reference to this religion has meant im-
pressing, in various stages of the history of that country, a new thrust to secular society, by 
mobilising people around national aims of a more cultural and political than religious 
nature.
4 It would be enough to cite modern philosophy and psychoanalysis, which, in various ways, 
insist on the authoritarian, oppressive role of religion within social life and on the negative 
implications exercised on individuals’ life conduct.
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In the furrow of these views emerged a secularistic vision: in a laicistic soci-
ety, it is useful and opportune that there should be a retreat of the influence of 
religion from the claim to want to guide human action. The aim of this mani-
festo is to guarantee the progress of man and the extension of his individual 
freedom.
Within this branch of research, rather than putting the accent on the 
 differentiation of the secular from the religious sphere, or on the eclipse of the 
sacred, or on the privatization of religion, secularization coincides with 
the passage that leads mankind out of its minority condition to guide it along 
the illuminated ways of rationality that are strengthened by the scientific revo-
lution, with its technological applications. This is what the founder of sociol-
ogy, A. Comte (1864), indicated in the early 1800s, as an evolution of the human 
species by its exit from the theological stage to arrive, after passing through the 
metaphysical stage, at the finally positive and scientific one.
3 The Change of Perspective: towards a Post-Secular Society?
3.1 Indications from the Literature
The studies of secularization, although with different emphases, all adopt a 
view of history as a progressive succession of phases marked by breaks. The 
phase of modernity marks the arrival at a stage in which religion is counter-
posed with the characteristics of an epoch. Concentrating principally on what 
has been lost, these studies have difficulty in grasping the fact that, in reality, 
religion and the religious experience do not disappear from the modern 
scene.
Significantly, those theses are subsequently questioned by their own sup-
porters, who have realized that reality offers a profoundly different scenario 
from what appeared as an inexact and even “ideological” interpretation of 
secularization (Martin, 1973: 198; 2005).
Exemplary among others is the case of Cox who, twenty years after publish-
ing a book entitled The Secular City (1966) –which sustained the evidence of 
the secularization taking place–, published a new book in 1984, entitled Reli-
gion in the Secular City: Toward a Postmodern Theology, where the author  argues 
that we are entering a post-modern era of religious reawakening and return to 
the sacred.
Also the title of Berger’s well-known text A Rumor of Angels (1969) was al-
ready eloquent in this sense: he speaks of a murmur, to indicate that interest in 
the sacred and the transcendental dimension has not completely disappeared, 
and is represented metaphorically as a barely perceptible whispering of angels. 
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However, it is especially his text The Desecularization of the World, written in 
1999, that suggests the most decisive change in outlook.
Casanova too, in his famous text entitled Public Religions in the Modern 
World (1994), describes a passage to a subsequent phase, beyond seculariza-
tion, speaking of a de-privatization of the religious phenomenon. Going away 
from the predictions developed within a purely illuminist cultural framework, 
he alludes to the attempt of the great religions to counter the process of mar-
ginalization to which they have been subjected by the advent of modernity. 
The religious traditions refuse to limit their range of action to the simple care 
of souls but attempt to show the close connection between the importance of 
ethical-religious questions and the economic-political life of the various na-
tional contexts. Added to this are two other tendencies that confirm the change 
in relation to the expectations: faced with the progressive differentiation be-
tween religion and the other social systems, religion tends in any case to play a 
preponderant role in society; in addition, the decline in faith and religious 
practice in a strict sense does not affect all the contexts in the same way, so the 
picture relating to contexts other than the European need to be analyzed bet-
ter.5 The effects of this investment of the religions in the public field are two: a 
re-politicization of the public and private religious sphere (for which, for ex-
ample, among some active minorities there is a return to thinking that religion 
must function as an inseparable element of social integration); a pressing ap-
peal to the existence of transcendent ethical norms that must be placed at the 
basis of socio-economic and political life.
Starting from a similar assumption to Casanova’s, Beyer (1994) states that 
globalization favors the conditions for a recovery of the presence of religion in 
the public sphere, speaking of a “global civil religion”. A presence that, accord-
ing to Kurtz (1995), involves questions considered as universally important, as 
for example the advent of biotechnologies, defense of the environment, global 
conflicts.
In these authors’ line of thought, religion is thus considered as a phenome-
non able to mobilize energies within society, playing a crucial public and po-
litical role. And if on the one hand the change of perspective that starts to be 
discussed, enables us to describe the signals of a reality that the theories of 
secularization were in danger of losing, on the other hand it often tends to 
5 Concerning this last aspect, also Martin (2005), criticising the idea of a disappearance of re-
ligion, states that on the contrary it shows symptoms of evident vitality, for example with 
reference to Christianity in Latin America, Africa, Asia. These symptoms lead one to think 
that secularization limited itself to looking at just a particular social context, i.e. Europe, 
where the indicators of continuous decline of religion were indeed very marked.
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consolidate a mental habit whereby, also in the presence of significant reli-
gious phenomena, one continues to think according to the model of the “dis-
appearance” and, possibly, of the “return”, of the “death” and the “triumph” of 
religion.
The hypothesis of a “return” of religion is explained by the need for an order 
within the chaos of cultural and social complexity, of a direction of sense for 
the individual conducts of life: it can also bring with itself a different god from 
that of the historic European religions (Graf, 2004; Kepel, 1991; Shah et al., 2012).
Revisiting the theories of secularization, the hypothesis we assume in these 
pages goes in the direction of considering the latter as such a jagged, complex 
process that already includes dynamics of a religious nature within itself. 
Hence, “post-secular” society should be understood not as a phase subsequent 
to that of secularization.6 From a closer examination, the same process of sec-
ularization originates precisely from a religious phenomenon, namely the 
Protestant Reformation, given that the latter also includes the social and civil 
dimension in its moral project, favoring an anthropocentric turn and an im-
manent pluralistic orientation in its unforeseen effects, as pointed out by Greg-
ory (2012).
The hypothesis is that secularization does not necessarily exclude religion 
and religiosity: in this way, the religious experience can probably be under-
stood as an experience that does not contradict secularized contemporary so-
ciety, even though its position and its social and individual role are very differ-
ent from the past. It is rather a matter of grasping the changes that it has 
encountered and how the conditions of the contexts of adherence to the faith 
have changed. If secularization and religious phenomenon have long been un-
derstood, manifestly or implicitly, as contradictory, the point becomes trying 
to consider them rather as opposite poles that do not annul each other but that 
are in constant tension between them. And it is precisely from this tension that 
the contemporary religious experience of individuals and organized groups 
takes shape, highlighting the fact that both the former (secularization) and the 
latter (religious experience) are non-linear phenomena, and yet intense and 
involving given that they concern numerous dimensions. Secularization in-
volves all the levels of existence and social life, taking on, as we have seen, dif-
ferent definitions and features. And religious experience can be considered as 
6 Terminologically, the expression “post-secular society” is intended to express a “change in 
consciousness” with respect to the terms in which the process of secularization was previ-
ously described and studied (Ballestrem, 2009: 267). For an analytical reconstruction of the 
question, see the Doctoral Thesis by Nicoli (a.y. 2017/2018).
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a constant of the human being, observable in all historic ages and different 
civilizations, according to many different modes of expression (Eliade, 1957; 
Ries, 2007; Hart 2013).
As Rémond (1999) has effectively pointed out, the long description of the 
progress of secularization over two hundred years has been able to describe 
only a part of the events; it says nothing about other forms of presence and the 
perennial nature of the religious fact. To stop only at the religious decline 
would  forget that also in the most secularized society statistically the religious 
fact remains very important and that it is by far the most massive social fact of 
a voluntary nature.
3.2 Some Empirical Observations
Rémond’s statement finds further confirmation in the data of the Gallup Foun-
dation (relating to 2016), according to which 62% of people in the world define 
themselves as “religious” and many of them are also engaged in activities of a 
religious nature; 71% declare that they believe in God and consider the reli-
gious dimension as an important reference point in their daily life; 25% define 
themselves as “non-religious”, while the number of atheists is around 9%.7 If in 
some contexts –such as Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa– the religious 
experience is strongly felt and is expressed through belonging to institutional-
ized historic Churches and/or to groups often born of the various evangelical 
ramifications, or –as often occurs particularly in Asia– it takes shape with ref-
erence to local spiritualities (Buddhism, Hinduism etc.) and, for the Arab 
countries, in relation to Islam, in Europe we observe a high level of seculariza-
tion which is accompanied, however, by the declaration of feeling in any case 
“religious” by tradition and culture. We shall shortly return to the contents and 
ambivalences of these declarations.
Research and data on the European context in fact confirm the persistence 
and the complex structure of the religious phenomena. This happens both be-
cause adherence to a religion is an option increasingly “thought-out” and cho-
sen (often unconventionally), and due to the growing religious pluralism con-
figured by reason not only of the historic presence of the great traditional 
7 The data quoted here are taken from the 2017 report by Gallup International: End of Year 2016. 
Global Report on Religion, which covers 68 countries (http://gallup.com.pk/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/04/Global-Report-on-Religion-2.pdf). Among the various information, the report 
confirms the connection, which has emerged for some time, between religiousness and 
 socio-demographic characteristics (such as age, income and education: in general, as educa-
tion and income levels grow higher, religiosity levels tend to diminish).
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religions in their internal structure (in particular, the different Christian con-
fessions), but for the growing coexistence of persons and groups bringing dif-
ferent faiths.
In a text edited by P. Berger et al. (2008), the authors posed the question of 
whether Europe is really as secularized as people say and think, especially with 
reference to the United States of America considered as a religious nation.8 
According to Lehmann, on the one hand, precisely for its development, secu-
larization would seem to be a typically European process, therefore a sort of 
“exceptional” process of a portion of the world. On the other hand –in the face 
of some far-reaching social changes, including globalization and international 
migrations– it is necessary to better understand whether secularization has 
been only a transitory phase in European history or whether the profoundly 
secularized continent will align itself with the other continents where religion 
continues to be important; or whether the other continents, like the people 
who arrive in Europe with a different religious and cultural background, will 
adapt to the European cultural-religious frame (Lehmann, 2004).
Although estimates of the number of believers and the mapping of reli-
gious affiliations are not easy to construct, they led Berger (1999, 2001) to 
assume that Europe is affected by a certain de- secularization. In the per-
spective adopted in these pages, rather than de-secularization, we prefer to 
speak of coexistence, within a post-secular society, of secularizing tenden-
cies with forms of adherence to religion as tendencies that do not contra-
dict each other but coexist. In this framework, states Pace (2011), the Euro-
pean socio-religious geography appears as a picture in movement; on one 
side, three quarters of Europeans say that they feel religious, that they resort 
to some form of prayer, that they feel the need to give a meaning to their 
action with reference to some form of prayer, in addition to a link to an 
institutional frame. In relation to traditional religions, both in countries 
with a Catholic majority and those with a Protestant majority, the reference 
to the religious dimension takes in a varied range of feelings and actions in 
terms of belonging, of active participation or generic acknowledgment, of 
8 According to various researchers, until the 1970s, the United States and Europe seemed to be 
proceeding in step in the secularization process (Inglehart, Norris, 2004), but then the USA’s 
destiny seems to have changed, given that American churches have tended to move as com-
petitors within a crowded market, positioning themselves on emerging needs. Thus, within 
what has been defined as the “spiritual turn”, not only has there been a change in the ways of 
believing of people seeking their own “spiritual way of life” that makes them feel well, but 
also in the religious offer of goods and services by the religious institutions (Roof, 1993). The 
debate about spirituality and the relationship between religion and spirituality is very wide, 
both in the USA and in Europe; for a useful introduction see Giordan (2007, 2016).
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total or partial affiliation to the contents of faith. On another side, alongside 
the substantial nucleus in Europe that continues to define itself as Christian or 
belonging to the historic Jewish minorities, we see a growth –as a result of the 
grafting of new cultural and religious stocks through the migratory processes– 
of forms of Christianity referring to new Churches, of mainly Asian, African, 
and Latin American origin, which build on a spirituality mainly without dog-
mas and apparatus.9 Alongside this is an increasingly important presence of 
Islam, though not so marked in absolute numerical terms: the estimated pres-
ence of Muslims in the countries of the European Union does not on average 
exceed 3% of the population of the principal countries with large-scale immi-
gration (Ibidem).10
In general, the social and cultural environment of many European societies 
is still marked by the presence of the historical religions, although new forms 
of religion seem to emerge alongside them. If we wish to trace “an ideal map of 
religiosity of Europeans, on the one hand, the different meridians and parallels 
tend to show the long history of the religions that civilized this or that area of 
Europe, and on the other to highlight a morphology of the religious terrain 
which is still fed by a common humus, but which is dotted with many gardens 
and vegetable patches cultivated directly by individuals” (Ibidem: 65–89).
The data of the Pew Research Center, too, confirm that the majority of Euro-
peans (about 70%) continue to consider themselves as Christians even though 
they do not regularly attend the Church they belong to (only 22% say they are 
9 Pace refers to the data of the European Values Study (evs): prudent estimates state that 
about 37 million Europeans belong either to Pentecostal churches of protestant matrix or 
to new charismatic and neo-Pentecostal churches that have arrived through immigrants. 
See also Halman et al. (2008, 2005).
10 The 2018 Report of the Pew Research Centre, referring only to the countries of Western 
Europe, gives an estimate of 4.9% (including Norway and Switzerland, with the highest 
peak values in France – 8.8%, UK – 6.3% and Germany – 6.1%). As is known, however, 
there is an objective difficulty in measuring the presence of the different religions in Eu-
rope. Often the reference consists of the residence permit of the immigrants who, in this 
case, are the principal bringers of the Islamic religion (apart from some European regions 
where Islam is a historically rooted local presence): this is evidently a vague figure as 
geographical origin cannot be taken as a secure source for stating automatically that all 
the inhabitants coming from countries with a predominant Muslim tradition adhere to 
that religion and/or are practising believers (whether in their homeland or where they 
have emigrated to); in addition, the minorities also living in these countries should be 
considered; in some cases, they emigrate precisely by reason of their different religious 
affiliation from the official one (in this connection see Chapters 6, 10 and 14).
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practicing).11 The non-practicing12 form the majority in all the Western Euro-
pean countries, with particularly high peaks in the Nordic Countries (reaching, 
for example, 68% in Finland against 9% practicing; 55% in Denmark against 
10% practicing), with the exception of Italy (where the percentage of non-
practicing and practicing is equal, at about 40%).
Although Europe appears as a secularized region, in many of the countries 
studied in the survey the non-practicing believers far exceed those who state 
they are non-believers (atheists, agnostics or, more in general, the so-called 
“nones”). And also, even with the recent immigrations from the Middle East 
and North Africa, there are in any case more non-practicing Christians than 
people of other religions, considered all together. According to the Pew Re-
search Center, these figures are explained by the fact that what remains par-
ticularly rooted in the individual life experience is the Christian identity as the 
cultural badge in Western Europe, an identity not in a merely nominal sense.
Furthermore, although there has been, for some time, a strong tendency 
towards a decline of Christianity in various countries (e.g. Belgium, Finland, 
Ireland, Holland, Spain and Portugal), other countries, at the same time, ex-
hibit a relative stability or a more modest decline. The process of seculariza-
tion varies considerably from country to country.13 It should then be defined 
also in the light of the various historical vicissitudes of the different nations 
and of the relationship that each country has maintained with the religion or 
religions present within its territory in the phase of construction of the mod-
ern State.14
11 The report is available at http://www.pewforum.org/2018/05/29/being-christian-in-west-
ern-europe/. The data refer to a survey carried out in the period April-August 2017 in 15 
countries of Western Europe, through 24,000 telephone interviews administered to 
adults. The processes identified have been continuing for some time also in the countries 
of Eastern Europe, as for example in Romania where, already ten years ago, there was a 
very high percentage, with almost 98%, of people declaring themselves to be “Orthodox” 
with 30% practising (Kosela, 2007).
12 Those are considered as such who define themselves as Christian but attend the places 
and activities of worship only a few times in a year. Those who attend at least once a 
month are considered “practising”.
13 In this connection it should also be pointed out that in some cases (e.g. Germany, Sweden, 
Denmark, France, UK) the smaller decline recorded over recent years starts from an al-
ready fairly high level of secularization.
14 In fact, in some cases religion has contributed historically to the formation of the national 
identity, rooting itself in people’s experience beyond the declared affiliation. In other con-
texts, freeing from dictatorial regimes has meant distancing oneself also from the domi-
nant religion which, with respect to those regimes, had adopted ambiguous attitudes, 
while in yet other cases religion has played exactly the opposite role, acting as a critical 
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And if, in general, the religious phenomenon seems to have become more 
problematic and fragile than in the past, this does not mean that it has lost all 
significance in relation to personal biographical paths. This is evident, for ex-
ample, in the frequent visits to sacred sites, as testified by the widespread phe-
nomenon of pilgrimages in many regions of Europe (Cipriani, 2012; Damari, 
2016)15 and to places of worship (also those less institutionalized) or in the 
persistence of the demand for solemnization of certain decisive moments of 
existence.16 This finds confirmation in the case of Italy, which occupies a par-
ticular position in the Western European panorama, as indicated: empirical 
research shows a structured, complex, and vital co-presence of secularizing 
tendencies and forms of religiosity.17 If for example we observe the religious 
practices, with reference to Catholicism, we note that the bond between the 
Italians and the Church has been loosened but has not been broken (Garelli, 
2011). This is well confirmed by the request for sacraments even by the more 
uncertain and hesitant believers.18 The religious sense continues to be wide-
spread among Italians who do not completely renounce turning to the Catho-
lic Church, even if in different ways than in the past. In fact, although personal 
discretion is widespread as regards the choice of timing, manner and forms of 
participation (Diotallevi, Allievi, 2004), it is not possible to talk of a definitive 
abandonment of religious practice, but rather of a religiosity seeking new 
element towards the system, gathering around itself the resilient forces (consider, for ex-
ample the case of Spain with the Franco dictatorship and the case of Poland before the 
fall of the Berlin Wall).
15 When the Council of Europe in 1987 recognised the importance of the religious and cul-
tural paths running through various European regions, a new season opened up for ad-
herence to these itineraries (see, for example, what happened with the “Way of St. 
James”).
16 We refer, more precisely, to the so-called “rites of passage” i.e. those that mark the three 
cardinal moments of existence, solemnising birth (with Baptism in the Christian tradi-
tion), the union between two persons (marriage) and death (funeral).
17 See in this connection the various studies and sociological researches in Italy: among oth-
ers, Garelli (1995, 2003, 2011); Gattamorta (2009); Abbruzzese (2009, 2010); Pollini (2012); 
Berzano (2017a, 2017b).
18 Sacraments constitute the heart of Italian religiosity –and, more generally, of Catholic 
religion– as evidenced by the persistence of their celebration also by those who consider 
the faith only as a cultural tradition. In addition, if sacraments risk losing their  specificity –
that of being the meeting point between immanence and transcendence and of linking 
the individual to the community– they represent one of the major challenges for the 
Catholic Church because of their importance among people even in the secularizing 
pressures. The importance of sacraments emerged also from a recent research in Italy 
carried out by a group of researchers of arc, Center for the Anthropology of Religion and 
Cultural Change, Catholic University of Milan, and the Italian Episcopal Conference dur-
ing 2015–2016 (cfr. the Survey Report drawn up by arc, 2016).
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modes of expression, which are able to make greater use of the individual’s 
contribution within a traditional, communitarian frame.
The European picture is therefore in movement. The question of seculariza-
tion is more complex than it had been presented initially by the different 
branches of study: in fact, within the category of those who define themselves 
as believers there appear the “intermittent” and the “doubtful” who, unlike the 
atheists and agnostics, do not abandon their path of faith. In other words, the 
fact that the religious experience in secularized society is profoundly crossed 
by doubt does not seem to preclude the possibility of a spiritual and religious 
search by those who manifest it.
At the same time, from the research there also emerges a more “disenchant-
ed” view of reality, which expresses itself for example in the gradual abandon-
ment of some fundamental beliefs: the existence of life after death, the divine 
judgement of history, the role of original sin. This phenomenon reflects some 
typically modern secularizing dynamics, linked to the oblivion of topics that 
bring great questions, such as death, evil and good, which influence the reli-
gious representations of believers and adhesions to given contents of faith, 
profoundly modifying them.19
3.3 The “Secular Age”, Secularized and Religious
The evidence of the complex relationship between secularization and reli-
giousness has led a number of researchers to associate with the term “post-
secular society” a wider meaning than that which aims to record simply the 
passage from one historical age to another, indicating rather how religion 
 persists within an increasingly secularized frame.20 The “dialectics of 
 secularization” –as discussed by Habermas and Ratzinger (2005)– would show 
the ambivalence of the processes of secularization: on the one hand, in the 
name of emancipation from religion –and from its dogmas, values and mean-
ings, from its truths, moral authorities, institutional forms– it was expected to 
disappear; on the other hand, however, this eclipse has not occurred.
In clarifying Casanova’s thesis, Habermas (2005) maintains that religious 
communities persist also within a more secularized horizon. For the German 
thinker, religion continues to exert an influence in the public spheres of the 
single countries, as well as signaling the phenomenon of pluralism of forms of 
19 In reality, these are questions set aside decidedly by contemporary culture in general (see 
for example the eclipse of the question of death for the contemporary man: among oth-
ers, cfr. Bauman, 1992).
20 On the notion of post-secular society understood in a broad sense see, among others: 
Habermas (2006); Belardinelli (2006); Ferrara (2009); and especially Taylor (2007).
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life following especially the processes of immigration. This opens up new chal-
lenges in terms of the necessary mediations by the religious authorities with 
the social contexts, on one side, and of opening towards religious thought by 
post-secular societies on the other.
In the change of outlook on post-secular societies, secularization can ulti-
mately be defined as a complex process, which, while causing breaks with the 
past, does not entail incompatibility with the religious phenomenon, so that 
there would not be a phase after secularization of returning of religion as if it 
had disappeared for a period from social and individual life. The religious phe-
nomenon, despite transformed with respect to the traditional forms, and al-
though fragmented and sometimes contradictory, remains even within the 
secularized contexts. This interpretation enables a widening of the scenario in 
which to investigate the phenomenon of religiousness, posing new questions 
that start from the recognition of a co-presence of secularizing tendencies and 
religious inclinations.
As stated by C. Taylor –one of the most authoritative researchers into reli-
gious phenomena–,
The whole culture experiences cross pressures, between the draw of the 
narratives of closed immanence on one side, and the sense of their inad-
equacy on the other, strengthened by encounter with existing milieux of 
religious practice, or just by some intimations of the transcendent. The 
cross pressures are experienced more acutely by some people and in some 
milieux, but over the whole culture, we can see them reflected in a num-
ber of middle positions, which have drawn from both sides. (2007: 595)
This scenario is well expressed by the metaphor, suggested by H. Joas, of the 
sea in a storm: like the sea, our history is marked by strong secular waves but 
also by religious back-currents that often revitalize religious traditions or facili-
tate new religious options (2014).
In this perspective, the view of history adopted by Taylor is not subtractive 
but additive: the turn of historical events is conceived as an uninterrupted suc-
cession of events, however non-linear it may be, that also presents some con-
stant nuclei, although subject to change. Among these nuclei, there is precisely 
the phenomenon of religion and religiosity. Recognizing how secularization 
has undoubtedly exerted a powerful influence on the religious phenomenon, 
he shows how this has nevertheless not caused its disappearance: the religious 
motivation “was and is evident in the creation of new forms, replacing those 
disrupted or rendered unviable by these ‘secularizing’ agents. The vector of this 
whole development does not point towards a kind of heat death of faith” 
 (Taylor, 2007: 437).
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Thus, despite the weakening of the faith, secularization causes a new posi-
tion of the sacred and the spiritual in relation to the individual and social life 
and challenges religion to examine its contents to verify what its message is 
regarding a historical period. And this “new placement is now the occasion for 
the reorganization of spiritual life in new forms, and for new ways of existing 
both in and out of the relation to God” (Ibidem).
Significantly, Taylor’s text analyzing these changes is entitled, as we have 
said, A Secular Age, inviting us to go beyond the more diffuse term “post- 
secular” unless we use it taking into account the complexity of reality. Also, for 
Joas the secular age is an epoch that is not marked by the absence of religion 
and faith but by the mixing of religious and non-religious elements, with a 
greater complexity of personal experiences.
Starting from this awareness and keeping in the background the idea of 
secularization as “a change from a society where believing in God is unchal-
lenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is one option among 
others, and frequently not the easiest one to embrace” (Taylor, 2007: 3), in the 
next paragraph we shall try to reinterpret European post-secular society as an 
interweaving of “cross pressures” on religious experience and within which it 
moves.
4 Post-Secular Society: an Interweaving of “cross pressures”
The most evident trends in the process of secularization that give rise to “cross 
pressures” on the experience of belief, to the point of changing the conditions 
of the context in which it takes shape, are those that Weber expressed with the 
two terms of “disenchantment” of the world and “rationalization”. These are 
two closely interconnected movements that influence each other and affect 
both the societal structural factors and personal experience.
Disenchantment of the world, as already mentioned, consists in the gradual 
loss of the magical-sacral reference, which goes in step with the growing belief 
of human beings that they can control the forces of nature by means of a cal-
culating rationality. These processes, in late-modernity, constitute an indisput-
able fact. Disenchantment and rationalization produce multiple effects on re-
ality, but not all these effects are necessarily negative as Weber argued.21
On the one hand, having removed every magical-sacral reference, the disen-
chanted man finds himself effectively less constrained by external forces and 
21 The discussion that follows is based primarily on the already-mentioned reflection by 
Taylor in A secular age, where the phenomenon of disenchantment is reinterpreted, in its 
positive and negative aspects, starting from the focus on the experience of modern man.
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able to manage his existence and his relationship with the world by himself; in 
short, he becomes more autonomous. In parallel with this process, a new sub-
jective demand opens up, for understanding, participation and action, which 
in Modernity becomes increasingly important. The disenchanted man is no 
longer satisfied with being a passive spectator in the experiences that mark his 
life –which include the religious experience– but demands the possibility of 
participating actively, of becoming their protagonist.22
On the other hand, in order to be able to happen, disenchantment requires 
an assumption to be satisfied: that is to say, it is necessary for the subject to 
make a veritable break with respect to the link between himself and the world, 
which only from that moment can be perceived as an objective, separate and 
external reality and only as such controllable. According to an effective meta-
phor of Taylor’s, the self, from “porous”, becomes “buffered”, separate from ev-
erything and everyone (Taylor, 2007: 38; Taylor, Dotolo, 2012). This break with 
the world takes on various forms in reality.
The first form directly concerns the link between the self and the deity 
which, following the break, undergoes a veritable “uprooting”23 from the earth-
ly world: there is thus a passage from a world where everything refers to a god, 
i.e. to a meaning other than and external to the self, to a world in which the 
signs of the deity disappear and the idea that the divine reveals itself in our 
world appears even incomprehensible (Scruton, 2015).
The second form of break concerns the link between the self and the com-
munity, that is to say that social space where the individual defined his identity 
by virtue of his belonging to a group, which in turn qualified itself in the light 
of a sacred and divine foundation. The community guaranteed the condition 
of a belief shared among its members and sustained the biographical paths of 
the latter. Thus, if the distancing of the individual from the community, which 
has occurred in the disenchantment, has on the one hand enabled the modern 
man to recognize himself and assert himself as a single, unique individual, on 
22 These are aspects amply discussed by Habermas (1986). According to the author, the de-
centralization of the religious vision of the world, and the freeing of the vital world from 
a highly dogmatic dimension, open for the individual the possibility of clarifying and veri-
fying in first person the reasons on which the various ‘claims to validity’ rest, thus allow-
ing the production of a criticisable understanding. Disenchantment of the world thus has 
the merit of opening up a new potential of rationality in the vital world; a positively quali-
fied rationality which is distinguished from the instrumental one by the fact of being 
oriented to understanding and founded on an interpersonal relationship.
23 The term takes up A. Bilgrami’s expression “deus deracinus”, which puts the accent on the 
act of eradicating the divine roots from the world, which, as a result, becomes an ugly, 
desacralized place (Warner et al., 2013).
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the other hand it has transformed the construction of the identity into a bur-
densome task, to be achieved in spite of the dissolution of the community.
A third form concerns the link between the self and the other person, in 
other words the social relationship. Disenchantment, in fact, if taken to its ex-
treme consequences, requires total autonomy from the “buffered” self, which 
must erect barriers against everything that escapes its control. The link with 
the other becomes devoid of usefulness in the eyes of a person who considers 
reality from the point of view of a calculating rationality; thus, in the majority 
of cases, the other ends up as an obstacle to modern man’s project of autono-
my and independence.
The process of rationalization intertwines with disenchantment. It consists 
in a movement of a historical nature towards a progressive predomination of 
the instrumental, calculating attitude, with respect to action oriented to value 
and meanings.
In other words, among all the possible ways of relating to reality, what is 
progressively affirmed in modernity is a rational view of the world, based prin-
cipally on scientific knowledge and technological control (Inglehart, Norris, 
2004). At this point, it appears evident that modern man, moved by that quest 
for comprehension, participation and action that has been freed in disen-
chantment, chooses to avail himself of this worldview, which rationally ex-
plains every event, including those linked to the religious phenomenon. With 
the consequent refusal of all contents and meanings that do not fall within the 
criteria of instrumental rationality in the strict sense, and which in the eyes of 
the disenchanted man therefore appears devoid of meaning: in the case of re-
ligion, the dimensions of mystery and grace, which by definition cannot be 
explained in rational terms, are excluded.
From the process of disenchantment and rationalization “cross-pressures” 
unfold, which influence the religious experience. We shall dwell in particular 
on some of them: the subjectivization of this experience, with its positive and 
the more problematic aspects; the question of social bonds; the change of the 
relationship between transcendence and immanence.
4.1 The Challenge of Subjectivity and the Question of the Fluctuating 
Religion
In many European countries, as already mentioned, the disenchantment of 
the world has implied a loss of significance of traditional religions or, in some 
cases, a sort of ex-culturation of Christianity (e.g. in France) as stated by 
 Hervieu-Leger (1986) or, more in general, a sort of de-Christianization of the 
European context (Lehmann, 1997). The shrinking of the space occupied by 
the more institutionalized religions has been accompanied by a widening of 
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the space in which individuals, with different levels of freedom, have renegoti-
ated their religious beliefs, in favor of a less strong bound to dogmas and social 
ties.
These processes pose some challenges, in particular to religious institutions, 
to the way in which they propose religious practice, to their ability to seek me-
diations between the more institutionalized dimension and the more subjec-
tive one of belief, considering that religion continues to be an important point 
of reference. At the same time, however, also at a level of religious experience 
we see the same loosening and weakening of bonds that runs through the wid-
er social life, and individuals often abandon themselves to the continuous fluc-
tuation of things, up to the experience of insignificance that leads them to 
pursue consistent reasons for going forward by resorting to the numinous. So if 
on the one hand there emerges a quest for greater subjectivity in living the re-
ligious experience also with reference to more traditional forms of affiliation, 
on the other hand, what is sought continuously within religious experience is 
the uniqueness of one’s own self, its sacrality, according to individualized paths 
also in the direction of “alternative spiritualities”.
As far as the first aspect is concerned –the relationship between the institu-
tionalized dimension and the more subjective dimension of faith– we are deal-
ing with an equilibrium that is always difficult to maintain. It concerns the re-
lationship between “religion” and “religiosity”. In this respect, it is useful to 
refer to another classical sociologist, G. Simmel, who –unlike his contempo-
raries Weber and Durkheim– more than focusing on the modern process of 
secularization, approaches religion starting precisely from the personal experi-
ence that individuals make of it. For Simmel, religiosity is the space in which 
the subject gathers himself with respect to the mystery, it is the place where 
the center of the individual safeguards itself, i.e. the opening towards the tran-
scendence; religion instead is the objectivated historic form that emerges from 
the continuous interaction over time of a plurality of persons. Religion is 
therefore concerned with the collective cultural translation of religiosity; it 
takes shape through the organizational modes of religiosity.24
A problematic aspect of religion is, in Simmel’s view, the tendency to unify 
the religious behaviors of its adepts around norms considered universal to be 
applied homogeneously to everyone. This has led, over time, to ignore all the 
more personal dimension of religious experience and –in the more specific 
case of Christianity– of the concept of salvation, i.e. of the dimension 
24 Simmel overturns the usual concept, whereby religion must already be present in order 
for religiosity to arise, and states that “religion does not create religiosity but religiosity 
creates religion” (1997: 150).
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 questioning individuality. And it has led to a failure to consider adequately the 
 importance of cultivating one’s own talent, demanding uniform behavior from 
all instead of drawing on the uniqueness of each person. According to Simmel, 
if God, for the believer, is placed at the center of existence of the human being, 
then He is not counterposed to his individuality. Therefore, religiosity consti-
tutes a space where the subject protects his experience of transcendence even 
from the possible absorption of religious structures. Subjectivity is always a 
subjectivity in relation to another you, a beyond self, the world, history, the 
divine.25 For Simmel, safeguarding the person does not in fact mean opting for 
the absence of organized forms. With reference to the religious sphere, he 
points out that one of the functions formerly carried out by the Church was to 
assert the value of the person as unmistakably unique. The point is that, as 
happens for all instituted social forms, also religious ones can threaten to mo-
nopolize the people, thus pushing them to realize their identity outside them. 
This has negative implications for religion itself: the latter –as Simmel predict-
ed in the early 1900s– risks retreating into the private, losing the possibility of 
representing a “Heimat” for even the most individualized believer. In this way, 
the Churches themselves, as institutions placed at the service of the perpetua-
tion of the faith over time, and the mediation of the contents of belief are 
weakened, as they are sustained by believing persons.
Religiosity and religion interpenetrate, in a constantly dynamic equilibri-
um: religiosity constitutes the beginning of renewal of religion that remains a 
significant source of symbolic values also for social life. In order to prevent the 
breakup of religion, Simmel considers it as necessary to create spaces where 
the heritage of tradition is placed more in relation to the recipients, to their 
needs, thus recognizing the possibility of a personal, creative contribution.
So on the one hand, disenchantment causes us to continually rethink the 
relationship between the more institutionalized dimension of belief and sub-
jective experience, so that the two poles coexist and supplement each other, 
but on the other, disenchantment that absolutizes and strengthens itself in the 
increasingly technical, nihilistic and fragmented cultural frame of contempo-
rary societies, may lead to the construction of that “God of one’s own” of which 
Beck speaks. With this definition he indicates a religious where “a God of one’s 
own might well be template for a life or a space of one’s own” allowing the 
25 Simmel is in fact critical towards the absolutization of the modern process of individual-
ization that leads to the impoverishment of the subject because the subject comes to find 
himself without bonds, without the world – an abstract Ego. This dualism that runs 
through the modern subject threatens to eclipse its original duality; the subject is, for 
Simmel, a “whole man”, i.e. both an individual in himself, peculiar, and an individual pro-
jected outside himself, social (Martinelli, 2014).
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subject to construct his own “sacred canopy” (Beck, 2010: 14, 16).26 The “God of 
one’s own” is, in fact, a god with whom one intimately interacts into the daily 
experience of human life, beyond the religious dictates and dogmas. However, 
this “God of one’s own” tends to become “a commonplace, banal and trivial. It 
has been devalued by endless repetition. No distinction is made any longer 
between God and idols. We move in a world of multi-faith quotations whose 
source and meaning we do not know”; it is sufficient to look through “a cata-
logue destined for the New Age market – for the God of our own choosing has 
become venal” (Ibidem: 13). That “God of one’s own” becomes a god filtered by 
the awareness about our own life, knowledge, a god similar to us and reflecting 
our own image: it is the individual that builds his own religious cover and de-
cides his own faith. This is an attitude that does not exclude the adherence to 
a doctrine or a Church: the individualistic forms of affiliation to religion are in 
fact numerous, as long as subjectivity desired. This shapes a fluctuating religi-
osity, where religious faith can freely be conveyed, like any other content, pro-
vided that it does not require any privileges. In the mare magnum of cultural 
resources made available in the mediatized aesthetic space, there is also the 
religion as a symbolic resource equivalent to many others.
Heelas and Woodhead (2005), in considering the relationship between reli-
gion and spirituality –which in Europe, unlike the USA, implies a progressive 
marginalization of religion by spirituality– argue that, despite the indicators of 
secularization, the sacred does not disappear but is redefined in tune with the 
massive “subjective turn” of modern culture described then by Taylor: this 
“subjective turn” is a turn to subjective-life, a life lived in deep connection with 
the unique experience of the self in relation to one’s own emotions and pas-
sions, which shape a subjective life-spirituality.
Within this orientation, it is not to be excluded that a breach may open to 
the return of the numinous (Casement, Tracey, 2006), until religious experi-
ence undergoes torsions approaching the neo-magical. Paradoxically, the dis-
enchantment is countered by forms of re-enchantment with the world. The 
neo-magical attitude uses religious forms to promote an optimistic relation-
ship with reality.27 Magic has its own functionality, because it reintegrates the 
26 The term “sacred canopy” used by Beck is taken from a famous Berger’s text (Berger, 1967).
27 As Malinowski wrote, “the function of magic is to ritualize man’s optimism to enhance his 
faith in the victory of hope over fear. Magic expresses the greater value for man of 
 confidence over doubt, of steadfastness over vacillation, of optimism over pessimism” 
(1948: 70).
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individual into some system of values without binding it to Churches (De 
 Martino, 1962): each one tries in fact to propitiate the positive forces to his own 
advantage. In this frame, contemporary individualism marries easily with neo-
magical attitudes while religion tends to produce communities. In full confor-
mity with the contemporary consumeristic culture, the reference to magic sat-
isfies the need for immediate solutions and a low acceptance of normativity. It 
dissolves the complex link of the relationship with God, with the other and the 
community, paradoxically reinforcing the technical-rational dimension of col-
lective life, within which the otherness becomes abstract.
In conclusion, disenchantment produces cross pressures, sometimes con-
tradictory ones, on the religious experience: on the one hand, it pushes for a 
useful revision of the relationship between the personal experience of the 
faith and the order of instituted forms; on the other hand, a greater subjectiv-
ization of the religious experience can mean a total unbalancing on the indi-
vidual side which produces by itself what to believe in, within a fluctuating, 
basically immanent religion.
4.2 Reconstruction of Bonds and Emergence of Closed Communities
The weakening of bonds brought about by disenchantment produces unex-
pected side effects. On the one hand, the “buffered Self” becomes effectively 
able to keep under control, even manipulate and construct, wider and wider 
portions of reality, but on the other there grows a sense in him of insecurity 
and disorientation, produced precisely by the different forms of break carried 
out. In fact, the bond, while forming a constraint in some senses, is in other 
senses a promise of support to the individual in his biographical path.
Not relying, instead, on a network of bonds (whether with the deity, the 
community or the other) that confers a meaning to existence, the modern 
man, disorientated, exposes himself to numerous options that post-secular so-
ciety places before him: “at one moment, we understand our situation as one 
of high tragedy, alone in a silent universe, without intrinsic meaning, con-
demned to create value (…) a flattened world, in which there aren’t very mean-
ingful choices because there aren’t crucial issues” (Taylor, 1991: 68).
In this disorientation, a question of rooting emerges: it often goes in the op-
posite direction to systematic eradication, to eclectic nomadism, to the aim-
less wandering and pure universalism celebrated by contemporary culture. It 
expresses a need of identification with something: a demand that goes in the 
direction of communities considered to be salvific. Not by chance, in the age of 
individualism, which already the classics of sociology thought to become more 
and more unbridled, there is an increase in the fusional forms of community 
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and the so-called “gated communities”.28 The more the process of demolition 
of the real and of meanings advances, the more a space is created for the search 
for a new foundation, understood as something solid to be subtracted from the 
discussion and from the insubstantiality to which the whole existence seems 
to be subjected. In this line, religion – together with other references, such as 
territory, ethnicity and tradition – belongs to those distinctive elements that 
are not suspected of being affected by the virus of fragmentation: religion be-
comes a powerful bond, able to contain and counter the crumbling of social 
bonds and cultures. It becomes a particularly strong reference for reaffirming 
some roots that allow some form of personal and collective identification, in 
the face of relativism and chaos.
Thus, wishing to recover what has been lost, it is done with the idea of or-
dering the world in a fundamental difference between a “we” and a “you”, be-
tween an inside and an outside. And when the “sacred” comes on the scene, 
religion can even acquire radical, fundamentalist features, without excluding 
violence through organized groups.29
Religion is once again subjected to cross pressures: on the one hand it can 
provide that “Heimat” that the believer seeks in order to be able to give a mean-
ingful direction to his experience, but on the other hand it lends itself easily to 
being made to coincide with a reassuring element for the individual identity 
and a fundamental answer to the need for protection from the threat of insig-
nificance. And if religion has often surfaced in forms of creative and collective 
resilience to the problems produced by the dominant model of development 
or of critical protest for a forward-projected social redemption, it is here evoked 
as a compensatory refuge, functioning as a protected technique mediating val-
ues (De Martino, 1958). In this frame, the values that religion serves to mediate 
are those originating particularly from tradition. Religion is thus reduced to 
becoming a bulwark to keep itself firmly in the past, even though it competes 
with other repertories that contradict it (in particular the media), with no con-
cern over the fact that the values of which it makes itself a bearer are often only 
affirmed in words but belied in facts.
28 Among others, refer to Bauman (2001) who defines this kind of aggregation “peg commu-
nities”, i.e. spaces where people seek pegs on which they can together hang their fears and 
anxieties.
29 The relationship between the sacred and religion is, as is known, a theme that recurs 
constantly in literature as in social life; it is particularly delicate because, precisely in the 
name of the sacred, religion takes on and justifies violent features (among others, see in 
particular the work of R. Girard, for example 1972, 1982; for a recent research into the mat-
ter, with reference to the European context, see Lanzetti, 2018).
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There are some emblematic data of the already mentioned Pew Research 
Center from which an orientation emerges, among European (Christian) believ-
ers, to use religion as a symbolic repertoire called upon to assert an identity, or 
alleged identity, against, in particular, what is “different”, represented especially 
by the immigrant. The data show, for example, a greater frequency of negative 
opinions among believers (both practicing and non-practicing) towards other 
religions, especially Islam. This raises a number of thorny questions, such as the 
one relating to the meaning of “Christian identity” and, consequently, to the role 
of religious contents and the relationship between religion and culture.30
In this connection, Brubaker (2016) speaks of a “reactive Christian identity” 
to indicate how the topic of Christian religious identity has become a question 
around which many other questions raise in secularized Europe – such as the 
defense of individual rights (freedom of expression, individual autonomy, gen-
der equality, toleration of homosexuality etc.) that are perceived to be threat-
ened by the settling in one’s own territory of cultural and religious groups con-
sidered to be anti-modern.31 Those who consider themselves as believing 
Christians and, in particular, non-practicing, call for a reduction in immigra-
tion to Europe more easily than do the “nones”, especially if coming from the 
Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. Brubaker sees an “assertive secularism” 
which, unlike the “militant secularism” understood historically as opposition 
to institutional power and the influence of the authority of the Church, is now 
aimed against Muslim immigrants and their descendants: this is a tendency 
which, in the author’s view, concerns especially some populist movements, 
which appeal to religion in defense of the West, although what they are inter-
ested in is not religious values in the strict sense.
As it has often happened in history, religion becomes a cultural badge used 
in defense of questions that in reality are not closely connected with religious 
contents (in this case, the Christian ones). The process of “culturalization” of 
religion is pursued, again according to Brubaker, for a dual gain. On the one 
hand, it allows Christianity to have a position of privilege as “culture” within a 
context –the secularized European one– in which it has lost that privilege as a 
religion, given the liberal State’s commitment to neutrality in religious matters. 
On the other, it enables minority religious practices, redefined as cultural, to be 
restricted in a way that would not be possible, given the option of liberal States 
toward religious freedom.
30 For a detailed account of related ethical issues, see Chapter 2.
31 The encounter, or the confrontation, between Christianity and Islam is often reduced to a 
pair of concepts: liberal and illiberal, individualistic and collectivist, democratic and au-
thoritarian, modern and retrograde, secular and religious.
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Roy (2016) takes up a similar position when he states that European Christi-
anity, from being a faith with its rites and practices, has become a mere cultural 
badge that easily risks degenerating into a neo-ethnic badge with closures to-
wards the outside. In this frame, the continuity between Christianity in Europe 
and modern secularism is no longer based on values considered universal and 
felt to be common to both positions. If we wish to speak of continuity, this is 
built, if anything, around the idea of identity: the Christian identity is under-
stood in a merely “cultural” sense, excluding the religious values in the strict 
sense from those that are instead defined as “European values”, made to coin-
cide mostly with individual rights.
As highlighted by various scholars of religion, where religion, for one reason 
or another, has been historically “culturalized”, in reality it is no longer a reli-
gion, but something else, thus also compromising the conditions for a bal-
anced religious pluralism, given that religions end up competing miserably 
with one another rather than allying themselves around common, shared 
questions, therefore nurturing the fundamentalist traits that are hidden in 
each of them (Soeffner, 2014).
The questions are very complex. The breaking of intersubjective and social 
bonds produces cross-pressures on the religious experience, in the direction of 
exasperating the search for strong bonds, reassuring identity, not without the 
danger that religious groups take on radical traits. On the other hand, however, 
this shows that the individual without ties is an abstraction and that he there-
fore seeks a position within significant relational networks.
In this sense, the search for ties finds, in belonging to religious groups, a 
pertinent response to this need, given that the religious dimension is a pro-
found element of the believer’s identity and lifestyle, with positive effects on 
social coexistence when the form of these aggregations is peaceful. It would 
suffice to mention, among the many experiences of this kind, the case of the 
so-called “ethnic” communities and missions made up of immigrants, present 
in many European cities with reference to the Christian context or, in the case 
of the other religions, the numerous places of worship and the cultural associa-
tions that have an explicit reference to religion. In particular, the ethnic mis-
sions have a long history in Europe following the large-scale migrations in the 
second post-war period: suffice it to think of the case of the Italian, Spanish 
and Portuguese migrants in the cities of Central and Northern Europe where, 
in many cases, they favored routes of integration not counterposed with the 
local host society.32 Their role is to provide places of worship but also of 
32 Among the numerous studies on the subject, see: Prencipe (2010) and, with reference to 
the European case as a whole Tassello et al. (2011). For the Italian case, see, among others: 
Golinelli (2011); Ambrosini (2016); Ambrosini et al. (2018).
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 assistance, education, solidaristic commitment and production of culture.33 
These structures can carry out an important task of “ferrying” into the local 
ecclesial communities, after offering the possibility, for an initial or more pro-
longed period, of expressing themselves in their own language and according 
to the traditions of their communities of origin. As to the risk of a possible re-
treat within their ethnic, cultural and religious communities, there is also a 
tendency, if and where present in the arrival society, to consider migrations as 
a transitory phenomenon and religion as a parallel element in relation to the 
immigrants’ experiences. In this case, the result is often a limited adaptation 
and a poor inclusion by the migrants into the structures of the host society. On 
the contrary, where the presence and religious experience of the migrants are 
considered as structural phenomena of the host society and as a vital and vital-
izing part of the activity of the Churches and local religious groups, virtuous 
processes are set in motion with positive side effects, insisting on the value of 
the religion in relation also to broader social ties.34
4.3 Transcendence and Immanence
The effect of the interweaving between disenchantment and rationalization 
is the detachment between immanence and transcendence. If indeed the man 
of the Middle Ages or, as Taylor puts it, the man of Latin Christianity consid-
ered the two polarities only simultaneously, because every immanent occur-
rence could not have an autonomous significance but had a transcendent 
foundation, for the disenchanted man this co-presence has become inconceiv-
able. The disenchanted view of the world is based on the assumption that no 
immanent phenomenon can at the same time have a transcendent founda-
tion, because otherwise it would escape the control of man; on the contrary, it 
must be possible to explain everything rationally.
The gradual unfolding of a technical society pushes decidedly towards the 
immanent option. This type of society –leaning on individualization and 
 fragmentation of social bonds, economic and financial expansion, technologi-
cal progress and bureaucratization, detachment between functions and 
 meanings– has legitimized itself thanks to its capacity to increase the possi-
bilities in a constant, ever-greater manner, together with the predictability of 
what occurs, and to overcome the limits posed by the institutions and the cul-
ture with their constraints of place, memory, meanings and values. In this 
model, on the one hand there arises the individual; on the other, the  increasingly 
33 See in this connection the research as to the role of religion in the process of integration 
of migrants into the new cultural context contained in Part 4, where it is also stated how 
religion-, faith-based organizations contribute to integration and social cohesion.
34 Refer to the experience described in Chapter 16.
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systemic organization that responds to the growing demand for individualiza-
tion. For the system, the individual is a bearer of needs to be satisfied: for the 
individual, the system is the interlocutor that must guarantee the maximum 
individualization by reducing social obligations to the minimum. As in a cir-
cuit that continuously feeds itself, individualization reinforces the process of 
technicalization of society. The growing demand for subjectivity coming from 
individuals in the advanced societies is satisfied (at least this is the dominant 
assumption) through the increase in the systemic power, able to broaden the 
instruments infinitely, beyond the meanings.
The technical element is one of the factors that give shape to post-secular 
society by acting within it; it is what has been increasingly raised to a system 
shaping a technical society (Magatti, 2018). Disenchantment and rationaliza-
tion thus reach unheard levels in the age of techno-science, where the pervasive 
capacity to increase the possibilities without limit requires the individuals to 
remain continually open. Transcendence is exchanged precisely with this un-
conditional opening to new possibilities here and now.35 It is as if the opening 
of man to the beyond were shifted onto a completely horizontal axis, neverthe-
less able to play this immanence in a highly dynamic way. It is indeed an insis-
tent immanence that candidates itself to give rapid, relevant answers regarding 
people’s existence, if we think of the role acquired by consumption, and of the 
capacity of technical systems to give solutions to day-to-day problems and to 
the possibilities of optimization and manipulation of reality (and life), up to the 
 hypothesis of overcoming the fragility and mystery because they are in contra-
diction with the efficiency, predictability, performativity required by contempo-
rary capitalism. Significantly, already W. Benjamin defined modern capitalism 
as a “religion” because it “serves essentially to allay the same anxieties, torments, 
and disturbances to which the so-called religions offered answers” (2103: 59).
In this frame, the strong material component is more and more preponder-
ant. All this, however, has increased the need to draw on an immaterial dimen-
sion. In part, this need has been intercepted and incorporated by capitalism 
itself which, above all, with marketing, has understood how to recover a sort of 
reference to the immaterial (Baudrillard, 1976), in order to respond apparently 
to the “spiritual” needs of individuals, but transforming them into something 
else, more in line with its own project.36
35 Past and future are swallowed up in an eternal present celebrated as the only time exist-
ing: the perception of continuity, that is of the dynamic and processual nature of time, 
breaks down. As argued by Hervieu-Léger, in contemporary society we observe a situation 
brought about by the pure and simple disappearance of every memory that is not imme-
diate and functional (1993).
36 As stated by Boltanski and Chiapello (1999), what distinguishes capitalism is its ability to 
intercept the reactions towards it by transforming them so as to be able to incorporate 
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Beyond consumption, the thrusts in the direction of the immaterial are 
channeled into other orientations, such as the myth of the “return to origins” 
which animates some of today’s ecological movements, or the logic of giving 
and sharing proposed in various forms in contemporary societies, especially 
through the use of Web platforms.
On the more strictly religious front, we may think of the moments of 
ritual that persist even though they seem out of time in the eyes of contempo-
rary culture. Often considered to be the heart of religiosity, such practices – 
inevitable exposed to the cross pressures that we are discussing– are in danger 
of losing their specificity, that is their being the possible point of encounter 
between immanence and transcendence, and of posing, by virtue of this na-
ture, a correspondence between daily life and faith, between an earthly time 
and an eternal one, between the single person and the community. Different 
scholars have documented the crisis of such rites and religious practices, re-
duced to mechanisms emptied of meaning. On closer examination, however, 
this crisis is actually present but is only one side of the coin. The other side 
suggests that we investigate more thoroughly, what it means to live religious 
practice today with all its complement of reference beyond the immanence 
that envelops daily life, demanding directly to the only person who can speak 
of such a personal experience: the one who lives it in the first person.37
Each of these phenomena of orientation to the immaterial is one of those 
signs of transcendence and constitutes a laceration of that immanent frame-
work which, according to Taylor, overshadows post-secular society. The com-
plete realization of that framework would lead to what Taylor calls “a purely 
self-sufficient humanism (…) a humanism accepting no final goals beyond hu-
man flourishing, not any allegiance to anything else beyond this flourishing. Of 
no previous society was this true” (2007: 31).
Between immanentistic and disenchanted tendencies, on the one hand, 
and re-enchantment phenomena on the other, the search for an immaterial 
dimension (expressed in different ways) and the persistence of the religious 
phenomenon in its appeal to transcendence contribute to keeping the imma-
nent framework open and not saturated. If this were not so, societies would 
implode and people would be impoverished of that freedom that arises from 
distancing themselves from the saturation typical of technical societies, regu-
lated by the logic of functionality: through this distance, individuals are able to 
access universes of meaning.
them. And, significantly, Pine and Gilmore speak of an “economy of experiences” to un-
derline how also the emotional component is incorporated in the ambits susceptible to 
entering into the circuit of economic valorisation (2000).
37 Useful in this direction is the work described in Parts 3, 4, and 5 of this book.
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5 Conclusive Considerations: Some Issues Related to the Migration 
Processes
In this chapter, starting from the literature and from some empirical observa-
tions, we have analyzed the secularizing tendencies at work in modernity and 
contemporaneity, in the light of some effects produced by them within society. 
More in particular, we focused on “post-secular society” – a society in which 
the religious experience finds itself in the midst of disenchanting tendencies 
without, however, definitively succumbing to them. What has changed in it are 
the conditions of belief and the ways in which we have access to the contents 
of faith.
We have thus spoken of the emergence of a new demand for subjectivity 
within the religious experience, which represents a challenge for the religious 
institutions in their knowing how to place themselves in our time, and simul-
taneously provokes problematic torsions at the limit of religion itself. We have 
then focused on the weakening of social bonds, which exposes the individual 
to new forms of religious aggregation with closed and sometimes radical traits, 
whilst bringing with itself the need for community inherent in the individual. 
And we have seen the tendency to adopt a rationalized view of reality that 
questions the dimension of meaning and conflicts with the religious view in its 
opening to the transcendence.
The outlook of “post-secular” society suggests that we do not consider such 
tendencies as a sign indicating an eclipse of religion from social and individual 
life and, consequently, its possible return after a period of absence: the real 
circumstance, the starting point for the present reflection about seculariza-
tion, suggests considering that secularization and religious experience, in oth-
er terms modernity (or late-modernity) and religion, do not completely ex-
clude one another.
The scenario of European “post-secular societies”, that complex set of secu-
larizing pressures and tendencies moving in the opposite direction as well as 
cross pressures within it affecting religious experience, subjecting it to new 
challenges whose conclusion is not foregone, constitutes the frame within 
which immigration takes place and within which Europe itself is challenged. It 
is challenged also by migrations to overcome the unresolved, ambivalent ten-
sion between the techno-economicism of its politics (especially those related 
to the migration of labor) and its philosophy of rights (among which there is 
religious freedom) and solidarity embedded in its foundation project.38
38 For a useful analysis of the challenge of migration “in a Janus-Faced Europe”, and the os-
cillation of Europe between positions of openness and closure, pluralism and uniformity, 
see Zanfrini (2019).
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In some respects, the plural scenario of the European post-secular societies 
is shaped also by the presence of migrants: the believers with a migration back-
ground contribute to shaping the variegated religious landscape, and to the 
reconsideration of questions set aside following the processes of seculariza-
tion, even if only for the fact that they make the religious phenomenon more 
“visible” within European societies by placing at the center issues linked to 
freedom and human rights.
In the final stage, we shall mention two questions emerging in post-secular 
society, solicited also, though not only, by the presence of migrants. We refer in 
particular to religious pluralism and the role of religion in the public area. 
These are nodes around which unsolved questions and ambivalences of glo-
balization and secularization condense, but also complex challenges in the 
direction of a re-opening of the horizon with respect to a society that wishes to 
question itself, beyond the mere technical function, on meanings of human 
coexistence.
5.1 The Challenge of Religious Pluralism
Religious pluralism constitutes the proof that the dream –fed by globalizing 
tendencies– of a world without differences has not come true. All the 
 migrations –closely connected with the phenomenon of globalization– have 
contributed to profound changes from a cultural and religious point of view. 
Not, however, in the sense of a fusion that homologates singularities but in the 
sense of a coexistence of different religious alternatives. In fact, although the 
nation States have for a long time tried to impose some homogeneity also from 
a religious point of view, so as to guarantee social cohesion, the international 
migratory processes have sustained religious pluralism (Saunders et al., 2016). 
This is particularly true in the case of Europe, where diversity based on religion 
is one of the most challenging (Zanfrini, 2019).
If we wished to find a point of contact between religious pluralism and the 
aspirations of globalization, it would concern the deconstruction of dominant 
value references. From this point of view, religious pluralism lends itself well to 
a society where the individual dimension is increasingly preponderant over 
the collective dimension. Although every religion always tries to meet a need 
for belonging, the plurality of alternatives has been interpreted as a way to 
satisfy the need of individuals, especially of the contemporary individuals, to 
choose – Berger defines this need as “heretical imperative” (Berger, 1979) – and 
to shape with one’s own hands one’s personal spiritual and religious path. In 
this regard, often pluralism is simply confused with a veritable “do-it-yourself 
religion” (Lucà Trombetta, 2004) put together by the individual who draws on 




In the framework of European religious pluralism, migrants themselves can 
undergo the influences of the tendencies of individualism and subjectivism. 
One’s religious orientation –which in the case of migrants is often decisive in 
defining personal and social identities– can therefore weaken, or radicalize by 
reaction, or can be renegotiated with the context and take on a new form.
On the front of the processes of secularization, religious pluralism produces 
two effects. On the one hand it belies the “classical” hypotheses of seculariza-
tion whereby the religious phenomenon, reacting to changes in modernity and 
in the globalizing dynamics, would simply wither away – or, in the more nor-
mative theses would have to wither away. On the other hand, pluralism consti-
tutes a challenge for the more traditional kinds of religion and for the charac-
teristics presented by such religions: the integrity and solidity given by the 
internal consistency and by the constancy of individual paths; the presence of 
a strong collective and community dimension, and of dogmas and doctrines 
stable over time, of a univocal truth bringing salvation, and a consolidated rit-
ual dimension. Also in this case there emerges an underlying ambiguity of re-
ligious pluralism, which on the one hand nourishes the religious impulses, but 
on the other undermines the more traditional forms. This ambiguity cannot be 
resolved on a theoretical level but must be observed in the concrete of the ex-
periences of individuals and groups. Undoubtedly, some European contexts 
form an interesting framework for analyzing these processes, because they are 
contexts with the strong presence of a historical religion (Christianity) in its 
most evident institutional form. At the same time, they are challenged to redis-
cover more deeply the contents of their faith, which often contemplates, al-
ready in itself, a dimension of opening and plural encounter. This, for historical 
events (not least the difficulty precisely in facing modernity) and for contin-
gent needs, has been put in the background with the danger, moreover, of 
weakening the potentialities inherent to religion itself. Pluralism therefore also 
constitutes a chance where it becomes a reason for a deeper knowledge of its 
own religious contents.39
In addition to the more traditional religions, it is important to acknowledge 
the presence of other religions, such as the oriental ones –Buddhism and 
 Hinduism–, New Age and the New Religious movements. These, too, reflect the 
role of migrations and, although their diffusion varies from country to country, 
their presence is evident also because of media support – an example is the 
renowned achieved by the Soka Gakkai or by Scientology in the media sphere. 
39 Significant in this sense is the Synodal process experienced in the Diocese of Milan: it has 
contributed to the deeper understanding by believers (both native and immigrants) of 
the content of their faith (see again Chapter 16).
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These religions are different from the traditional western ones and can often 
be translated into forms of alternative spirituality rather than true paths of 
faith – in some cases, in the concrete of the experience of the single individu-
als, they can be reduced to simple practices or philosophies of life. In this 
sense, they are difficult to perceive as a menace for Europeans, who on the 
contrary are curious about these currents running through the pluralism of the 
western world.
In considering the possible configurations of the relations between Europe-
ans and migrants, it therefore becomes necessary to specify first of all what 
types of religion enter into relation with one another through people. In addi-
tion, the “Christian” population is in reality very varied internally, as an effect 
of the dynamics above outlined which shape multiple paths: there are those 
who feel they simply belong to a cultural form; those who adhere for personal 
belief; those who declare themselves to be convinced Christians but practice 
intermittently; those who say they are Christian in their own way and adhere 
to Christianity selectively.40
And if, on the one hand, Europeans consider the increase in religious plural-
ism as a source of cultural enrichment, on the other hand pluralism is inter-
preted as a cause of conflict if not as even a threat to the identity, especially in 
relation to Islam – a religion which, though limited in percentage terms, has 
seen a growing diffusion as a result of migratory flows. The level of mistrust has 
increased following terrorist attacks in Europe. However, on a different level, 
the difficulties in reconciling radically different worldviews and ways of think-
ing of individual and social life often reach public debate: the possibility of 
building mosques, whether or not to remove the crucifix from state schools, 
the use of the veil are some such examples. In these debates, religion – 
 differently from expectations – enters significantly into the public scene. And 
the public sphere takes on a crucial role in shaping the integration processes of 
migrants; it can direct the interpretations but above all the states of mind to-
wards immigrants, just as it can decide to throw light on some phenomena and 
leave others in the shadow – for example, the fact that in the European terri-
tory there are integrated second generations of immigrants, just as there are 
native Europeans who have converted to Islam.
In the plural religious framework, the encounter and/or the confrontation 
occur within a context that, in the wake of disenchantment and  rationalization, 
40 See, for example, for the case of Italy and Catholicism, the research on young generations 
realized by Bichi and Bignardi (2015); and with reference to migrations (with a high Chris-
tian and Catholic internal component) and, more in particular, to the second generation, 
see Bichi et al. (2018).
Martinelli108
<UN>
has accentuated some aspects of collective life, at the expense of other dimen-
sions. And, in this context, religion can acquire a crucial position because it is 
not equivalent to functional and technocratic views of reality but raises ques-
tions of meaning regarding social life and the human condition.
5.2 Religions as “Anti-environments”
J. Habermas, in his extensive research into the public sphere, has come to iden-
tify precisely in religion the models of language and meaning that allow us to 
name experiences, relationships, history, the world, and hence interpret what 
otherwise would probably remain unexpressed.
This leads us to the point on the role of religion in the public sphere, which 
calls into question, more broadly, the meaning of “laïcité”, on the one hand, and 
the task of religion in general, on the other.
As far as “laïcité” is concerned, the French Revolution has bequeathed to us 
the notion of laïcité to be understood as that condition in which non-religious 
thought finds its place and legitimacy in a world dominated by the stance de-
fined by the institutionalized Church. From here, given the formation of the 
State according to the idea of laïcité, what takes shape is the effort to retain the 
influence of religion within well-defined borders, by relegating it to the private 
space. However, the question arises whether, in a social world organized 
around the global technical system and surrounded by an “a purely self- 
sufficient humanism”, where the human dimension of social life is marginal-
ized, it is the right time to review the conception of laïcité, as it often ends in 
“laicism”.
The French philosopher Henri Bergson focused on the ways in which reli-
gion, precisely because it is embodied in historical processes, experiences the 
internal dialectic between openness and closure, between conservation and 
prophecy. This dialectic, while continuously threatening to render religion or-
ganic with the status quo, also enables the continuous evocation of new ener-
gies for critical and creative innovation.
In such a direction, religion represents one of the few experiences able to 
oppose the “purely self-sufficient humanism” that is deeply embedded in our 
times. A useful idea to capture the potential role of religion is that of the 
“ anti-environment” – a concept used by McLuhan (1964, 1967), which we adapt 
here to our subject. Within a social context deeply marked by the pervasive-
ness of rationalization and disenchantment, combined with technical systems 
constituting the “environment” of our whole individual and social life, “anti-
environments” are worth a lot, as they shape a space able to activate some an-
tidotes to the technocratic, homologating colonization of human life. Religion 
could be one of these “anti-environments”; others are certainly conceivable 
(i.e. education, arts, etc.).
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By reopening the question of meaning in relation to existence together with 
the meanings and forms of the human condition, this “anti-environment” is 
extremely relevant for the freedom of everyone, believers and non-believers. In 
a world that threatens to collapse on itself, in which technique has no counter-
weights and reality is confused with individualized points of view, this envi-
ronment is a valuable bulwark of freedom precisely in redesigning the refer-
ence to “transcendence” – a term which describes not only the human openness 
to a God, a divine otherness, but also a domain of awareness, of openness to 
the mystery of the other or of creative principles that humans can access in 
order to receive guidance in relation to sense-making. Transcendence allows 
us to distance ourselves from historical configurations that are built on an “a 
purely self-sufficient humanism” pestered by the expansion of technocracy. 
That idea about transcendence can play a crucial role in stimulating profound 
processes of social transformation. In such a frame, religion could be consid-
ered as a “sacred space of the infinite”, as it is able to safeguard human open-
ness to the unexpected and the otherness, and to shape humanly-practicable 
paths, interweaving the material dimension with the sense-making demands, 
the finite and the infinite (Magatti, Martinelli, 2012).
Therefore, starting from the important recognition of keeping open the 
question of meaning, which is strongly related to freedom, it is possible to re-
define the issue that historically has gone under the name of “laïcité”, going 
beyond the “immanent frame” which shaped –as Taylor highlights– the social 
imaginary that arose during the Enlightenment, as people started trying to 
conceptualize society in self-subsistent terms, which is to say in a way that 
does not presuppose the existence of a transcendent spiritual reality and does 
not admit the human possibility to be resilient to defined social patterns.
The assertion of secularization, according to which religion is only a private 
matter, denies the fact that all societies –even though in different ways– have 
questioned themselves about the issue of the infinite. Simply because such a 
question –whatever the answer– concerns the human condition. Of course, 
this opens up important questions regarding the public sphere and its reorga-
nization. The history of modernity bequeaths to us the awareness that no reli-
gion (as well as no ideology, culture or tradition) can reasonably expect to ex-
haust the universal breadth of human experience. And yet, this does not mean 
that it is not worth taking into account the great religious traditions as worthy 
spaces for building a richer social world and, therefore, one more suitable for 
human condition. The recognition of the collective value of the “sacred space 
of the infinite”, for example, may create a more favorable condition for the de-
velopment of the intercultural and interreligious dialogue that is a current hu-
man imperative of our time and that may be deployed not only horizontally –
among different conceptions of values– but also vertically, namely by 
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considering the structural openness of the human being to transcendence as 
an unavoidable feature. It is an openness to which every culture and religion 
offers answers and different realizations.
This “sacred space of the infinite” includes the religious dimension within 
the public life not as a compensatory receptacle of those problematic conse-
quences of socio-economic development models that succeed over time. If it 
were such a receptacle (as it often is), it would be unable to distance itself from 
the principles of those models. Rather, the “sacred space of the infinite” – 
 precisely through a new understanding of “laïcité”– becomes a valuable “anti- 
environment” that allows us to always reopen the issue of sense about collec-
tive living and the plurality of human achievements. Its potentiality comes 
into play both in challenging dogmatisms that even in a free society eventually 
rise, and in fighting fundamentalism of religions that becomes more likely the 
higher the demand for meaning raised by religion is censored.
In conclusion, post-secular society expresses the emergence of a new epoch 
in relation to the epoch of secularization, a time in which the religious phe-
nomenon is affected by profound changes and does not at all seem doomed to 
disappear. The challenge is rather to recognize, on the one hand, the new risks 
punctuating the religious experience and, on the other, to capture the signals, 
often formless and not yet institutionalized, that open up in post-secular soci-
eties, by going in the direction of considering religion – understood as a pos-
sible “anti-environment” and a “sacred space of the infinite” – as a sphere that 
can safeguard dimensions of the human (opening towards transcendence, the 
central role of meanings, the uniqueness and dignity of the person, the crucial-
ity of bonds and the recognition of the other, the importance of questions such 
as justice, peace, the safeguard of creation, etc.) which make up a heritage of 
value for all.
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Chapter 4
Migration and Religious Freedom:  
the Legislative and Judicial Framework  
at International and European Level
Andrea Santini and Monica Spatti
1 Introduction
Despite being a fundamental human right, freedom of religion is still violated 
in many parts of the world today.* The violation of this right can take on differ-
ent forms. Sometimes, it simply consists of preventing people from choosing 
their own religion. More frequently, there are abuses. In some countries people 
belonging to religious minorities are discriminated and are prohibited to exer-
cise some basic rights such as participating in public elections, applying for 
jobs or freely circulating in the country. Sometimes religious minorities are 
subject to detention, torture or other cruel treatments.
These persecutions, which can be of different kind, represent, as described 
in Chapters 5 and 10, a driving factor of emigration. Indeed, oppressed people 
try to migrate to a place where they hope to live in peace. Once they left their 
country of origin, they try to apply to some form of protection from the State 
they emigrated to. The purpose of this contribution is to verify the conditions 
under which legal protection can be granted to those individuals who have left 
their country of origin due to religious persecutions. The research will focus on 
both international and European law, as well as the relevant case law on the 
matter. Accordingly, it will be necessary to understand first what freedom of 
religion is from the point of view of international and European law. Secondly, 
it will be analyzed what kind of protection can be granted to those people who 
are leaving their country due to a violation of their freedom of religion.
2 Freedom of Religion or Belief in International and European Law
Freedom of religion or belief is a fundamental right recognized in several 
sources of international law. It was first proclaimed in art. 18 of the Universal 
* Although this chapter is the result of common reflections and work, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 
have been drafted by Monica Spatti and paragraphs 4 and 5 by Andrea Santini.
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Declaration of Human Rights and then enshrined in several legal acts both 
binding and not binding, regional1 and universal.2 It is worth to recall, in par-
ticular, art. 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(iccpr),3 and art. 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (echr).4
Commonly known as “freedom of religion or belief”, the full definition of 
this human right is “freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief”. Ac-
cordingly, it recognizes not only the right to have any religion or belief, but also 
the right not to profess anyone.5 The inclusion of freedom of thought and con-
science in the definition has the purpose to cover also atheism and not only 
strictly religious convictions (Evans, 2001: 40). The formula adopted in many 
legal acts is so wide to include also the right not to reveal religious convictions 
or beliefs to anyone.6
International law does not define what “religion” is. Normally international 
courts and other bodies in charge of the protection of human rights interpret 
it in a broad sense. More precisely, the concept of religion cannot be limited to 
established confessions or those “with institutional characteristics or practices 
analogous to those of traditional religions”.7 For this reason, international 
1 Among the human rights regional treaties recognising the right to freedom of religion or 
belief see: American Convention on Human Rights, San José, 22 November 1969, art. 12; Afri-
can Charter on Human and People Rights, Nairobi, 27 June 1981, art. 8.
2 Among the universal binding acts see, for example: Convention relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, Geneva, 28 July 1951, art. 4; Convention on the Rights of the Child, New York, 20 Novem-
ber 1989, art. 14; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, New York, 18 December 1990, art. 12. Among the 
other international acts see, inter alia: the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion of Belief, proclaimed by General As-
sembly resolution No. 36/55 of 25 November 1981; the Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by General As-
sembly resolution No. 47/135 of 18 December 1992.
3 New York, 16 December 1966.
4 Rome, 4 November 1950.
5 See General Comment No. 22, adopted by the Human Rights Committee on 30 July 1993, para 
5. See the following judgements of the European Court of Human Rights: Kokkinakis v. Greece, 
25 May 1993, par. 31; Buscarini and others v. San Marino (gc), 18 February 1999, par. 34; Alexan-
dridis v. Greece, 21 February 2008, par. 32.
6 General Comment No. 22, cit., par. 3. See also the European Court of Human Rights’ judge-
ments Sinan Isik v. Turkey, 2 February 2010, par. 49–52, and Dimitras and others v. Greece, 3 
June 2013, par. 35.
7 General Comment No. 22, cit., par. 2. The European Court of Human Rights has recognized 
the guarantees coming from art. 9 echr to traditional religions as Alevism (judgement Izzet-
tin Doğan and others v. Turkey (gc), 26 April 2016, par. 114), Buddhism (judgement Jakóbski v. 
Poland, 7 December 2010), Hinduism (judgement Kovalkovs v. Latvia, 31 January 2012), Islam 
(judgement Hassan et Tchaouch v. Bulgaria (gc), 26 October 2000), Taoism (decision X. v. 
United Kingdom, 18 May 1976), Sikhism (decision Jasvir Singh v. France, 30 June 2009), but also 
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 human rights bodies do not distinguish between “religion” and “sect”. The 
 European Court of Human Rights has applied art. 9 echr regardless any quali-
fication coming from national authorities.8 The term “belief” has also been in-
terpreted in a wide sense in order to include convictions of non-religious na-
ture, such as pacifism,9 anti-abortion convictions10 and vegetarianism.11 At the 
same time, the concept of belief is not so broad to include any personal prefer-
ence. According to the European Court of Human Rights, in order to be pro-
tected by the Convention, the personal conviction must have “a certain level of 
cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance”12 (Bielefeldt, 2015: 16–17).
Once defined what freedom of religion or belief is, it is possible to identify 
two dimensions where it applies: the forum internum and the forum externum. 
The forum internum regards the internal sphere of the individual and consists 
of the right to have a freely chosen religion or belief. Accordingly, it cannot be 
subject to any coercion. The forum externum instead consists of the freedom to 
profess a certain religion or belief. As it may have consequences on the others, 
it can be subject to limitations. Therefore, freedom of religion is not an uncon-
ditional and absolute principle, such as the prohibition of torture and slavery 
or freedom of opinion. Freedom of religion or belief as prescribed by interna-
tional law simply implies the prohibition of coercion: no one can be forced to 
have or adopt a religion against their will.13
The right to change religion is the most controversial component of free-
dom of religion or belief. The travaux préparatoires of several treaties reveal 
that State representatives had passionate debates on the opportunity to recog-
nize the right to change religion. Some countries were openly against it by ar-
guing that it may encourage unwelcome proselytism and undermine national 
 to more recent religions as Aumism of Mandaron ( judgement Association de Chevaliers 
du Lotus d’Or v. France, 31 January 2013), Osho (judgement Mockuté v. Lithuania, 27 
 February 2018, par. 121), Mormonisme (judgement The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. United Kingdom, 4 March 2014), the Raelian movement (decision f.l. v. 
France, 3  November 2005), Jehovah’s Witnesses (judgement Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow 
and others v. Russia, 10 June 2010).
8 The European Court of Human Rights has not excluded from the guarantees coming from 
art. 9 groups as Scientology (decision X. and Church of Scientology v. Sweden, 5 May 1979), 
druidism (decision Chappell v. United Kingdom, 14 July 1987), the “Divine Light Zentrum” 
(decision Omkarananda and Divine Light Zentrum v. Switzerland, 19 March 1981), without 
investigating their qualifications.
9 European Court decision Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, 16 May 1977.
10 European Court decision Knudesn v. Norway, 3 March 1985.
11 European Court decision w.c. v. United Kingdom, 10 February 1993.
12 European Court judgement Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, 22 March 1983, par. 
293.
13 General Comment No. 22, cit., par. 5.
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cohesion14 (Bielefeldt et al., 2016: 57–58). For this reason, while the right to 
change religion was expressly mentioned in the Universal Declaration on Hu-
man Rights and in the echr, the iccpr adopted the more nuanced formula of 
“religion or belief of one’s choice”. Despite this reticence, the right to change 
religion constitutes a necessary component of freedom of religion as under-
lined by the Human Rights Committee in the General Comment No. 22.
The right to change or abandon a religion is not granted in every country 
yet. While few governments punish this behavior through criminal sanctions, 
other countries foresee some other consequences, such as limiting access to 
education, employment, as well as the right to travel and vote (Bielefeldt et al., 
2016). This happens in particular in those States that have an official religion 
(Bielefeldt et al., 2016). Quite interestingly, international law does not prohibit 
States to choose an official religion, even if this choice may increase the risk of 
discriminations and persecutions against minorities.15 As pointed out by the 
Human Rights Committee “the fact that a religion is recognized as a State reli-
gion (…) or that its followers comprise the majority of the population, shall not 
result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the 
Covenant”.16
The forum externum of freedom of religion or belief consists of the right to 
manifest any religion or belief. This freedom has a private as well as a commu-
nity dimension, as it protects the manifestation of belief “in worship, obser-
vance, practice and teaching” both in public and in private (Clark, Durham, 
2015). The collective aspect of freedom of religion or belief gives communities 
the right to perform “acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their 
basic affairs”,17 this including the right to establish places for worship,18 select 
and train leaders,19 establish religious schools, etc. More generally, the right to 
profess a religion or belief does potentially include a broad range of acts, such 
as the use of ritual formulas, observance of holidays and of dietary regulations, 
as well as wearing distinctive clothing.20
14 The recognition of the right to change religion in art. 18 of the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights is the main reason for the abstention of Saudi Arabia at the vote. See 
A/C.3/SR.289, par. 40–47.
15 According to H. Bielefeldt, 2015: 20 “Freedom of religion or belief, understood as a human 
right for all without discrimination, can thus become a powerful argument for establish-
ing secular constitutions and secular legal orders”.
16 General Comment No. 22, cit., par. 9.
17 Ivi, par. 4.
18 See the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights Association for Solidarity with 
Jehovah Witnesses and others v. Turkey, 24 May 2016, par. 104–108.
19 European Court of Human Rights judgement Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria (gc), 26 
 October 2000, par. 85–89.
20 General Comment No. 22, cit., par. 4.
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As it has already been said, the right to manifest a religion or belief can be 
subject to limitations. According to art. 18 (3) iccpr and art. 9 (2) echr, legiti-
mate restrictions must be prescribed by the law and pursue a legitimate aim, 
such as public safety, public order, health, moral or the protection of rights and 
freedom of others. Moreover, the restriction is legitimate as long as it is neces-
sary to achieve the defined aim, thus requesting an evaluation of the propor-
tionality of the measure.
Freedom of religion or belief is also recognized within the European Union 
legal system. From a EU law perspective, this right is directly connected to the 
values on which the Union is based –such as democracy, the rule of law and 
respect of human rights– as it contributes to their achievement.21 In particular, 
art. 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (cfr) of the European Union 
presents the same formulation of freedom of religion outlined in art. 9 echr.22 
However, art. 10 of the Charter does not provide a specific discipline on the 
possible limitations of freedom of religion. This depends on the decision of the 
drafters to introduce a general provision in art. 52 cfr allowing limitations to 
all rights and freedoms provided by the Charter. According to par. 3 of this 
provision, in particular, when the Charter contains rights which correspond to 
the rights guaranteed by the echr, “the meaning and scope of those rights 
shall be the same as those laid down” by the echr. As clarified in the explana-
tions relating to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as the right guaran-
teed in art. 10 (1) cfr corresponds to the right guaranteed in art. 9 of the echr, 
limitations should also comply with the discipline that the latter provision 
provides on the matter in par. 2.
3 Refugees and the Principle of Non-refoulement
Another important treaty for the protection of freedom of religion or belief is 
the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees adopted in 1951 (hereinafter: 
Geneva Convention).23 It represents the only global treaty protecting people 
who are escaping from their country of origin due to the risk of serious 
21 See the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, 
adopted by the Council of the European Union, 24 June 2013, par. 1.
22 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Strasbourg, 12 December 2007.
23 The Geneva Convention is integrated by the Protocol of New York, adopted the 31 January 
1967, that removed, for those States that have ratified it, the geographical and temporal 
restrictions established in the Convention according to which the Geneva Convention 
applied only to persons who became refugees as a result of events occurring before 1 Janu-
ary 1951 in Europe.
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 violations of their fundamental rights, including freedom of religion or belief. 
According to art. 1 (A) (2) of the Geneva Convention, a refugee is someone who
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country.
The people falling under this definition may obtain the status of refugee if the 
country where they ask protection has ratified this Convention.24
Also the European Union takes care of people obliged to escape from their 
country of origin. More precisely, Directive 2011/95/EU recognizes two kinds 
of protection: the “refugee status” and the “subsidiary protection”.25 The defi-
nition of refugee outlined in art. 2 (d) of the Directive recalls the same formu-
lation adopted by the Geneva Convention, which focuses on the risk of perse-
cution. At the same time, the Directive is more precise as it specifies in details 
the requirements to be considered a refugee. For example, aside from defining 
explicitly what acts can be qualified as “persecution” (see infra par. 4), art. 10 
also explains the possible reasons behind such behavior. Furthermore, it is 
also interesting for the purpose of this research the fact that art. 10 (1) (b) pro-
vides a definition of religion: this consisting of “the holding of theistic, non-
theistic and atheistic beliefs, the participation in, or abstention from, formal 
worship in private or in public, either alone or in community with others, 
other religious acts or expressions of view, or forms of personal or communal 
conduct based on or mandated by any religious belief”. The definition is clear-
ly very wide in accordance with the approach adopted by the treaties on the 
protection of human rights mentioned above.
Quite interestingly, EU law also clarifies who the actors of the persecution 
may be. This is something the Geneva Convention has left rather nuanced, by 
simply stating that the refugee “is unable (…) or unwilling, to avail himself of 
the protection” of his country of origin. From this formulation, it has been pos-
sible to deduce that refugees are “unwilling” when the persecution comes 
24 145 States have ratified the Convention. See https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTEC 
TION/3b73b0d63.pdf.
25 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 
on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as ben-
eficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eli-
gible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, in oj L 337, 
20 December 2011, pp. 9–26.
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 directly from the State, and “unable” when the country of origin is not able not 
protect them from persecution coming from others. Art. 6 of Directive 
2011/95/EU supports this interpretation, as it explains that the actors of perse-
cution include not only States but also parties or organizations that control the 
territory of the State, totally or for a substantial part, and non-state actors 
when the authorities don’t want, or are unable to, provide protection.26
Directive 2011/95/EU regulates also another situation, which has been ig-
nored in the Geneva Convention: the possibility to become refugees after hav-
ing left the country of origin. Better known as refugees “sur place”, this phe-
nomenon is particularly important for the purpose of this research because it 
covers the issue of those who change their religion after having left their coun-
try. Accordingly, art. 5 of the Directive clearly states that the fear of being per-
secuted may be also based “on events which have taken place since the appli-
cant left the country of origin”.27
Subsidiary protection takes care of those who are escaping from their coun-
try not due to the risk of persecution but for other reasons. According to art. 2 
(f) of Directive 2011/95/EU, a person is eligible for subsidiary protection when 
he or she “does not qualify as refugee but in respect of whom substantial 
grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned 
to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or her 
country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious 
harm (…) and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or 
herself of the protection of that country”. This kind of protection focuses on 
the risk of suffering serious harm in the country of origin. As clarified in art. 15 
of the Directive, serious harm may consist of death penalty, torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatments, and punishments in the country of origin or, again, 
“serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indis-
criminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict”. 
The subsidiary protection can therefore have a very wide application.
The recognition of the status of refugee implies a series of guarantees ex-
pressly established in the Geneva Convention, including the right to access 
housing, labor market, freedom of movement within the territory of the State, 
right to obtain travel documents, etc. The same guarantees are also provided by 
Directive 2011/95/EU in favor of those who have obtained either the status of 
refugees or the subsidiary protection.
26 Art. 6 also applies in relation to the subsidiary protection. Between the European Court of 
Human Rights judgements see h.l.r. v. France, 29 April 1997, par. 32, and Ahmed v. Austria, 
17 December 1997, par. 44.
27 Art. 5 also applies in relation to the subsidiary protection.
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The most important form of protection for refugees is provided by the prin-
ciple of non-refoulement outlined in art. 33 of the Geneva Convention and ex-
tended by EU law also to the beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. According 
to art. 33 (1) “No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion”. Therefore, those who have 
obtained the status of refugee cannot be expelled or returned to a country 
where there is a risk of persecution. Within the Geneva Convention the prin-
ciple of non-refoulement is not absolute, as art. 33 (2) establishes that “(t)he 
benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee 
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of 
the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment 
of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that 
country”. Similar provisions are provided in art. 21 of Directive 2011/95/EU.
The principle of non-refoulement has been recognized in many internation-
al and regional treaties28 and its content has developed in accordance with the 
evolution of international law on human rights. An important contribution in 
this regard was given by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
In the well-known case Soering v. United Kingdom of 1989,29 the European 
Court claimed that States parties cannot expel, return, extradite or reject any 
person towards countries where they risk being subject to torture and degrad-
ing or inhuman treatments and punishment (all these behaviors being illegal 
in accordance with art. 3 of the Convention). It should be noticed that the 
echr does prevent States from expelling or rejecting people towards countries 
where there is a well-founded risk that the individual may be subject to a pun-
ishment or inhuman treatment.30 The risk must be real and regard specifically 
the person subject to expulsion, thus excluding a situation of general risk 
 concerning either an entire community or other people presenting a similar 
28 AU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Addis Abe-
ba, 10 September 1969, art. 2 (3); American Convention on Human Rights, cit., art. 22 (8); 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, New York, 10 December 1984, art. 3; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union, art. 19 (2).
29 Judgement of 7 July 1989.
30 See, inter alia, the European Court judgements Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, 20 March 
1991, par. 75, Chahal v. United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, par. 74, and h.l.r. v. France, cit., 
par. 33–34.
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status or background.31 However, in cases of extreme violence, it is not neces-
sary to demand specific evidence of an individual risk, as the latter is implied 
in the general context.32
Similarly, art. 2 echr, on the right to life, has been applied in a way to pre-
vent States from expelling, returning, extraditing or rejecting anyone towards a 
country where there are substantial grounds to believe that their life is at risk.33
Clearly, the case law of the European Court does not focus specifically on 
refugees. The echr protects all human beings, regardless the personal status 
of the beneficiaries. It is remarkable that the European Court granted protec-
tion regardless any consideration on the danger the right-holders may repre-
sent for the country or the community where they live.34 Indeed, the prohibi-
tion of torture and inhuman treatments, as well as the right to life cannot be 
balanced with other interests or rights.35 According to the Court, governments 
have sufficient instruments to limit dangers for the security of the community, 
i.e. applying imprisonment after a due trial.
In addition to the evolution “rationae personae”, the principle of non-refoule-
ment has also evolved “rationae materiae”. While art. 33 of the Geneva Conven-
tion prohibits expulsion and return, the rejection at the frontier is not express-
ly contemplated. Looking at the preparatory works of the Convention, it is 
quite clear that the contracting States did not want to regulate this situation 
(Aga Khan, 1976; Goodwin-Gill, 1996). Nowadays, however, the gap has been 
filled: it is generally acknowledged that the principle of non-refoulement does 
prevent rejection at the frontier (Coleman, 2003; Stenberg, 1989).36
31 European Court judgements Vilvarajah and others v. United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, par. 
111, and h.l.r. v. France, cit., par. 41.
32 European Court judgements Salah Sheekh v. The Netherlands, 11 January 2007, par. 148, and 
na. v. United Kingdom, 17 July 2008, par. 115–117.
33 European Court decisions a.a. v. Norway, 21 October 1993, Sinnarajah v. Switzerland, 11 
May 1999, and judgements Bahaddar v. the Netherlands, 19 February 1998, par. 75–78, and 
Kaboulov v. Ukraine, 19 November 2009, par. 99.
34 In the judgement Chahal v. United Kingdom, cit., par. 80, the European Court has affirmed 
that “the activities of the individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous, can-
not be a material consideration. The protection afforded by Article 3 is thus wider than 
that provided by Articles 32 and 33 of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of 
refugees”. See also judgements Ahmed v. Austria, cit., par. 41 and Saadi v. Italy, 28 February 
2008, par. 127.
35 Saadi v. Italy, cit., par. 140.
36 See: Declaration on Territorial asylum, adopted by General Assembly resolution No. 
2312(xxii), 14 December 1967, art. 3 (1); Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
resolution No. (67) 14 on Asylum to persons in danger of persecution, 29 June 1967, par. 2; 
Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
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The evolution of the principle of non-refoulement triggered by the case law 
of the European Court has influenced international law as a whole. The Hu-
man Rights Committee for example, as well as the Committee against Torture, 
have repeatedly recognized that “the principle of ‘non-refoulement’ of persons 
to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that they 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture” or inhuman or degrading 
punishment or treatment, or would be in a danger for their life, is absolute 
(Bouziri, 2003; Phuong, 2007; Weissbrodt, Hörtreiter, 1999).37
4 Religious Persecutions
As seen above, the notion of refugee can be deduced from the one of persecu-
tion. This is indeed the situation which allows to access the status of refugee. 
While the Geneva Convention does not provide any definition of persecution, 
EU law is more precise. Art. 9 (1) of Directive 2011/95/EU states that an act of 
persecution must: (a) be sufficiently serious by its nature, or because it is re-
peated, “as to constitute a severe violation of basic human rights”; (b) or “be an 
accumulation of various measures, including violations of human rights which 
is sufficiently severe as to affect an individual in a similar manner as men-
tioned in point (a)”. The notion of persecution is therefore defined by an objec-
tive criterion, meaning “the nature and intrinsic severity of the act or the situ-
ation experienced as well as the consequences suffered by the person 
concerned in his country of origin”.38
Art. 9 (1) specifies that the most relevant affected human rights are those 
which cannot be derogated according to art. 15 (2) echr, and therefore are 
considered absolute. These are: right to life (art. 2); prohibition of torture and 
degrading or inhuman treatments and punishments (art. 3); prohibition of 
slavery (art. 4 (1)); nulla poena sine lege (art. 7). The concept of persecution as 
established in the Directive is consistent with the case law of both the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee: as it was al-
ready explained, these authorities have already clarified that States cannot 
 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, in oj L 
180, 29 June 2013, pp. 96–116, art. 3.
37 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20, par. 9 and 12, and Committee 
against Torture, General Comment No. 4 (2017), par. 9–11.
38 Opinion of Advocate General Bot, 19 April 2012, joined cases C-71/11 and C-99/11, Bundes-
republik Deutschland v. Y and Z, par. 53.
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expel, return, extradite or reject people towards countries where they risk 
 being subject to torture and degrading or inhuman treatments and punish-
ment or to be deprived of their life.
Art. 9 (2) of Directive 2011/95/EU gives some examples of acts of persecu-
tion. These are, first of all, “acts of physical or mental violence”, thus including 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.39 Other exam-
ples recalled in art. 9 (2) are: “legal, administrative, police, and/or judicial mea-
sures which are in themselves discriminatory or which are implemented in a 
discriminatory manner”, “prosecution or punishment which is disproportion-
ate or discriminatory”, and, again, “denial of judicial redress resulting in a dis-
proportionate or discriminatory punishment”. These examples focus on the 
concept of discrimination and disproportion. At the same time, a mere dis-
crimination does not lead to a persecution. Par. 2 must be read in conjunction 
with par. 1: a discrimination does not necessarily lead to a persecution, espe-
cially if it doesn’t also cause some serious violation of human rights.
When focusing on freedom of religion, it is necessary to verify what behav-
iors may be qualified as a religious persecution. As seen above, persecution is 
a personal attack, which may undermine the most essential rights. Accord-
ingly, only serious violations of the right to freedom of religion or belief could 
be considered as a form of persecution. This has been already clarified by the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union in two important cases regarding the expulsion of asylum seekers to-
wards countries where they may have been persecuted because of their reli-
gious affiliation. The European Court of Human Rights in the case Z. and T. v. 
United Kingdom,40 and the Court of Justice of the European Union in the case 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y and Z,41 stated that the mere violation of free-
dom of religion or belief does not constitute a persecution, even if there is a 
radical ban to practice the religion of own choice. A violation of the right to 
freedom of religion or belief may represent a persecution (thus allowing the 
39 About the distinction between “inhuman” and “degrading”, the European Court has stated 
that “inhuman” is a premeditated treatment, which “was applied for hours at a stretch and 
caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering”, while a treat-
ment can be considered “degrading” when it is “such as to arouse in its victims feelings of 
fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly 
breaking their physical or moral resistance” (see judgement Jalloh v. Germany, 11 July 2006, 
par. 68). Torture, instead, is an aggravated form of inhuman or degrading treatment.
40 Decision of 28 February 2006.
41 Judgement of 5 September 2012, joined cases C-71/11 and C-99/11.
Santini and Spatti122
<UN>
possibility to obtain the status of refugee) only when the person, “as a result of 
exercising that freedom in his country of origin, runs a genuine risk of, inter 
alia, being prosecuted or subject to inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment” or being tortured or killed.42 Therefore, the violation of freedom of 
religion or belief does not automatically allow the possibility to obtain protec-
tion  (Labayle, 2012). It is instead necessary to look at the consequences com-
ing from that violation. Only if the violation consists of acts of torture or de-
grading and inhuman treatments, or a threat to life or, again, a risk of being 
prosecuted for  religious affiliation, the claimant can obtain protection. The 
Human Rights Committee adopted the same view. The case X. c. Denmark 
concerned an asylum seeker who refused returning to his country of origin 
where he risked  incarceration without trial and torture in detention due also 
to his refusal to undertake military service on the basis of conscience.43 The 
Committee declared that the allegations were founded and stated that the de-
portation would constitute a violation of art. 7 of the iccpr, which is the norm 
recognizing the prohibition of torture and degrading and inhuman treatments 
and punishments (Bielefeldt et al., 2016: 411–413).44
The judgement Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y and Z of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union is interesting under another point of view. The national 
judge asked the Court to consider whether the fear of persecution –which pre-
vents expulsion only if it is supported by evidence– exists even if the person 
could prevent the persecution “by abstaining from certain religious practice” 
in the country of origin.45 The Court answered that none of the rules of the 
Directive states that “it is necessary to take account of the possibility open to 
the applicant of avoiding the risk of persecution by abstaining from the reli-
gious practice”.46 Accordingly, a State cannot allow an expulsion when the per-
son concerned may be safe simply by abstaining from a religious practice or 
hiding an affiliation. According to the Court of Justice, “where it is established 
that, upon his return to his country of origin, the person concerned will follow 
a religious practice which will expose him to a real risk of persecution, he 
should be granted refugee status”.47
42 See: decision of the European Court of Human Rights Z. and T. v. United Kingdom, cit., and 
judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. 
Y and Z, cit., par. 66–67.
43 Decision of 26 March 2014.
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5 Concluding Observations
Everyone in the world must be able to benefit from a series of fundamental 
rights, which are inherent in the essence of human being. Freedom of religion 
or belief is certainly one of them. As established in international and European 
law, and better clarified by international courts and treaty bodies, this right 
covers a very wide number of situations and can be limited only in few cases. 
Unfortunately, many countries do not respect freedom of religion, this having 
a negative impact on the conferral of other fundamental rights. It is therefore 
understandable that people oppressed for their religion decide to move to an-
other country in order to find a place where they can freely express themselves. 
In the host State, they ask, first, the right to practice their religion or belief and, 
second, the right not to be sent back to the country of origin. At the same time, 
international and European laws on immigration do not automatically protect 
everybody who cannot effectively exercise their rights in their country of ori-
gin. As clearly explained by the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, protection must be reserved to those 
individuals who are exposed to serious breaches of their fundamental rights. 
Therefore, a violation of freedom of religion or belief does not automatically 
grant the right to receive protection.
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Chapter 5
No Size Fits All: Diversity, State and Politics  
in the Contemporary Middle East
Paolo Maggiolini, Andrea Plebani and Riccardo Redaelli
1 Introduction
Especially since 2001, the multiple crises inflaming the wider Middle East have 
dramatically altered the geopolitical equilibriums of a region that has always 
played a crucial role in the international arena. Affected by heightening levels 
of violence and widespread destabilization, the area became increasingly as-
sociated with processes of radicalization and socio-political fragmentation al-
legedly destined to redefine the very foundations of a system whose roots can 
be traced back to the end of the Great War.
The arch of crises that came to bisect the region largely contributed to pro-
jecting the image of a Middle Eastern region “endemically” marred by divisions 
and instability and destined for partition according to apparently undeniable 
ethno-sectarian fault lines. In this framework, Middle Eastern ethno-linguistic 
and religious diversity has become the focal point of two different and oppo-
site arguments. On the one hand, diversity has been considered the victim of 
increasing polarization, manipulated and politicized in order to impose spe-
cific political agendas. On the other, it has been listed as one of the drivers or 
sources of present instability in a region experiencing its own Thirty Years War, 
as Europe did in the 16th century.
The chapter aims to take a distance from both understandings, reconsider-
ing the contemporary history of the Middle East and of state- and nation-
building in the region based on the image of multiple geographies. Instead of 
again proposing the idea of the Middle East as a mosaic, the chapter aims to 
offer an engaged account of the role of diversity in the region, analyzing the 
multiple features that have characterized and composed it. Through the idea 
of multiple geographies, the chapter will explain why diversity in the Middle 
East has always played a crucial role. The Middle East stands out not only for 
its diversity per se, but because the features that compose and define its diver-
sity and multi-vocality often strongly intertwine and overlap, giving birth to 
social fabrics far more complex and branched than usually represented.
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In this spirit, after delineating some of the main features defining the Mid-
dle East diverse socio-political fabric, the chapter focuses on contested visions 
of state and nation that have developed especially in the Arab world since the 
turn of the 20th century. It analyzes the most prominent features and elements 
of a debate waving across supra-national, trans-national and national visions 
and orientations of how to represent and organize diversity in accordance to a 
modern State framework. On these bases, the third part of the analysis places 
the above-mentioned dynamics in a historical continuum tracking its roots in 
the post first world war order. The chapter then concludes by showing how a 
more precise understanding of the Middle East’s diversity, of its significance 
and role can help to demystify today’s sectarian narratives and tackle instabil-
ity and violence in the region.
By focusing on contested visions of State and nation and the role diversity 
plays within these fields, the analysis does not intend to downplay the influ-
ence exerted by geopolitics over the regional scenario. Especially since 2001, 
the wider Middle East has become the epicenter of a heightening competition 
between (and among) state and non-state actors able to project their influence 
well beyond the boundaries of their polities and to alter the equilibriums of 
the area in ways and modalities that would have been impossible even to con-
ceive only a few years before. While geopolitical dynamics have always played 
a crucial role in the area, their incidence escalated dramatically during the 
course of the 21st century. Far from being confined to the mere security level, 
these phenomena invested the socio-political, economic and even cultural di-
mensions favoring a growing interplay among the international, regional, na-
tional and local domains that has become the specific focus of a significant 
part of the most recent academic literature. By stressing the role diversity, 
State and politics play in contemporary Middle East the current analysis aims 
also at reaffirming the necessity to recur to a holistic approach able to take in 
due consideration the multiple nuances of a region that has always had in its 
diversity one of its most defining features.
2 A Diverse Social Fabric Defined by Multiple (and Variable) 
Geographies
Widely perceived well before the beginning of the 21st century as a highly un-
stable area subject to cyclical outbursts of violence and lingering instability, 
the wider Middle East has witnessed in the past two decades one of the most 
critical phases of its history. From North Africa to the Persian Gulf and beyond, 
the region has been invested by a series of crises that impacted dramatically on 
its equilibriums.
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The war on terror launched after the 9/11 attacks and Operation Iraqi Free-
dom in particular, came to be seen as the defining moment of a new historical 
phase marking the passage from a U.S. dominated world to an international 
system increasingly characterized by its multi-polarity. And it was in the Mid-
dle East that the unipolar moment emerged after the Cold War began to crum-
ble: as described by several analysts and media pundits alike, it was as if a new 
Pandora’s box had been opened, thus setting free evils ready to wreak havoc 
well beyond the region’s disputed boundaries. Old prejudices combined with 
self-fulfilling prophecies foreseeing heightening East vs West confrontations 
and images of unending violence, brutality and gross violations of human 
rights contributed to surreptitiously transform the area in as a sort of “onto-
logical Other” socio-politically (but –interestingly– not economically, militar-
ily and geopolitically) detached from its most immediate neighbors, Europe 
and the West in primis (Tuastad, 2010).
The scale of the destabilization that invested the region and the conse-
quences it had over the international system spurred an intense debate aimed 
at assessing the root causes of the phenomenon. Particularly important was in 
this sense the crisis that affected the Iraqi State from 2003 onwards and the 
analytical frameworks adopted to describe it. While several studies focused on 
the responsibilities of the U.S.-led international coalition, the shortcomings of 
the Iraqi reconstruction process and the disillusion stemming from the inabil-
ity to cope with the huge expectations generated by the fall of the Baʿthist re-
gime, other recurred to different interpretative paradigms focusing on the al-
legedly inherent weakness of the Iraqi State. According to such visions, the 
causes of the difficulties post-2003 Iraq had to cope with were to be found in a 
sort of “original sin” marring the history of the Iraqi State since its inception: 
the decision to create an artificial State in line with British imperial desiderata 
yet not in line with the aspirations of its diverse population. Accordingly, prior-
ity had not to be given to the deficiencies of the post 2003 reconstruction pro-
cess but to the apparently unavoidable polarization of the Iraqi political sys-
tem along sectarian1 lines.
According to such visions, the deepening polarization of the Iraqi socio-
political fabric represented the proof that alleged “primordial” identities, de-
spite having been marginalized by the consolidation of the modern State, 
maintained the potential to mobilize significant strata of the population and 
to influence both State and regional politics. The emergence of non-state ac-
tors largely defined by overtly sectarian agendas, their ability to provide basic 
1 While in studies related to the Middle Eastern region the term tends to refer to Sunni – Shia 
competition, the term is here employed in its broader sense, referring to ethnic, linguistic, 
religious and confessional related processes and features.
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services to populations largely neglected by their governments coupled with 
the fragmentation of the Iraqi political spectrum and the inability of state in-
stitutions to reassert their primacy all contributed to threaten the very founda-
tions of the Iraqi polity.
Even more important, the heightening destabilization of the wider Middle 
East registered from 2011 onwards and the emergence of similar phenomena all 
over the area increasingly questioned state-centered representations of the re-
gion making sectarian paradigms attractive well beyond the Iraqi borders.
Loyalties based on sect, kin and different forms of local particularisms grad-
ually acquired an academic dignity of their own and were increasingly entrust-
ed with a symbolic dimension far exceeding the contours of the debates be-
tween “primordialist” and “modernist” schools (Hinnebusch, 2016; Al-Qarawee, 
2013).
Reimagined through such lenses, the wider Middle East came again to be 
increasingly represented as a mosaic of different communities defined by 
clear-cut fault-lines constrained in a regional framework dominated by “artifi-
cial states”. Sectarian conflicts in the region were then largely considered as 
manifestations of ancient ethnic hatreds and struggles symbolized by an ar-
chetypal approach of We vs Others.
The process reached its apex between 2014 and 2016 spurring a debate cen-
tered around the possible overcoming of an a-historical and often mythicized 
“Sykes-Picot” order accused of having been framed according to the needs of 
Western colonial powers and hence of being disconnected from the “natural” 
equilibriums of the area (Kamel, 2016a, 2016b). Curiously enough, some of 
these positions seemed to partially reflect the propaganda of the “Islamic 
State” organization that in June 2014, after extending its grip over most of the 
Jazira region, announced the erasing of the Syria-Iraq borders and the begin-
ning of a new era destined to cancel the legacy of a century of humiliation.
It was 98 years ago that the Allies of wwi forged a secret agreement to 
carve up the territories of the Muslim lands. This arrangement, referred 
to since as the Sykes-Picot agreement, mapped out parts of the Middle 
East and designated them as being under the influence or control of ei-
ther France or the United Kingdom in anticipation of the subsequent 
conquest of the region. (…) Years after the agreement, invisible borders 
would go on to separate between a Muslim and his brother, and pave the 
way for ruthless, nationalistic tawaghit (impious tyrant) to entrench the 
ummah’s division rather than working to unite the Muslims under one 
imam carrying the banner of truth. (…) As the operation to capture Nina-
wa and advance towards Baghdad and the Radi strongholds to the south 
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was underway, the lions succeeded in taking control of the border region 
between Wilayat Al-Barakah in Sham, and Wilayat Ninawa in Iraq, and in 
demolishing the barriers set up to enforce the crusader partitions of the 
past century. (Islamic State Report, 2014: 2-4)
Jihadist proclaims apart, the calls for a complete redefinition of existing Mid-
dle East boundaries found a significant echo in the West albeit being met, ex-
pect for a few notable exceptions, by stiff local opposition (Plebani, 2018). Par-
ticularly interesting are, in this regard, the positions expressed by Robin Wright 
who proposed to replace the current regional order with a new one based on 
the creation of fourteen new States presenting a higher level of religious and 
ethno-linguistic homogeneity (Wright, 2013, 2016).
Questioning the validity of such schemes does not pertain to the scope of 
the present analysis. Much more significant is, instead, analyzing the theoreti-
cal assumptions underpinning them and, in particular, the essence of the sec-
tarian boundaries claimed to define the groupings slated to become the con-
stituent units of such a re-imagined Middle East.
While no shared socio-political taxonomy of the phenomenon exists – with 
the term itself being the focus on an intense debate (Haddad, 2017; Hin-
nebusch, 2016) – sectarian conflict and polarization are generally created out 
of imagined boundaries set at the linguistic and religious levels, with kinship, 
regionalisms and local particularisms playing lesser albeit important roles.
Broadly speaking, the primary marker of group identity tends to be set at 
the (ethno-)linguistic level. While the wider Middle East has always been char-
acterized by the compresence of multiple groups, Arabic is by far the main re-
gional language, with Turkish, Persian, Kurdish and Hebrew communities fol-
lowing suit. Yet, such groupings represent only part of the extremely diverse 
Middle Eastern linguistic spectrum. Other communities inhabiting the area 
include Amazighs, Circassians, Assyrians, Armenians, Turkmen, Azeris, Balu-
chis, and Pashtuns, just to mention some of the most demographically rele-
vant. Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan represent typical examples of such linguistic 
“melting-pots”. Furthermore, the region is characterized by a high-level of 
intra- linguistic diversity with each key group presenting significant internal 
variety and marked differences. Such a situation is evident when considering 
Arabic dialects spoken in North Africa and the Levant but the same holds true 
even at country level. Iraq, for example, is the home of at least three Arabic dia-
lects (Jaziran, Mesopotamian, and of the Marshes) and of three Kurdish ver-
naculars (Kurmanji, Sorani and Pehlewani).
A second fault-line is generally represented by religion. While Islam is un-
disputedly the most practiced faith, the region is home to a wide array of 
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non-Muslim groups of whom Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, Sabians- 
Mandeans, Yazidis, Kalashas represent some of the most known examples. 
Such variety is further increased by the presence of different sects and denomi-
nations within the main religious communities. Beyond Sunni-Shia differenti-
ation, Islam presents a significant internal diversity. Although today less rele-
vant than in the past, Sunni Islam has traditionally encompassed a precise 
number of “schools” of interpretation (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi, Hanbali). At the 
same time, it has always been characterized by the presence of Sufi orders that 
played a crucial role in bridging the gap with realities characterized by ex-
tremely diverse socio-political, cultural and economic fabrics. In this regard, 
Naqshbandi Sufi order’s influence in both Iraq and Turkey is illuminating. Sim-
ilarly, Sunni Islam is today strongly influenced by different orientations in the 
way of experiencing and practicing its message in private and public life. The 
role of Salafism at the local, regional and international levels explains not only 
a strict and puritanical approach toward Sunni Islam, but also how the same 
orientations can foster diverse attitudes distinguishing between quietists, pol-
itics-oriented, and militant-activists (Wiktorowitz, 2006).
Shia Islam is also internally diverse, with many sub-confessional groups 
such as Alevi in Turkey, Alawites and Ismailis in Syrian or Zaydis in Yemen. In 
this framework, Ibadites and Druze differently distance from such a picture. 
The former represents a sort of third path toward Islam, while Druze maintains 
a certain distance and autonomy, strongly defending their community bound-
aries, albeit being connected with the history of Islam in the region. With 
Christians, the situation further complicates, because in the Middle East, one 
can find multiple confessions and rites. The region is the homeland of Eastern 
and Oriental Christianity (for example, Orthodox, Syrians and Copt), but it 
also sees the presence of Catholics of different rites (such as Latin, Melkite, 
Maronite) and of different manifestations of Reformed Christianity (for in-
stance: Anglican, Lutheran, Evangelists, Adventist). In all these cases, the reli-
gious factor can variably intertwine with the ethno-linguistic dimension pro-
ducing a very nuanced image of the Middle Eastern socio-cultural fabric and of 
its multiple and variable geography. Religious diversity can enrich an ethno-
linguistic sphere, dividing people speaking the same languages between differ-
ent religion, confessions and rite. This is particularly evident within the Arab-
Speaking domain where one can find Sunnis and Shiites (of different schools, 
orientations and sub-confessions) and Christians, equally diverse in their be-
longing and professions. But it also manifests with Kurds, predominantly be-
longing to Sunni Islam, but also to Shia Islam and Yezidism. Turks and Kurds 
also differentiate between Sunni Islam and Alevi, with the latter generally con-
sidered part of the Shia world. Furthermore, religious affiliations can become 
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a vector through which expressing a different (quasi)ethno-linguistic indepen-
dent identity. It is the case of Assyrians in Iraq, but also of Druze in Israel.
Kinship and family ties too tend to be considered as factors further contrib-
uting to shape the weltanschauung and the realm of possibilities of single indi-
viduals and communities. Such a perception becomes particularly relevant 
when considering the influence exerted by tribal norms and power structures 
over different areas and in different times. The concept of tribe remains highly 
contested due to past tendencies to read a broad array of socio-political dy-
namics in exclusively tribal terms and to reify power dynamics inherently fluid 
and subject to changes (Dodge, 2003). Yet, tribal networks keep being consid-
ered important players contributing to determine local equilibriums and dy-
namics. Traditionally considered to be built along segmented structures largely 
(albeit not exclusively) defined in terms of kinship (Evans-Pritchard, 1940; 
Emanuel Marx, 1977; Khoury, Kostiner, 1991), tribes can be described as forms 
of mutual-aid association aimed at preserving internal order, defending the 
group from external threats and maximizing its resources. Competition among 
the different sub-units of the archetypal tribe (confederation, tribe, clan, seg-
ment, etc.) and with external opponents activate forms of in-bound solidarity 
that may expand up to the ladder of the tribal system or be mitigated by me-
diation processes rooted in forms of collective responsibility (Gellner, 1983; 
Gellner, 1990; Lindholm, 1986). Far from being limited to specific (and largely 
peripheral) areas and from being insulated from state apparatuses, tribal dy-
namics have tended to overlap with different layers of power and authority 
succeeding in exerting significant influence vis-à-vis the State.
This capacity and potential have endured state- and nation-buildings pro-
cesses. Although attacked and subject to different pressures from the central 
power, tribalism has entertained a strict relationship with the state power. 
While tribes have certainly represented hinders to the ambitions of central 
rule, they have also represented in time of need a resource to be exploited 
(through selected cooptation) to increase the legitimacy of a regime. At the 
same time, tribalism has distinguished itself for its resilience, especially when 
the centralizing logics of the States entered in phases of structural crisis losing 
its absolute monopoly over power. Paradigmatic, in this sense, are Saddam 
Hussein’s tribal policies enacted after the Gulf War (Baram, 1997) as well as the 
case of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan that since the 1970s has promoted 
Bedouin traditions with the aim of consolidating the national identity fabric 
and the legitimacy of the its regime (Massad, 2011).
Regional identities and forms of local particularisms complete the set of 
fault-lines associated with the already-mentioned sectarian visions. Albeit 
less considered than other layers of differentiation, these factors played an 
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important role in articulating alternative visions of unity within the State 
(promoting autonomist and federal schemes), in supporting the redefinition 
of the existing order (projects advocating partitioning or union of different ar-
eas) or in inoculating local power dynamics within state institutions. The pre-
dominance of Tikritis within the upper echelons of the Iraqi administration 
during Saddam Hussein’s tenure is a good example of the latter (Baram, 2003; 
Zeidel, 2007), while the former is well represented by Benghazi’s longstanding 
pleas for autonomy within the Libyan system or Basra bids for self-government 
(Visser, 2005; Isakhan, Mulherin, 2018).
While the above-mentioned layers of differentiation unequivocally influ-
ence the equilibriums governing the Middle Eastern socio-political spectrum, 
they do not represent any sort of “prime movers” able to shape regional dy-
namics and equilibriums alone. Looking at the Middle East as a mosaic of 
“gated communities” largely autonomous, independent and based on a set of 
largely fixed (primordial) elements does not reflect the complexity and the flu-
idity of socio-political frameworks characterized by the overlapping of mutu-
ally influencing factors and by a constant competition (Roy, 2018). A feature, 
the latter, well represented by the old tribal saying “me against my brother. Me 
and my brother against my cousin. Me, my brother and my cousin against the 
outsider”.
Even ethno-linguistic boundaries, while representing an important element 
of differentiation and one of the fault-lines more prone to be politicized, can-
not be considered unsurmountable walls inevitably destined to separate dif-
ferent communities and to determine their political stances. Especially in 
times of crises, transversal ties tend to be rediscovered and differences put 
aside. The case of the alliances forged between the Kurdish peshmerga and 
tribal units of Arab Sunni descent to face the threat posed by the “Islamic 
State” organization in northern Iraq is a clear example. The same holds true at 
the religious level, as demonstrated by significant cases of interfaith solidarity 
taking place even at the apex of the Iraqi civil war, and at the tribal level, where 
it is still far from uncommon to find components of a single tribe belonging to 
different confessions and even religions.2 The very fact that the term sectarian/
sectarianism (today’s ta‘ifiyya) is largely perceived as derogatory in countries 
like Syria and Iraq (which used to be considered as the countries most 
 characterized by the presence of mixed families) and that local populations 
2 Significant, in this sense, are the case of the Iraqi Muntafiq confederation (led till the begin-
ning of the 20th century by the Sunni al-Sadoun clan but mainly made of sub-units of Shia 
descent) and the tribal allegiances centered around al-Karak and al-Salt witnessing forms of 
Christian-Muslim solidarity (Maggiolini, 2010).
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have been the most vocal in opposing to projects aimed at partitioning the re-
gion along sectarian lines (Plebani, 2018) largely attests to this stance.
Instead of looking at the region through sectarian lenses and mosaic-in-
spired analytic prisms that, despite their alleged theoretical purity, present 
multiple deficiencies and rigidities, the diverse socio-political fabric of the 
Middle East seems to be better served by an approach taking in consideration 
the strong interaction and the mutual influence characterizing the different 
souls of its societies. In doing so, it is impossible not to consider the crucial role 
played by state agencies in imaging, articulating and dealing with diversity in 
all its forms. Artificial or not, Middle Eastern modern States have contributed 
to shape regional dynamics and equilibriums in ways and modalities that can-
not be ignored.
Building on such considerations, the regional socio-political spectrum 
could then be described as the result of multiple geographies of power that, 
while competing among each other, contribute to influence the environment 
they operate in and by doing so get influenced by it. It is in this framework that, 
as described in the second part of this chapter, the theories elaborated by Jean 
Pierre Bourdieu can represent a particularly useful asset.
3 Contested Visions of State and Nation
The study of the Middle East multiple and variable geographies holds an im-
portant double role for understanding how state- and nation-building process-
es have developed in this region since the turn of the 20th century. On the one 
hand, it delineates the features and elements out of which “State” and “nation” 
have been imagined, projected and transformed. On the other, it is the subject 
through which alternative visions of “State” and “nation” have been developed, 
inevitably becoming one of the arenas on which geopolitical and regional 
competitions took place and are still developing.
The analysis of the features and parabolas of state- and nation-building pro-
cesses in the contemporary Middle East has been always a focal thread in stud-
ies of the region and in tracing the reconfiguration of its diverse socio-political 
fabrics from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire until today, both from a 
theoretical perspective and from a historical one. This started from and has 
advanced according to different contextual conditions, political interests and 
ideological orientations, each providing important clues for reconsidering why 
the Middle East has witnessed the development of multiple, contested visions 
of State and nation.
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Such a history still speaks out with the name that is employed to describe 
the area. Elaborated around the mid-19th century according to Western colo-
nial projections within the Ottoman Empire and then imposed during the 
Mandate period, the term Middle East is a geographical notion intrinsically 
imbued with geopolitical meanings. It substantially conveys a specifically 
north-western European perspective of the role and position of the region in 
world geography. In fact, this definition historically depended on Europe’s con-
ceptualization of itself and others, where the others (the Middle East) are de-
scribed as a region essentially contended by diverse and conflicting under-
standings of its borders and identities (Zubaida, 2011).
This kind of understanding continues to vehicle the conviction of a sort of 
inadequateness of the Middle Eastern social-political fabric to fully conform to 
the modern State ideal and to adopt categories such as that of nation, because 
historically imposed from above and outside. The Middle East becomes the 
region of “States without nations” (Vatikiotis, 2016) or a geographic mosaic of 
different minorities fluctuating in an Islamic continuum.
Accordingly, this analysis takes its distance from these orientations. In do-
ing so, it does not question either the presence, saliency, and role of the mani-
fold and diverse Middle East identity and community landscapes or the impor-
tance of Islam in politics and society or the complex political and security 
situation that has undermined and still challenges the condition of many mi-
norities, communities and groups in the region. Rather, it proposes to focus on 
the politicization and reconfiguration of regional identity spheres for pursing 
political projects, especially in the field of state- and nation-building process-
es. The question is not whether and why state- and nation-building processes 
developed or failed, but how they have been conceived out of regional diver-
sity, affecting their conditions and roles. At the same time, exactly because the 
acritical imposition of the idea of nation according to a narrow Western under-
standing has been problematic, given the composite Middle Eastern land-
scapes, the historical exploration of its development still stands out as an im-
portant thread in regional politics.
In essence, the history of the Middle East shows that identity designations 
can be selectively manipulated and reconfigured either by a central regime to 
project its authority and legitimacy or by local communities to resist or estab-
lish solid relationships of cooperation with central powers, but also with exter-
nal actors, to defend themselves or extract revenues. The colonial past has mat-
tered, the role of Islam is grounded in history, diversity has always played an 
important role, and the competition between external and regional powers has 
always played a crucial role in orienting state- and nation-building processes.
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All these elements need to be taken into consideration in exploring and un-
derstanding socio-political engagements and disengagements within and from 
the region. Nevertheless, the Middle East is much more than a mosaic com-
posed of distinct tiles that dominate or are dominated. Politics in the region is 
not simply the result of linear and univocal behaviors, postures and strategies 
developed by homogenous, coherent and monolithic ethno-linguistic and reli-
gious communities or kin groups. As said above, this image needs to be recon-
sidered, looking at regional diversity according to the idea of variable geogra-
phies unevenly distributed over this wide territory. State and nation have been 
developed according to these variable geographies and through a complex 
matrix of contestation, cooperation and competition at the local, regional and 
international levels. Instability and turmoil, which affected the region well be-
fore the end of Great War, have not broken out because the concepts of “mod-
ern State” and “nation” have simply been refused per se. Rather, conflicts, un-
rest and wars need to be analyzed as the symptoms or manifestations of a 
deeper quest for meaning, legitimacy, authority and power. This process has 
been developing since the late 19th century. State and nation have been thus 
the arena and subject of this struggle, drawing new political contents out of 
regional diversity and inevitably pervading the realms of citizenship, commu-
nity affiliation, the role of religion in public space and the political quest for 
identity. This is one of the reasons why the Middle East has witnessed the elab-
oration of a number of contested visions of it; a dynamic that today has en-
tered into a new phase following the 9/11 attacks, the 2011 uprisings and the 
explosion of an all-out geopolitical regional competition. In this framework, 
diversity in all its attributes has been an actor and not just a scapegoat or 
victim.
4 State and Nation in the Middle East: an Analytical Assessment
Moving to the level of theories and approaches, State and nation in the Middle 
East have been analyzed according to different concerns and interests.
On the one hand, there are studies that have predominantly focused on ex-
ploring the origin of nations. In this regard, the central question that has sub-
stantiated such analyses is why ethnicity has become a dominant force in 
modern politics and a political fact in the life of States (Bengio, Ben-Dor, 1999). 
Primordialists espouse the idea that ethnic groups have an authentic exis-
tence that endures from generation to generation (Geertz, 1967). They are not 
simply ascriptive, but able to bypass and overcome other forms of belonging 
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and  identification. Modernists take their distance from such an understand-
ing,  pointing out that the modernization process has transformed traditional 
societies. Modernization has exacerbated ethnic conflicts, but it has also laid 
the basis for the creation of new entities and, thus, new States beyond premod-
ern identities (Gellner, 1990; Anderson, 1991). In this regard, mass communica-
tion, education and modern technologies are fundamental for understanding 
this process of “imagining” the nation. Ethno-symbolism seems positioned 
between these two poles, suggesting the importance of recognizing the ethnic 
origin of modern nations without ignoring the importance of the process of 
reconfiguring and transmitting ethnic symbols (Smith, 1989, 1999, 2003). There-
fore, phenomena such as Political Islam and its relationship with national ide-
als in the Middle East can be understood in a totally different manner accord-
ing to each perspective. Primordial approaches often point out that the 
Western ideal of nation is substantially undermined by the persistent and per-
vasive relationship between politics and religion (Vatikiotis, 2016). According-
ly, Islam would represent a dominant force inherently inclined to transcend 
boundaries and spheres of territorial modern States. Therefore, nations in the 
Western sense cannot fully emerge in the region. In this framework, non-Mus-
lim communities are considered to be inevitably destined to remain minorities 
in the fullest meaning. Modernists and ethno-symbolists can variably consider 
Political Islam as one of the products of modernity. According to these visions, 
the phenomenon would not represent the most authentic expression of the 
traditional religious culture, but it would convey new understandings of its 
role in the public sphere through the construction or revival of symbols and 
meanings (Zubaida, 2001). Nevertheless, beyond their evident differences, all 
approaches subscribe to the conviction of the importance of analyzing ethnic-
ity, its attributes and features for understanding Middle Eastern politics and 
the relationship between majorities and minorities in the region.
On the other hand, one can find studies more clearly focused on analyzing 
the history of the different ideologies and political systems that have devel-
oped in the Middle East since the end of the 20th century.
From an ideological standpoint, the main divide has been the contraposi-
tion between secularists/liberals and Islamists (the idea of a secular State vs. 
an Islamic State). These two orientations have also assumed different perspec-
tives, dividing those supporting nationalist/patriotic orientations (e.g. Syrian, 
Egyptian, Lebanese nationalisms or manifestations of irredentism as in the 
case of the Kurds, but also Islamist activism focusing on the national level such 
as in Jordan) from those promoting supranational projects (e.g. the pan-Arab; 
pan-Iranian; pan-Turkish or pan-Islamic).
From this standpoint, it is interesting to point out that after the Arab upris-
ings these opposing poles tended to converge on the concept of “civil State” or 
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“civil government” (dawla madaniyya). Although it is widely considered to pos-
sess indubitably positive connotations, this notion is still subject to debate, 
lacking clear-cut definitions. Dawla madaniyya seems basically to convey the 
idea of the need for a democratic regime and the opportunity to avoid playing 
identity politics, prioritizing the development of an inclusive society despite 
the fact that it is not clear if the essence of society, State and nation that such 
a vision seeks to promote conforms to liberal/secular or Islamist ideals (Bahlul, 
2018). While it is still premature to consider it an orientation, it is worth men-
tioning because it elucidates the state of the art of such a debate.
Historically, whatever the content of the various political projects that have 
developed since the end of the 20th century, the ideological competition con-
cerning State and nation has initially entailed a reconfiguration of the tradi-
tional ethno-linguistic and religious designations of the Ottoman epoch, trans-
forming the manner of conceiving and understanding regional diversity and 
projecting it toward its modern and contemporary forms. This is one of the 
first elements that need to be taken into account for analyzing the transforma-
tion of regional identity spheres and boundaries through state- and nation-
building processes.
In fact, it was between the late 19th and early 20th centuries that words such 
as “Turk” and “Arab” lost their past connotations. Previously referring to rough 
local communities and tribal peoples, they became honorable and patriotic 
expressions of nations in search of independence (Zubaida, 2001). The Kemal-
ist State and its muscular secularism elevated the word “Turk”, to which was 
associated a Sunni Muslim character, to the key parameter for guiding state- 
and nation-building in the country, relegating non-Sunni Muslim and non-
Turkish speaking communities to the margins because considered inherently 
alien. It is important to point out that the reference to Sunni Islam was inter-
preted as part of the cultural attribute of being Turk in a process of nation-
building expressly secular in its stance. In the case of the “Arab” ideal, the dy-
namic has been much more contested, and still is, although regional 
competition has ceased to be predominantly played out on this kind of rhetori-
cal discourse. It has constantly oscillated between approaches focused on 
stressing the existence of a single Arab nation, with a common language and 
culture but also with multiple religious manifestations (predominantly Islam 
and Christianity) and those supporting the intrinsic association of “Arabness” 
with Islam. In both cases, such orientations have varied, oscillating between 
different territorial configurations despite sharing the same conviction of the 
need to question the Mandate systematization. At the same time, other forms 
of nationalism have been developed with a clear patriotic stance, downsizing 
or refusing the saliency of Arabness, such as in the case of the Maronites in 
Lebanon or of Egypt during the inter-war period.
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Similar developments also occurred in the Iranian context, culminating in 
the 1930s with Tehran’s official request to avoid use of the word “Persian” in 
diplomacy, deeming the term “Iranian” more appropriate for communicating 
the “authentic” pluri-millennial culture and traditions of this territory and its 
populace.
This plurality of orientations and outlooks, even within the same identity 
field as in the case of Arabness, should not be considered peculiar or excep-
tional. The multiple forms and platforms through which nationalist ideals 
have been promoted is the clearest expression of the variable socio-cultural 
geographies that cut across this region, depicting many possible landscapes 
with shifting boundaries and spheres. Accordingly, the history of the Middle 
East and its countries offers further evidence that nationalism is never a uni-
fied and homogeneous phenomenon (Owen, 2013).
At the state-building level, such diverse ideological orientations have been 
variously elaborated and contextualized. Nevertheless, there have been two 
main models of political system that have been followed. These are monar-
chies (either centered on a family such as in Jordan and Morocco or dispersed 
and extended like in Saudi Arabia) and republics. These two models of po-
litical system implicitly differ in their approaches to diversity. For instance, 
the case of Jordan shows how monarchies have more frequently promoted a 
sort of “fuzzy” nationalism (Frisch, 2002), maintaining a certain ambiguity in 
their discourses in order to separate and selectively recompose or organize lo-
cal diversity according to an idea of “nation” similar to that of one big fam-
ily united around the ruling crown. At the same time, between the 1930s and 
the 1950s, the Hashemite crown of Iraq proved how such an image can also 
be instrumental to developing a more pronounced discourse based on Arab 
nationalism.
Republics have, instead, been more obvious and outspoken in their assimi-
latory ideals, directly entering the field of nation-building with the aim of mak-
ing a “strong” nation the condition of their existence and the path through 
which to fulfil promises of independence and progress, due also to the discom-
fort that political elites have in the Middle East with the idea of federalism or 
identity plurality within the state structure. In essence, they have more fre-
quently embarked on identity politics. This is not to say that monarchies have 
been distinctive for a gentler or softer approach than republics in their strategy 
to manage and deal with diversity or that they have shown less interest in na-
tion-building, but to underline some basic, and very general, differences in 
their stances and struggles for legitimacy through state- and nation-building 
processes. At the same time, there is no intention here to over-simplify, ignor-
ing that regimes changed over time, sometimes preserving nationalist rhetoric 
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while developing it in its essence and scope. An eloquent example is provided 
by Baʿthist Syria and how it transformed with Hafiz Al Assad and then after the 
ascendancy of his son, Bashar. While preserving the same rhetoric of Arabism, 
Al Assad’s Baʿthist regime overcame part of its traditional secularist stance, 
reintroducing references to Islam in the constitution. In essence, he sought to 
promote his own idea of Arab nationalism, transitioning it from the role of 
ethnic kinship to a principle centered on cultural affinity, with the aim of 
quelling sub-national identities and manipulating minority issues. Bashar Al 
Assad then concentrated on promoting an idea of Syria as the “safe-haven” for 
minorities dwelling in the country. The regime and political system remained 
stable, but their ideological content structurally changed through manipula-
tion of Syrian diversity (Rabo, 2012). This evolution elucidates how diversity 
can be both actor and subject in state- and nation-building processes, serving 
as the basis for developing new coalitions of power or becoming a victim of 
political projects.
Therefore, without the ambition of being exhaustive, this brief systematiza-
tion offers some initial clues for looking at the complex political continuum 
within which Middle Eastern regimes positioned or transitioned since the de-
feat of the Ottoman Empire. Clearly, the intertwining between the various 
ideological orientations and their different forms of contextualization pro-
duced different forms of rulers, each proposing their specific understanding of 
State and nation, and how to create them out of local diversity.
In this regard, it is worth pointing out that differences and analogies be-
tween such experiences also depended on or were affected by other two fac-
tors, namely authoritarianism and rentierism. Both factors played and still 
play a fundamental role in defining rulers and regimes in the region and in in-
fluencing their contextual approach towards diversity in state- and nation- 
building processes. They should be taken as attributes that further complicate 
the intertwining between the ideological and systemic levels. For example, au-
thoritarianism was manifest both in the case of Nasserist Egypt through its 
single party system and in the Hashemite monarchy of Jordan between the 
1960s and the end of the 1980s, when parliamentary life in the country was 
suspended. Regarding such countries, it is still employed, albeit adding the at-
tribute of “hybrid”, to describe a regime that tolerates and somehow promotes 
procedural forms of democracy but does not fully subscribe to it. Therefore, 
authoritarianism should not be simply considered as equivalent to strong, se-
vere or repressive regimes or political systems. In this field, authoritarianism 
can be viewed as a distinctive position and method of engaging and dealing 
with society and diversity via state- and nation-building processes. Its frequen-
cy and ubiquitousness have been widely explained according to culturalism. 
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 Nevertheless, authoritarianism should be reconsidered according to a precise 
historical parabola. After the Second World War, state- and nation-building 
processes were widely launched and developed under the pressure of traumat-
ic transformations, first with the aim of taking revenge on European colonial 
projections and then to forestall the effects of recurring political and military 
failures. On the one hand, the trauma of colonization was reprocessed consid-
ering it the result of internal fragmentation and weaknesses. According to such 
an understanding, colonization in the heart of the Middle East had been pos-
sible because of the inadequateness of political leaderships and the presence 
of internal fifth columns. On the other, with the exception of North African 
countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Middle East region has fre-
quently witnessed the foundation and emergence of new political systems and 
regimes more because of revolts, civil wars and coup d’états than as the culmi-
nation of popular revolutionary movements and popular national struggles for 
independence.
The intertwining between these factors has not only infused into state- and 
nation-building processes a sense of urgency and anxiety, but it has also en-
caged them in a sort of securitization syndrome, subjecting Middle Eastern 
society to the authoritarian dilemma. State and nation were essentially consid-
ered weak and authoritarianism became the posture to make them strong out 
of their fragility. In order to strengthen state foundations there has been a ten-
dency to “overstate” state role and structures, as pointed out by Ayubi (Ayubi, 
1996). Although Middle Eastern countries already existed on the map, the co-
lonial legacy consolidated the idea of the need to establish “authentic” States 
and nations out of past manipulations and impositions. At the same time, such 
projects were considered in need of being defended against a number of differ-
ent challenges and possible enemies at the local, regional and the internation-
al levels. This situation became the hotbed that fostered the emergence of the 
military against civil rule. In fact, already during the interwar period, two coup 
d’état took place in Iraq with Sidqi-Sulayman (1936) and later on with al- Kaylani 
and the officers of the “Golden Square” (1941) (Marr, al-Marashi, 2017). In this 
framework, shortly after defeat at the hands of Israel in 1948, Syria witnessed 
the first post-Mandate era military coup with Husni Al Za‘im deposing Shukri 
Al Quwatli with the support of the population (Salibi, 1998) and a few years 
after, the Free Officers in Egypt (1952) became a model. The military entered 
regional politics, mobilizing their populaces and presenting itself as the only 
actor capable of taking the State and the nation to real independence. The role 
of the military and the constant tension between them and civilian rulers are 
factors determinant to understanding an important part of the history of state- 
and nation-building processes in the region.
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In essence, authoritarian regimes in the Middle East are distinctive for pri-
oritizing the direct and constant mobilization of people, bypassing representa-
tive institutions and political participation. They are also characterized by 
their focus on political forms of control both of society and of the economy. 
The Middle Eastern authoritarian State has not simply governed society, but 
has claimed to control all spheres in the life of their States and societies, show-
ing no tolerance for forms of autonomous organization (Zubaida, 1993). Civil 
society has thus become an extension of the regime-state and of its bureau-
cracy. In cases such as that of Kemalist Turkey and Pahlavi Iran (1920s) or Nas-
serist Egypt (1950s-1960s), nationalism combined with authoritarianism ex-
pressing the will to create both “State” and “nation” at the same time, 
reconfiguring society according to rigid categories imposed from above.
In this framework, rentierism helps to elucidate how authoritarianism has 
established its resilience in Middle Eastern politics and how the State has been 
developed as a mechanism of distribution and patronage. To a large extent, 
rentierism has been and still is more important for understanding the history 
of States and regimes in the region than the previous categories and orienta-
tions. In fact, rentierism explains important attributes of Middle Eastern au-
thoritarian States and regimes. In particular, it describes why they have been 
essentially immanent, intrusive and invasive, but not capable of penetrating 
society as in the case of totalitarianism (Owen, 2013). These features are not 
simply useful for appreciating the scope of authoritarianism in the Middle 
East, but reveal the essence of the relationship between regimes and societies. 
Although forms of rentier State existed already during the inter-war period, 
such as, for example, the case of the Emirate of Transjordan and its depen-
dence on the revenues provided by London, this model has been developed 
since the 1970s, during the oil crisis. Rentierism has been employed to explore 
and explain the role of patronage and distributive policies in modern Middle 
Eastern States and regimes (Beblawi, Luciani, 1987). Well described by the prin-
ciple of “no taxation, no representation”, rentierism has allowed regimes to 
“buy” their legitimacy, imposing themselves on societies and cultivating their 
loyalty without the need to pervade them through taxation and other forms of 
extraction. Rentierism has thus been a critical resource for regimes seeking 
stability and legitimacy, but it has also been an endemic weakness for States 
and regimes in the region. Such a condition has amplified a State’s dependency 
on a distributive and exchange relationship. The State appeared to be strong, 
but this attribute was achieved to the detriment of society, intentionally weak-
ening it (Migdal, 1988). At the same time, rentierism has provided the State 
with power and leverage, but has also precluded hegemony (Ayubi, 1996). Ac-
cordingly, authority, legitimacy and sovereignty are imposed from above and 
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depend on enduring acts of distribution and patronage. Beyond these, regimes 
intrinsically lack substantial recognition. This condition has undermined 
state- and nation-building processes in their essence. While the focus on ideo-
logical orientations and models of political system is fundamental for guiding 
the analysis, an excessive concentration on them can distract, losing sight of 
the transformation and dynamism of Middle Eastern politics over the decades. 
The State can be interpreted as a sort of coherent political architecture while 
the nation turns into the product of single actors and specific ideologies 
(Mitchel, 1991). In order to overcome such a risk, a more effective analytical 
approach seems the one looking at State and nation as a field. The State be-
comes a “national field” from which the nation can be imagined, “promoted” or 
represented according to the accumulation or exclusion of the diverse ele-
ments that compose a socio-cultural fabric within a given territory (Zubaida, 
1993; Owen, 2013). This approach contemplates all previous remarks. But it also 
criticizes the notion of the State as a unified actor, distinctive from society. 
Therefore, the State per se becomes a field and an arena for re-orienting and 
re-directing all assumptions of power toward its political center as opposed to 
the traditional transboundary relationships of the pre-modern epoch. In its 
Middle Eastern articulation, the national political field determinates advan-
tages and distributes resources on the basis of individuals, families and com-
munities, whether village, religious or kin-group. The actors involved in the 
field compete for resources and influence through cooperation or contesta-
tion, inevitably infusing new political meanings. Therefore, it is through this 
matrix of relationships that the political field can transform and change. In 
essence, the analysis of state- and nation-building processes can become the 
study of this field and its evolution through the multiple relationships between 
its inhabitants. State, nation and society are thus integrated into one single 
field, which through its functioning can selectively vehicle either inclusion, 
participation and co-optation or exclusion, marginalization and even alien-
ation. At the same time, it can be transformed in an arena within which exter-
nal influences are projected in order to orienting its functioning, providing 
with extra support specific actors with the aim of making them prevail in the 
internal competition for recognition, legitimacy and authority.
5 The Struggle to Create State and Nation Out of Middle Eastern 
Diversity
The contemporary history of the Middle East shows that the above-mentioned 
orientations and models have not simply been contextualized in a number of 
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different manners, but have also been experienced with very ambiguous and 
contrasted stances. This seems particularly clear looking at Arab countries, the 
focus of this overview.
In the Middle East, state- and nation-building processes have been always 
developed under the pressure of overlapping solidarity-group, patriotic/na-
tional and supranational influences (Roy, 2007). Different forms of loyalties 
have not simply competed for leadership and for orienting and guiding these 
processes, but have often developed in synchrony, with strong overlapping. 
Such a dynamic placed diversity under contrasting tensions, making it actor 
and subject of continuous political interplays (Zubaida, 2002). Pan-Arabism 
and pan-Islamism (in both the Shiite and Sunni versions) have been the lead-
ing supranational ideologies that inspired a number of political platforms, 
groups and movements in the region. They have largely represented the main 
political utopias through which it has been dreamt to reconfigure the frag-
mented Middle Eastern geography and dissolve the international boundaries 
imposed in the 1920s (Roy, 2007). At the same time, each orientation has pro-
posed a distinctive vision of regional diversity and of its political saliency.
While a supranational utopia has constantly provided a fundamental point 
of reference, concrete politics have been always developed according to a “na-
tional” framework. This was manifest in the uneasy relationship between 
Baʿthist Syria and Nasserist Egypt at the time of the United Arab Republic 
(1958–1961), which failed because perceived by Syrians as a form of assimila-
tion and not the fulfilment of Arabism (Owen, 2013). The same could be said 
about the strained relationship between Syria and Iraq since the 1960s, with 
the two Baʿthist declinations competing for leadership in the region. Even the 
Muslim Brotherhood established its presence in the region through national 
chapters (Boulby, 1999). This soon proved to be far more than a simple func-
tional strategy. Since the 1950s, and especially during the ban on the Brother-
hood’s parent branch in Egypt, each chapter has taken root in its respective 
country, developing specific local orientations. This occurred without ques-
tioning any aspects of the supranational pan-Islamist vision promoted by the 
Brotherhood. In this regard, indicative is the different positioning of the Ku-
waiti and Jordanian branches during the Gulf war in 1991, with the former sup-
porting prompt intervention and the latter opposing the US’ coalition (Moad-
del, 2002). This episode also elucidates another aspect of the importance of the 
national dimension for actors usually considered inspired by a supranational 
vision. Their history shows that each chapter has most frequently looked at 
regional politics according to the perspective of their territory, country and 
regime, and not vice-versa. It was by associating with the national framework 
that they conveyed and articulated their utopic supranational vision (Roy, 
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2007). Another example is provided by the most recent events occurring after 
the Arab uprisings and, in particular, following the ousting of Muhammad 
Morsi in Egypt (Milton-Edwards, 2017). If one looks at the fragmentation pro-
cess experienced by the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, it becomes clear how 
national visions and interests have taken the upper hand over supranational 
orientation. In Jordan, the Brotherhood’s division into three different branches 
is neither solely the result of manipulation, co-optation and selective repres-
sion nor a consequence of their survival strategy, but confirms how the na-
tional dimension (the national political field) remains key in concrete 
politics.
Nevertheless, to complicate the situation, this “national” focus is not un-
challenged. Quite the contrary, it is constantly undermined by multiple inter-
nal divisions (ethnic, religious and kin-group) which can either destabilize the 
country fabric or increase the ambiguity of concrete politics.
Ethnic divisions tend to be most significant “challengers” of the State and of 
its territorial dimensions and territorial space (such as the Kurds in Iraq or 
Turkey) (Bengio, Ben-Dor, 1999). At the same time, radical or existential forms 
of competition can develop also within the same ethnic dimension not simply 
for controlling the State and its resources, but for advancing contrasting vi-
sions of the identity of State and nation (e.g. Fatah and Hamas in their search 
for a Palestinian State) (Sayigh, 2011) to the point of breaking out into open 
conflict for control of the national political field. This is also the case of ethnic 
and religious rivalries that compete for their position within the State (e.g. the 
ethnic and religious rivalries in Lebanon and Iraq). At the same time, they can 
also transgress a State’s international boundaries, reconnecting with suprana-
tional ideologies while still posing as a national actor (e.g. Hizb Allah and Iran) 
or they can associate with supranational utopianists to reinforce their political 
leverage, status and transboundary networks (e.g. the relationship that devel-
oped between the Islamic State organization and some tribes in the area of the 
Jazeera between Syria and Iraq) (Collombier, Roy, 2018).
This is the complex matrix of relationships and contrasting influences that 
describe the development of concrete politics in the region, fostering multiple 
visions of State and nation. As said before, the mechanics and grammar of this 
complex interplay are defined by variable regional geographies.
In this regard, history shows that such a matrix mainly due to a series of 
specific traumatic events (Roy, 2007) that contributed to reshuffling balances 
of power and alignments in the region. In literature, these have been tradition-
ally described according to the following tripartition: the demise of a great 
Arab kingdom from the Mediterranean to Mesopotamia; the Arab States’ de-
feats at the hand of Israel (1948, 1967, 1973), and the Iranian Revolution from 
which emerged the Islamic Republic of Iran (Roy, 2007). The present crisis and 
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conflicts in the Middle East can be understood on the basis of such a legacy, 
with most recent events being part of a process of transformation and recon-
figuration that had begun at the end of the 20th century.
The first trauma explains the conditions and rationales on which national 
political fields have been developed. The aftermath of the First World War pro-
duced different effects on Middle Eastern geographies.
At the regional systemic level, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire 
opened this space to the contextualization and imposition of the modern state 
ideal according to the Western vision. From then on, this became the “compul-
sory model” inspiring all debates and confrontations beyond specific orienta-
tions and ideals. At the political level, the expulsion of Faysal from Damascus 
in 1920 attested to the drastic failure of the war strategy espoused by part of 
Arab nationalist leaderships, namely those who had decided to fight against 
Istanbul, supporting London and Paris. Instead of a united Arab State at the 
heart of the Middle East, as the Sharif of Mecca had tentatively negotiated 
with London in exchange for its support against Istanbul, the two European 
countries (backed in a second moment by Russia and Italy) opted for partition-
ing the region according to the (in)famous Sykes-Picot agreement (1916). The 
foundation of modern Middle Eastern States was realized on the basis of a se-
lective re-interpretation of the Ottoman past and according to French and 
British geopolitical interests (Rogan, 2012).
London supervised the organization of the Mandate in Palestine, making 
sure that the Balfour Declaration guaranteeing a “Jewish Homeland” was in-
cluded in the texts. It created the Emirate of Transjordan from a remote pe-
riphery of the old provinces of Damascus and it offered its administration to 
one of the sons of its ally, Sherif Husayn of Hijaz. At the same time, London 
promoted the foundation of the Kingdom of Iraq merging the three Ottoman 
provinces of Baghdad, Basra and (eventually) Mosul, and recognizing its crown 
to Faysal, another son of Sherif Husayn. Such a systematization was considered 
perfectly suited to London’s geopolitical interests in the area and its colonial 
empire.
In turn, Paris obtained control of the rest of the Ottoman Sham, promoting 
the foundation of a “smaller Syria” and of a “wider Lebanon”. Syria was formed 
by the unification of the Aleppo and Damascus areas plus the Jabal Druze and 
the plain of Latakia. The Sanjak of Alexandretta was instead detached and rec-
ognized as part of modern Turkey. “Greater Lebanon” was created by merging 
the Mountain with the Ottoman districts of Tripoli, Sidon and the Bekaa 
Valley.
This picture of the configuration of the contemporary Middle East was com-
pleted by Turkish and Iranian stabilization of their State boundaries and re-
gimes (both of which adopted the secularization process of their societies as a 
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path to consolidate the state structure) in the early 1920s and by the Al Saud 
triumph in their struggle to form a State, fulfilled with the conquest of Medina 
and Mecca that allowed them to found today’s Saudi Arabia.
In the short term, the price of this process was essentially paid by the Arme-
nians, Kurds and Assyrians who saw their independence ambitions totally frus-
trated. The new inter-war regional outlook developed according to a precise 
politicization of ethno-linguistic distribution and minority status. In essence, 
at a macro level, the regional balances of power were defined according to the 
tripartition between the Arab (divided into distinct countries), Turkish and Ira-
nian dimensions. Non-Arab/Turkish/Iranian groups were thus ignored as well 
as heterodox Muslim groups, while non-Muslims were integrated as religious 
minorities. Regarding the heterodox Muslims, their position was essentially 
fragile (such the Alevi in Turkey or Baháʾis in Iran) and this is still the case today 
since they have no access to concrete politics. The foundation of the colonial 
State was decisive in framing national political fields. It fostered the organiza-
tion of (supra)national camps.
At the national systemic level, each country was involved in direct “negotia-
tion” with the Mandate power for establishing local balances of power and the 
new political centers of authority (Khoury, 2003, 2014). In essence, London and 
Paris were able to capitalize the support of a part of local leaderships establish-
ing precise modus vivendi, exploiting variable local geographies. Generally, 
both powers designed the national political field through the combination of a 
selective political discourse centered on patriotic and ethno-national features 
(being Syrian, but also Arab) and the re-interpretation of the traditional Otto-
man instruments for dealing with non-Muslim communities, now understood 
according the framework of the protection of religious minorities. This oc-
curred explicitly, for example in Iraq with the Declaration of Guarantees (1932) 
(Müller-Sommerfeld, 2016), or indirectly, such as in Transjordan’s institutional-
izing the role of the Church in the field of education and personal status (Mag-
giolini, 2015). In Mandate Palestine, Britain’s strategy was clearly ambiguous in 
its stance, also giving contrasting ambitions to the impracticability of harmo-
nizing Jews and Arabs. Divide and rule selectively played with ethno-linguistic 
and religious designations. It avoided giving political or legal content to terms 
such as Palestinian or Arab-speaking in favor of the adoption of religious cat-
egories, Muslims and Christians. In substance, Palestinians were not recog-
nized as a nation and they were classified in Mandate administration accord-
ing to their religious affiliations (Robson, 2011).
In the post-war period, London’s strategy to define State and nation in 
the Middle East thus followed the model of the Treaty of Lausanne signed 
by Turkey. Non-Arab ethno-linguistic groups were ignored, being considered 
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 fragments to be assimilated within the three above-mentioned majoritarian 
designations. Religious factors were taken into account in the name of the 
Ottoman past.
In the area under French control, the reconfiguration of variable local geog-
raphies was much more strident, at least apparently. While the Maronites’ am-
bitions were welcomed, establishing their leadership in the newly founded 
“Greater Lebanon”, the fusion of Ottoman districts with a considerable Muslim 
presence assured Paris the role of arbiter in national politics. In Syria, Paris was 
more “creative” (Dueck, 2010). While France consolidated the external interna-
tional borders according to the Mandate treaty, internally the country was re-
currently divided. Initially, the Mandate administration recognized three mini-
states (Aleppo, Damascus and that of the Alawites), followed by a fourth, the 
Jabal Druze. In 1925, Damascus and Aleppo were then merged, becoming the 
backbone of the future “united” State of Syria. This subdivision was inspired by 
an ambiguous understanding of Syrian diversity, promoting a political accom-
modation based on local distinctiveness (Aleppo and Damascus) and quasi 
ethnic-religious designations (Druze and Alawite that never before had been 
recognized as such within the Ottoman Empire) (White, 2007). At the same 
time, Christians were granted specific protection status as non- Muslim minori-
ties. This divide and rule strategy endured until the 1940s. Although in use for 
less than a couple of decades, its effects produced a controversial legacy, politi-
cizing and spatializing identities in the country.
Inevitably, the demiurgic Mandate policy did not develop unchallenged. Re-
bellions and protests recurrently broke out, especially in Palestine as a conse-
quence of the rising tension between Jews and Arabs. At the same time, it is 
also important to point out that the Mandate vision was substantially consid-
ered acceptable by a large part of the local political leaderships. Patriotic ori-
entations concentrated on the territorial State recently founded. They contest-
ed or collaborated on the basis of achieving the independence of their newly 
founded countries. Nationalists inspired by supranational ideals opposed for-
eign presences and their visions, but they also found a part of such systemati-
zation acceptable because inherently subscribing to Arabism (White, 2012). 
Accordingly, the issue was overcoming the international boundaries dividing 
the Arab nation, not conveying a different vision of the identity of the region. 
On the basis of such understanding, the interwar period became a hotbed for 
nationalist/patriotic platforms (e.g. the Lebanese nationalist movement in-
spired by the Maronite intellectuals of the Revue Phénicienne; the Egyptian 
Wafd party of Saad Zaghloul Wassef Boutros Ghali, pan-nationalist move-
ments such as the 1932 Syrian Social Nationalist Party of the Greek-Orthodox 
Antoun Saadeh and the 1947 Baʿth Party of Michel Aflaq and Muhammad Al 
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Bitar). But during the same decades also emerged the first modern pan-Islamist 
movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, in Egypt in 1928. The Brotherhood was 
the sole actor taking a distance from the ideal of the secular national State and 
that of “Arabness”, focusing on the need to promote an Islamic approach to-
wards the state- and nation-building processes in the region. At the same time, 
it is also interesting to point out the manifestation of another form of pan-Is-
lamist orientation. In early 1931, following the first congresses of Mecca and 
Cairo dedicated to discussing the necessity to re-establish the Caliphate in the 
Arab world, the Muslim Supreme Council in Palestine organized the first Is-
lamic Congress with the aim of conveying in the same place representative 
from all Muslim countries. Although the Congress was widely ostracized by 
official authorities, such as those of Turkey and Egypt, it expressed this desire 
of unity and solidarity beyond the imposed categories and boundaries. It is 
also indicative because the Congress, predominantly attended by Sunni, was 
opened by a Shiite Imam. Today, this can sound strange giving the predomi-
nance of the Sunni-Shiʿa sectarian predicament, but it was perfectly fitting the 
search for unity of those decades.
The second trauma pertains to the Arab States’ defeats at the hand of Israel 
(1948, 1967 and 1973), thus embracing the phase of independence, the secular 
nationalist movement in the region and the reconfiguration of regional bal-
ances of power and national political orientations that culminated in the sepa-
rate peace between Egypt and Israel (Camp David 1978) and the revolution in 
Iran (1979). This was a very intense and dynamic period in the history of the 
region, characterized by transformations and transitions at the local, regional 
and international levels. While immersed in a world shaped by Cold War logic, 
the Middle East embarked on a complex struggle for defining State and nation, 
regional balances of power and its role at the international level. In this strug-
gle for power, leadership and meanings, the Middle East’s variable geographies 
played a crucial role.
The 1950s and 1960s were the decades of Arab nationalist triumph, which 
became the leading ideal in state- and nation-building processes. It was during 
this period that the tension between patriotic and supranational orientations 
were clearer. At the same time, becoming progressively more evident during 
those years was the above-mentioned ambiguity in the relationship between 
utopian and concrete politics in the Arab nationalist sphere. In this regard, the 
Mandate legacy and the 1948 defeat of the Arab front against Zionism and the 
newly founded State of Israel were determinant.
The nationalist movement had multiple voices. While all shared the same 
conviction about the need to promote development and progress from above 
and about State intervention in society and the economy, they promoted 
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 different visions and strategies. Arabism became a contested ideal disputed 
between different nationalist currents (e.g. Baʿthist vs. Nasserites) as well as 
between national parties subscribing to the same ideology (Syrian Baʿthists vs. 
Iraqi Baʿthists). However, competition also developed through the rivalry be-
tween monarchies and republics, with the two branches of the Hashemite 
family in Iraq and Jordan proposing a path toward Arabism through the fulfil-
ment of the united Arab State promised by London, and Nasserists promoting 
the pan-Arabist vision as the solution to Arab weaknesses (Rogan, 2012).
At the country level, post-war nationalism produced contrasting effects. For 
those subscribing to the Arabist ideal, the nationalist movement offered inclu-
sion and participation in national fields. On the other hand, the non-Arab eth-
nic groups were further marginalized, being forced to surrender to assimila-
tion by the various nationalist regimes ruling in the region. But secular 
nationalism imposed a price also on non-Muslim Arab-speaking communities. 
In fact, in the spirit of national unity and equality, they were asked to renounce 
most of the guaranties and autonomies recognized by Mandate authorities, 
proving their loyalty to the State and nation. In the early 1950s in Syria, for ex-
ample, Colonel Shishakli publicly championed the need to eliminate religious 
minorities’ reserved seats in parliament (Picard, 2012). In Iraq, the military 
coup in 1958–1959 by Qasim and his second-in-command ʿArif was only rhe-
torically presented as a solution to “national” minority issues (Rassam, 2006; 
Donabed, 2015). The promises of integrating Iraqi diversity were subordinated 
to the primary concern of defending the State and the regime in power. While 
containing or quelling any attempts requesting recognition of non-Arab iden-
tities, the Baʿth party in Syria and Iraq concentrated on depoliticizing the role 
of religious affiliations.
State and nation were recomposed in the image of the ruling party that im-
posed itself as the sole reference in charge of representing the people, mobiliz-
ing them and managing national, political and economic life in the country. It 
is not a coincidence that, in these countries, the Christian establishments 
(charities and schools) were generally nationalized, thus reducing the maneu-
ver space of Christian leaderships.
But such dirigisme in state- and nation-building processes not only put 
pressure on ethnic and religious designations through the imposition of a ma-
joritarian perspective, but also sought to create political identity in the image 
of the ruling power. An indicative example in this regard was in Jordan be-
tween 1950 and 1967, when the Hashemite rulers sought to develop a totally 
new expression of “national” identity (Massad, 2008). The “Jordanian” designa-
tion was created with the objective of legitimizing Hashemite rule over the 
East and West Banks. Therefore, it was initially created from the  Trans-Jordanian 
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and Palestinian outlooks. This strategy was very ambiguous in its stance, also 
because the Hashemite sought to develop it within the broader framework of 
Arabism. In fact, it was opposed and contested by both the left leaning sup-
porters of pan-Arabism and the Palestinians involved in organizing their na-
tional resistance movement.
In essence, with the independence of the Arab countries, the struggle for 
State and nation put great pressure on Middle Eastern diversity. The variable 
regional geographies were substantially overshadowed in the name of the ide-
al of the “strong State” and “homogenous nation”, ambiguously declined by dif-
ferent combinations of supranational ideologies and concrete politics (Mah-
mood, 2015).
In the early 1970s, Middle Eastern politics began to change. Pan-Arabism 
movements and leaderships were suffering a crisis of legitimacy and political 
credibility. The defeats by Israel and intra-Arab competition for regional lead-
ership was exposing their internal ambiguities and weaknesses. This opened 
the space for elaborating new political projects and reconfiguring previous bal-
ances of power. It was in this context that progressively developed the so-called 
“return of religion in politics”, namely the re-introduction of Islam into consti-
tutions and States (where before it had been either given a marginal position, 
such as in Syria, or subjected to the modernizing political ambition of the re-
gime, like in Nasser’s Egypt), the co-optation of religion by political leadership 
to find new legitimacy and, finally, the (re)emergence of different Islamic ac-
tors in the public arena, from Islamist political activists and radical militants to 
the first currents of the contemporary Salafist vision under the inspiration of 
personalities such as Al Albani. In this framework, the most representative 
event was surely the revolution in Iran and the triumph of Khomeini – as it will 
be explained below, the third trauma in the history of defining “Arabness” in 
state – and nation-building processes. Nevertheless, it is important to point 
out that the “return of religion” was also expressed in the non-Muslim dimen-
sion with reconfiguration of the role of the Church and its ecclesiastical insti-
tutions in the community and public spheres (McCalloum, 2012). Neverthe-
less, at a closer glance, this decade represented a much more complex historical 
intersection than a simple phase of transition towards the revival of Islam in 
politics, in its multiple manifestations. In this regard, the civil war in Lebanon 
of 1975 is indicative, coalescing in a single conflict multiple polarizing factors, 
at the religious (e.g. Christian-Muslim), national/supranational (e.g. Maronite 
nationalism-pan-Arabism and Palestinian nationalism) and geopolitical levels 
(e.g. Syrian and Israeli interventions). The Lebanese civil war has been a real 
crucible of Middle East fault-lines, anticipating their future political develop-
ments. The foundation of Hizb Allah provides the clearest evidence of the 
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newly developing configuration of the intertwining between solidarity-group, 
patriotic/national and supranational levels. Hizb Allah emerged in the midst 
of the civil war as a militant Islamist movement equally dedicated to a plurality 
of goals: defending the Lebanese Shiite community in the country; advancing 
the ideal of direct involvement of the Shiite clergy in politics (the al-wilayat 
al-faqih doctrine), while informally serving the interests of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran in the region; and striking back at Israel and Zionism for the sake of 
the Palestinians and Islam.
Therefore, the 1970s can be described as a decade of different political tem-
poralities in the search for establishing State and nation on a solid new basis, 
with traditional secular orientations fighting to defend their role and authority 
in the attempt to recover from the failures of the 1960s, and new forms of po-
litical engagement emerging on the basis of different visions of identities and 
boundaries in the region. These dynamics developed according to multiple 
contextual configurations, transforming regional balances of power and logics 
of alignment in the whole Middle East. On the one hand, the so-called “return 
of religion to politics” did not entail making polity and society more “religious” 
(Mahmood, 2015), but described a potent mechanism of politicizing commu-
nity identities that progressively appeared at the local and regional levels, also 
through the re-ethnicization and re-activation of religious boundaries. On the 
other, nationalism and ethno-nationalism continued to play a central role. The 
1970s also saw the revival of traditional forms of ethic-irredentism, such as 
with the case of the Kurds and Assyrians in Iraq, and continuation of the Arab 
nationalist struggle for State and nation.
In this framework, the Iraq-Iran war well represents the complexity of this 
period of transformation. At the contextual level, the ascendancy of Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq fostered a new phase of muscular state- and nation-building 
processes. Diversity was confined and contained (Sassoon, 2012). Arabization 
and Baʿthification were the main objectives to be pursued on the basis of Sad-
dam Hussein’s personality cult (Donabed, 2015). Diversity was only tolerated if 
conforming to such a vision. It was not opposed per se, but it was subject to 
functional considerations of its contribution to achieving the regime’s objec-
tives. More generally, diversity was considered something to be kept private if 
not to be fully assimilated through acculturation, political negation and indoc-
trination. The rhetoric of the unity and indivisibility of the State predominated 
over any group or community’s distinct perspective. It was in this framework 
that the Kurdish struggle for autonomy gained new momentum.
At the regional level, the war between Baʿthist Iraq and Khomeini’s Iran was 
much more than an inter-state conflict for leadership in the region or control 
of the contested border of the Shatt Al-Arab. It can be considered as the 
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 muscular reaction to the third traumatic event in the history of defining the 
political meaning of “Arabness”, namely the revolution in Iran and the founda-
tion of the first Islamic Republic in the history of the region.
Although the Iraqi-Iranian border is one of the most vivid expressions of the 
variable geographies in the Middle East, with Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds, ei-
ther Sunni or Shiite, on both sides, it has always served as a sort of psychologi-
cal political frontier dividing the visions of two Empires –in one of their last 
historical manifestations, the Ottoman and the Safavid– and their heirs. In the 
course of the centuries, this political division also acquired a political-religious 
implication, beyond strict demographic facts, defining the separation between 
a field where Sunni Islam was undoubtedly ruling, no matter the faith of its 
subjects, and a context where Shiism was dominating, according to the same 
understanding. This psychological frontier was then essentially interiorized, 
remaining latent (Roy, 2007). The post-Empire configuration of the Middle 
East substantially respected such an understanding, as the tripartition be-
tween Turkish, Arab and Iranian spheres explains. Without subscribing to pe-
rennialism, after 1979, this cultural specialization became open to contestation 
especially within the so-called Arab world, with the possibility of negating –
in essence– the ideal of State and nation as it had been developed until then. 
The reason lay in the above-mentioned tensions between national and supra-
national. Although explicitly advocating pan-Islamism, the Islamic Republic 
of Iran adopted instead a clear nationalistic posture, and it openly called into 
question not only the continued existence of such a psychological border (the 
separation between the realm of Sunnism and that of Shiism, according to a 
sectarian understanding), but also the very existence of an Arab Iraq, implic-
itly Sunni (an Iraq defined according to the Baʿthist ideal of Arabness). The Is-
lamic Republic of Iran was perceived as inherently predisposed to entertaining 
a strong relationship with Middle Eastern Shiite communities, menacing Arab 
solidarity in the region, overstating the real importance of relations of those 
ties for Tehran (which always subordinated them to its geopolitical interests). 
In essence, the Islamic Republic of Iran was considered a challenge to the very 
fabric of Iraq, a menace that could have subverted “national” hierarchies by 
negating the “Arab” character of Shiism in the country. With this in mind, and 
considering the predominance of Shiism on a demographic level, such subver-
sion could have threatened the very foundations of the Iraqi socio-political 
field.
Accordingly, the Iraq-Iran war (which on the contrary demonstrated the 
weakness of the sectarian paradigm, as well demonstrated by the loyalty shown 
to Baghdad by Iraqi soldiers of Shiite descent) was not simply a conflict be-
tween two regional rivals representing structurally different identities and 
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 orientations, but also a struggle for State and nation in both countries. In fact, 
in the midst of the war and throughout it, both regimes were fully dedicated to 
state- and/or nation-building processes, Iran to establishing the Islamic Re-
public over an already solid “national State” frame and Iraq to securitizing and 
welding “national borders” of its political field. Moreover, beyond concerns 
and fears, the Iraqi “national” political field fought compactly against Iran, 
without showing signs of internal fragmentation. The same occurred in the 
opposite camp.
With this in mind, the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
Iraqi-Iran war offer important clues for understanding part of present con-
flicts’ logics and root-causes because it provides a field in which to explore the 
impact of politicization processes outside of variable regional geographies. In 
fact, the Iraq-Iran war, in all its implications, cannot be understood only ac-
cording to one analytical lens. This is also the case for the conflicts and crises 
in today’s Middle East. It requires an appreciation of the tensions between na-
tional, supranational and local-contextual levels; geopolitical rivalries; the po-
tential of ethnic and religious factors as well as the protracted contraposition 
between secular and Islamist orientations (and within them). The use of mul-
tiple interpretative lenses helps us understand the function of variable geogra-
phies, subjects and actors in this political struggle for State and nation. It also 
suggests taking a distance from essentialist and monolithic interpretations of 
the issues and challenges at stake, reconsidering engagement and disengage-
ment in the region as the result of the intertwining of multiple factors and not 
simply the implementations of decisions taken by individual united and co-
herent actors.
Therefore, the Iraq-Iran war is an important episode for looking at how re-
gional politics progressively began to change and transform during the last two 
decades of the 20th century, with multiple dynamics of politicization and re-
vival of political content in the broader field of identities. In fact, if one looks 
at the Middle East between the 2003 military operations in Iraq that signaled 
the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the recent uprisings, it clarifies the 
manifold features and multiple pull-factors that are fueling present turmoil, 
severely testing diversity. Without suggesting any connections between them 
or offering reductionist explanations of dynamics essentially having multiple 
significances, these two events put into the spotlight the development of an 
intricate dynamic of contestation and construction of new meanings of State 
and nation, intertwining concrete politics, geopolitics and utopian orienta-
tions. On the one hand, the fall of Saddam’s regime and the uneven path of the 
Iraqi reconstruction process mobilized Iraq’s variable geographies in the cam-
paign to define the logics, contents and balances of power in the “new”  national 
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political field (Zubaida, 2012). In essence, the military operation drastically 
opened room for making a new political field, redrawing boundaries both in-
ternally and internationally as well as exposing the Iraqi system to multiple 
external influences. It also destabilized the capacity of the Iraqi State to resist 
external influences. In fact, preservation of the territorial scope of the Iraqi 
State has been subject to multiple pressures and tensions regarding its regime, 
political system and the very existence of the country as such. The image of 
variable ideologies helps again to elucidate the situation. The fall of Saddam’s 
regime inherently weakened the psychological frontier between (Arab) Shiism 
and (Iranian) Shiism (Roy, 2007). Obviously such a divide did not disappear, 
but somehow moved within the Iraqi polity, questioning both the concept of 
being “Arab” and “Iraqi”, ascribing new meanings to Sunni and Shiʿa designa-
tions, and making the state- and national-building process acquire a geopoliti-
cal role in its fullest meaning, for the country and the region. Such a process 
becomes particularly evident when considering the different positions have 
emerged at the political level within the Iraqi Arab Shia community, with ac-
tors maintaining extremely close relations with Iran and other focused on a 
more Iraq-centric vision. In this sense, even the civil war that reached its peak 
between 2006 and 2008, usually labelled as a sectarian struggle between Arab 
Sunnis and Shiites, can speak in favor of such an understanding if considered 
as a fight for supremacy over State and nation (namely the Iraqi national politi-
cal field).
At the same time, the post-Saddam state- and nation-building process cre-
ated enough maneuver room for Kurds, and somehow for the Assyrians, to 
project their own idea of the Iraqi political system, oscillating between the de-
mand for full independence and that for pronounced autonomy. Moreover, the 
Kurds’ autonomist or separatist ambitions have not only challenged the tradi-
tional territorial configuration of Iraq, but have also potentially created the 
possibility of setting a new frontier between a Kurdish and a non-Kurdish 
world well beyond Iraq and across other countries in the region, namely Syria 
and Turkey. In fact, it is now perceived as running into Syria, where Turkey is 
engaged to neutralize it.
On the other hand, by overthrowing regimes that had been ruling for de-
cades in countries such as Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, the Arab uprisings opened 
a new chapter in the history of state- and nation-building processes in the re-
gion. The final results are still contended. It is exactly this state of affairs that is 
fueling the present turmoil. In Syria, the uprisings quickly turned into a civil 
war and a geopolitical confrontation that now is approaching a tentative solu-
tion that seems to be working in favor of the Assad regime. In a country like 
Egypt, the balance of power suddenly changed, triggering a phase of strong 
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confrontation between military and civil rule, liberalists-secularists and Is-
lamists, inevitably involving the spheres of community identity in complex 
dynamics of negotiating places and roles within a newly developing configura-
tion of the national political field. In the case of Libya, the national political 
field essentially collapsed under the pressures of contrasting parochial and 
tribal interests and solidarities, despite the fact that the territorial configura-
tion is not questioned in its international boundaries.
It is in the heart of such complex dynamics of polarization and politiciza-
tion that the Islamic State (is) developed and expanded, unilaterally proclaim-
ing itself a caliphate in Mosul (2014). Beyond the specific features of this orga-
nization, its code of conduct and strategy, is most vividly evidences the 
political potential of the Middle East’s variable geographies and the multiple 
possible configurations of the intertwining between solidarity-group, patriot-
ic/national and supranational influences. is has positioned itself in the midst 
of Iraqi-Syrian geographies, politicizing them on the basis of its utopic vision 
(Hughes, 2017). It has exploited the rhetoric of the psychological frontier be-
tween an Arab Sunni and Iranian Shiite world, ambiguously playing with “na-
tional” and sectarian polarizations and tensions on the ground. At the same 
time, it has sought to co-opt local kin-group solidarities and their transbound-
ary potential to challenge existing international boundaries and consolidate in 
rural and remote contexts (Collombier, Roy, 2018). This operation was not sim-
ply imposed from above, but worked out by developing an alternative path 
through the intertwining between local, national and supranational concerns. 
This has made its utopian vision resound in the region and internationally. The 
historical vicissitudes of is can also be considered a testament to the contro-
versial consequences produced by using diversity and variable regional geog-
raphies as strategic military resources at the disposal of political agendas for 
the state- and nation-building process.
6 Conclusion
The entropic spread of violence that destabilizes today’s Middle East, threat-
ening the survival of its populations beyond religious or ethnic affiliations, can 
be clearly understood without the need for subscribing to a culturalist ap-
proach. The protracted instability in Iraq, the civil wars in Syria, Libya and Ye-
men, the political crises that Egypt experienced from the uprising until the 
election of Al Sisi as president and, finally, the emergence of the Islamic State 
organization between Syria and Iraq are not demonstrations of an intrinsically 
anarchic Middle East shaped by primordial identities. They are the most  recent 
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developments of a matrix, established at the turn of the 20th century, which 
has fostered a struggle for authority and legitimacy taking place at intra- and 
inter-state levels. In this framework, the controversial spread of sectarian vio-
lence and its destructive effects over the wider Middle East have to be consid-
ered as an integral part of an historical continuum whose roots cannot be 
tracked to the beginning of the 21th century alone and that have further been 
exacerbated by competing geopolitical agendas. Accordingly, the “new Middle 
Eastern Cold war” apparently centered around the Sunni-Shia divide and the 
development, the imposition and the exploitation of sectarian forms of vio-
lence represent other forms of the struggle for supremacy within national and 
supranational political fields, where the religious, along with other features, as 
seen before, have become particularly manipulated for developing new politi-
cal meaning out of the regional multiple geographies.
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Chapter 6
Christians Navigating through Middle East 
Turbulences: the Case of the Copts in Egypt
Alessia Melcangi and Paolo Maggiolini
The aim of the chapter is to offer a dynamic account of the Christian presence 
within the Middle East, of its contribution to and position in the contemporary 
history of the region. In this regard, the historical vicissitudes of the Coptic 
community will be helpful to focus on the challenges, issues and ambitions 
that have influenced Christians’ history in the region from the beginning of the 
contemporary state- and nation-building process in the contemporary Middle 
East until today.
In the first part, the chapter will focus on the multi-vocal dimension of the 
Christian presence in the Middle East, a feature that needs to be taken into ac-
count to fully understand its position and condition within the different States 
in the region. In the second part, the chapter will analyze the dynamics of sec-
tarian violence against and persecution of Christians in the Middle East. In 
particular, it will focus on contemporary Egypt from the 1950s until the 2011 
uprisings, taking the specific case of the Egyptian Christian Copts as a case 
study. In recent years, communalism has inflamed Egypt, weakening national 
cohesiveness and unity.
1 The Multi-vocal Christian Presence in Today’s Middle East
The history of Christians in the contemporary Middle East is an account that 
speaks with multiple languages and many vocabularies, sketching a number of 
multifarious images of their present and future condition in the region. These 
representations can be either rich and many-branched or monolithic and 
axiomatic.
If one looks at the perspectives and orientations through which Christians 
in the region have been considered and narrated, most of the representations 
can be enclosed within a continuum defined by two only apparently contra-
dictory but, in reality, often complementary discourses. These poles can be 
briefly summarized according to the following formulations and discourses.
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A first discourse tends to approach Christians as a homogenous subject, 
without showing specific interest in exploring local, regional or denomination-
al distinctions (Makari, 2014). Accordingly, such an outlook often points out 
that the common features of their presence in today’s Middle East are the fra-
gility of their condition and their almost inevitable emigration. At the heart of 
such an understanding one can find the implicit idea that, because of their 
faith, Christians cannot fully integrate into a socio-political fabric inspired by 
Islam, unless by accepting to be a sort of second-class citizen. This image is a 
product of a more general description of the Middle East as an anarchic and 
radical space (Malak, Salem, 2015; Korany, 2015). This perception had matured 
already in the 19th century, but has consolidated since the 1970s with the Islam-
ization of Middle Eastern politics and public discourse (Robson, 2011). Al-
though such a perspective can be substantiated by concrete evidence, it can 
pose the risk of essentializing and stereotyping their condition through their 
sufferings and challenges. And so the demise of most of the Arab uprisings’ 
promises and the conflicts in Iraq and Syria have increased such an under-
standing. In reality, the decline of Christians’ presence is not a phenomenon of 
today. It began at the turn of the 20th century, when Christians represented 
14% of the region’s population (7 million) (Johnson, Zurlo, 2015). Since then, 
emigration and a declining birth-rate progressively eroded their numbers, but 
it was by the mid-1970s that the pace of this dynamic considerably accelerated. 
In the 1970s, Christians had already decreased to 7% (12 million in 1975) and 
today they are 5% (25 million in 2015). In 2050, they will be likely 25 million, 
namely 3% of the population (Johnson, Zurlo, 2015). While Egypt continues to 
have the largest Christian population in the region (8 million), countries such 
as Iraq have witnessed a dramatic decline in their number. First the 2006 civil 
war and then the emergence of the Islamic State tragically accelerated the 
pace of their decline. At the end of 2013, from a population of more than a mil-
lion, Christians in Iraq were estimated to be no more than 300,000 to 500,000, 
with approximately 80% of their religious establishments destroyed or dam-
aged and abandoned (Salloum, 2013). Their decline is almost turning into an-
nihilation. Such an outlook is only partially mitigated by the fact that the 
Christian population is increasing in countries such as Saudi Arabia (4%), Ku-
wait (10%) or the United Arab Emirates (14%). In fact, this trend is fostered by 
the arrival of a significant number of Christian migrant workers from South 
and Southeast Asia (Johnson, Zurlo, 2015). Therefore, it does not directly affect 
the scope of the historic Churches of the Middle East.
Nevertheless, numbers alone cannot explain the various points of tensions 
that affect the situation of Christians in today’s Middle East. They are not able 
to fully communicate their diverse issues and approaches to the ongoing 
177Christians Navigating through Middle East Turbulences
<UN>
 regional instability. In fact, by making their sufferings and demographic de-
creases the main if not the sole parameter for understanding their condition 
and presence, this discourse risks overlooking the complexity of the challenges 
and positions at stake. While Christian leaderships loudly exhort the interna-
tional community to recognize their plight, which is real and evident, they also 
resist being simply portrayed as a detached or passive minority distinct from 
the rest of the social fabric of the countries where they live, condemned to sur-
render by remaining at the margins or heading abroad (Rowe, 2014). Such a 
position is particularly clear with the case of Christians in Iraq or Egypt.
Without underestimating Christians’ present challenges and fragility, a sec-
ond discourse tends to look at Christians in the region according to their func-
tional potential (McGahern, 2012). Accordingly, since they have played a cen-
tral role in the history of the modern Middle East as intellectual vanguards of 
Arabism and cultural and spiritual bridges between the West and the East, to-
day Christians can perform a new positive role in the region. Because they are 
subjects or victims and not a direct part of present struggles, they can serve 
today’s Middle East by aiding in the mediation of a resolution to the ongoing 
conflicts. While such an understanding tries to project a creative role for Chris-
tians in the Middle East, it encages them within a sort of “identity and role 
syndrome” (Kattan, 2012: 51). Although it recognizes an agency to them, such 
an ideal type of discourse tends to evaluate their presence according to their 
capacity to perform a role. In essence, they become compelled to perform a 
sort of recurring duty of persuading their Muslim neighbors of the benefits 
and usefulness of their presence in the region. Such an understanding risks 
essentializing Christians in the Middle East by removing them from the heart 
of the ongoing conflicts or considering only what they can offer to both the 
West and the East. This approach is frequently employed in the case of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and was proposed again in Iraq after 2003. In this 
framework, Christians’ passive role is only apparently redeemed, while their 
identity and suffering risk being implicitly denied, becoming secondary to the 
roles of mediator and/or of a bridge between cultures and civilizations. It is not 
surprising that local Christian communities have frequently resisted this func-
tionalist discourse, advocating for full recognition of their right to live in the 
region and to be recognized as full citizens in the different Middle Eastern 
States without being compelled to prove their values and the “profitability” of 
their presence. As said above regarding the first discourse, this is not to negate 
that Christians have such potential and role to play, but their presence should 
be explored, recognizing them as an integral part of the ongoing conflicts and 
crises with full rights to have a voice beyond what they can offer. This holds 
particularly true today when the present turbulences in the region are fostered 
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by disagreements and conflicts between Muslims that do not per se, or always, 
result in attacks against Christians because of their faiths or that configure for 
them a specific role to play. They are integrally part of the ongoing conflicts 
and crises not simply because they have been targeted and have suffered from 
the conflict, but because the issues at stake concern the nature of the State, the 
notion of rights and duties, the concept of public space and that of welfare 
from which the Christians should not be excluded.
In essence, while both discourses clearly point out critical factors and ele-
ments for understating the present challenges to Christians’ presence in to-
day’s Middle East, they need to be cautiously endorsed to avoid the risk of mis-
reading Christians’ attitudes, overlooking their behaviors and strategies. On 
the one hand, the sole focus on their sufferings denies Christians agency. On 
the other, the sole acknowledgment to Christians of a role as mediators in con-
flicts and crises deprives them of the right to be recognized as a full part of and 
voice in the ongoing dynamics beyond the function that they can perform.
Now looking at the multiple landscapes which describe and distinguish the 
diverse configurations of Christians’ presence in the Middle East, it is impor-
tant to recognize that Christians’ multi-vocal character implies that each voice 
possesses a distinctive ecclesiastical identity, biography and local history 
to tell.
In this framework, Christian multi-vocality can be variously described and 
appreciated. On the one hand, it can be approached by focusing on the diverse 
stances adopted by Christians in the Middle East both in local and regional 
politics and in their relationship with the West. It can be explored by consider-
ing two distinct “orientations”, “outlooks” or “discourses” developed by Chris-
tians in the Middle East since the turn of the 20th century. Labelled by Sabra as 
“Arab Christian” and “Eastern Christian” outlooks (Sabra, 2006: 44), these two 
perspectives define a sort of wide continuum of shifting and evolving positions 
portraying the different Christians’ understandings of their role and position 
within the region. Arab Christian orientation tends to attach great value to 
Arab culture and identity, including Islamic civilization. This position has been 
openly supported by intellectuals such as Michel ʿAflaq, the founder of the 
Baʿath party, but also by various Christian personalities in Iraq and the Pales-
tinian territories. In this framework, although is not the rule, the relationship 
with the West can sometimes be uneasy and critical with the specific aim of 
countering the image of Middle Eastern Christians as the natural allies of the 
West or, worse, as one of its fifth columns in the region because of their faith. 
Eastern Christian orientation extends their sight beyond the limits of the Arab 
dimension with the aim of embracing the multiple expressions of Christianity 
in the Middle East, thus including all non-Arab Christian communities, such as 
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the Armenians or Assyrians. In doing so, the word “Eastern” posits a distance 
from Islam and Islamic culture and civilization as well as from the Arab cul-
tural milieu (Sabra, 2006). Such a distance can vary in its lengths, but this ori-
entation expresses a general agreement on the need to prioritize Christian 
identity and establish a solid relationship with the West for the sake of protect-
ing local Christian communities.
Therefore, Arab Christian orientations evidently support the idea that their 
distinct religious affiliation does not contradict their solid roots in Arab cul-
ture (for instance, the Christians in Palestine and Jordan). Eastern Christian 
perspectives can take on different forms. Coalescing religious and ethno- 
linguistic features to stand out from the majoritarian Arab milieu, it can mani-
fest a local patriotic or national sense of belonging (such as the Copts in Egypt) 
or an autonomous ethno-nationalist pride (such as the Assyrians in Iraq and 
the Maronites with the Phoenician ideal in Lebanon). Although such orienta-
tions should be considered ideal types, they are useful in exploring the differ-
ent Christians positions towards local politics and/or understanding their 
choice to emigrate, going beyond the simple category of fragile minority and 
persecuted subjects and appreciating their dynamism.
On the other hand, Christians’ multi-vocality can be described by consider-
ing how it locally changes, intertwining the ecclesiastical, community and 
ethno-linguistic dimensions. It can also be understood on the basis of how 
Christian demography is unevenly distributed within the different Middle 
Eastern States, with some communities and Churches strongly concentrated 
within specific countries while others are distinctive for being essentially dis-
seminated or “trans-boundary”. The socio-economic factor is of equal impor-
tance in understanding their position within a specific country.
Looking at the Israeli-Palestinian contexts, the manifold implication of 
Christians’ trans-boundary presence speaks out per se. While being 2% of the 
population both in Israel and under the Palestinian National Authority, Chris-
tians are divided between the jurisdictions of three Patriarchates (Greek Or-
thodox, Armenian and Latin), five archbishops (the Church of the East, Syrian 
Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox and Ethiopian) and two Reformed bishoprics (An-
glican and Lutheran). In the case of the Latin and Greek Orthodox Patriarch-
ate, these two ecclesiastical institutions exert their authority over most of the 
Christians in Jordan. Although the vast majority of Christians in Israel- Palestine 
are Arab natives – with the exception of foreigners and Hebrew-speaking 
Christians (both Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox) in Israel – this plural-
ity exists in a very fragmented landscape with each ecclesiastical institution 
having distinct orientations and identities (O’Mahony, 1999). Christians in the 
Israeli-Palestinian context clearly show how multi-vocality can also mean 
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 ecclesial fragmentation (O’Mahony, 2005); a condition that Christian religious 
leaderships seek to confront by fostering ecumenical dialogue. This is a chal-
lenge for both Christians in the Middle East and to one’s searching for a univo-
cal explanation of their position in daily politics and society. Furthermore, 
Christians in Israeli-Palestinian territories are part of two different political 
fields in conflict. While they are a minority in both contexts, their contextual 
socio-political positions significantly change. Conflict and contextual minority 
conditions increase the complexity of their positioning, presenting consider-
able divergences in their outlooks and orientations. For those living in Israel, 
Christians as well as Muslims are faced with all the challenges of being part of 
the Arab speaking minority in a non-Arab country, especially after the recent 
developments in promoting the Jewish character of Israel, epitomized by the 
removal of Arabic as an official language of the country. This pressure is ampli-
fied by ongoing conflict and the tension between different designations (Arab-
speaking minority, non-Muslim and non-Jewish religious minority) and in 
their relationship with their Palestinian brethren living under the Palestinian 
National Authority. Moreover, their position is challenged by the increasing 
role that religion plays in local politics, which tends to single out Christians as 
irrelevant if not for their international networks, marginalizing or removing 
their presence in a confrontation that predominantly involves Jews and Mus-
lims. Regarding the case of the Palestinian territory, Christians have been di-
rectly part of the Palestinian national movement since the beginning, support-
ing the idea of an independent secular Palestinian State to achieve the status 
of full citizens as Arab and Palestinian. They have both participated in secular 
political platforms and developed new understandings of their presence and 
role as a non-Muslim religious community integrally part of the Palestinian 
nation. At the same time, the growing influence of Hamas and the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad has posed a challenge to such a commitment (Andezian, 2008). 
The Islamization of local politics and of the national resistance keeps on pos-
ing the risk of marginalizing their role, encaging them within the sole dimen-
sion of religious minority.
On the other hand, the case of Iraq offers useful insight to appreciate the 
different outlooks that Christians can promote in a situation of relative con-
centration within a single country. The Christian landscape in Iraq (1% of the 
population) (Johnson, Zurlo, 2015) appears fragmented and multi-vocal as it is 
within the other Middle Eastern countries. Christians are divided between the 
Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholics, Chaldean Catholics, the Church of the East 
(ecclesiastically also known as the Assyrian Church of the East), and finally 
Latin (Roman Catholic) and Reformed communities (O’Mahony, 2004). In this 
framework, Assyrians and Chaldeans differ in their positions towards the idea 
181Christians Navigating through Middle East Turbulences
<UN>
of Iraq and thus in regard to how they conceive of their presence in the country 
(Zubaida, 2002). Their outlooks are deeply grounded in the history of the mod-
ern Middle East since the turn of the 20th century; orientations and positions 
that have been accentuated even more after the 2006 civil war and the emer-
gence of the Islamic State. The Chaldean Church have always been devoted to 
developing Christian minority status as a resource for protecting the commu-
nity and, at the same time, positioning it as an integral part of the wider Iraqi 
social fabric. Accordingly, they concentrate on avoiding that their minority 
status could be turned into political marginalization. On the other hand, the 
Assyrians have always sought to reunite local Christians to demonstrate an 
ethnic-linguistic identity distinct from that of an Arab Iraqi. In this framework, 
the recognition of ethnic-linguistic minority status or achievement of the right 
to autonomy in a localized province within the country was considered neces-
sary to confirm their own political dignity and rights as a distinct nation. Such 
divergences between Chaldeans and Assyrians have thus directly influenced 
their stances towards Baghdad, dividing local Christians between integrational 
and separatist or autonomist orientations (Maggiolini, 2018). In the case of 
the Assyrians, this attitude has come at a tragic cost. Persecution and open 
confrontation by the central authorities have pushed them out of the country, 
consolidating in their diaspora a strong sense of uniqueness.
Finally, similarity in the trajectories of the Assyrians, Maronites and Copts 
offers another two important examples of the complexity of being both Chris-
tians and part of the Middle East. Their concentration in territories that are 
homelands of their community and original seats of their Churches has devel-
oped a solid relationship with these contexts so that they perceive their pres-
ence and existence as the most vivid and authentic expression of the history, 
tradition and thus identity of their countries (McCallum, 2010). In these cases, 
concentration has favored a process of full identification with and projection 
of a specific idea of State and nation, where they consider themselves not only 
a part of the project but also an essential if not core component. It is somehow 
possible to say that in these cases the Church is lived as an institution that was 
already manifesting the existence of a “nation” before the launch of the nation- 
and state-building process at the turn of the 20th century. Focusing on the case 
of the Copts, such a position has constantly developed two different, albeit 
intertwined, dialectic approaches (Mahmood, 2016). One component of the 
community has focused on reconfiguring the distinctive Coptic religious char-
acter into an autonomous ethnic category, as a national minority. On the other 
hand, the vast majority of the community has refused such a discourse, em-
phasizing that the Copts are the original voice of historic Egypt and therefore 
never a minority by definition.
Melcangi and Maggiolini182
<UN>
Nevertheless, Christian multi-vocality also appears through the intertwining 
of socio-economic and geographic conditions. Copts in Egypt show how these 
factors are more determinant in explaining the marginality of a part of the 
community than the mere religious factors. This also explains how Muslims 
and Christians defined a common ground, expressing the same frustration dur-
ing the uprisings. Similarly, Christians’ concentrations in specific towns and 
villages and their predominant presence in professional sectors are important 
for understanding how the community divided between supporters and op-
posers of Al Assad’s regime during the protests in 2011 (Farha, Mousa, 2015; 
 Fahmi, 2018).
To conclude this section, multi-vocality is an intrinsic feature of Christian 
communities in the region and it appears under different configurations cut-
ting across multiple dimensions and discourses. It also represents a challenge 
that Christians have tried to face by both participating in secular platforms and 
by developing new theological and ecclesiastical thinking through ecumenism 
and interfaith dialogues. But multi-vocality is not simply important for under-
standing Christians living within the Middle East – it is also a critical factor to 
be taken into account in exploring the manifold and diverse motivations that 
induce Christians to emigrate or seek refuge abroad.
2 Christians in Middle Eastern Politics
Christians’ multi-vocality is not only the most vivid expression of the rich ec-
clesiastical and theological patrimony of Eastern Christianity and its millen-
nial history, but it is also the product of the different contextual configurations 
that Christians have experienced in the region.
Histories of Christians in the contemporary Middle East traditionally begun 
focusing on the last century of the Ottoman Empire’s rule in the region. Given 
the scope of such a chapter, it is not the case here to explore this period in their 
history in detail. What it is useful to take into consideration is that precisely 
during this century were laid the bases on which later the orientations de-
scribed before developed, first during the Mandate period (from the 1920s to 
the 1940s) and then in the course of the first two decades of the Middle Eastern 
States’ independence (in the 1950s and 1960s). The 19th century is the period of 
the colonial encounter between the West and the East (Makdisi, 2000).
With the image of the colonial encounter can be portrayed the develop-
ment of an intricate relationship of influence, conditioning, cooperation and 
reaction that directly influenced the history of what would become the 
 contemporary Middle East (Mitri, 2012). It was exactly from this period that 
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Christian multi-vocality began to acquire a political scope. Religious spheres 
arose as one of the first fields through which to participate in the life of the 
Empire or challenge Ottoman authority (Makdisi, 2000). Christians in the Em-
pire began to be described in the West as a fragile minority doomed to be per-
secuted by an intolerant Islam. At the same time, local Christian communities 
began to distinguish between different orientations, namely the “Arab” and 
“Eastern”. One component became the vanguard of Arabism, with the aim of 
promoting a secularist interpretation of the concept of the Arab “nation”, 
stressing the need for Muslims and Christians to reunite in a single nation be-
cause they shared a common language and culture (Cragg, 1991). In this frame-
work, the triumph of Arabism would make it possible to overcome religious 
divides and politicization, emancipating from Ottoman rule and resisting Eu-
ropean interference. Other communities started to claim their right to live ac-
cording to their cultural and religious heritage in a homogeneous autonomous 
space. Therefore, in the course of the 19th century Christians emerged as dy-
namic actors in the life of the Empire, contributing to the reinvention of the 
political significance of the different regional localities belonging to the Otto-
man State, as citizens of Istanbul’s polity, supporters of Arabism or distinct 
ethno-linguistic communities searching for their full recognition (Roussos, 
2014).
With these premises, the period between the two World Wars was a phase 
both of disillusion and hope. Christians dedicated themselves to pursuing dif-
ferent political programs aimed at fulfilling the promises of independence and 
emancipation previously elaborated. The establishment of modern Middle 
Eastern States under the Mandates projected the Christians presence towards 
three different, albeit frequently intertwined, political paths. First, the Man-
date powers kept on with their strategies of cultivating relationships with mi-
nority communities. Depending on the specific socio-political balances of each 
territory and the different French and British colonial strategies, Christians in 
the post-Ottoman Middle East were integrated into the new States under the 
double guise of citizens and protected minority. The protection of minori-
ties became one of the facets of the colonial strategy of divide and rule and a 
source of legitimization for the Mandate system (White, 2007). Christians were 
invited to develop their community institutions as distinctive social units on 
the basis of their minority status. On the one hand, such an accommodation 
of Middle Eastern non-Muslim diversity consolidated a specific, homogeneous 
image of “Christians in the Middle East”, overlooking their contextual ethnic 
and denominational differences as well as their political aspirations. On the 
other, Christian constituencies fragmented. Christians either concentrated on 
consolidating their community borders and spheres, as a religious minority, or 
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on overcoming the post-Ottoman configurations promoted by Paris and Lon-
don. It was exactly in this framework that the Assyrians focused their efforts 
in the struggle to be recognized as an autonomous nation, ethnically and reli-
giously distinct. However, their project dramatically failed. Left alone by Lon-
don, the Iraqi State showed no tolerance for what was perceived as a threat to 
the ideal of the Arab nation (Zubaida, 2002). The Assyrians were first repressed 
and then forced to accept their minority status as a part of the non-Muslim 
minorities living in the country, with no recognition of their ethnic-linguistic 
demands. Similarly, in Egypt the Copts refused minority discourses and the 
quota system proposed by London in the early 1920s. Their specific religious 
affiliation was considered the most authentic proof of their belonging to the 
Egyptian nation (Mahmood, 2016). In essence, during these decades the pro-
cess of diversification of Christians’ orientations developed, along with that 
of their Muslim brethren, dividing between different notions of the scope and 
role of community, nation and State. While Christians generally promoted the 
ideal of a secular State and nation on the bases of a shared language, history 
and culture, these positions oscillated between pan-nationalist movements 
(e.g. the 1932 Syrian Social Nationalist Party of the Greek-Orthodox Antoun 
Saadeh and the 1947 Baʿath Party of Michel Aflaq) and nationalist ideals (e.g. 
the Lebanese nationalist movement inspired by the Maronite intellectuals of 
the Revue Phénicienne; the Egyptian Wafd party with Wassef Boutros Ghali) 
(Robson, 2011).
With the end of the Second World War and the independence of the Middle 
Eastern States, Arabism and pan-Arabism increased their momentum, becom-
ing the leading ideologies for developing nation- and state-building processes 
in the region. Ideals and aspirations theorized during the inter-war period be-
came thus not only viable, but imposed as the core ideologies for achieving full 
independence from the past colonial influence. In reality, most of the Mandate 
systematization of majority-minority relationships and the condition of Chris-
tians in politics remained almost untouched. Arabism and pan-Arabism did 
not take the form of liberal regimes, but of muscular political projects authori-
tarian in their stance. Nonetheless, Christians fully participated in these proj-
ects, because essentially secular.
However, the ideal of a national unity to be defended against any kind of 
divisive pressure, both external and internal, imposed a precise code of con-
duct on Christians. By embracing such orientations, Christians and their reli-
gious institutions were granted the right to access public space. But they were 
also “invited” to privatize their identities as Christians for the sake of nations 
and states designed in the spirit of Muslim majorities (Mahmood, 2016). In 
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 essence, assimilation was the most practiced strategy for managing diversity in 
the region.
The pan-Arabist movement lasted for almost two decades, progressively en-
countering crises after the Six-Day War and the defeat of the Arab front by Is-
rael in 1967 and again in 1973. In this framework, the 1970s represented a disori-
enting awakening, setting the condition of a new systematization of regional 
politics that today, after the 2011 uprisings, is still looking for new positive di-
rections. The liturgies and rhetoric of the previous decades were somehow 
kept alive by almost all regimes in the region, but the Arab States entered into 
what afterwards became a prolonged period of internal crises only partially 
allayed by the temporary rise in oil prices between the mid-1970s and early 
1980s. In essence, while nationalist programs were being progressively dis-
missed, their place was taken by strong regimes imposed on their societies. In 
particular, an event and a dynamic proved that previous Christians’ orienta-
tions were going to be confined to the margins of regional politics.
First, the Lebanon civil war (1975–1990) led to a drastic discontinuity in the 
traditional balances of power of this country, the sole non-authoritarian re-
gime with a political system dominated by non-Muslims in the region (Mac-
Callum, 2010). The civil war diminished and fragmented Christian leverage, in 
particular that of the Maronites. It dissolved their primacy within the new 
power-sharing system and polarized Maronite political elites between the Sun-
ni and Shiite fronts. At the same time, while Maronite nationalists were en-
countering a severe defeat on the ground, Church religious leaders, and espe-
cially the Maronite Patriarch, re-emerged as leading authorities for the local 
community. The Maronite Patriarch increased his political role by devoting 
himself to the mission of representing the interests of the entire Christian 
community within the framework of multi-faith Lebanon.
Secondly, while the Lebanese civil war was breaking out, Islam’s institution-
al and political appeal began to rise in the region, pushing Christian communi-
ties to reconfigure their role and presence. The progressive Islamization of 
Middle Eastern politics, well epitomized by the course of the revolution in Iran 
(1979), represented a real turning point. It came about through growing Is-
lamist activism in political and radical militant groups. At the same time, it 
occurred through the development of “formal” or “institutionalized” Islam, 
even in countries such as Egypt or Syria that until then had defined their re-
gimes and political systems as essentially secular. As the chapter will point out, 
this development worsened the conditions of Christians in Egypt between the 
1970s and early1980s. It also formed the basis for reconfiguring the political bal-
ances of power in what would become the Syria of Hafiz al-Assad and his son 
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Bashar, again making religious and ethnic discourses instrumental to legiti-
mizing rulers or contesting the regime in power (Rabo, 2012).
In essence, from the late 1970s and increasingly during the 1980s Christians 
experienced a double dynamic, only apparently contradictory. On the one 
hand, they witnessed a lessening of their manoeuvre room in regional and na-
tional politics, in some circles fostering adoption of an introverted attitude and 
a clustering around Church institutions and leaderships (Roussos, 2014). Such 
a stance developed further at the end of the 1980s while Arab States entered 
into what would become a prolonged period of economic difficulty and legiti-
macy crisis, concealed only by the presence of strong regimes in most of the 
countries of the region. It is not surprising that an increasing number of Chris-
tians begun to emigrate, seeking career opportunities abroad. On the other, 
such a conditioned retreat pushed them to reconnect with their religious di-
mension, fostering a new exploration of the significance of being Christian in 
the Middle Eastern institutional, political, social and national dimensions. The 
Islamization of regional politics led Christian Churches to revive and re-launch 
their activities for the sake of a new, active and creative role in the region (Mc-
Callum, 2010). While the idea of their inevitable decline in an increasingly Is-
lamized Middle East was developing at the international level, Christian eccle-
siastical institutions dedicated themselves to internal reforms with the aim of 
rejecting such a predicament (Robson, 2011). By the mid-1980s, Christians thus 
focused on elaborating new theological thinking and understanding about 
their minority condition, and conflict and crisis in the region, describing such 
challenges as essentially fostered by a lack of social justice and an ongoing 
political struggle. In essence, they refused the religious hypothesis as the main 
driver of Middle Eastern instability.
The intertwining between this double dynamic found the most vivid repre-
sentation in what has been called the “authoritarian dilemma”. This dilemma 
has compressed the Christian presence between two extremes: appealing to 
the strong or fierce regime in power for the sake of defending their community, 
prioritizing stability and security, or mobilizing for change and reform of both 
political systems and regimes, accepting the risk of being involved in a difficult 
transition with no guarantees of improvements for Christian conditions (Mc-
Callum, 2012).
This dilemma describes the complex continuum within which Christians 
continuously oscillated until and during the Arab uprisings in 2011. It should be 
recognized that security was more frequently prioritized by Church and com-
munity leaderships. Accommodating the regimes in power gave Christian es-
tablishments the benefit of the support of state administration, acting as rep-
resentatives for their communities and minimizing the impact of sectarian 
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tensions within their own countries (Rowe, 2014). This modus vivendi was the 
case with Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Mubarak in Egypt, as the chapter will show, 
and Hafez and Bashar al-Assad in Syria. With the case of Syria, this configura-
tion has taken a very controversial outlook that the ongoing civil war is con-
tributing to reinforce. In a country where ethnic and linguistic features can 
transcend and cut across absolute religious classifications (see Chapter 5), sec-
tarian politics has been always a resource in the hands of the regimes in power. 
With Hafez and Bashar al-Assad, the idea of a Syrian “safe haven” for all minori-
ties in the country, and especially for Christians, has been systematically culti-
vated, imposing a tacit agreement based on an exchange between accepting 
constraints on political liberties and undoubted loyalty to the regime in power, 
with the right to practice one’s own religion and defend professional interests 
in the economy (Farha, Mousa, 2015).
Nevertheless, the propensity to prioritize security should not be overstated 
or considered the sole dimension describing all Christian forms of participa-
tion. Christians have also concentrated on their renewal and social activism, 
advocating for their rights as full citizens of their countries and for those of 
their Muslim brethren. In this framework, the Christian diaspora has increas-
ingly played an important role in echoing and internationalizing what was and 
is going on in their country of origins (Longva, Roald, 2012).
The 2011 uprisings, the so-called Arab Spring, drastically denounced the lim-
its of such political pacts on which most regimes have based their legitimacy 
and power in the region. The protests openly called for the ousting of authori-
tarian rulers and the development of inclusive and pluralist systems at the po-
litical, social and economic levels. Christians looked at protests and demon-
strations with a great degree of trepidation. While some Christian leaders 
initially hesitated to support the demonstrations, most of their faithful actively 
participated in what seemed to be the winning battle for pluralism (Muasher, 
2014). However, it soon became clear that the end of traditional regimes was 
also producing the severe destabilization of entire state systems. Herein lies 
the “awakening” paradox. While successful in dismantling old regimes, until 
today protests have failed to develop new concepts of State and civic relations. 
At the same time, the instability has politically reactivated primordial ties such 
as ethnicity, tribalism and religious factionalism. Against this background, reli-
gious affiliations proved to be useful mechanisms at the service of internation-
al, regional and local elites’ interests in pursuing different political agendas. In 
this regard, the case of Syria is emblematic. In this country, protests soon trans-
formed into a civil war, also becoming the final hotbed, along with Iraq, of the 
Islamic State. The successful popular revolts calling for pluralism and inclusion 
quickly gave way to the present regional geopolitical struggle for power and the 
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“global minority crisis in the Arab World or in the Muslim World” (Picard, 2012) 
produced by growing sectarian rivalries. This situation has fragmented Chris-
tian communities in these countries, dividing Church leaders, the local clergy 
and laity between different positions towards the regime (Fahmi, 2018).
Today, Christians find themselves again confronted with all traditional di-
lemmas of the past. While it is undeniable that the uprisings seem to have de-
finitively deprived Christians of political influence, marginalizing their posi-
tion and making them even more subjected to the authoritarian paradox, 
conflicts have again pushed them to prove their resilience, increasing their 
activism. Today’s Middle Eastern Christians are thus committed to remaining 
a factor and a voice in the region, resisting the general conviction that they can 
be solely the victims of Middle Eastern politics, doomed to seek refuge abroad 
or to accept marginalization and protection from the “new” political regimes. 
Accordingly, the analysis of the Copts’ strategy and position during those 
events will be illustrative.
3 Sectarianism, Religious Strife and the “Unbreakable Marriage” 
between the State and the Church under Mubarak (1981–2011)
When Mubarak resigned from president of Egypt, after thirty years of continu-
ous power and as a consequence of the famous “Tahrir’s days of wrath”, the 
Copts finally believed, with their Muslim counterpart, that most of the past 
discrimination would have ceased. This represented part of the hopes that the 
Egyptian revolt of 2011 tried to make possible, only to see them wane in the 
post-revolutionary stage.
For the Copts, the following transition phase and the current presidency of 
Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi represent the replay of the same dynamics: nowadays as 
in the past, the Egyptian Orthodox Christian community, the biggest Christian 
community of Middle East, remains the target of violence and discrimination 
that neither the revolt nor the establishment of a new post-revolutionary gov-
ernment were able to stop. As in the past, religious freedom and equality, de-
pending on state institutions that can guarantee all citizens’ constitutional 
rights, are far from putting down roots.
After the collaboration established between Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasser and the 
Patriarch Kirollos vi during the Sixties, the regime-Coptic community rela-
tions deteriorated in the 1970s under President Anwar al-Sadat, who embraced 
Islam and Islamists as a tool to carry out the so called “corrective revolution”: 
the aim was to change the ideological and economic theories which supported 
the Nasserian regime, the secularism and the Egyptian socialism over all, that 
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had failed under the blows of the 1967 defeat. A consequence of this “correc-
tion” was the return of Islam in the political sphere and the following conclu-
sion of the golden age for interfaith relations in Egypt which put again the 
Copts under siege, as a separated and discriminated community. But while at-
tacks by Muslims on Copts have a sectarian element, confessional differences 
are not the primary source of tension. Egypt’s outdated laws and authoritarian 
institutions have made Copts a target of social conflict.
Every analysis and research on the Coptic community in Egypt needs to de-
vote a part to analyze which is its real numerical size. From an historical per-
spective, this represents a complex dispute: it is difficult to obtain reliable data 
from government statistics and from those of the community. The govern-
ment’s will to reduce the relevance of the Coptic community and the fear of 
the Christians to declare their faith in public has made the official census 
inaccurate.
The Egyptian census, conducted in 1976 during the presidency of Anwar al-
Sadat, reported a total of 2.3 million Copts, or 6.7% of the total population of 
almost 39 million (McDermott, 1988; Chitham, 1986). This figure met the incre-
dulity of the Copts who threatened to launch their door to door count. This 
impracticable method was not put into practice and the Copts continue to 
speak of a much higher figure: Coptic groups in the US talk of 8 million, a fig-
ure which has gained wide currency outside Egypt (Pennington, 1982).
The Egyptian official statistics available pointed out that in 1996 the number 
of Christians reached 3.5 million, 5.7% of the population of 63 million (Cour-
bage, Fargues, 1998; Denis, 2000; Bayoumi, Moriconi-Ebrard, 2005). According 
to the 2006 census figures, released by the official statistical agency of Egypt, 
the Central Agency for Mobilization and Statistics, the population, including 
those living abroad, is estimated to have reached 76.5 million.
A study published in 2011 by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion 
and Public Life states that the Christian population represents the 5.3 % of the 
Egyptian’s one (Pew Research Center, 2011), as opposed to the widely used me-
dia figure of 10%. Researchers arrived at the number from Egypt’s 2006 census 
data underlining that “for decades the Christian population in Egypt has been 
less than 10% of the population”. Though there may be some converts in Egypt 
from Islam to Christianity, “it’s unlikely that that number is very large” (Har-
rington, 2011). According to this research “the highest share reported in the past 
century was in 1927, when the census found that 8.3% of Egyptians were Chris-
tian; in each of the eight subsequent censuses, the Christian share of the popu-
lation gradually shrank” (Harrington, 2011). In spite of these new data, some 
others estimate that the number of Copts oscillates between 5 and 6 million, or 
8% to 9% of the entire population. The number of Christians in Egypt remains 
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a hotly-debated issue in the country but, looking at the recent figures, the 
Copts continue to represent by far the largest Christian community in the Mid-
dle East.
Intercommunal conflict during Sadat’s presidency prefigured the problems 
Copts would face under Mubarak (1981–2011), the scaf (Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces, which took power upon Mubarak’s ouster in 2011), and the 
presidency of the Muslim Brother Muhammad Morsi (2012–2013). Since reli-
gion has replaced nationalism, matters that should have been governed by the 
law became to be managed as identity politics.
Religious strife emerged during all of the Mubarak regime, although partic-
ularly it started to increase from the end of the 1980s. The “Autumn of fury” that 
overwhelmed Sadat and his presidency, culminated with the assassination of 
Sadat the 6th October 1981 by an Islamist militant and the house arrested of the 
Patriarch Shenuda, after a dramatic period marked by social violence between 
the Muslims and Christians (Farah, 1986; Murphy, 2002).
One of the first goals carried out by Mubarak after he took power was to 
fight against the radical Islamic movement in order to isolate and crush the 
violent extremists: Mubarak’s regime remained under severe Islamist pressure 
for all the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. During the 1990s, Mubarak’s 
intelligence and police forces fought an internal war against al-jamaʿa al- 
islamiyya which become very powerful and had stepped up its violent activi-
ties: they started to target regime officials, foreign tourists and Copts.
Radical Islamists were more widespread through the rural immigrants of 
Saʿid although the Cairo suburbs of Ayn Shams and Imbaba also witnessed 
outbreaks of violent clashes from 1990–1992, typically instigated by routine dis-
putes between Muslim and Christian neighbors that escalated into large-scale 
riots with numerous injuries and casualties on both sides. The wave of radical 
Islamist terrorist attacks targeting tourists and foreign businesses beginning in 
mid-1992 was also a threat to Coptic security. In 1992 alone, thirty-seven anti-
Coptic attacks were reported, although national attention was more focused 
on the threat that Islamist radicals posed to state security rather than address-
ing the Coptic issue in particular (Ayalon, 1999).
This specific type of answer to the religious issue in Egypt, and the problems 
linked with it, are rooted in the tarnish nature of the Egyptian authoritarian 
regime and in the sectarianism concept. Since the beginning of the Republic, 
Egyptian leaders have defended a rigid hierarchy instead of instituting politi-
cal equality and the country’s military rulers governed granted rights and op-
portunities as a concession to the population. Under such an authoritarian 
system, religious identity mattered less than wealth and personal connections 
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to the army and religion has served to fragment a society that is already sharply 
split between rulers and ruled (Melcangi, 2018).
The capacity and will of the Egyptian authoritarian political system to man-
age sectarianism as a tool for maintaining their power and for exploiting the 
religious or communal identity in order to enable the political organization, 
the gaining of political legitimacy, and the promotion of political change was 
fundamental (Aras, Bardakcı, 2014). The ideal of dividi et impera with a top-
down sectarianism strategy was finalized to keep consensus and maintain sup-
port for the regime. Although sectarianism was denied and repudiated, infor-
mally the Egyptian regimes engaged in a systematic attempt to politicize 
differences as tools for controlling masses and maintaining power (Ryan, 2001).
As always, the government position moved toward two main paths: denial 
and repression. The denial, expressed in an insensitive way, became rejection 
of the existence of tensions. The president tried to cement the President’s im-
age as a protector of Muslims and Christians with the “national unity” cam-
paign of the early 1990s, but the claims of the Christians went unheeded.
A perpetual guarantee remained in the form of a shared Egyptian identity 
and the social intermingling of Copts and Muslims in a single social context, a 
“unique Egyptian fabric… whether in the cities or in the country” (al-Gawhary, 
1996: 21). The use of terms like “national dialogue” and “national unity”, trying 
apparently to break down barriers, did not consider the differences and the 
real problems of the Christian group. This claim to national unity was for ex-
ample used by Nasser and Kyrollos vi during all the Nasserian period. National 
unity is not a new concept, but it started to have an increased political signifi-
cance: at that time it was used in order to consolidate the government rhetoric 
and bring together the different groups in support of the regime which depict 
itself as the only defender of the national unity (Fawzi, 2010; Elsässer, 2014).
This is especially true in particular conditions depending on economic, so-
cial and political changes: in the late 1980s, Egypt’s economy suffered markedly 
from falling oil prices and was further weakened by a drop in the number of 
remittances from its three million workers abroad. In spite of a rising debt bur-
den, the government continued to rely heavily on foreign economic aid, lead-
ing to growing interference by the International Monetary Fund (imf) in 
Egypt’s economic policies; in 1991 the Egyptian government signed the Eco-
nomic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program with the imf and the World 
Bank. The country’s currency, the Egyptian pound, had to be devalued several 
times, interest rates were raised, and subsidies were lowered on food and fuel 
(Roccu, 2013). These policies especially harmed the poorest Egyptians, who of-
ten looked to Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood for assistance. 
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On the other side, the Islamic Group, continued to resort to terrorism against 
political leaders, secularist writers, Copts, and even foreign tourists, the last-
named being a major source of Egypt’s foreign exchange. So, as for the previous 
presidents, the official rhetoric and the use of the call to national unity became 
a mechanism for avoiding a discussion of the challenges inherent to the social, 
political and economic dramatic situation.
In fact, although the government of Mubarak issued several laws in favor of 
the Copts such as the “relative” flexibility in the legal procedure for building 
churches, the establishment of Christmas as an official state holiday, the lead-
ership’s intervention to sponsor the development and revival of study centers 
and of cultural artefacts, especially on the occasion of millennium celebra-
tions, the community emphasized that the government’s attempts to fight the 
fundamentalist current led to its side-lining of Coptic issues and concerns 
(Melcangi, 2015). When attacks against Copts intensified, Mubarak exploited 
Coptic insecurity to his own political benefit and the government remained 
passive and refrained from intervention or action. For decades he and his cote-
rie propagated the narrative that without Mubarak’s protection the Copts 
would fall into the shadow of a zealously Islamist and anti-Christian regime 
(Ibrahim, 2000).
During the last three decades, polarization between Muslims and Christians 
has grown. Both groups have become religiously more conservative. Mubarak 
allowed interreligious tensions to escalate; by the year 2000, random acts of 
violence against the Copts had become normative. Many state officials, secu-
rity officers and legislators denied the existence of sectarian violence in Egypt 
or minimized the extent of the problem. The most dangerous way to deal with 
the problem of interreligious clashes was based on the conviction that it was a 
security problem that required the application of the ongoing state of emer-
gency (Mubarak conducted his entire presidency under “emergency law” No. 
162 of 1958) which legitimized all types of intervention of the State (Egyptian 
Initiative for Personal Rights, 2010). Of course, the worsening of the economy, 
infrastructure and security climate of Egypt dragged Copts down along with all 
other Egyptians who suffered for a civil society which was marked by perma-
nent government interference and repression (Brownlee, 2013). “This inconsis-
tency has led people to lose faith in the law and to take the law into their own 
hands, which has caused horrendous crimes” (Al-Aswani, 2011: 131). Under Sa-
dat and his successor, State security agents have been active participants in the 
violence rather than inept bystanders, a practice that with difficulty has 
changed during the decades, as the facts of Kosheh1 in 2000 confirmed. It was 
1 The al-Kosheh incidents refer to a series of intercommunal riots and strife in an Upper Egyp-
tian small village arising from a murder investigation in the autumn of 1998 in which Copts 
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clear that the State neglected to protect them, as in the bombing of the Alexan-
dria Church in 2011.
4 Reformation and Resilience: Strategies of the Church vis-à-vis 
Mubarak’s Regime
The only way to survive for Church was to reshape the self-image in which it 
took an important lead, resulting in continuing the reformation of the com-
munal identity towards a religious identity and in the social restructuring of a 
traditional community. In doing so, the Church, stifling the divergent opinions 
inside the community, imposed itself as the only voice which had the right to 
define what it means to be Coptic, underlining the differences and the same-
ness compared with the other community and defining their way to be Egyp-
tian. Having overcome the polarization born inside the community during the 
exile of the Patriarch Shenuda, the Church was able again to re-establish its 
strength enlarging consensus around the notion of Coptic identity and the 
foundation of philanthropic societies and a reinvigorated patriarchate.
The Patriarchate expanded its services compared with the past three de-
cades through a centralization of church administration and a revival of Cop-
tic culture. In doing so the Church saved Copticness blending it with the Egyp-
tianness by working at the level of religious traditions and everyday activities. 
The common national sense of belonging was strictly connected with a spe-
cific symbolism: e.g. the continuous reference to the Nile river as the common 
cradle of both Muslims and Christians considered as naturally Egyptians. “In-
scribing the Nile in the Christian mythology of sanctity consequently consti-
tutes an effective claim of belonging to the national entity” (Galal, 2012: 51). 
This reference created a connection to the time when Egypt was Christian, 
Egyptians were Copts and the Egyptian territory was consequently genuinely 
Christian. “The pilgrimage to the sites where, according to tradition, the Holy 
Family lived during its stay in Egypt, can trace an ideal direct line between the 
nation and the Copts’ authentic sense of belonging and the coherence be-
tween being Christian and being Egyptian” (Melcangi, 2018: 135). At the same 
time, Coptic sacred sites where saints and martyrs lived, together with the sto-
ries and traditions about their martyrdom, became a fundamental point of ref-
erence for Copts in order to show their way of being Egyptian through Christi-
anity. They were used not only to build Christian identity but also to negotiate 




the minority status. Obviously, the stories about the saints and martyrs showed 
the importance of the asceticism and the sacrifice. Suffering became an aspect 
of the life of Egyptian Copts, the only possible destiny which relegate the 
Christian to this marginal and passive minority status.
Regarding the ecclesiastic structure, Shenuda tried to enforce parity and 
uniformity on the dioceses replacing the local privileges and clan loyalties with 
the loyalty to his person, by placing people close to him in the key positions in 
the administration throughout the country (Hasan, 2003). The aim was not 
only to introduce a new morality into the Church, but, more importantly, to 
control the economic and cultural development of the community. Moreover, 
a new spread of the Patriarch’s monographs regarding all sorts of topics from 
Christian life was implemented: the Church’s newsletter and the illustrated 
news magazine al-Kiraza were published regularly by the office of the patri-
archate and projected the image of an active Church and a tool for responding 
to social concerns and criticisms of the Church leadership (Rowe, 2009). On 
the other side, we can see how the spread of publications among the Christian 
group, critical editorials of the community newspaper Watani, and Christian 
television programs contributed in the same way to consolidating the 
 community support for the Church policy. Part of this flowed into the wider 
project of creating a network of supporting foreign Christian organizations 
with the final aim of promoting the “internationalization” of the Coptic ques-
tion. In spite of his advanced age, the Pope continued to visit the Coptic com-
munity abroad in order to demonstrate his global leadership at home as it was 
reported in the patriarchal publications, with the consequent effect of provok-
ing a division inside the community between who consider this as an external 
interference.
An evident “vibrant and resilient civil society apparatus” (Rowe, 2009: 124) 
emerged during the last ten years of the Mubarak regime which was boosted 
by the neo-millet forms of Coptic engagement. As Paul Rowe States, “Chris-
tians are unlikely even to pose a security threat to the regime and instead form 
a convenient pet concern that justifies a strong security State” (Rowe, 2009: 
124). This form of social participation which is based on civil society activity 
strictly connected with the Church became the expression of a “high-impact 
political participation” which denied electoral challenge and at the same time 
the absence of participation of the Copts in the political arena, highlighting a 
change in the way it was expressed. Or, as Samer Soliman states, it cannot be 
explained just as a reaction to the Islamization of the State and the public 
space, but as a product of modernity itself (Soliman, 2006) or, as Dina al-Kha-
waga underlines “elle est une action de moralisation religieuse de la vie pub-
lique dépourvue de valeurs et corrompues, (…) la réponse à une crise de valeur 
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et le moyen direct de défendre une minorité dans une société qui  perdrait ses 
références communes et qui tendrait à exclure les coptes de ses repères cul-
turels” (Al-Khawaga, 1992: 347).
“As a result, there are effectively no challenges to the authority of the Church 
in the spiritual realm” (Rowe 2005: 90) which directly led it to play a more ac-
tive and defensive role but, above all, to exercise a high power such a mission 
to minister to all Egyptian Christians, inside and outside the community. And 
this role had to be played with the support of the President, according the tra-
dition personal collaboration established between Nasser and the patriarch 
Kyrollos vi, elected in 1959. From the years of Nasser and Kyrollos, these char-
acteristics of the relationship between the Copts and the Egyptian government 
have remained until today.
In fact, regime-Church relations benefited from a fresh start when Shenuda 
was released from house arrest in 1985: the Patriarch supported Mubarak po-
litically while the president privileged the Coptic Orthodox Church as the 
principal channel for handling Copts’ concerns. This arrangement, a kind of 
religious corporatism or a “tactical agreement”, amplified Shenuda’s authority 
and let Mubarak address millions of Egyptian Christians through a single proxy 
(Asher-Schapiro, 2012).
The former started to adopt a low profile, to cooperate with the regime, to 
avoid confrontation and embrace the rhetoric of national unity publicly sup-
porting Mubarak and consolidate his power within the Church. The President 
needed the support of the Copts more than ever in order to base its antiterror-
ism policy and create a magnificent image of interreligious harmony, allowing 
Coptic independence in community affairs and recognizing Shenuda as the 
voice of the Church in political matters. This entente fostered the kind of mi-
noritarian discourse. It was in the Church’s interest to limit the expression of 
Copts as individuals.
“The regime was good at window dressing, and public meetings with the 
Coptic Patriarch Shenuda iii cemented the president’s image as protector of 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Although it remained difficult for Copts to 
obtain permits to build or repair churches, he (the president Mubarak) allowed 
several grand projects, and declared January 7th, Coptic Christmas, a national 
holiday” (Van Doorn-Harder, 2011). So, the national public sphere started to be 
based on the relationship between Patriarch Shenuda iii and president 
Mubarak, like what Rowe called a “millet partnership”: the historic pattern of 
the late Ottoman period, known as the millet system, thus gave way to a neo-
millet system in which the Church operated as the main filter and representa-




As Fahmi states, “the regime also protected the Church’s financial indepen-
dence, and permitted the Church to ignore court rulings concerning Copts’ 
personal affairs that were not supported by the Church leadership” (Fahmi, 
2014). In the wake of this new phase cooperation, the Pope supported Mubarak’s 
policies, discouraging Coptic activists from putting pressure on the regime.
Shenuda and the bishops alone were allowed to petition the regime on a 
whole range of sensitive issues including sectarian violence, church construc-
tion and family disputes. He was also consulted in appointing Coptic govern-
ment officials and bureaucrats (Asher-Schapiro, 2012). The only chance for av-
erage Copts to improve their lives would have been to take a high-profile 
position in the government-backed National Democratic Party of Mubarak, 
not only because religious political parties are not legal, so that even the Mus-
lim Brotherhood have had to stand as independents, but also because “it was in 
the Church’s interest to limit the expression of Copts as individuals rejecting 
the idea of founding a Coptic political party” (Melcangi 2013: 236). The presi-
dential and parliamentary elections have highlighted how the government 
tries to exploit the Coptic votes by making all kinds of promises to the Church 
and the people, but not offering anything in return after victory. Moreover, the 
government, supported by the Pope, manipulated the community as a sectar-
ian bloc, instead of participating in the political process as individuals: “Indi-
vidual political stances based on democratic convictions are the only way to 
solve ongoing political problems. That is certainly more preferable than de-
claring loyalty, en masse, to the ruling party only to be met with unfulfilled 
promises. (…) Maintaining this position Coptic votes have remained a bargain-
ing chip between the ndp and political authorities on the one hand, and the 
Church on the other” (Kamal, 2010).
This provoked the severe reaction of the Coptic elite and young Copts who 
had repeatedly asked the Patriarch to operate according to his role, accusing 
him of penalizing the culture and practice of full Egyptian citizenship (Niko-
lov, 2008). It was in the Church’s intention to make the Copts – once again – 
into a millet, a sectarian community that is largely autonomous, while at the 
same time, the Church itself was pressing the State to implement the rights of 
modern citizenship.
By recognizing the Patriarch as the official representative and voice of the 
Coptic community, the State endorsed this emerging ethno-religious identity, 
by which Copts are characterized by religion rather than by citizenship. More 
broadly, the result of the partnership between Patriarch and President is that 
there exists no secular leadership of the Coptic community untainted by com-
plicity with the government – no independent voice willing and able to voice 
Copts’ grievances. Finally, the Mubarak-Shenuda pact hid rather than solved 
the institutional disadvantages suffered by Coptic communities.
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The political, social and economic condition of Christians in Egypt, in fact, 
remained one of the main reasons for concerns. Whatever their percentages 
and the State statements according to which the Copts enjoy the same rights 
of citizenship as the Muslims, the practices governing their public life have 
not always been equitable. They are politically underrepresented and Coptic 
political participation remained limited to a number of appointed members 
of the Parliament and ministers with second-rate portfolios. In the election 
of 2005, Copts were disappointed when the ndp, despite its pretensions to 
being the party of national unity, announced that only few Copts would be 
on its list of candidates (Melcangi, 2013) explaining that Coptic candidates 
were “less electable” and an obstacle for the aims of the party. Moreover, in 
2007, the regime broke a promise reportedly made to the Church that it 
would allocate a specific number of seats to Copts in the Shura Council 
elections.
Coptic representation in the last cabinet before the recent Egyptian Revolu-
tion consisted of two ministers, Youssef Boutros Ghali in the Ministry of Fi-
nance and Maged George in the Ministry of the Environment; in the Shafiq 
interim cabinet (January 2011) only the Minister of Environment kept his post 
(Chaillot, 2011). The official regime limits Coptic citizens to a symbolic partici-
pation in the political system, which is made most evident by the President’s 
appointment of Coptic representatives in the People’s Assembly. In the 2010 
elections, prior to the Alexandria Church bombing, former President Mubarak 
chose to appoint only seven Coptic members of Parliament out of ten that he 
is constitutionally allowed to select (Ibrahim, 2008).
If we look at the social context, they are drastically underrepresented in a 
number of fields. There are hardly any high-ranking Copts in the military, po-
lice force, judiciary or diplomatic corps. Copts are also marginalized in univer-
sity presidencies and governorships as well as positions deemed sensitive to 
national security, from the upper echelons of the security apparatus to the 
pedagogical front lines where Copts are prevented from teaching Arabic. And 
furthermore, the issue of the renovation or construction of new churches re-
mained a reason of concern for Copts that the Egyptian governments have 
failed to address. Copts seeking to build or renovate churches still had to work 
through a bureaucratic and political morass to obtain permits.
Important state offices are still closed to Egyptian citizens with a Coptic 
background, and their representation in the judiciary, the official media, diplo-
matic missions, the army and the police does not exceed 2% of the total. For 
instance, there are 17 public universities in Egypt, each having one director and 
three or four deputy directors with a total of 71 positions; not a single Copt oc-
cupies one of these seats. In addition, there are 274 deans in Egyptian faculties, 
none of which includes a single Copt (Guindy, 2010).
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However, Copts do obtain leading posts in Egyptian society and have a large 
presence in civil society associations. The presence of Egyptian Copts is not 
limited to a specific profession or a cluster of professions; they practice all pro-
fessions and are active in all economic fields like their Muslim counterparts. 
Just like Muslims, Copts are represented in all social strata.
A significant number of Copts are concentrated in private and skilled pro-
fessions; even so a large gap exists between the economic dynamism of Egyp-
tian Christians and their political and legal stature. Such a fact tends not to 
console the productive and economically successful Coptic man, but increases 
his frustration instead, for he would expect –with additional vigor– a legal and 
political treatment that makes him equal to other citizens.
Only at the end of the 2000s, some Coptic youth, believing that the Mubarak 
regime was the cause of their problems, started to participate to new political 
movements which called for workers’ rights, full judicial independence, and 
political reform (the April 6 Youth Movement, youth for Justice and Freedom). 
One of them was the Egyptian Movement for Change, and also known by its 
slogan Kifaya (Enough). This group, born in 2004, led some Copts who opposed 
Mubarak’s policies to act politically and challenge the President’s partnership 
with Shenuda. It was the rising of a new activism among the youth within the 
community: this group put a distance between themselves and the Church’s 
support for the regime and started to get involved in politics on their own. 
“Some young Copts, rather than appealing to the respect of human rights, con-
cluded that Christians would only get equal rights within a democratic regime 
based on the principle of citizenship for all Egyptians” (Fahmi, 2014). These 
movements from below represented the beginning of a protest march which 
was able to break the chains of the national ideal, now too narrow and unbear-
able, questioning the power of Mubarak, his solid alliance with the Church and 
bringing out all the contradictions of the Egyptian system that would lead to 
the revolt of 25th January, 2011.
5 Revolution and Beyond: the Long Road for Coptic Rights’ 
Recognition in the Post 2011 Egypt
The revolution of 2011 put a strain on the political role played by the Patriarch 
within the Coptic community: some tragical attacks on Christians in 2010 led a 
younger cohort of Copts to distance themselves from the Church’s support for 
the regime. The decisive event happened in 2011, when a massive explosion 
tore through the midnight mass at the Coptic Church of Saint Mark and Pope 
Peter (also known as the Church of the Two Saints) in Alexandria. The car 
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bomb killed 23 parishioners, injured dozens, and shattered the regime’s pre-
tense of keeping Christians safe. The New Year’s attack exposed Copts’ con-
tinuing vulnerability, despite living in a security State with a powerful chief 
executive. Egyptians were horrified and outraged while during the investiga-
tion some Coptic lawyer accused the Minister of Interior orchestrated the 
bombing to scare Copts into backing Mubarak out of fear of further sectarian 
strife (Fadl, 2011; Tadros, 2013).
As a consequence, many young Christians decided to take part in the 25 
January uprising, challenged the position of Shenuda, revealing a new political 
and social rebirth inside the community which emerged from a long political 
apathy (Casper, 2013). They fought by rallying behind a liberal and civil cause 
or demonstrated for particular Coptic issues, showing that they claimed an 
idea of Egyptian nationality while not refusing their religious identity (Guir-
guis, 2012).
The Church discouraged the Copts to participate in the uprisings, consider-
ing the linkage with the Mubarak regime, but despite this, the revolutionary 
days soon became a moment of unity in Egypt between Muslims and Chris-
tians where they agreed and cooperated on the need for democratic reform.
By contrast, after the 2011 revolt, the camaraderie that joined Copts and 
Muslims lasted only a few weeks and new sectarian strife seemed to start again. 
Only to quote some examples, on the 4th of March 2011 two men were killed 
during clashes in Helwan Governorate between Muslims and Christians, which 
also saw Muslims set fire to a church in the village of Sol, in the south of Cairo; 
thousands of Christians, joined by many Muslims, have been staging a sit-in in 
front of the Egyptian tv building on the Nile Corniche in Cairo protesting 
against the attack on the St. Mina and St. George churches (Habib, 2011). On 
the 7th of May, 2011 there was a series of attacks that took place against Coptic 
churches in the poor working-class neighborhood of Imbaba in Cairo; many 
protesters staged a sit-in in front of the Egyptian Television and Radio Union, 
known as Maspero (Habib, 2011; Osman, 2011).
The Copts became increasingly fearful as the political and social identities 
of Islamist groups began to crystallize in the aftermath of Egypt’s 25th January 
revolution (El-Ghobashy, 2011). The first months after Mubarak was deposed 
revealed that Copts were isolated if not overwhelmed by the rise of Islamist 
forces which took control of Tahrir Square. During this period of general inse-
curity for all Egyptians, public security had collapsed across the country and a 
wave of violent episodes involving Copts showed their acute vulnerability.
Christians in Qena and the nearby governorates of Sohag, Minya, and Asyut, 
which are home to the country’s largest concentration of Copts, became the 
target for many kidnappings: beginning in 2011, Copts in these regions of  Upper 
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Egypt were frequently abducted and held until their families paid a ransom 
(Tadros, 2011). Indeed, kidnappings in Minya, where Christians are estimated 
to make up more than a third of the population, have been a weekly occur-
rence since Mubarak’s ouster (Brownlee, 2013). scaf’s position on sectarian 
matters suggested the adoption of a policy of tolerance toward sectarian as-
saults on non-Muslims.
The most tragic attack on Copts occurred the 9th October, when, after the 
arson of a church in Aswan, a large group of Copts and their Muslim support-
ers congregated once again in front of Maspero to denounce the scaf’s com-
plicity in anti-Christian violence. Before the protesters could reach the build-
ing, army vehicles plowed through the crowd. The day ended with clashes with 
the army, where in the end, 25 Copts were killed and more than 300 were in-
jured. The Maspero massacre created a real trauma in the memories of the 
Christians and the Muslims who participated to the sit-in which is still ex-
tremely difficult to forget: it represented a critical moment in the history of 
Egypt’s political transition from authoritarian rule because it reflected the 
single worst assault by an Egyptian ruling authority against a non-Muslim mi-
nority in modern Egyptian history. And, moreover, it demonstrated that Copts 
were as vulnerable as they had been before the revolution and that the scaf 
soon showed its violent face (Toma, 2016; Tadros, 2011; Carr, 2013; Eskander, 
2016).
The Maspero Youth Union,2 a political group whom quest for recognition of 
religious justice has found a receptive audience among Copts across classes, 
geographic locations, and political orientations, asked immediately for a fair 
trial to find out what happened in Maspero, why it happened and who ordered 
the killings of peaceful protesters (Fahmi, 2015). But finally, the court verdict 
read that three soldiers were found guilty but that nobody had been charged 
with any crime (Gokpinar, 2012).
The presidential election of 2012 summer gave the final blow to all the Chris-
tian’s chances for the establishment of a democratic and human rights respect-
ful Egyptian political system; in fact, during the presidential election of 2012, 
Mohamed Morsi, the official candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom 
and Justice party, edged out Shafiq, 51.7% to 48.3%.
The election victory of Morsi plunged Copts into mourning as they started 
to feel in danger, more than in Mubarak period. According to Mariz Tadros, and 
as the National Council for Human Rights (nchr) highlighted in its report on 
2 The main ideal of this group was the prevention of conflict and in case of conflict, to compel 
government authorities to implement the rule of the law rather than hold the more tradi-
tional meetings of reconciliation.
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the second round of elections, Copts were prevented from going to the voting 
stations and that assaults were instigated against them: “the use of intimida-
tion against Copts went largely unreported in the media as the focus was on 
what was happening inside the polling stations” (Tadros, 2013: 232).
In fact, although the Constitution issued at the end of 2012 stated that Chris-
tians enjoy full citizenship, they remained marginalized and with Islamist 
voices dominating the government they were becoming more socially isolated. 
“While President Morsi’s rhetoric indicated a desire to be more inclusive, his 
actions fail to protect the Christian communities by, for example, curtailing 
hateful speech and unfounded allegations about them” (Van Doorn-Harder, 
2013: 17). Mohammed Morsi and his government have not found an appropri-
ate response to the problems of religious diversity, rights and minorities, and 
the relations between the religions and the State.
When in June 2014, one year after the new president’s election, an anti- 
Morsi movement gained steam, Copts were among the millions calling for his 
early removal from office and new elections. The military answered by depos-
ing the President the 3rd of July: they were led by the Minister of Defence and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah 
al-Sisi.
He was flanked by notables from the country’s major religious communities, 
including the new Patriarch Tawadros ii elected in November 2012: the Pope, 
who has declared his will to return to a spiritual role within the community, 
soon returned to his political role as a consequence of a more polarized Egypt. 
Al-Sisi spoke in reconciliatory tones of moving the country forward according 
to a political route map and a new collaborative feeling between communities: 
in fact, the new cabinet included three Coptic ministers, one of them assigned 
to handle the influential trade portfolio. “But displays of national unity at the 
upper echelons of Egyptians politics did not establish interfaith comity among 
the population. Further violence followed the coup. Initial reports indicate the 
attacks were fueled in equal measure by Islamist grievances and State indiffer-
ence” (Brownlee, 2013: 19). On the 3rd of July, arsonists burned a church in 
Minya in the south while vandals struck at a church in Marsa Matruh on the 
northwestern coast. The sectarian clashes arose again and in a violent form. In 
the middle of August arsonists damaged or destroyed more than 40 churches 
in Upper Egypt, Beni Suef, and Fayum. In this chaotic context, General Abdel 
Fattah al-Sisi run for the presidential election in May 2014 winning it with 23.78 
million votes, 96.91% a turnout of 47.5%. This market the beginning of the “al-
Sisi’s reign” and a sort of go back to the past for the Coptic community.
The current Egyptian President al-Sisi wants to renew the covenant of col-
laboration established with the Church years ago: following in the footsteps of 
his predecessor Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasser, today the new raʿis is trying to overcome 
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the criticism of those who accuse the State of not doing enough to protect the 
rights of Christians in Egypt. On January 6, 2018, on the occasion of the Coptic 
Christmas, al-Sisi inaugurated with Patriarch Tawadros ii the new cathedral 
that, according to the President’s intentions, should become the largest Chris-
tian Church in the Middle East.
Built 40 kilometers east of Cairo, on the site that will see the rise of the “New 
Cairo” (the future administrative and financial capital of Egypt according to a 
government plan of urban expansion), the cathedral was erected in record 
time so that the Egyptian authorities could show this goal on a solemn occa-
sion where al-Sisi held a speech restating the call for national unity between 
Christians and Muslims without divisions or differences. But the churches in 
Cairo look like fortresses nowadays, because of the enormous security mea-
sures stepped up by the government in every place of worship around the 
country: a consequence of the violence that in recent years has seen the Copts 
become the new target of isis terrorist attacks (Melcangi, 2019).
From the killing and forced evacuation of several dozens of Christians in 
2017 in al-Arish, the capital city of the North Sinai governorate –where a vast 
anti-terrorist operation of the armed forces is now taking place– to the brutal 
attack of December 11th 2016 at the Coptic cathedral in Cairo, and the double 
attack on Palm Sunday, April 9th, 2017, in Tanta, in the Nile Delta region, and in 
Alexandria: these attacks against the Copts suggest that terrorist violence is no 
longer confined to the Sinai peninsula but is instead moving towards the main 
urban centers, putting a strain on the validity of al-Sisi’s vows to preserve 
Egypt’s security, a pivot of his propaganda especially during the 2018’s presi-
dential election.
The security question therefore continues to represent a dangerous vulnus 
in the Egypt of al-Sisi. Despite the terrorist attacks seems to be progressively 
diminishing, as a sign that the military repression carried out by the Egyptian 
president mainly on the Sinai produces encouraging results, the country fails 
to guarantee security, indispensable for the rebirth of international tourism, 
and to eradicate sectarian attacks against the religious minorities, which al-
ways have great echo in international public opinion.
Al-Sisi, re-elected in march 2018 with 97% of the votes for the second term, 
put security as the fundamental point of his electoral campaign. However, 
even if diminished, the terrorist attacks continue to threaten two important 
pillars of the president’s stabilization strategy: first of all foreign tourism linked 
with the economic condition of the country which now is going through a pe-
riod of economic growth.
The other priority objective is to tackle the jihadist terrorism which targets 
especially the Coptic Christians: the attacks on churches and Christian 
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 institutions are increasing. These actions move in the dual direction of accen-
tuating sectarianism within Egyptian society and undermining the external 
image of al-Sisi, sanctioning its inadequacy in controlling the jihadist threat 
present in Egypt.
Acts of violence have a strong emotional and political impact, because 
they can tear the “Egyptian national fabric” to which the raʿis constantly ap-
peals. On the other side the government has thus played the card of terror-
ism to legitimize the continuation of the state of emergency, to justify the 
brutality of national security personnel and to silence political opposition.
Al-Sisi’s government still represents for the Copts of Egypt a barrier of 
protection and the guarantee of political stability. And the last presiden-
tial elections confirmed the positioning of the Christian community led by 
the  Patriarch faithfully at the side of the al-Sisi, despite the voices of many 
young Copts and intellectuals resonate with criticism towards the President’s 
authoritarianism.
6 Conclusion
The transitional period, following the Egyptian uprising of January 2011, 
showed how much the country has a fragile and polarizing political system and 
an economical sector in deep crisis. In this situation it was very simple for the 
minorities to look at the regime as the only guarantee for their survival. Espe-
cially when the support is proportional to the regime opportunistic claims for 
democratic or secular values. Or if the risk of being persecuted and considered 
a target for violent attack is real, as in the case of the last attacks committed by 
jihadist groups against several Coptic churches, using the minorities support 
to authoritarian regimes as a justification for their violent attacks against reli-
gious minorities. In addition to acts of violence and intimidation, the condi-
tions of political, economic and social discrimination still weigh on the most 
numerous Christian communities in the Arab world. This condition makes 
Copts’ strategy and position clearly illustrative of the wider challenge that to-
day’s Christians are experiencing in the region.
Since the uprising, the complex political situation of Egypt led to an evolu-
tion on the activism and political participation of the Coptic community, 
which confirm these aspects. Beside the claim of some Copts who stand along-
side the President, with the Patriarch, afraid of becoming the new martyrs of 
the “religious war” conducted by jihadists, there is a dissident movement with-
in the community that has long claimed a return of the Church to its original 
spiritual task. These are the voices of a large group of young Copts who 
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 participated in the 2011 uprising and who became the bearer of demands for 
democracy, freedom and full political participation, freed from identity and 
sectarian dynamics.
But Al-Sisi’s government still represents a barrier of protection and the 
guarantee of political stability for the Copts of Egypt. And the latest elec-
tions confirmed the positioning of the Christian community led by the Pa-
triarch faithfully at the side of the raʿis, despite the voices of many young 
Copts and intellectuals have resonated with criticism towards the President’s 
authoritarianism.
<UN>
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Chapter 7
Religious Affiliations and Social Coexistence in the 
Islamic Middle East Countries
Giancarlo Rovati
1 Introduction
In the contest of our multi-dimensional research on (forced) migrations be-
cause of religious reasons, it is particularly interesting to analyze the religious 
and cultural orientations that characterize Islamic Middle East countries, 
where several religious minorities are facing heavy difficulties to be accepted 
and welcomed.
With the aim of focusing on the question of religious tolerance in Islamic 
countries and understanding how tolerance could be increased, it is particu-
larly useful to consider the information provided by the most recent Arab Ba-
rometer surveys, which, since 2006, have been studying Arab people’s values, 
attitudes and behaviors. Among these aspects, careful and close attention is 
devoted to the relation among religion, civil law, political authorities, and de-
mocracy, in addition to the classic religion topics – i.e. beliefs, practices, and 
sense of belonging.
In this chapter, we will analyze some data collected over the past decade 
through the third and fourth Arab Barometer survey (carried out in the two-
year period 2012–2014 and in the year 2016–17) based on representative sam-
ples of the adult population. They involved, respectively, 12 and 7 Arab coun-
tries (Table 7.1) (Arab Barometer, 2012–2014 2016–17) but our analysis will focus 
only on some of them (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine), as they can be 
compared to each other more directly, from a cultural and geo-political point 
of view. Unfortunately, Iraq was not included in the 2016 wave, so it is impos-
sible to apply an identical longitudinal comparison to this country.
People living in these five countries have been active subjects and –at the 
same time– victims of the large and lasting conflicts that have broken out the 
Middle-East in the last few decades. In the case of Egypt and Iraq, citizens took 
part in a hopeful democratic experiment –optimistically named Arab Springs 
(Ghanem, 2018)– based on a pluralistic electoral competition to choose their 
ruling classes. Despite every optimistic expectation, this democratic process 
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failed and new autocratic regimes have been established (Alkhatib, 2014; Cey-
hun, 2017a, 2017b; Tavana. 2017). The hope of a real new course of political 
events has been scaled down, as well as the expectations of a more open plu-
ralistic society (Rahman, 2016; Grinin et al., 2019).
2 Religious Belonging and Personal Religiosity
The wide majority of people interviewed in each Arabian country belongs to 
Islamic religion with the exception of the Lebanese, one third of which (38%) 
are Christians and in small amount (7%) Druse; also in Egypt and Palestine 
there is a small minority of Christian believers (4–5%) mainly concentrated in 
some areas.
The same distribution is confirmed by the fourth Arab Barometer wave (ap-
plied in 2016) with a small, but significant, increase in Christians and other 
minorities, parts of which have been compelled to escape from Syria (Ceyhun, 
2017c) (Table 7.2).
Source: Arab Barometer data 
Table 7.1  Countries involved in the third and fourth Arab Barometer survey
Third survey: 2012–2014 Fourth survey: 2016–17
Country Sample Country Sample
Egypt 1195 Egypt 1200
Jordan 1795 Jordan 1500
Iraq 1215 n.p. n.p.
Lebanon 1200 Lebanon 1500
Palestine 1171 Palestine 1199
Algeria 1220 Algeria 1200
Morocco 1116 Morocco 1200
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It is only in the case of Lebanon that we have specific information on the reli-
gion composition of both the Islamic community –with half Sunnis and Scyth-
ians, who together represent 56% of the total sample1– and of the Christian one 
that includes a high variety of denominations, mainly Maronite (25%), Ortho-
dox (7%), Catholic (4%), and Armenian (1%). This empirical evidence docu-
ments the possibility of a real pluralistic coexistence among different religious 
and cultural identities, with the support of suitable political institutions.
According the sample composition of each country, the data commented 
below include the answers by both Islamic and not Islamic people, the large 
diffusion of Islamic faith and belonging in four out five countries (see 3rd 
wave) offers the opportunity to make some comparisons among national dif-
ferences about religion, civil law, politics, and democracy (Bréchon, 2018).
The diffuse sense of belonging to a specific religion is supported by a strong 
personal commitment, considering that:
– More than 90% declare to be a “religious person”, with the highest degree in 
Egypt and Jordan (94–95%); two years later (2016), Egyptians and Jordanians 
confirm their primacy, while Lebanese drop 7 percentage points  (Table 7.3);
– About 70% declare to pray regularly every day, with values under the aver-
age in Lebanon (60%), where there are more unresponsive and indifferent 
people. These widespread attitudes register some changes in the fourth 
wave, growing up in Jordan (from 71% to 77%) and decreasing in Egypt 
(from 69% to 56%), Lebanon (from 60% to 50%) and on the whole (from 
70% to 65%) (Table 7.4);
1 In the 2016 survey Muslims represent 60% of the total interviewed, 46% of them Sunni and 
54% Shia.
Source: Author’s elaboration on Arab Barometer data 
Table 7.�  Religious belonging of representative samples interviewed in 2014 (3rd wave) and 
2016 (4th wave)
Egypt Iraq Jordan Lebanon Palestine Total
2014 2016 2014 2016 2014 2016 2014 2016 2014 2016 2014 2016
Muslim 94% 96% 100% n.p. 100% 98% n.p. 60% 96% 97% 91% 87%
Christian 6% 4% 0% n.p. 0% 2% 38% 33% 4% 3% 9% 11%
Other n.p. n.p. n.p. n.p. n.p. n.p. n.p. 7% n.p. n.p. n.p. 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% n.p. 100% 100% 38% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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– 40% declare to take part regularly in weekly religious ceremonies, with 
higher percentages among Egyptians (67%) and Jordanians (61%), and low-
er percentages among Iraqis (18%), for reasons that could be related to 
 insecurity rather than religious disinterest. The irregular ceremony partici-
pation is more widespread among Palestinians who, from this point of view, 
appear to be more secularized.2
– The listening and the reading of the Koran (or the Bible) are more diffused, 
also in this case, among Egyptians (50%) and Jordanians (49%), thus con-
firming that they are the most faithful and assiduous people. According to 
the 2016 survey, this behavior declines in each country (especially in Leba-
non with 20% vs 38%) and, overall, attesting at 35% vs 42% (Table 7.5).
– The majority of interviewed (39%) assert to apply effectively the teachings 
of the Prophet (Mahomet) in their daily life and therefore to be good 
Muslim;3 on the contrary, only a small minority (3%) consider themselves as 
completely incoherent and faraway from Islamic commandments.
– It’s interesting to underline the strong distance between the Palestinians’ 
and the Lebanese’ self-esteem regarding their religious commitment: the 
former are confident in 46% of the cases, while the latter only in 26%.
2 This issue is absent in the 4th wave survey.
3 This issue, too, is absent in the 4th wave survey.
Source: Author’s elaboration on Arab Barometer data 
Table 7.3  Do you consider yourself to be a religious person?
Egypt Jordan Lebanon Palestine Total
2014 94% 95% 85% 93% 92%
2016 97% 97% 78% 92% 89%
Source: Author’s elaboration on Arab Barometer data 
Table 7.4  Do you pray daily?
Egypt Jordan Lebanon Palestine Total
2014 69% 71% 60% 77% 70%
2016 56% 77% 50% 75% 65%
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The “self-examination” requested to the interviewed regarding their under-
standing and their practice of the faith also includes an evaluation of their 
personal fidelity and coherence towards the teaching of Prophet Muhammed 
and an evaluation of the same topics from other believers with whom they are 
in touch.
Generally, the interviewed evaluate themselves as good testimony of the 
Prophet’s teachings, with some kind of over-estimation and self-confidence: 
39% declare to be “a good Muslim” and only 21% feel to be “not very” or “not at 
all” reliable.
The evaluations towards the others is decisively lower, because they are con-
sidered as “good” testimony only by 18% of the people and as “bad” by 37%. The 
general results are differentiated among countries: Lebanese and Palestinians 
are particularly negative, while Egyptians are very optimistic and confident to-
ward their fellow worshippers.
In summary, we may say that most interviewed have a high self- commitment 
to the faith they declare, which, in fact, has a great and direct influence on their 
everyday life (Spierings, 2018).
3 Islam and Civil Law
The relation among the norms ruling the religious community and the secular 
community has been (and still is) a largely discussed topic, ascribable – 
 synthetically– to the question of “secularity”, i.e. the distinction among the re-
ligious and the civil spheres in the context of “pluralistic societies”, very differ-
entiated in every aspect (Jamal, 2018).
In Europe, the acquisition of this distinction is part of a long-lasting and 
dramatic historical process, started during the 14th century and proceeded 
 until the 19th century. Indeed, the principle “cuius regio, eius religio” (during 
the Protestant and Catholic Reform) established the primacy of the religious 
beliefs of the rulers (kings or other chiefs) over the ruled people, with the 
Source: Author's elaboration on Arab Barometer data
Table 7.5  Do you always listen to or read the Quran/the Bible? 
Egypt Iraq Jordan Lebanon Palestine Total
2014 50% 26% 50% 38% 46% 42.5%
2016 43% n.a. 41% 20% 40% 35%
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 consequent right to impose their own ideas and principles over the “mass”, 
with an authoritarian approach.
What the European culture has considered for many centuries as obvious 
and mainstream is, however, not accepted inside the Islamic world. There, the 
distinction between religion and politics –established, from an ideal point of 
view, from Jesus Christ’s sentence “Render to Caesar the things that are Cae-
sar’s, and to God the things that are God’s”– has never taken root, both for 
doctrinal and social reasons.
Even if in some Arab Islamic countries secular political regimes arose dur-
ing 20th century,4 after the Khomeini revolution (1979) the cultural and politi-
cal hegemony of religious chiefs grew newly up, with a consequent revival of 
political-religious conflicts in the whole Middle East, as in the emblematic 
case of Shia and Sunni regimes (see Chapter 5).
With the complicity of many economic, national, ethnic cleavages inside 
the Arab Islamic countries, the religious identities have re-obtained the central 
role of “cement of the society”; therefore, it is not surprising that religious 
norms have become the central point of every kind of (moral, legal, economic, 
political) value and rule. The open question is in which way the coexistence of 
different religious believers may be regulated, respecting differences and pro-
moting freedom of speech and expression.
According our empirical data,5 most of the people interviewed in 2012–2014 
have assigned to Islamic laws the primacy over popular willing, denying essen-
tial value to democratic procedures. This approach is mainly diffused in Jor-
dan, where 40% of the people strongly agree with the idea that “The Govern-
ment and the Parliament should enact laws in accordance with the Islamic 
law”; the same idea is more cautiously supported by Palestinians (30%), Egyp-
tians (26%), and Iraqis (16%), but if we add the partial agreement (“somewhat 
agree”), the consensus reaches 65–80%. This idea is firmly refused by the Leba-
nese, who prefer the secular primacy of popular consensus.
The opposite idea that “The Government and the Parliament should enact 
laws in accordance with people’s wishes” reaches less consensus (20% on aver-
age), even if, in total, agreements (52%) always overcome disagreements 
(42%). It is important to underline that the Lebanese people confirm their 
support to the principle of democratic consensus (43%), rejecting “strongly or 
somewhat” (82%) the principle of Islamic hegemony. In other words, many 
4 See the regime of Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970), President of Egypt from 1954 to 1970 and 
the role of Baʿth party, in Iraq, at the base of the regime of Saddam Hussein (1937–2006), 
lasted from 1979 to 2006, and supporter, in Syria, of the Arab Republic since 1963. In 1970, the 
power was achieved by the Assad dynasty.
5 The data here discussed have been collected only in the third Arab Barometer survey 
(2012–2014).
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Lebanese people support the distinction between religion and politics accord-
ing to the secular approach (see below, §4).
The intermediate solution that tries to combine both the previous 
principles –assigning different priorities to religious or secular principles, ac-
cording to the questions to face6– gets the maximum consensus among Iraqis 
(34%) and Egyptians (33%), followed by Jordanians (26%) and Palestinian 
(16%), who, as we noted before, largely support the monocratic solutions. The 
dissent of the Lebanese towards the religious principle is confirmed also by 
means of this variable, considering that 52% of them reject a limited intrusion 
of religious norms into politics.
The same ideological tendencies get reinforcement when people react to 
the question of criminal laws, i.e. the branch of law that produces heavy re-
strictions to personal freedom in the event of behaviors considered as danger-
ous for the members of society. The most confessional are, again, Jordanians 
(51%), followed by Palestinians (37%), Egyptians (31%) and Iraqis (28%). Leba-
nese people confirm their previous attitudes, supporting mainly (60%) the 
non-religious perspective.
Similar preferences emerge when people refer to the primacy of Islamic 
laws in the contest of family relations: 60% of Jordanians strongly agree with 
the idea that “The Government and the Parliament should enact personal sta-
tus laws (marriage, divorce) in accordance with the Islamic law”, while only 
12% of Lebanese accept this hypothesis.
Finally, the fundamentalist approach is, once again, clear when people an-
swer to the sentence “The Government and the Parliament should enact in-
heritance laws in accordance with the Islamic law” by referring directly to tra-
dition and Islamic norms: Jordanians put themselves at the top (63%), followed 
by Egyptians (56%), Palestinians (50%) and Iraqis (49%). Lebanese are at the 
bottom, with a very little agreement (14%).
All the answers on these topics have been transformed in a synthetic index 
named Islam Law Conformity Index (islc Index) finalized to check how impor-
tant the Islamic law must (or must not) be in producing and supporting the 
decision of both Government and Parliament (Table 7.6).7
6 See the following sentence: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the follow-
ing principles in the enactment of your country’s laws and regulations? The Government and 
the parliament should enact penal laws in accordance with the Islamic law”.
7 For calculating this index, the original variables (q605.1 to q605.6) have been recoded 
giving:
– Highest score to options that indicate unconditioned agreement with the primacy of Ko-
ranic law in every Government or Parliament decision (see q605.2, q605.4, q605.5, q605.6);
– Middle score to options that indicate a conditioned agreement with the primacy of Ko-
ranic law in every Government or Parliament decision (see q605.1);
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On a scale from 1 to 6, the average score reached by all interviewed is 4.02, with 
higher values in Jordan (4.51) and lower ones in Lebanon (2.43) confirming a 
well know trend.
In Jordan and Palestine, the islc Index is higher among young people (up to 
29 years old: 4.55 and 4.45), who look more radical, while in Egypt and Iraq this 
Index is higher among the elderly (4.52, 4.30). The generational change goes in 
opposite directions in the single countries: it increases traditionalism in Jordan 
and Palestine, but it contributes to modernization in Egypt and Iraq. Lebanon 
keeps its originality: it is less sensible to Islamic traditionalism, owing to the 
relevant presence of Christians; nevertheless the (low) Islamic traditionalism 
is more attractive for young people (Robbins, 2017).
4 The Influence of Shariʿa
Inside these general trends, largely approving the cultural leadership of Islam 
in the field of moral and legal regulation of society, specific attention should be 
paid to the supporters of the direct application of Shariʿa in all private and 
public spheres – as it is recommended by the radical loyalty to Islamic  tradition 
– Lowest score to options indicated in the unique variable that establishes no conformity to 
Quranic law (see q605.1).
Source: Author's elaboration OF Arab Barometer data 
Table 7.6  Islamic Law Conformity Index by sex and age (score: min = 1, max = 6)
Sex Age
Total Male Female Up to 29 30–45 46 and 
over
Egypt 4.30 4.32 4.28 4.03 4.42 4.52
Iraq 4.28 4.27 4.28 4.22 4.33 4.30
Jordan 4.51 4.43 4.61 4.55 4.48 4.51
Lebanon 2.43 2.41 2.45 2.71 2.56 2.09
Palestine 4.36 4.27 4.45 4.45 4.32 4.30
Total 4.02 3.99 4.04 4.06 4.11 3.83
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and by the fundamentalist political movements (Bell et al., 2013; Ciftci 
et al., 2018).
Our reference is mainly to the third edition of Arab Barometer employing 
more questions8 finalized to understand:
– The expected role of Shariʿa in laws regulating marriage and divorce;
– The perception of the effective influence of Shariʿa on the laws of each 
country;
– The divine or human foundation of Shariʿa according the theological and 
cultural debate developed in the last years inside Islam;
– The (effective or potential) conflict among the western vision of democracy 
and the Islam teachings on the same question;
– The limited concession of political rights to non-Islamic minorities;
– The contrast among the economic Islamic teachings and the application of 
interests by the bank system.
The idea that Shariʿa must regulate marriage and divorce is supported by 69%, 
mainly in Egypt and Palestine, where people appear to be more orthodox and 
radical. The existence of a direct relationship (strong or not) among Shariʿa 
and ordinary laws is perceived by 53% of the interviewed, with percentages 
above 60 points in Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, but very low in Lebanon (23%).
Except for the Lebanon case –where Shariʿa influence is limited and, there-
fore, the opinions expressed by the interviewed probably reflect the reality– it 
is not easy to distinguish if the evaluations by people reflect a deed (judgment 
of fact) or a wish (judgment of value).
This ambivalence cannot be observed in the 2016 survey, where people have 
answered to a clearer question: 33% would like the laws in their countries to be 
entirely or, mostly, based on the Shariʿa. Then, 41% would like an equally bal-
anced system (based on Shariʿa and on the will of the people). Finally, only 12% 
indicate the primacy of the people will, according the rules of liberal-demo-
cratic systems. The preference for Shariʿa overcomes that for democracy, main-
ly in Palestine (50% vs 11%) and Jordan (44% vs 4%), in open opposition to 
Lebanese attitudes (66% in favor of popular will) (Table 7.7).
According to a fundamentalist interpretation, the primacy of Shariʿa gains 
its support by its divine origin and, thus, it cannot be reformed or disregarded; 
this approach produces radical consequences, not only at theological level, but 
8 In the 2016 survey, this issue was not discussed with the same extension, even if some topics 
had been dealt with.
Rovati�14
<UN>
also at a social and political one, therefore generating difficulties as far as a 
pluralistic and tolerant coexistence is concerned.
Two interviewed out of three extensively agree with the idea that Shariʿa is 
“Word of God”, with higher consensus among Palestinians (76%) and Jordani-
ans (71%), but under average percentages among Lebanese people (43%), ow-
ing to the presence of many non-Muslim people.
The spread of the ideological radicalism may be further estimated through 
three other items creating a large debate among Islamic theologians and law-
yers and concerning democracy, political rights, as well as the bank system.
On average, 26% think that democracy is a system that contradicts the 
teaching of Islam. This attitude is more diffused among Jordanians (strongly + 
somewhat: 37%), Palestinians (31%) and Lebanese (30%) because the Muslim 
part of the population is highly concentrated on this position. On the contrary, 
it is less supported by Egyptians (6%), directly involved –in the same period– 
in a democratic experiment.
These orientations have been confirmed also in the 4th Arab Barometer 
wave (agreement: 26% vs 24%), but with very significant changes in Jordan 
and Egypt, respectively more and less supportive towards the compatibility 
Islam-democracy (Jordan: 79% vs 54%; Egypt 71% vs 77%) (Table 7.8).
Strictly connected to the democratic question is the idea (sometimes, unfor-
tunately, corresponding to a practice) that in a Muslim country, non-Muslims 
should enjoy less political rights than Muslims: 21% agree, strongly or some-
what, with this hypothesis. Compared with other topics, the consensus is low: 
only Jordanians exceed the average (39% vs 21%) while 65% of Lebanese and 
46% of Egyptians strongly refuse it.
Table 7.7  Which of the following statements is the closest to your point of view? Laws of 









the will of 
the people
Mostly on 
the will of 
the people
Entirely on 







Egypt 23% 10% 50% 4% 7% 4% 0% 100%
Jordan 32% 11% 51% 2% 2% 2% 0% 100%
Lebanon 3% 4% 27% 22% 44% 1% 0% 100%
Palestine 41% 10% 36% 3% 8% 2% 0% 100%
Total 24% 9% 41% 8% 16% 2% 0% 100%
Source: Author’s elaboration on Arab Barometer data 
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The agreement goes up, once again, when people answer to the contrast among 
teachings of Islam and the charging of interest applied by banks: 86% of Jorda-
nians and 81% of Palestinians support this interpretation, but only 53% of 
Egyptians and Iraqis share the same sentiment. Submitted two years later, the 
same question has obtained, on average, an increasing agreement (75% vs 
69%), due principally to Lebanese answers (77% vs 62%), mainly to engage in 
controversy with Islamic people than for ideological consensus (Table 7.9).
In conclusion, we must register a very large consensus towards central top-
ics of the Islamic doctrine, which, on many occasions, have relevant political 
consequences. Even if the majority of people does not directly support the 
radical Islamic groups that propose to apply Shariʿa “sine glossa” to all the as-
pects of social and political life, these groups receive, at least indirectly, an 
ideological legitimization that is difficult to deny.
On the basis of the previous variables, we may elaborate an “Islamic Tradi-
tionalism Index” (ist Index) that reaches its maximum agreement (73%) at the 
maximum level of intensity.9 This result acquires an emblematic importance 
when compared between each country: the ideological traditionalism reaches 
its (relatively) higher degree in Egypt (average score 2.76 on a scale 1 to 3) and 
9 By grouping the scores of this cardinal measure at three levels (low, middle, high), the large 
majority appears to be very traditionalist.
Source: Author’s elaboration on Arab Barometer data
a The formulation of the question presents some differences in the two Arab Barometer waves. 
In the 2014 wave, the question was “Democracy is a system that contradicts the teachings of 
Islam”; in the 2016 wave, the question was “Democracy is a Western form of Government that 
is not compatible with Islam”.
Table 7.8  Compatibility of Western democracy with Islam teachings: agreementa
Agree  





2014 2016 2014 2016
Egypt 5% 12% 77% 71%
Iraq 23% n/a 55% n/a
Jordan 37% 18% 54% 79%
Lebanon 30% 34% 61% 60%
Palestine 31% 30% 66% 64%
Total 26% 24% 65% 69%
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in Palestine (2.73), while its minimum degree is registered in Lebanon (2.12). By 
comparing the totals, we can observe that there are no significant differences 
among male and female sub-groups (2.64). The same trend is registered in 
each country, with the only exception of Lebanon, where women overcome 
man in the level of traditionalism – which, in any case, is lower than in other 
countries.
The orientations of the three different age groups are practically similar, but 
it is interesting to note that in Egypt, Palestine and Lebanon, the Islam tradi-
tionalism is a peculiarity of the youngsters, with probably not positive conse-
quences on social coexistence (Table 7.10).
In opposition to the Islamic Traditionalism Index –synonymous of strong 
conservativism– we have elaborated an index of modernization, named “Islam 
Openness Index” (iso Index), on the basis of three variables collecting positive 
agreement towards:
a) gender-mixed education in Universities;
b) the possibility for women to wear modest clothes without needing to 
wear hijab;
c) the right of religious minorities to practice their religion freely.10
10 From the calculus of the Index, we have excluded the variable “To what extent do you agree 
with each of these statements?” Difference and variation between Islamic scholars, with 
regard to their interpretation of religious matters, is a good thing (q6082) because, by 
Source: Author's elaboration on Arab Barometer data
Table 7.9  Banks charging interest contradict the teachings of Islam
Agree  
(strongly or  
somewhat)
Disagree  
(strongly or  
omewhat)
2014 2016 2014 2016
Egypt 55% 53% 21% 30%
Iraq 54% n/a 29% n/a
Jordan 86% 85% 9% 13%
Lebanon 62% 77% 25% 19%
Palestine 81% 81% 15% 16%
Total 69% 75% 19% 19%
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The majority (63%) of the whole sample agrees (strongly or somewhat) that, in 
universities, young women and men could study together, but the differences 
among countries are very wide (Robbins, Thomas, 2018): the agreement of 
Egyptians (49%), Palestinians (55%) and Jordanians (57%) is under average, 
while 94% of the Lebanese openly support this issue (Table 7.11).
The substitution of the hijab with other modest clothes receives, at a gen-
eral level, less consensus than before (54% vs 63%), because 65% of Iraqi, and 
52% of Palestinians are mainly adverse (Table 7.12).
The right to practice freely own religion meets a quite universalistic support 
(86% agree strongly or somewhat) but in Jordan (79%), the consensus is under 
the average.
Despite what we could expect on the basis of Islamic Traditionalism Index 
(very high in 73% of the cases), people who are not open-minded are a minor-
ity (25%), while people with a positive openness reach 36%. On a scale from 1 
to 4, the most open-minded country is Lebanon (3.30 scores), followed by Jor-
dan (2.93) and Egypt (2.90): on the contrary, the countries less open to the in-
novations are Iraq (2.70) followed by Palestine (2.83) (Table 7.13). Gender dif-
ferences are generally not relevant, except in Jordan, where women are more 
innovative than men; young people are not more open than the elderly, as in 
Egypt and Lebanon.
 applying factor analysis to the empty array (q6071 to q6073 and q6082 to q6087), it turns 
out to be not pertinent enough.
Source: Author's elaboration OF Arab Barometer data 
Table 7.10  Islamic Traditionalism Index by sex and age (score: min = 1, max = 3)
Sex Age
Total Male Female Up to 29 30–45 46 and 
over
Egypt 2.76 2.79 2.74 2.79 2.74 2.76
Iraq 2.71 2.72 2.71 2.70 2.72 2.73
Jordan 2.71 2.70 2.73 2.67 2.72 2.76
Lebanon 2.12 2.08 2.16 2.16 2.19 2.00
Palestine 2.73 2.75 2.71 2.75 2.72 2.72
Total 2.64 2.64 2.64 2.64 2.66 2.62
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The indexes that we have constructed to reduce the complexity of the informa-
tion present direct (and statistically significant) correlations among them, 
Source: Author’s elaboration of Arab Barometer data 
a In the 2017 wave, the question was “Is it acceptable, in Islam, for male and female university 
students to attend classes together?”.
Table 7.11  Gender mixed education should be allowed in universitiesa
Agree  
(strongly or  
somewhat)
Disagree  
(strongly or  
somewhat)
2014 2016 2014 2016
Egypt 49% 64% 41% 33%
Iraq 66% n.p. 30% n.p.
Jordan 57% 56% 38% 44%
Lebanon 94% 90% 5% 9%
Palestine 55% 56% 44% 43%
Total 64% 67% 32% 31%
Source: Author’s elaboration of Arab Barometer data 
a In the 2017 wave the question was “A woman should dress modestly, but Islam does not re-
quire that she wears a hijab”.
Table 7.1�  Women should wear modest clothes without needing to wear the hijaba
Agree  
(strongly or  
somewhat)
Disagree  
(strongly or  
somewhat)
2014 2017 2014 2017
Egypt 50% 51% 41% 46%
Iraq 31% n.p. 66% n.p.
Jordan 61% 49% 34% 51%
Lebanon 78% 68% 20% 31%
Palestine 47% 44% 52% 56%
Total 54% 54% 42% 45%
�19Religious Affiliations and Social Coexistence
<UN>
which are sometimes positive and sometimes negative, as in the case of Is-
lamic Traditionalism Index and of Islam Openness Index.11
Thanks to these two indexes, it is possible to identify different ideological 
subgroups inside Islamic people that create an Islam pluralistic typology, not 
always easy to interpreter in an ideal-type way. The conceptual boundaries 
among them are sometimes undetermined by an empirical point of view, ow-
ing to some contradictory overlapping, as in the case of 1,437 interviewed (23% 
of total sample) who reach a high score in both the indexes (Table 7.14).
The most numerous group is represented by “opportunist people”, i.e. very 
conformist, but hesitant and open to some changes (27%), followed by those 
who may be defined as “contradictory people” (23%), as they declare to be very 
traditionalist as well as very open to some changes, and the effective radical 
extremist, i.e. very traditional and very close (22%). All the other groups are 
not very consistent and are composed of: “revisionist” (7%) (traditionalist, but 
with much openness); “moderate people” (7%) (traditionalist and open- 
minded at a medium level); “conservative people” (5%) (traditionalist and less 
open); reformist (5%) (not that traditionalist and very open); in talks people 
(2%) (not that traditionalist and quite open); apathetic (1%) (neither tradi-
tionalist nor open) (Table 7.15).
11 The highest positive correlation emerges among Islamic Traditionalism Index and Islam 
Law Conformity Index (r coefficient = .448); negative correlations emerge, on the contrary, 
among Islam Openness Index (that indicates distancing from a rigid orthodoxy) and the 
other ones, respectively with r. coefficient -.190 and -.304.
Source: Author's elaboration of Arab Barometer data 
Table 7.13  Islam Openness Index by sex and age (score: min = 1, max = 4)
Sex Age
Total Male Female Up to 29 30–45 46 and 
over
Egypt 2.90 2.92 2.88 2.86 2.91 2.95
Iraq 2.70 2.73 2.67 2.72 2.71 2.65
Jordan 2.93 2.88 2.98 2.96 2.93 2.88
Lebanon 3.30 3.29 3.31 3.25 3.27 3.36
Palestine 2.83 2.84 2.83 2.81 2.86 2.82
Total 2.93 2.92 2.94 2.91 2.93 2.97
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The statistical distribution of all these groups inside each country allows to 
find some new peculiarities, together with some confirmations: in Egypt, Iraq, 
and Palestine the diffusion of extreme radicalism is confirmed, but positive 
signals come from the presence of contradictory openness in favor of the abo-
lition of some “taboos”.
The contradictory orientations indicated by empirical results reproduce, in 
a reliable way, the ideological and political uncertainty that has been long 
characterizing the Islamic countries of the Middle East and their difficulties to 
Table 7.14  Islamic Traditionalism Index (recorded in three levels) (IST INDEX R3) by Islam 
Openness Index (recorded in three levels) (ISO INDEX R3) 
  iso INDEX R3
ist INDEX R3 Low Medium High Total
low 89 136 294 519
medium 305 438 446 1189
high 1398 1667 1437 4502
Total 1792 2241 2177 6210
Source: Author's elaboration on Arab Barometer data
Table 7.15  Islam pluralistic typology
Country Total
Egypt Iraq Jordan Lebanon Palestine % N.
Opportunist 28% 34% 26% 12% 32% 27% 1667
Contradictory 25% 13% 29% 27% 20% 23% 1437
Radical 29% 29% 21% 5% 27% 23% 1398
Revisionist 6% 4% 8% 14% 6% 7% 446
Moderate 6% 9% 7% 7% 6% 7% 438
Conservative 2% 8% 6% 3% 4% 5% 305
Reformist 3% 1% 1% 22% 3% 5% 294
In talks 1% 2% 1% 7% 2% 2% 136
Apathetic 0% 2% 1% 3% 1% 1% 89
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 6210
Source: Author's elaboration on Arab Barometer data
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promote a transition towards a more tolerant coexistence between majority 
and minority groups (identified mainly by their religious beliefs) among which 
Christians are prevalent.12
The comparisons by sex and age show less differences inside each ideologi-
cal group, which are characterized more for their radicalism than for their 
reformism.
5 Religion and Politics Relations: Towards a Secular Political 
Approach
In order to understand the cultural trends that are developing in Arab societ-
ies, it is important to deal with the relations among religion and politics, by 
using as reference the polarity “dependence–autonomy” of politics, according 
to a well-known Western intellectual approach. Without accepting the inter-
pretative frame of the French “laïcité” –based on a radical separation between 
religion and politics, which in fact aims to submit religion to politics– we as-
sume the distinction among “fundamentalism” (direct interference of religious 
authorities on politics) and “secularism” (autonomy of politics from religion’s 
influence).
Among the variables regarding this issue, four of them measure the agree-
ment towards a direct interference of religion in the political arena, while the 
other two measure the opposite vision; on the basis of these variables, we have 
elaborated two concise indexes, named, respectively “Secular Politics Index” 
(secpol) and “Fundamentalism Index” (funpol).
In a scale from 1 to 4, the total average score of the Secular Politics Index 
overcomes point 3, documenting –as we will read below– a middle-high dispo-
sition to defend the autonomy of politics (and politicians) from religious lead-
ers (imams, preachers, priests). This disposition is less appreciated in Palestine 
(2.90), but strongly shared in Lebanon (3.62), where each variable reaches the 
highest average score.
By grouping the scores of Secular Politics Index in three modalities (low, 
middle, high), most interviewed (53%) put themselves at the highest level of 
agreement, with 82% of the Lebanese vs 29% of Palestinians (Table 7.16).
Gender and age differences are very limited, confirming a large ideological 
homogeneity and conformism (Table 7.17).
12 The contradictory attitudes are less diffused in Iraq (13%) where opportunism is more 




The total average score of the Fundamentalism Index is attested at point 2; this 
result documents a low disposition for the direct control of political organiza-
tions from religious authorities. This attitude reaches the highest score in Jor-
dan (2.52), Palestine (2.44), Iraq (2.43), and the lowest one in Lebanon (1.38) 
confirming the specificity of this country (Table 7.18).
By grouping, also in this case, the scores of the Fundamentalism Index in 
three levels, it emerges that 56% of the people put themselves at a low level, 
with a primacy of the Lebanese (90%) and the last place of Jordanians (39%) 
(Table 7.19).
The comparisons by gender underline, in each country, that women are 
more traditionalist than men; fundamentalism is also more diffuse among the 
Source: Author's elaboration on Arab Barometer data 
Table 7.16  Secular Politics Index R3
Country
Egypt Iraq Jordan Lebanon Palestine Total
Low 15% 17% 21% 7% 26% 17%
Middle 27% 35% 31% 11% 45% 30%
High 58% 48% 48% 82% 29% 53%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Author's elaboration on Arab Barometer data 
Table 7.17  Secular Politics Index by sex and age (scores: min = 1, max = 4)
Sex Age
Total Male Female Up to 29 30–45 46 and 
more
Egypt 3.27 3.32 3.22 3.19 3.26 3.39
Iraq 3.10 3.14 3.07 3.10 3.11 3.09
Jordan 3.10 3.08 3.11 3.09 3.13 3.05
Lebanon 3.62 3.63 3.60 3.54 3.55 3.73
Palestine 2.90 2.91 2.88 2.87 2.89 2.93
Total 3.19 3.20 3.17 3.15 3.17 3.27
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elderly, except in Lebanon, where they lived the dramatic ethno-religious con-
flict during the 70s and the 80s of the past century (Table 7.20).
The secular or fundamentalist attitudes toward politics are directly related 
to the consensus towards secular or religious political parties in each country, 
which has been evaluated, too. In partial contradiction with the opinions reg-
istered through the Secular Politics Index, the majority of the interviewed 
(49%) express their (strong plus positive) preferences in favor of the religious 
political parties, while only 30% disagree with this eventuality. As usual, the 
citizens of Palestine and Jordan opt for a fundamentalist approach (supported 
by 67% and 59% of the people), while the citizens of Lebanon mainly adopt a 
secular approach (67%) (Table 7.20).
Source: Author's elaboration of Arab Barometer data 
Table 7.18  Fundamentalism Index by sex and age (scores: min = 1, max = 4)
Sex Age
Total Male Female Up to 29 30–45 46 and 
over
Egypt 1.99 1.90 2.08 1.92 1.98 2.09
Iraq 2.43 2.38 2.49 2.36 2.49 2.47
Jordan 2.52 2.49 2.55 2.47 2.56 2.53
Lebanon 1.38 1.37 1.39 1.45 1.44 1.26
Palestine 2.44 2.37 2.50 2.46 2.44 2.40
Total 2.18 2.14 2.22 2.18 2.24 2.10
Source: Author's elaboration oF Arab Barometer data
Table 7.19  Fundamentalism Index R3 
Egypt Iraq Jordan Lebanon Palestine Total
Low 70% 44% 39% 90% 44% 56%
Middle 16% 23% 20% 5% 24% 18%
High 14% 33% 40% 5% 33% 26%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Some final evaluations arise from the correlation coefficients between the in-
dexes built during our comparative analysis13 and from the frequencies of the 
indexes grouped in three classes.
As we could expect, the preferences for the autonomy of politics from re-
ligious authorities (see Secular Politics Index) are positively correlated with 
the Islam Openness Index (r= .364) and negatively correlated with the Funda-
mentalism Index (r= -.322). A negative link (even if with lower score) may be 
observed with some other indexes, such as the Islam Law Conformity Index 
(r= -.158), Islamic Traditionalism Index (r = -.148). On the contrary, the Funda-
mentalism Index is positively correlated with the Islam Law Conformity Index  
(r = .461), the Islamic Traditionalism Index (r=.216) and negatively correlated 
with the Islam Openness Index (r= -.308) (Table 7.21).
Finally, we may underline that the highest ideological consensus is in favor 
of the Islamic Traditional Index (73%), on the one hand, and of the Secular 
13 All the correlations are statistically significant at .001.
Source: Author's elaboration on Arab Barometer data
Table 7.�0  Religious – Not religious political party agreement 
Egypt Iraq Jordan Lebanon Palestine Total
Strong preference  
for a religious political 
party
26% 20% 35% 8% 43% 27%
Preference for a 
religious political  
party
19% 35% 24% 9% 24% 22%
Preference for a not 
religious political  
party
27% 17% 10% 27% 14% 18%
Strong preference for a 
not religious political 
party
12% 4% 2% 39% 5% 12%
Do not agree with 
either sentence
16% 24% 30% 16% 14% 21%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
��5Religious Affiliations and Social Coexistence
<UN>
 Politics Index (53%), on the other, followed by the Islam Law Conformity Index 
(39%) and the Islam Openness Index (38%). Fortunately, the Fundamentalism 
Index –which may be considered as a radical expression of traditionalism – 
 obtains the last position (26%) (Table 7.22).
The positive position gained by secular perspective in the field of politics 
may be considered as a promising step for the improvement of the democratic 
dialectics inside Muslim Arab society, even if the past attempts to build secular 
politics (in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria) have flown into autocratic regimes.
Source: Author's elaboration on Arab Barometer data 
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Low 26% 8% 28% 17% 56%
Middle 34% 19% 35% 30% 18%
High 39% 73% 38% 53% 26%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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6 The Coexistence among Islamic and Christian People
The presence of religious minorities in hegemonic contests meets, in general, 
a lot of difficulties, not only for legal reasons (that formally could establish fair 
rules) but, principally, for social reasons, i.e. for the sense of superiority that 
majority groups express and apply toward “the others”, easily considered devi-
ant and dangerous for the establishment. According to the most positive hy-
pothesis, majority groups may be “tolerant” but rarely “inclusive”, i.e. open to 
mutual relationship.
Lebanon’s troubled experiences –marked by bloody conflicts in the 70s and 
the 80s– are the reasons behind the fact that Lebanese are less optimistic 
about the effective status of the relationship among Christian minorities and 
Islamic majorities in their country. On the contrary, it is not unexpected that 
the most optimistic about this topic are Egyptians, Palestinian and Iraqis (in 
their countries, in fact, Christian minorities are nearly invisible). There is, in 
practice, a negative correlation among the effective relevance of Christian mi-
norities in each country and the idyllic representation of their acceptance 
from Muslim majorities (Table 7.23).
In the perspective of our research, it is, in any case, interesting to analyze 
the sentiment of social distance towards people concerned with a different 
religion (mainly Christians) or belonging to different Islamic tradition, such as 
Shia or Sunni (Jihan, 2017).
In the first hypothesis, 27% of interviewed does not like to have people of 
different religion as neighbors, and 18% like it (the remaining 55% are indiffer-
ent). The refusal overcomes the acceptance in Palestine (28% vs 19%) and in 
Jordan (21% vs 10%), while the contrary happens in Egypt (47% like it vs 14%) 
and in Lebanon (29% vs 14%) (Figure 7.1).
In the second hypothesis, hostility grows up to 39%, while acceptance de-
creases to 14% (with 45% indifferent) (Figure 7.2). Strong difficulties arise, 
therefore, inside the Muslim people whose religious and political conflicts af-
fect dramatically the people living outside the Islamic denominations. The 
hostility is stronger in Egypt (50% vs 14%) and in Jordan (41% vs 7%), while 
tolerance is more widespread in Lebanon (31% vs 15%), confirming the atti-
tudes and the trends emerged also in the Third Arab Barometer survey.
7 Conclusions
Every reflection on the ideal relation that should exist between religious be-
longing and the promotion of a renewed social coexistence –built on the 
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 respect of the different identities and on the promotion of their right of ex-
pression at individual and collective level– must be based on the epochal 
meeting between Pope Francis and the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar Ahamad al-
Tayyib, which took place in February 2019 in Abu Dhabi, ended with the Docu-
ment on “Human Fraternity for world peace and living together”.14
The first apostolic visit of a Pope in the Arabic peninsula, and the long and 
intense dialogue with the Islamic religious authorities that made it possible, 
established a very fruitful opportunity to explain to all religious believers and 
goodwill people the joining value of faith in God and its reconciling conse-
quences on human and interpersonal relationships. The idea of this Document 
was itself conceived from a fraternal and open discussion to invite “all persons 
14 Document on “Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together” signed by His Ho-
liness Pope Francis and the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar Ahamad al-Tayyib (Abu Dhabi, 
4 February 2019).
Table 7.�3  How do you view the relationship between Christians (in Egypt: Copts) and 
Muslims in reality?  
Egypt Iraq Lebanon Palestine Total
A relationship of 
brotherhood, citizen-
ship and cooperation
80% 73% 39% 77% 67%
A relationship strained 
as a result of the 
cumulative mistakes of 
both officials and the 
people on both sides
12% 6% 30% 9% 14%
A relationship strained 
because of the mistakes 
of officials
3% 7% 16% 5% 8%
A relationship strained 
because of foreign 
conspiracy
5% 11% 13% 5% 9%
Do not know 1% 3% 1% 4% 2%
Refuse - - 1% - -
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Author's elaboration on Arab Barometer data
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who have faith in God and faith in human fraternity” to work together for pro-
moting the “culture of mutual respect, tolerance, coexistence and peace”.
In the foreword of the Document, everybody can read that “Faith leads a 
believer to see in the other a brother or sister to be supported and loved. 
Through faith in God, who has created the universe, creatures and all human 
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dislike Would not care like No answer
Figure 7.1 To have people of a different religion as neighbors





















Egypt Jordan Lebanon Total
dislike Would not care like No answer
Figure 7.� To have people of a different sect of Islam as neighbors
Source: Author's elaboration on Arab Barometer data
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creation and the entire universe and supporting all persons, especially the 
poorest and those most in need”.
The Document resolutely declares that “religions must never incite war, 
hateful attitudes, hostility and extremism, nor must they incite violence or the 
shedding of blood. These tragic realities are the consequence of a deviation 
from religious teachings. They result from a political manipulation of religions 
and from interpretations made by religious groups who, in the course of his-
tory, have taken advantage of the power of religious sentiment in the hearts of 
men and women in order to make them act in a way that has nothing to do 
with the truth of religion”.
The Pope and the Imam invite all the believers “to stop using religions to 
incite hatred, violence, extremism and blind fanaticism and to refrain from us-
ing the name of God to justify acts of murder, exile, terrorism and oppression”. 
In this way, they emphasize the importance of the role of religions in the con-
struction of world peace.
Among the most demanding sentences of the Document –which aim to im-
print a turn to the religious and social relations between Muslims and Eastern 
and Western Christians– we found the solemn obligation to adopt “a culture of 
dialogue as the path; mutual cooperation as the code of conduct; reciprocal 
understanding as the method and standard”.
The Document is fully aware of the difficulties that prevent the fulfilment of 
a “bright future for all human beings (the arms race, social injustice, corrup-
tion, inequality, moral decline, terrorism, discrimination, extremism and many 
other causes)”. However, it intentionally bets on the deepest desires of every 
man and woman.
The aim of the Document is very clear, as much as the urgencies and hopes 
that support it, but it is evident that many efforts should be made to solve the 
religious, cultural and social conflicts that affect Middle East countries, as we 
have verified also through the Arab Barometer surveys.
According our empirical data, most of the people interviewed in 2014 and 
2016 support the fundamental values at the basis of a pluralistic, tolerant, and 
democratic political system (freedom of belief, right to practice freely own re-
ligion, equal political rights for the religious minorities, same rights of women 
to education and employment). However, in every country (mainly in Jordan 
and Palestine), there are significant minorities (well organized and powerful) 
that do not support a more open society, i.e. a different way to build the coex-
istence of different identities. In this perspective, also the generational change 
looks ambivalent: in Jordan and Palestine, many young people are still attract-
ed by Islamic traditionalism more than by its modernization, even if in Egypt 
and Iraq opposite trends can be observed. Also in Lebanon, that is the most 
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pluralistic and tolerant country, the (low) Islamic traditionalism is more at-
tractive for young people.
On the whole, people open to introduce positive changes in civil and politi-
cal society represent a consistent minority (about 35%), but they have to face 
a very conservative and reacting people (about 25%) who, in fact, support dif-
ferent kinds of fundamentalism.
From a historical and political point of view, it is evident that in many coun-
tries it is impossible to promote and reach a positive coexistence and peace 
without a true and affordable cooperation among religious leaders and a faith-
ful belonging to the Christian and Islamic religion. Many ancient and contem-
porary events document the big importance of this kind of relationships, espe-
cially in the Middle East region where Christianity and Islam arose and where, 
nowadays, Christians are a small minority with many social troubles, and Mus-
lims are the largest majority, unfortunately divided by strong and large con-
flicts between Sunni and Shia.
According to our empirical analysis, we may say that the transition to a 
more tolerant, civil, and religious coexistence met the largest difficulties 
among Muslim people, from whom is expected a decisive contribution to 
peace and prosperity – two fundamental conditions also for the right to not 
emigrate (Teti, Abbott, 2017).
© VERA LOMAZZI, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004429604_009
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Chapter 8




In Muslim-majority societies, women tend to face severe disadvantages and 
discrimination more than in other countries. As a source of the gender in-
equalities existing in these countries, the patriarchal tradition is generally 
linked to the religious roots of legislation and cultural heritage. Despite what 
most of the Western public opinion believes, the gender cultures that can be 
retrieved in the Muslim-majority countries differ across societies and the sta-
tus of women varies. In this contribution, we aim at reflecting beyond the sim-
ple readings that equate gender inequality with Islam. With a focus on coun-
tries of North Africa and the Middle East (mena) we intend to provide an 
overview of the different gender cultures existing in this area. Gender cultures 
in this region are all somehow affected by the relation between religious norms, 
political and legislative power, but the extent to which norms and regulations 
impact on women’s right can be different. Similarly, people also can combine 
their quest for gender equality and the support for the religious influence on 
legislation and social life in different forms. Furthermore, gender cultures are 
subject to the country’s specific way of coping with the post-colonialist period 
and implementing reforms. Despite the strong normative effect of these insti-
tutional positions, there is not a unique way of living the link between religious 
faith and women’s rights. On the contrary, in the mena societies some feminist 
positions challenge the current status quo combining the quest for women’s 
rights with their support for the implementation of laws inspired by Islam in a 
variety of combinations, which range from secular to Islamist feminisms.
After providing a general overview of the gender cultures in mena coun-
tries, the contribution offers a reflection on the different outcomes for gender 
equality of the Arab Uprisings occurred in the region in 2011. In order to further 
explore the current gender cultures in the region, we observed how people 
combine the quest for gender equality with their support of Shariʿa law. To do 
so, we use data from the Arab Transformations Project, which investigated the 
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social, political and economic transformation after the uprisings in Egypt, Lib-
ya, Jordan, Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia. By using typologies built on the basis of 
extant literature (Badran, 2001; Fox et al., 2016; Mir-Hosseini, 2011), we identi-
fied differences in the distribution of Secular Feminist, Muslim Feminist, Re-
formist, and Islamist people living in these countries, illustrating a variety of 
gender cultures in line with the historical developments described by the theo-
retical literature.
2 Gender Cultures in the mena Region
Pfau-Effinger (1998: 150) describes the gender culture as the “uniform norma-
tive assumptions existing in society about the proper form of gender relations 
and of the division of work between men and women”. These norms and val-
ues guide people in their behavior about gender relations and provide gender 
role expectations. Societies differ in the way they define the proper role for 
women and men. Gender cultures are in fact situated, that means that they 
are subject to the characteristics of each society, which can also change over 
time. The different economic, political, and social historical pathways led so-
cieties to develop different gender cultures, which reflect in a variety of gen-
der norms and related expected gender roles, who changed accordingly with 
the broader structural and cultural change of societies (Inglehart, Norris, 2003; 
Pfau- Effinger, 2004). The way gender cultures develop is a very complicated 
process: it refers to the intertwined relation between individual, relational 
and institutional levels of gender relations (Wharton, 2005). The individual 
values, showed for example in supporting egalitarian gender roles, cannot be 
explained only from an individual perspective, because they also result from 
the socialization process and the daily negotiations (West, Zimmerman, 1987). 
Therefore, they are not just a matter of individual preference. Furthermore, 
this ongoing process takes place in a societal context, made of laws, social 
norms, and institutional structures that are of course part of a society’s gender 
culture and affect the individuals’ values and behaviors.
In a cultural context, the mainstreaming ideas about masculinity and femi-
ninity as well the prevailing family model determine what in a society can be 
considered an appropriate role for a man and for a woman. Such gender norms 
impact on people’s life at individual, domestic and social level. They could refer 
to every aspect of personal and social life. The appropriate way of dressing for 
a woman or a man at each stage of life, the behaviors considered more or less 
adequate in private and in public contexts, the “right” roles that a woman or a 
man should have in society, the distinction of tasks and caring  responsibilities 
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between husband and wife and the tasks assigned to sons and daughters, the 
agreement about a specific share of inheritance between daughters and sons, 
or the fact the women could or could not be allowed to travel alone – these are 
all aspects of the gender norms within a particular social context.  Following 
different historical-cultural paths, societies have developed different gender 
cultures displaying different position between the maintenance of more tra-
ditional-patriarchal values and progressive views, with the adoption of values 
and behaviors more oriented towards reciprocity than complementarity (In-
glehart, Norris, 2003; Pfau-Effinger, 2004; 1998).
In the case of societies in the mena region, it is impossible to think of gen-
der cultures without including into the reflection two relevant aspects that 
contribute to defining the value systems of these societies as well their struc-
tural organization: the intertwined relationship between religion and politics 
and the past Western domination.
Islam and post-colonialism are in fact essential elements of the cultural 
context of this region. In several countries of the mena region, the Shariʿa law 
disciplines the private as well as the public life. In particular, the personal sta-
tus codes concern laws and norms about marriage, divorce, custody, inheri-
tance. Because of the impact of such regulation on women’s lives, the personal 
status codes are often recognized as a central issue for women’s rights in the 
region (Fox et al., 2016; Hatem, 1994; Rahman, 2012). Western observers tend to 
equate Shariʿa to patriarchal laws. As Mir-Hossein points out (Mir-Hosseini, 
2006, 2011), it is instead necessary to consider the distinction between Shariʿa, 
that refers to the revealed law of God, and fiqh, which is the jurisprudence 
based on the human interpretation of Shariʿa. The Sahriʿa is an essential source 
of justice for most Muslims, but its interpretation is a crucial debate in the 
Muslim world and different traditions exist (Carlisle, 2019; Mir-Hosseini, 2011; 
Rahman, 2012). As Rahman (2012) explains, regardless of the school of law, the 
family laws sourced by Shariʿa are built on the Quran that describes gender 
roles according to the natural differences between men and women. Similarly 
as in other religious traditions, this reflects into the specialization of tasks and 
responsibilities because of gender. Nevertheless, also in this case scholars’ po-
sitions can differ. In addition to the quest for women’s rights, also reformist 
views that would encourage reinterpretation and legal changes are emerging 
(Mir-Hosseini, 2011).
Such a strict link between religion and legislation challenges the tradi-
tional conceptualization of Western democracy, based on the separation of 
religious and political powers (Hashemi, 2009). By assuming this perspective, 
theocracy has been seen as one of the main causes of unequal rights (in the 
cases of women and minorities) and of the reinforcement of authoritarianism 
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 (Altemeyer, Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1995; Mir-Hosseini, 2006). The cur-
rent process of radicalization, with the call for a rigid “return to Shariʿa” also in 
the domain of women’s rights, claimed by Islamist forces, is interpreted as an 
opposition to the Western model of democracy and the attempt of re-affirming 
an authentic identity as reaction to the colonialist era and orientalism (Fox 
et al., 2016; Hilsdon, Rozario, 2006; Mir-Hosseini, 2011).
In this general context of complexity, countries in the mena region devel-
oped different gender cultures, which resulted from the specific historical 
pathways, cultural heritage, the unique ways of coping with the post- colonialist 
period and of implementing reforms (Abbott, Teti, 2017b; Sarnelli, 2016).
3 cedaw Acceptance and Shariʿa Law
To consider differences in gender cultures one may consider individual values 
as well as institutional aspects. To further explore the connections between 
gender cultures and their relation with religion, it could be interesting to con-
sider to what extent country legislations norm gender relations and define 
women’s right (Branisa et al., 2014). While previous research already explored 
differences between the institutional aspects of gender cultures in the mena 
region concerning issues related to gender-based violence (Kelly, Breslin, 2010), 
here we consider how the gender cultures can differ in this region by observing 
the ways countries accepted the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (cedaw).
The cedaw, adopted by the United Nations in 1979, is one of the most im-
portant treaties concerning gender equality. Not only does it define the basis to 
achieve gender equality, but it also conceptualizes the equal access to, and 
equal opportunities in, political and public life as a matter of human rights. 
The Convention describes discrimination against women as
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which 
has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, en-
joyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a 
basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other 
field. (Article 1)
The cedaw is a cornerstone for gender equality legislation. Its strong rele-
vance is due to the fact of defining the forms of gender discrimination in a 
treaty potentially valid worldwide.
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Made of 30 articles, which cover gender equality in several domains (from 
personal freedom, to family rights, to social and political participation), the 
cedaw has been subscribed by 189 countries. However, not all of them ac-
cepted it entirely. Some countries ratified the cedaw with reservations on spe-
cific articles that would not be compatible with a nationally accepted interpre-
tation of the Shariʿa provisions. The main aspects of the different degree of 
acceptance of the cedaw have been already described in previous studies 
(El-Masri, 2012; Lomazzi, 2016). Here, a recap of the reservations to cedaw ar-
ticles in countries of the mena region is summarized in Table 8.1.
While Morocco, Tunisia, Djibouti, and Palestine Authority accepted cedaw 
without any reservations (Morocco withdrew the reservations in 2011), the 
other countries differ by their degree of acceptance of the convention, ranging 
from Yemen, that made a reservation only on article 29 concerning the admin-
istration of the convention, to Syria, that displays the highest number of reser-
vations, including the one concerning child marriage. As shown in Table 8.1, 
articles concerning marriage and family life, and freedom of movement are 
those that more frequently are considered in contrast with the national inter-
pretation of Shariʿa law. Such reservations are of particular relevance for the 
interest of this study. Laws implying a subsidiary position of women in society 
and in family life have a substantial impact on gender role expectations and 
individuals’ opportunity of self-determination. Since these reservations derive 
from the nationally widespread interpretation of Shariʿa, one could think that 
gender equality in Muslim majority States is limited because of the influence 
of the predominant religion and that people living in mena region are gener-
ally against women’s rights.
While it is undoubted that the countries in this region display lower levels of 
gender equality compared to other areas of the world, the generalization of 
such stereotypes may be misleading.
The World Economic Forum yearly drafts the Global Gender Gap Report.1 It 
provides a gender gap index aimed at measuring gender inequality in four do-
mains: economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, 
health and survival, and political empowerment. The index ranges from 0 (in-
equality) to 1 (lack of gender gaps, equality). According to the most recent re-
port (wef, 2018), countries in the mena region have low scores and occupy the 
lowest part of the rank. The most egalitarian is however Tunisia (0.648), fol-
lowed by United Arab Emirates (0.642); Kuwait (0.630); Qatar (0.629); Algeria 
(0.629); Bahrain (0.627); Egypt (0.614); Morocco (0.607); Oman (0.605); Jordan 




Table 8.1  cedaw Convention acceptance
Country Year of 
acceptance
Reservations to articles and main topics (the numbers in 
parenthesis indicate a specific paragraph of the article)
Algeria 1996 2 (policy measures i.e. intention to enshrine gender 
equality into domestic legislation)15(4) (equal rights to 
legal capacity and freedom of movement)
16 (equal rights in marriage and family life)
29 (an article related to the administration of the 
convention; i.e. arbitration in the event of a dispute)
Bahrain 2002 2 (policy measures i.e. intention to enshrine gender 
equality into domestic legislation)9 (2) (equal rights with 
men to acquire, change or retain their nationality; equal 
rights with regard to the nationality of children)
15 (4) (equal rights to legal capacity and freedom of 
movement)
16 (equal rights in marriage and family life)
29 (1) (an article related to the administration of the 
convention; i.e. arbitration in the event of a dispute)
Djibouti 1998 No reservation
Egypt 1981 2 (policy measures i.e. intention to enshrine gender 
equality into domestic legislation)16 (equal rights in 
marriage and family life)
29 (an article related to the administration of the 
convention; i.e. arbitration in the event of a dispute)
Iran - Even if in 2003, the Iranian parliament ratified the 
cedaw, it is still awaiting consideration by the Expedi-
ency Council.
Iraq 1986 2 (f) (g) (policy measures i.e. intention to enshrine gender 
equality into domestic legislation)16 (equal rights in 
marriage and family life)
29 (1) (an article related to the administration of the 
convention; i.e. arbitration in the event of a dispute)
Jordan 1992 9 (2) (equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain 
their nationality; equal rights with regard to the national-
ity of children)16 Paragraph 1 (c) (same rights and 
responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution), (d) 
(same rights and responsibilities as parents) and (g) (same 
personal rights, including the right to choose a family 
name, a profession and an occupation)
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Country Year of 
acceptance
Reservations to articles and main topics (the numbers in 
parenthesis indicate a specific paragraph of the article)
Kuwait 1994 9(2) (equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain 
their nationality; equal rights with regard to the national-
ity of children)16(f) (equal rights in marriage and family 
life)
29(1) (an article related to the administration of the 
convention; i.e. arbitration in the event of a dispute)
Libya 1989 2 (policy measures i.e. intention to enshrine gender 
equality into domestic legislation)16 (equal rights in 
marriage and family life)
Lebanon 1997 9 (2) (equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain 
their nationality; equal rights with regard to the national-
ity of children)16 (1) (c) (d) (f) (g) (equal rights in 
marriage and family life)
29 (1) (related to the administration of the convention; 
arbitration in the event of a dispute)
Morocco 1993 2 (policy measures i.e. intention to enshrine gender 
equality into domestic legislation)15(4) (equal rights to 
legal capacity and freedom of movement)
29 (an article related to the administration of the 
convention; i.e. arbitration in the event of a dispute)
The reservations were formally withdrawn in 2011.
Oman 2006 9(2) (equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain 
their nationality; equal rights with regard to the national-
ity of children)15 (4) (equal rights to legal capacity and 
freedom of movement)
16 (1a,c,f) (equal rights in marriage and family life)
29 (1) (an article related to the administration of the 
convention; i.e. arbitration in the event of a dispute)
Palestine 
Authority
Ratification without any reservations as a non-member 
State
Qatar 2009 2(a) (policy measures i.e. intention to enshrine gender 
equality into domestic legislation)9(2) (equal rights with 
men to acquire, change or retain their nationality; equal 
rights with regard to the nationality of children)
15(1) (4) (equal rights to legal capacity and freedom of 
movement)
16(1a) (equal rights in marriage and family life)
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(0.605); Lebanon (0.595); Saudi Arabia (0.590); Iran (0.589); Syria (0.568); Iraq 
(0.551); Yemen (0.499).2 These situations can be considered as the result of this 
2 Data on Palestine, Libya, Djibouti are not available.
Table 8.1 cedaw Convention acceptance (cont.)
Country Year of 
acceptance
Reservations to articles and main topics (the numbers in 
parenthesis indicate a specific paragraph of the article)
Saudi 
Arabia
2000 9(2) (equal rights with men to acquire, change or retain 
their nationality; equal rights with regard to the national-
ity of children)29(1) (an article related to the administra-
tion of the convention; i.e. arbitration in the event of a 
dispute)
Syria 2003 2 (policy measures i.e. intention to enshrine gender 
equality into domestic legislation)9 (2) (equal rights with 
men to acquire, change or retain their nationality; equal 
rights with regard to the nationality of children)
15 (4) (equal rights to legal capacity and freedom of 
movement)
16 1 (c), (d), (f) and (g) (equality in marriage and family 
life)
16 (2) (child marriage)
29 (1) (an article related to the administration of the 
convention; i.e. arbitration in the event of a dispute)




2004 2(f) (policy measures i.e. intention to enshrine gender 
equality into domestic legislation)9 (equal rights with 
men to acquire, change or retain their nationality; equal 
rights with regard to the nationality of children)
15(2) (equal rights to legal capacity and freedom of 
movement)
16 (equal rights in marriage and family life)
29(1) (an article related to the administration of the 
convention; i.e. arbitration in the event of a dispute)
Yemen 1984 29(1) (an article related to the administration of the 
convention; i.e. arbitration in the event of a dispute)
Source: oecd/cawtar, 2014
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variety of gender cultures, produced by the intertwined relationship of histori-
cal, cultural, political, economic and social processes. Despite the common 
fact of being a Muslim-majority country, countries in the mena region differ in 
several ways. The historical heritages flow into new and different pathways 
that distinguish political systems and regimes. The degree of influence of reli-
gious power on the political processes can profoundly differ and the institu-
tional positions towards human rights, and more specifically towards minori-
ties and women rights, vary as well. In the context of such different cultural 
and structural frameworks, women’s movements developed their action ac-
cordingly (Moghadam, 2018; Parashar, 2016). Consequently, also their influence 
on social change did not impact in the same way in all the countries.
The relation between religion and gender equality is however a central issue 
(Razavi, Jenichen, 2010), especially in this region. Most of the religions tend to 
support a traditional and patriarchal view of gender roles (Alexander, Welzel, 
2015; Forman-Rabinovici, Sommer, 2018; Inglehart, Norris, 2003; Klingorová, 
Havlíček, 2015). When religious and political powers are not distinct, their re-
ciprocal influence can establish a strong barrier to gender equality, especially 
when strictly confessional views are embraced in policy-making processes. On 
the other hand, the support for patriarchal values is not only due to religion 
and cultural aspects. In the case of the mena region, for example, authors also 
take into account structural factors that contribute to explaining gender in-
equality in the region (Moghadam, 2003; Rahman, 2012; Ross, 2008), such as 
oils and gas rent: “Oil production reduces the number of women in the labor 
force, which in turn reduces their political influence. As a result, oil-producing 
States are left with atypically strong patriarchal norms, laws, and political insti-
tutions” (Ross, 2008: 117).
Investigating gender equality in Muslim-majority countries is not easy be-
cause of the degree of complexity that needs to be taken into account (Alexan-
der, Welzel, 2015). For example, as seen earlier, countries in the mena region 
display a variety of institutional position towards conservative views. Further-
more, people’s opinions in the domain of women’s right and of the relation 
between religious and political powers can deeply differ. Moreover, such indi-
vidual positions need to be considered in the frame of the historical pathways 
of gender cultures that, in these countries, have been affected also by the colo-
nialist domination – which, in the long term, may have generated a backlash to 
traditional values (Fox et al., 2016; Hilsdon, Rozario, 2006). Alongside a dynam-
ic and longstanding scenario of feminist movements quite vivid in some of the 
mena countries (Al-Ali, 2003; Moghadam, 2003, 2008), people nowadays com-
bine the support for women’s rights with the support for the implementation 
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of laws inspired by Islam in a variety of formulations ranging from secular 
feminism to Islamist positions.
4 Islam and Feminisms
According to extant literature (Azam, 2018; Badran, 2001; Halverson, Way, 2011; 
Mir-Hosseini, 2006), four possible ways to combine the support for the reli-
gious source of personal status codes and women’s rights can be identified.
Based on the idea that only the separation between religious and political 
power can guarantee the establishment and the development of women’s 
right, the secular feminism follows the Western idea of a division between 
Mosque and State. According to this view, women’s rights should not have their 
roots in the religious tradition.
People who see this conceptualization as the fruit of the Western colonialist 
era and refuse the idea of a Westernization of the Arab world tend to criticize 
the secular position. Two main perspectives can be then assumed according to 
the degree of support towards gender equality and to what extent people link 
women’s rights to Islam.
The Muslim feminism (Halverson, Way, 2011; Mir-Hosseini, 2011) is a global 
movement that affirms that gender equality is reconcilable with Islam. “Justice 
and equality are intrinsic values and cardinal principles in Islam and the 
Shariʿa” (Mir-Hosseini, 2006: 629), and the traditional patriarchal interpreta-
tion of the Quran needs to be questioned. This perspective keeps the centrality 
and authority of the Quran uncontested. Furthermore, the supporters of the 
Muslim feminism argue that the promotion of women’s rights in the Arab 
world can be effectively pursued only by Islam-centered feminism (el- Husseini, 
2016).
Pursuing the centrality of Islam in social and political life, but with a radical 
twist, Islamists favor a stronger role of religious norms in personal status law. 
In contrast to Muslim feminism, who asks for a reinterpretation of the patriar-
chal reading of Shariʿa, Islamism views do not challenge the traditional per-
spective but call instead for a stricter observation of the religious provisions 
concerning also gender roles. Halverson and Way (2011) define Islamism as the 
result of the anti-colonial feeling that was widespread in the early twentieth 
century and that was particularly remarkable in British ex-colonies such as 
Egypt and India. Such fervor against the dominators led to the establishment 
in the city of Cairo of the Society of Muslim Brotherhood in 1931. Since its birth, 
the Muslim Brothers aimed to defend and reinforce the Islamic identity in con-
trast to Western influence. This intention reflected in the reinforcement of 
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 traditional Islamic morality. In more recent times, and not only in Egypt, Is-
lamist forces start opposing the reform processes of law secularization calling 
for a return to the Shariʿa. As reported by Mir-Hosseini (2011), this implied con-
sequences also in the domain of gender equality with the return to patriarchal 
norms and gender segregation. In the long term, the events connected with the 
Arab uprising have in some cases exacerbated this return to conservative views 
and resulted in radicalization.
The case of Islamic Reformism is a fourth theoretically possible combina-
tion of the concerns for gender equality and Shariʿa. This typology represents 
the position of those people who refuse the religious source of legislation and 
norms, but at the same time do not support gender equality. Their possible 
quest of reforms of Shariʿa provisions, considered necessary to deal with social 
change (when it is not meant for an entirely secular interpretation), is then not 
related to the support for women’s rights.
5 Women’s Rights and the Arab Uprisings
The events that developed into the Arab Uprisings made the relationship be-
tween gender equality, democracy, and religion even more complex. While ini-
tially the public opinion thought that such events would have triggered the 
quest for democratic values and gender equality, the effective impact of such 
uprisings on gender equality in the region is still unclear (Fox et al., 2016). This 
uncertainty in finding a common pattern is due to the fact that the impact of 
the uprisings cannot be evaluated without considering the particular situation 
of each country and the women’s status before the uprisings and the eventual 
pre-existing feminist movements. Countries have their own history and ex-
pecting similar pathways is a false pre-assumption. Furthermore, while many 
authors argue that the quest for gender equality should be considered as a rel-
evant part of social change, also wished by the Arab Uprising, which included 
the challenge to systems characterized by corruption, political and economic 
marginalization, this did not always meet the expectations (Teti, Abbott, 2017b).
The outcomes of the Arab Uprisings have been deeply different (Abbott, 
Teti, 2017b; Moghadam, 2018). In some countries, such as Syria, Yemen, and 
Libya the protests turned into violent civil conflicts, which are still causing a 
severe humanitarian crisis. Tunisia and Morocco embraced democratic transi-
tions. Protests in Morocco, for example, were very soon followed by promised 
reforms and amendments. Other countries reverted to authoritarianism. 
Egypt, which initially approached a democratic transition, turned instead into 
military authoritarianism. With regard to the impact of the uprisings on  gender 
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equality, Moghadam (2018) points out that it is necessary to consider women’s 
status before the rise of the protests because these prior conditions, that dif-
fered across the region, help to explain the different outcomes. Compared to 
other countries in the region, in Morocco and Tunisia women’s rights have a 
longer tradition (Moghadam, 2018). Institutional changes concerning for ex-
ample the withdrawal of the reservations to cedaw started quite earlier than 
the uprisings. Tunisia is considered to be one of the most gender-egalitarian 
country in the Arab world and the achievement obtained soon after the 2011 
protests are considered as part of a long-term process (Charrad, Zarrugh, 2014; 
Khalil, 2014). As Moghadam (2018) reports, Tunisia’s figures concerning female 
labor market participation, education, literacy and women in the judiciary and 
politics have been better than elsewhere already in the past. Furthermore, it 
was the only country with a political party led by a woman (Maya Jribi, leader 
of the Progressive Democratic Party). After the 2011 protests, the transitional 
government declared an equal opportunity law. Women largely participated in 
the public debate that deeply influenced the political processes. The role of 
women’s associations has been particularly relevant in the quest for women’s 
rights and secular law (Charrad, Zarrugh, 2014; Gray, 2012; Khalil, 2014; Mogha-
dam, 2018).
As in the Tunisian case, even in Morocco the achievements in the formal 
recognition of gender equality rights are part of a gradual process, which start-
ed with the acceptance of cedaw in 1993. In 2004, King Mohammed vi made 
essential amendments to the Family Code, giving women broader access to 
family and personal rights. In 2008, he lifted the reservations on cedaw. En-
abled also by the structural changes who favored women participation in pub-
lic life, women’s movements played an important role in addressing issues and 
assert women into this relevant debate (Moghadam, 2018). In 2011, the mass 
protest February 20th Movement brought to the adoption of a new constitu-
tion, which additionally increased women’s rights (Prettitore, 2015), prohibits 
any form of discrimination and defines the supremacy of the international hu-
man rights conventions over domestic law.
In Egypt, the situation took a different pathway. In the first decades of the 
20th century, women activism focused against colonial practices and protested 
alongside men for the liberation of Egypt (Magdy, 2017). As Sorbera describes 
(2014), this participation did not result in a formal recognition of political 
rights and women organized themselves in informal networks and later struc-
tured through those civil society organizations that led to achieve the right to 
vote in 1956. However, the patriarchal system remains unchanged and women’s 
rights groups were slowly marginalized (Magdy, 2017; Moghadam, 2018). Never-
theless, the long history of the Egyptian resistance to patriarchy exploded in 
the protests of 2011 (Sorbera, 2016).
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During the protests of 2011, women who participated in the rallies were sub-
ject to harassment and sexual abuse. When they were arrested during the pro-
tests that they were forced to undergo virginity tests (Hafez, 2014; Moghadam, 
2018). Such repression limited even more the potential participation of wom-
en. As Magdy (2017) reports, women’s quest for equal rights is still generally 
perceived as an attempt at Westernization and as a threat to traditional family 
values. Since after the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood have tried to re-
place the women’s rights agenda with a “family agenda”, reinforcing the oppo-
sition to a secular perspective on gender roles and gender equality. Under Al 
Sisi’s regime, women’s status did not improve. On the contrary, sexual violence 
and harassment increased and, in general, human rights were considered un-
der threat. Sorbera (2016) reports that only in the first months of 2015 almost 
400 Non-Governmental Organizations were obliged to closure, supporters of 
Muslim Brotherhood were sentenced to death, and activists in favor of human 
and labor rights were prosecuted. The risk of persecution, torture and death 
increased also for scholars, as in the terrible case of Giulio Regeni as well as in 
the recent one of Patrick George Zaki, demonstrating to the international ob-
servers the progressive turn of the Egyptian regime into a violent authoritari-
anism (Gonzales, 2016; Ryzova, 2017; Teti et al., 2017).
Moghadam’s overview of female mobilization in the mena region (2018) 
also reports the situation of Libya, Syria and Yemen. In Libya, since 1969, many 
laws have been implemented to grant women personal rights and to make sec-
ondary education compulsory for both men and women. These norms gave 
formal equality in the public sphere, but family law still relies on the unequal 
relationship between men and women and put women under the supervision 
of a male kin. At the same time, the country did not experience any formal 
women’s activism.
Soon after obtaining the right to vote in 1949, women were involved in pub-
lic life in Syria. However, the personal status law remained mainly uncontested. 
The country accepted the cedaw with a long list of reservation that made it 
impossible to implement any improvement for the women’s legal rights in the 
domain of family, marriage, divorce, child custody, and protection from gender- 
based violence (Kelly, Breslin, 2010). In Yemen, one of the poorest countries of 
the region, women’s status worsened after the unification in 1990, which 
brought the country to stronger Islamism. The constitution declares Shariʿa as 
a source of legislation. In addition, Article 31 affirms that women’s rights and 
duties are assigned by Shariʿa and established by the law (Moghadam, 2018). As 
reported also by the Human Rights Watch (2015), women in  Yemen face restric-
tion in their freedom of movement, discrimination with  regard to access to 
resources, and they are marginalized in political processes.  Gender-based vio-
lence is widespread and early marriage is a socially  legitimized practice. After 
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the revolts, Libyan Islamist groups start promoting a stricter  interpretation of 
the Islamic personal law as well as gender segregation in the public spaces. 
Meanwhile, Libya become an unsafe country and a central point for the isis 
activity (Engel, 2015; Moghadam, 2018). The group of Syrian women “Syrian 
women for the Syrian revolt”, emerged during the uprising, has been sup-
pressed by the rising Islamist groups. Women were marginalized by the politi-
cal life, patriarchal views and gender-based violence, included child marriage, 
exacerbated during the Syrian war and refugee crisis (Lomazzi, 2016).
So far, the situation of women in Jordan and Iraq after the uprising has not 
been studied in depth as in the case of the other countries. Among the few 
studies of this kind, Ferguson reports (2017) that in Jordan women’s organiza-
tion were not able to effectively improve the status of women during and after 
the uprising, also because of the depoliticization of such organizations.
This brief overview of women’s rights in the mena region suggests that peo-
ple living in such different societies would express their support to gender 
equality and Shariʿa provisions in a variety of forms, especially in the aftermath 
of the uprisings. In the next paragraph, we will explore how people combine 
these two aspects.
6 Islamism, Reformism, Secular and Muslim Feminism in Six 
Countries
While previous studies mainly focused on the theoretical description of the 
forms of feminism in the mena region (Badran, 2001; Halverson, Way, 2011; Mir-
Hosseini, 2011; Moghadam, 2001; Parashar, 2016; Winter, 2001), the current con-
tribution aims at empirically identifying the existence of such typologies. To 
our knowledge, only Fox et al. (2016) dealt with this issue by using survey data. 
They mainly focused on the change of support for women’s right in the after-
math of the Arab uprising, but not much information about the different 
 distribution of the forms of supports across countries is provided. Here, we 
slightly revise their conceptualization of feminism and use a combination of 
support for Shariʿa law and attitudes towards gender roles to describe the dis-
tribution of Secular Feminism, Muslim Feminism, Islamic Reformism, and Is-
lamism by using the most recent data available on this issue collected by the 
Arab Transformations Project in 2014 in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco 
and Tunisia.
6.1 Data Description
To illustrate the forms of feminisms supported by people, we use data collect-
ed by the Arab Transformations Project (AT2014).
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The Arab Transformations Project is a European Commission funded project 
(2013–2016) investigating the root causes of the Arab Uprisings in seven Arab 
mena countries. The project carried out also a survey in late 2014 to explore 
people’s attitudes and behaviors. Data collected among representative samples 
of the population are available for Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and 
 Tunisia.3 The dataset is freely accessible to users (Abbott, Teti, 2017a). Table 8.2 
shows the sample sizes and the fieldwork period for each country.
6.2 Measurements
To be able to detect different forms of feminism, we built a typology based on 
the theoretical literature (el-Husseini, 2016; Halverson, Way, 2011; Mir-Hosseini, 
2006, 2011) as well on the empirical work proposed by Fox et al. (2016). Accord-
ing to such perspectives, it is necessary to consider, on the one hand, the sup-
port for women’s rights and, on the other, the support for Shariʿa law. In par-
ticular, the authors stressed the important connection with the support for 
Islam being the source of legislation of family and personal status laws. We 
therefore computed two measurements, indicating the support for gender 
equality and the support for legislation inspired by Shariʿa and combined them 
to define four distinct typologies: secular feminists, Muslim feminists, Islam 
Reformist, and Islamist.
The support for gender equality is grasped by the agreement of the respon-
dents with the following statements:
a. A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl*
b. Women can work outside the home
c. On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do*
3 For more information about the project and survey methodology applied, please consult the 
project website: https://www.arabtrans.eu/.
Table 8.2  Sample sizes by country and survey
Sample size Fieldwork period
Egypt 1525 05 – 24/11/2014
Iraq 1613 4/05 – 22/06/2014
Jordan 2139 7–18/06/2014
Libya 1540 25/05 – 31/08/2014
Morocco 1777 15/07 – 30/10/2014




These items specifically cover the public dimension of gender ideologies 
( Davis, Greenstein, 2009) and help understand the degree of support for wom-
en’s rights in contrast with patriarchal values. The index is obtained by com-
puting the mean of the scores of each item and it goes from 1 (lowest support 
for gender equality) to 4 (highest support for gender equality). The scores of 
items indicated with * were reversed in order to achieve the same direction.
As pointed out by Fair et al. (2018), the support for Shariʿa can be operation-
alized in several ways. It is a complex and multi-dimensional concept and 
scholars have used measurements based on different conceptualizations fo-
cused on general or specific aspects of Shariʿa. While Fox et al. (2016), focused 
on the dimension of family and inheritance laws, alongside other religious pro-
visions concerning gender mixed education and women’s dress code, in our 
measurement we substitute the dimension related to inheritance issues with 
the support for Shariʿa in all aspects of the legislation. In this way we can cover 
a broader belief concerning the role of Shariʿa in regulating social, political, 
and economic life. The respondents were asked to express their agreement to 
the statements:
d. The government should implement only the laws derived from Shariʿa
e. The government and the parliament should make personal status/family 
law according to Shariʿa
f. It is acceptable in Islam for male and female university students to attend 
class together*
g. In Islam women should dress modestly, but Islam does not require that 
they wear a hijab*
Also in this case, the index is obtained by computing the mean of the scores of 
each item and it goes from 1 (lowest support for Shariʿa) to 4 (highest support 
for Shariʿa). The scores of items indicated with * were reversed in order to 
achieve the same direction.
Fox et al. (2016) were particularly interested in studying the support for 
Muslim feminism and according to the goal of their study; they operate dis-
tinctions only between secular and religious forms of support for gender equal-
ity. Here, we wish to explore differences in the distribution of different possible 
forms of combination of the support for gender equality and support for 
Shariʿa as described in the literature. The scores of both measurements have 
been then dichotomized and four typologies result from their possible 
combinations:
– Muslim Feminists: people supporting both gender equality and Shariʿa. 
Those belonging to this typology, support women’s right but refuse a secular 
interpretation of gender roles. Gender equality, according to this view, may 
be achieved through Islam.
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– Secular Feminists: this typology refers to those respondents who consider 
theocracy a limit for gender equality. Their support for gender equality goes 
together with the quest for secular codes ruling family laws, dress code, gen-
der segregation etc.
– Islamists: people belonging to this group display conservative views con-
cerning both gender equality and the source of legislation. They support 
Shariʿa as the primary source of regulations and support a traditional sepa-
ration of roles between men and women.
– Reformists: this fourth typology, resulted from the combination of low sup-
port for gender equality and low support for Shariʿa law, comprises the re-
spondents who have a traditional view of gender roles and, at the same 
time, may express a secular view concerning the source of legislation and 
would support reforms in this perspective.
By using such operative definitions, the graph in Figure 8.1 displays their distri-
bution in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, and Tunisia.
While in all the countries the different typologies coexist, their distribution 
profoundly differs. Compared to the other five countries here considered, 
Egypt displays the lowest share of people supporting gender equality (46.3%). 
Tunisia and Morocco, instead, show the highest rate of people questing for 
women’s rights (respectively 78.1% and 76.8% of the population sample). How-
ever, in all the countries except Tunisia, Muslim feminists are the biggest share 
of the gender egalitarian supporters. This means that most of the people advo-
cating for women’s rights see the roots of women’s rights in Islam and chal-
lenge the patriarchal reading of Shariʿa. About half of the people living in Jor-
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In all the countries, only a small amount of people question Shariʿa without 
supporting gender equality. The share of pure Reformists is very small (from 
3.6% in Morocco to 8.5% in Tunisia). Islamists, who consider Shariʿa as the es-
sential source for legislation in all aspects of social and personal life and argue 
that gender roles are defined by Shariʿa, are the biggest group in Egypt (46.2% 
of the sample). Islamist perspective is assumed by one-third of the Iraqi and by 
a bit less than 2 people in 5 in Jordan and Libya. In Morocco and Tunisia, peo-
ple expressing Islamist view are far less 20%.
These distributions result in line with the country characteristics emerged 
by the literature review (§5), especially in the case of Egypt, Morocco and 
 Tunisia. After the uprising, Egypt reversed into an authoritarian regime with a 
strong Islamist component and anti-Western feelings. Considering these as-
pects, it does not surprise that the country displays the lowest support for gen-
der equality, with particular regard to the secular (Western) view, and the high-
est share of Islamist. Tunisia and Morocco both implemented reforms that 
increased women’s rights as part of a pathway towards gender equality rooted 
in the past history of women’s movements, with Tunisia developing a stronger 
secular component.
7 Conclusive Remarks
Too often Western observers risk considering countries belonging to the mena 
region, and in general, Muslim-majority countries, as similar social contexts 
characterized by the common denominator of patriarchal gender norms. Ac-
cording to these views, Muslim women are thought in need of being saved 
(Abu-Lughod, 2013), assuming that they are not able to empower themselves 
and that the Western way to democracy and gender equality is the only way 
possible.
In this chapter, we tried to go beyond these perspectives and offered some 
elements to be taken into account for a more profound study of gender equal-
ity in these social and cultural contexts. In particular, we tried to stress the 
importance of considering the history of the country, with a specific reference 
to the colonialism and post-colonial framework, as well as the political, eco-
nomic, and social processes related to the Arab Uprisings that may have accel-
erated or suppressed the quest for democratic values and gender equality. Fur-
thermore, gender norms and the support for gender equality need to be studied 
in the context of the relationship with religion, in particular with the Shariʿa 
provisions concerning family rights and personal status.
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We introduced the variety of gender cultures existing in the mena region by 
providing an overview of the country’s acceptance of the cedaw, the most 
important international treaty on gender equality. The topics, as well as the 
amount, of reservations that each country made to the cedaw provide valu-
able insights to start understanding how deeply different the status of women 
between the countries of this region is. Women cannot access, at least formally, 
the same rights in all the countries. In most of the countries, women do not 
have the same rights as men in family matters, such as marriage, divorce, and 
inheritance. Algeria, Bahrein, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, 
and Syria made reservations to the article requiring countries to include gen-
der equality in the domestic legislation. In addition to these restrictions, wom-
en have limited freedom of movement in Oman, Qatar, Syria, Bahrein, United 
Arab Emirates. Iran never accepted the cedaw. Saudi Arabia made a reserva-
tion only to rights concerning the nationality of children. Djibouti, Palestine, 
and Tunisia have accepted the cedaw entirely. Morocco removed all the reser-
vation after the revolts of 2011.
Most of these reservations are due to a strict institutional observation of the 
Shariʿa personal status law. Institutions have an important role in defining gen-
der cultures. They provide the opportunity structure that enables men and 
women to enact their personal preferences and values. In addition, they con-
tribute to legitimizing gender roles. Despite the strong importance of religion 
in Muslim-majority countries, people may conceive the influence that religion 
should have in politics and legislation in different ways. Alongside a secular 
perspective that considers theocracy as a limit for gender equality, forms of 
feminisms combining the quest for women’s right with the support for the 
Shariʿa law are possible. So far, the different typologies have been discussed in 
the literature mainly from a theoretical perspective, while in this chapter we 
attempted an empirical exploration aimed at retrieving four typologies of the 
combination of support for gender equality and support for Shariʿa among rep-
resentative samples of the population living in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, 
Iraq, and Jordan in 2014. The distribution of the forms of feminisms differs 
among societies and reflects the historical pathways of these countries and the 
different outcomes of the Arab Uprisings. Tunisia, for example, has embraced 
an explicitly secular perspective since the acceptance of the cedaw in 2008. 
But this formal position reflected an already existing social context where the 
levels of female economic and political participation were higher than in other 
countries of the region, as well as education and literacy. During the uprising, 
women had a crucial role in the quest for women’s right and secular law 
(Charrad, Zarrugh, 2014; Gray, 2012; Khalil, 2014; Moghadam, 2018). In the 
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 aftermath of the uprising, Tunisians showed the highest share of support for 
secular feminism among the countries here considered. Also in Morocco, 
women’s organizations were particularly active before the uprisings that, how-
ever, pushed for reforms that increased women’s rights. Here the religious 
component is particularly strong and most of the supporters for women’s 
rights also believe that gender equality can be achieved in the respect of Islam 
and challenge the current interpretation of Shariʿa. Such “inspiration from 
Sharʿa” to achieve gender equality must not be confused with the wish of a 
“return to Shariʿa” called out by Islamist groups, which advocate for a stricter 
observation of Shariʿa provisions also concerning gender roles. In this respect, 
Egyptian society is a special case. According to our typologies, Egypt displays 
the highest share of Islamists: about 46% of the sample support Shariʿa as a 
source of legislation for personal status law and express conservative attitudes 
towards gender roles. Looking back to the history of Egypt, where anti-Western 
feelings have always been particularly strong, the refusal of a secular approach 
to gender roles can be read as a reaction to Western colonialism. The events 
following the turmoil led the country into violent authoritarianism that strong-
ly supports Islamic radicalization. Taken into account that Muslim feminism 
challenges the patriarchal approach to Shariʿa, the political processes in Egypt 
could explain why even the different forms of Muslim feminism, which is quite 
high in all the other countries, encounter less favor in Egypt.
Rooted in the historical pathways of each country, the question of whether 
the Arab Uprisings that occurred in several countries of the mena region in 
2011 resulted in democratization processes, and improved gender equality or, 
on the contrary, led to radicalization cannot therefore have a unique answer.
This chapter provided an introductory exploration of the form of feminism 
that can be developed in more complex interpretative analyses. A latent class 
approach, for example, may be particularly helpful to investigate the patterns 
concerning religiosity, the support of Shariʿa as a source of legislation, and the 
quest for women’s right. In addition, future research may employ time series 
data to consider the change over time and, therefore, assess better the impact 
of the Arab Uprisings on social change.
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Chapter 9
The “Place” of Religion in the Italian Asylum 
Seekers’ Reception System: Constitutional, 
Legislative and Procedural Framework
Paolo Bonetti
1 Religion in the Italian Constitutional System: Every (Italian or 
Foreign) Person’s Right to Religious Freedom
Forced migrations lead foreigners to come into contact with the Italian legal 
system, which is person-based, as well as built on the principles of democracy, 
pluralism and secularism, and in which religion plays an open role and has an 
open discipline, often shaped by very different criteria than those existing in 
the countries of origin and transit.
In the Italian constitutional system, the religious phenomenon is part of a 
social dynamic that must be recognized, respected and supported by public 
authorities through “negative” and “positive” guarantees: exercising religious 
freedom contributes to the “full development of the human person” (art. 3, 
par. 2 of the Constitution) and to the “spiritual progress of society” (art. 4, par. 
2 of the Constitution) (Troilo, 2008).
Furthermore, the historically predominant presence of Catholics and the 
presence, on the Italian territory, of the Vatican City State (state entity estab-
lished in 1929 thanks to the Lateran Pacts and in which the Holy See –i.e. the 
supreme authority governing the whole Catholic Church– is located) have 
caused religion in Italy to be perceived differently than in the other States 
(Ravà, 1963), and have facilitated the preservation of the de facto dominant 
character of the Catholic Church (Botta, 2002).
Indeed, sometimes foreigners enter the Italian territory to participate in the 
functioning of the central bodies of the Catholic Church (for this purpose, 
they enjoy free access and a special treatment, as established by the 1929 Trea-
ty between Italy and the Holy See) and the number of foreigners arriving and 
staying in the Italian State for religious reasons are much higher than in other 
States. The same provisions concerning immigration and the status of foreign 
nationals (Legislative Decree no. 286/1998) provide for a specific entry visa for 
religious reasons (which allows entry to religious people and foreign religious 
ministers belonging to denominational organizations and who intend to 
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 participate in religious events or exercise ecclesiastical, religious or pastoral 
activity), regulate stays for religious reasons and the right to maintain or regain 
family unity for holders of this kind of residence permit.
The constitutional principle of equality, established by art. 3 of the Consti-
tution, also applies to foreigners as regards the ownership of the fundamental 
rights guaranteed to every person by art. 2 of the Constitution. Among the 
latter, the right to religious freedom is certainly included, regardless of citi-
zenship status (Grosso, 1999; Pistan, 2013; Olivetti, 2018; Curreri, 2018) and is 
one of the fundamental rights guaranteed to all foreigners present in Italy, 
also in compliance with the already cited Legislative Decree no. 286/1998. 
Art. 19 of the Constitution acknowledges the right to freely profess one’s reli-
gious faith and to exercise it in any form, individually or with others, in private 
and in public, through rites not offensive to the accepted principles of public 
morality.
Hence it follows that the religious freedom is guaranteed to all foreigners, 
including asylum seekers, both during and after the administrative and judi-
cial procedure examining their applications. Moreover, foreigners who are pre-
vented from the actual exercise of these rights in their country of origin are 
entitled to apply for asylum according to art. 10, par. 3 of the Constitution as 
enforced by the current legislation. More precisely, art. 19 of the Italian Consti-
tution guarantees three faculties pertaining to religious freedom.
The first is the freedom to profess one’s own religion. This entails the freedom 
to declare publicly, either through words or deeds, (or even not to be forced to 
declare) one’s own religious faith, as well as the very freedom to choose to fol-
low one religion first, and then opt for another; or the freedom not to follow 
any religion or even to stop following it;1 or, more generally, the right not to be 
forced to behave in a religious way (Musselli, 1994), with no punitive, discrimi-
natory or persecutory consequences, on both the regulatory and the social 
level. The refusal or the claim to adopt behaviors that are forbidden or im-
posed by one’s own belief are in fact considered as actual acts of profession 
(Ricca, 2006). In this respect, freedom of religion also includes the right to con-
form one’s life to the indispensable dictates of one’s own conscience, thus re-
specting the fundamental rights recognized to other people as well as the con-
stitutional duties.
Besides, the freedom to profess one’s own religion implies –and implicitly 
presupposes– the faculty of shaping one’s own personal idea regarding reli-
gious matters and the faculty of adhering to, or not adhering to, a particular 
religious doctrine. Thus, the Constitutional Court affirmed that freedom of 
1 See Constitutional Court, sentence no. 239/1984.
269Religion in the Italian Asylum Seekers’ Reception System
<UN>
 conscience, referring to the profession of both one’s religious faith and of one’s 
opinion in religious matters, is included in the guarantee of art. 19 of the Con-
stitution and must also be included among the inviolable rights of man.2
The Italian legal system, which is based on personalist and pluralist princi-
ples, cannot remain indifferent to the cases of conscientious objection for reli-
gious reasons. Indeed, it has responded by repealing the obligations that were 
objected to, transforming them into mere faculties or allowing exemptions 
from them by providing alternative forms of services (for example, civil service 
as an alternative to the enrolment in the armed or police forces in times of war 
or serious international crisis). Moreover, the law recognizes forms of consci-
entious objection to abortive practices and medically assisted procreation 
(laws no. 194/1978 and no. 40/2004), as well as to animal testing carried out by 
doctors, researchers and students (law no. 413/1993).
The Italian constitutional system presupposes that “the development of the 
individual conscience as far as religious matters are concerned (whatever the 
final decisions are) is part of a more general spiritual and intellectual matura-
tion of the person. Thus, denying or reducing the autonomy of this process of 
maturation means to deny or prevent the development of the person as such” 
(Cardia, 1998; Bellini, 1973).
Religious freedom is a perfect subjective right, which can be enforced, with-
in the limits set by the juridical system, in relation to any subject, either public 
or private, and in any social context or relationship, exactly as all the rights per-
taining to freedom: it is, therefore, an inviolable and fundamental right, which 
does not allow for any repression or restriction by any public administrations.3
However, religious freedom is not without limitations, as every fundamen-
tal right can be restricted by other principles and precepts expressly stated or 
deriving from the Constitution,4 and must therefore be exercised so as not to 
damage other fundamental rights, both one’s own and others’ (e.g. personal 
freedom, freedom of domicile, of communicating privately, of circulation, of 
residence, of manifestation of thought, of association, of peaceful and un-
armed assembly, of trade union and political party organization, of property 
rights and private economic initiative, and of active and passive electorate) 
and in order to fulfil constitutional obligations (i.e. economic, political and 
social solidarity, defending one’s homeland, observing the Constitution and 
2 See Constitutional Court, sentences no. 14/1973, no. 117/1979, no. 239/1984.
3 See Cassation Court in joint sessions, 18 November 1997, no. 11432, in Quad. dir. e pol. eccl., 6, 
1998, p. 736.
4 Constitutional Court, sentence no. 100/1981.
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the laws, paying taxes, studying, educating and financially supporting one’s 
children).
Religious freedom also includes the right to leave or change one’s religious 
group. This is relevant also in relation to the legal status of foreigners already 
present in Italy, also to obtain the right to asylum, when in the country of origin 
such conversion might cause persecutions or discriminations. In fact, it allows 
the foreigner to be granted the status of refugee sur place, in compliance with 
art. 4 of Legislative Decree no. 251/2007, especially if the conversion is mani-
fested in Italy, but originally happened in the country of origin, without having 
been manifested in that country for the well-founded fear of being punished.
The conversion of anyone, Italian or foreigner, to a different religion cannot 
entail any sanction, not even by the abandoned religious confession, so that 
any impediment to cultivate normal relationships with one’s relatives and to 
use means of communication to prevent the conversion to, or the abandon-
ment of, a religious confession (when it does not integrate the criminal offence 
of kidnapping or private violence) violate the fundamental rights of freedom 
of the person, who is given the right to perform the activities necessary for the 
full restoration of the freedom, either directly or by contacting the judicial or 
the public security authority. Then, in the event that people within an authori-
tarian religious structure may lose their autonomous decision-making capaci-
ty, either their relatives or the public prosecutor could ask for judicial  measures 
with the aim to ascertain that they are not withheld against their will and that 
they are not the victim of undue external pressure to remain in the group 
(Musselli, 1994).
The religious freedom illustrated so far leads at least to four consequences, 
identified by the doctrine (Cardia, 2010), some of which may have significant 
relevance for the foreigner, including the asylum seeker:
a) the juridical irrelevance of both the confessional belonging and the reli-
gious beliefs of citizens in their public and social life;
b) the right to keep their religious affiliation and their religious convictions 
confidential;
c) the prohibition of imposing any confessional behavior on people;
d) the prohibition to investigate the personal religious orientation.
In this regard, it is worth looking more closely at the consolidated aspect of 
Italian jurisprudence and doctrine according to which confessional belonging, 
sentiments, opinions, and the behavior of people which are the direct expres-
sion of religious feelings or inner convictions are protected by a general prin-
ciple of confidentiality, based on art. 2 and 19 of the Constitution.
This aspect significantly affects the evaluation of the asylum applications 
that are based on an impediment to the effective exercise of religious freedom. 
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Said applications cannot be assessed by asking the foreigner to prove his or her 
religious affiliation or to fully understand the dogmas and the acts of worship 
of the professed religion, nor can they be rejected for the mere circumstance 
that, in the country of origin, the applicant did not state his/her religious affili-
ation or religious conversion in order to avoid negative consequences. In the 
Italian constitutional system these principles are implicit; on the other hand, 
these same principles have already been affirmed by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in examining the applications for the recognition of interna-
tional protection (Chapter 4).
The second faculty included in religious freedom is the right to promote one’s 
own religion, which comprises the right to spread information and knowledge 
among others in order to make them appreciate the religion and to try to con-
vert them – this, however, does not stand for conversion practices that under-
mine the fundamental rights of the converts, i.e. if they are not aware of it, if 
the conversion involves the use of force, or if it compromises the others’ per-
sonal integrity, health, and private property (Ricca, 2006).
The right to religious propaganda has some limits, since it must be exercised 
in such a way as to respect:
a) the rights of others, so that, for example, no type of religious propaganda 
legitimizes the violation of a person’s domicile or his/her right to rest 
(when the person is disturbed by songs, calls to prayer or ringing of bells);
b) the rules governing the means by which propaganda is implemented (for 
example, the press, radio and television broadcasting, etc.);
c) the religious freedom of others and also the religious sentiment towards 
other religions, so that it cannot be exercised through useless contumely 
which offends the believer (and therefore his/her personality) and in-
sults the ethical values on which the religious phenomenon is based.5
After many sentences of the Constitutional Court, the criminal legislation re-
garding the offenses against religious sentiment has been reformulated by law 
no. 85/2006, which ensures an equal protection of all religious confessions 
from the above-mentioned offenses.
The right to religious propaganda includes presenting one’s message in a 
way that turns out to be attractive, but, at the same time, does not allow any 
mystification – i.e. a manner that prevents the recipient of the propaganda 
from correctly perceiving the aims of the religious group (Musselli, 1994; Fin-
occhiaro, 1990).
The constitutional protection of the freedom to profess and promote one’s 
religion is relevant both for the reception standards of the asylum seekers 
5 Constitutional Court, sentence no. 188/1975.
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(which will be examined further below), and for the legal qualification of the 
actual danger to the security of the State deriving from the manifestation of 
any religious ideas. In particular, the administrative measure for expulsion or-
dered by the Minister of the Interior on grounds of public and state security, 
pursuant to art. 13, par. 1 of Legislative Decree no. 286/1998, cannot be applied 
in the event of mere manifestations of religious ideas, even in the case of Is-
lamic religious fundamentalism, and must instead refer to behaviors that are 
likely to create an actual danger to public order and to the security of the State 
(art. 159 of Legislative Decree no. 112/1998).
Indeed, the jurisprudence, faced with a ministerial expulsion based only on 
declarations made by the foreigner to the press and considered as “simple 
manifestations of the thought that, because of the blatant ways in which they 
have been expressed, objectively appear to be incompatible with the will to 
cause any real damage to anyone”, has affirmed that “the need to protect the 
fundamental good represented by the preservation of the bases of the system 
that guarantees the orderly development of the entire social life can legiti-
mately involve the compression of other constitutional values” and has there-
fore expressed the principle of law according to which “the faculties protected 
directly by the Constitution (such as the expression of thought) can be admin-
istratively compressed only if their exercise has proved to be of concrete dan-
ger to society”.6 On the contrary, the ministerial expulsion is considered legiti-
mate if it is not only based on an explicit adherence to Islamic fundamentalism, 
but also on the participation in activities of propaganda or of dissemination of 
material to incite religious violence in Italy or abroad.7
The third faculty consists in the freedom of worship, both in private and in 
public, excluding rites contrary to public morality. This freedom is manifested 
when performing ritual activities in private or public places, without requiring 
any authorization from the public authorities8 and without the prior notice to 
the authorities required by art. 17 of the Constitution for meetings in public 
places.9 It also entails the right not to participate in religious rites (Curreri, 
2018). In fact, religious freedom generally excludes any imposition by the state 
legal system, even when the act of worship belongs to the confession professed 
by the one to whom it is imposed, because the State does not have to interfere 
in an “order” that does not belong to it, except for the aims and in the cases 
6 Lazio Regional Administrative Court, headquartered in Rome, Section I ter, sentence 
11  November 2004, no. 15336.
7 See Council of State, Section vi, no. 88/2006.
8 See Constitutional Court, sentence no. 59/1958.
9 See Constitutional Court, sentence no. 45/1957.
273Religion in the Italian Asylum Seekers’ Reception System
<UN>
expressly mentioned by the Constitution.10 Thus, it is not only a matter of con-
science for non-believers, since they cannot be obliged to perform acts whose 
meaning goes against their convictions. The very nature of being religious is at 
stake, and, in the civil order, said nature can only be a manifestation of free-
dom.11 While implementing this principle, the Constitutional Court, with the 
sentence no. 149/1995 and other rulings, has played an important role on the 
legislation concerning the oath in the civil trial, which no longer contains ap-
peals to the deity. Similarly, with regard to the criminal trial, the legislator in-
tervened directly when the new criminal procedure code was issued.
Moreover, the public worship of one’s religion also entails the need to have 
free access to places where it is possible to perform cult activities and to open 
new places of worship not because there is a social right to have a place of wor-
ship, but because the State does promote its establishment, in compliance 
with both the rules on land management and of those concerning safety.12 The 
only rituals that are not admitted are those against public morality, which the 
doctrine identifies with the common sense of decency. Therefore, rituals in-
volving sexual or orgiastic activities are considered to be against public moral-
ity, as well as practices causing a general sense of repugnance and disgust on 
the basis of a common ethical sentiment, such as particular initiation ceremo-
nies (Mortati, 1976; Musselli, 1994) – which includes, in the prohibition, the 
“practices of worship that, due to their violent and aggressive nature, may be 
reprehensible to the human conscience” (Lillo, 2006).
Freedom of worship must also be exercised in accordance with the rights 
and freedoms of others. Ritual practices that damage life or personal liberty, 
and that therefore involve permanent damage to the physical integrity of con-
senting people (e.g. female genital mutilation), as well as practices that dam-
age the life or the physical integrity of animals are in fact unlawful. In particu-
lar, art. 583-bis of the Penal Code defines as a crime, punished by imprisonment 
from 4 to 12 years, “clitoridectomy, excision, infibulation and every other prac-
tice that produces effects of the same type”. Besides, art. 544-bis and 544-ter 
punish anyone who, “out of cruelty or without necessity”, kills or injures an 
animal, or subjects it to torture or distress (even during shows and events). On 
the contrary, the ritual slaughter of animals (halal for Muslims and kosher for 
Jews) is allowed by derogatory provisions of the Ministry of Health, and must 
be carried out in authorized facilities and under the supervision of local health 
authorities.
10 See Constitutional Court, sentence no. 85/1963.
11 See Constitutional Court, sentence no. 334/1996.
12 See Constitutional Court, sentence no. 63/2016.
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2 The Right to Asylum of the Foreign Nationals Who are Prevented 
from Actually Exercising Religious Freedom
Art. 10, par. 3 of the Italian Constitution provides that foreign nationals who, in 
their own countries, are denied the freedoms guaranteed by the Italian Consti-
tution, have the right to asylum in the Italian territory under the conditions 
established by law. Since religious freedom and the non-discrimination prin-
ciple towards any religion are provided for by the Italian Constitution, foreign-
ers who have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for religious reasons 
should enjoy the right to asylum. They should do so in one of the three forms 
provided for by the existing laws, in compliance with international and Euro-
pean standards (Legislative Decree no. 251/2007 and no. 25/2008). Such forms 
are the following: a) the refugee status (providing a 5-year residence permit, 
automatically renewable upon expiry); b) the status of subsidiary protection 
(providing a 5-year residence permit, renewable upon expiry and if the situa-
tion persists) for those who cannot be granted the refugee status, but who are 
afraid of suffering physical harm because of death penalty threats, inhuman 
and degrading treatments, tortures, and possible violence against civilians in 
situations of internal or international conflict; c) the special protection (provid-
ing a 1-year permit, renewable as long as the situation persists) for those who 
cannot obtain the refugee status or the subsidiary protection, but cannot be 
expelled because of the chance of persecution or torture in either the origin or 
the sending country. This last permit has partially replaced the previous resi-
dence permit for humanitarian reasons repealed by Decree Law no. 113/2018 
and which used to be issued to those who could not be removed for humani-
tarian reasons also deriving from constitutional or international obligations.
Legislative Decree no. 251/2007, in order to enforce the EU directive on in-
ternational protection (see Chapter 4), defines as “refugee” the foreign nation-
al who, owing to the well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion, is outside the country of nationality and is unable or –owing to such fear– 
is unwilling to avail himself or herself of protection of that country, or a state-
less person, who is outside the territory of former habitual residence and is 
unable or is unwilling to return to it for the same reasons as mentioned above, 
without prejudice to the causes of exclusion pursuant to art. 10 of Legislative 
Decree no. 251/2007. In order to grant the refugee status, the acts of persecu-
tion must be a serious violation of fundamental human rights, including reli-
gious freedom. This is violated when it is reduced to freedom of worship alone, 
or to worship only in certain places, when it is impeded or sanctioned the free-
dom to profess or to propagandize (thus prohibiting and punishing any form 
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of proselytizing or of missionary activity) or to belong or to convert to a par-
ticular religion.
However, the refugee status can be granted only if the violation of rights is 
serious. In fact, when a State guarantee a special condition for a specific reli-
gion, there is no persecution if the lives of the believers of other religions are 
substantially normal. Besides, as of December 2018, protection against reli-
gious persecutions may be less effective because –in compliance with the EU 
directive– the application for international protection in the Italian legal sys-
tem must be rejected when “in a part of the country of origin, the applicant 
either has no well-founded fear of being persecuted or is not at real risk of 
suffering serious harm, or has access to protection against persecution or seri-
ous harm, and he/she can legally and safely travel to and gain admittance to 
that part of the country and can reasonably be expected to settle there” (art. 
30, par. 1 of Legislative Decree no. 25/2008). Such notion turns out to be hardly 
effective if applied to the situation of multi-religious or federal States in which 
interreligious conflicts are very serious and the legislation of each federated 
State can adopt the model of confessionalism and religious discrimination.
In order to recognize the refugee status, acts of persecution or lack of pro-
tection against such acts must be connected to the reasons indicated by art. 8 
of Legislative Decree no. 251/2007, among which is “religion” itself, which in-
cludes theistic, non-theist and atheist convictions, participation in, or absten-
tion from, rituals of worship celebrated in private or in public, both individu-
ally and in community, other religious acts or professions of faith, as well as 
the forms of personal or social behavior based on a religious belief or pre-
scribed by it.
It is therefore not necessary to prove that the personal or social behavior 
that has been persecuted has a strictly religious character. As a result, if in a 
particular country there are policies specifically implemented to contrast cer-
tain religions or certain religious currents of thought (e.g. Islamic fundamen-
talism) through measures to combat terrorism or conducts against social 
peace, acts of persecution for religious reasons may occur. For example, they 
may happen against women who wear the veil in public, without having to 
demonstrate the anti-Islamic orientation of said political measures, nor the 
existence of a real intrinsically religious character of that social behavior, e.g. 
of the veil as prescribed by Islam, since a link with this religion based on expe-
rience is sufficient (Codini, 2009). Moreover, there is no persecution for reli-
gious reasons if ritual murders are prohibited, as well as any incitement to vio-
lence or to any common crimes committed for religious reasons.
Furthermore, there is actual religious persecution even if the religious affili-
ation of the person or his/her religious acts have erroneously been  presupposed 
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by the persecutor. In fact, in examining whether an applicant has a well- 
founded fear of being persecuted, it is irrelevant that the person actually pos-
sesses the racial, religious, national, social or political characteristics that pro-
voke the acts of persecution, as long as said characteristic is attributed to the 
persecuted person by the author of the persecutions (art. 8 of Legislative De-
cree no. 251/2007). In practice, for example, the Gorizia Territorial Commission 
recognized the religious persecution of an Eritrean woman raped in prison 
while pregnant and forced to have an abortion because of the violence suf-
fered after being accused of belonging to the Pentecostal Christian faith with-
out any evidence (Benvenuti, 2011).
Besides incorporating the EU directive on international protection qualifi-
cations (Chapter 4), these legislative norms seem to take over the three no-
tions of religion indicated in the unhcr guidelines:
a) religion seen as a belief;
b) religion seen as identity;
c) religion as a lifestyle.
The Court of Cassation granted the refugee status to a foreigner who fled his 
country for reasons connected to religious persecutions, even if said appli-
cant had provided no evidence whatsoever – and that was because the per-
secution had been attested by documentation from governmental and non- 
governmental organizations.13
Nevertheless, religious persecutions usually affect the right to freedom of 
religion (for example by prohibiting the worship of certain cults or confes-
sions), as well as other rights, for example by providing for different legal treat-
ment basing on whether one is or is not a member of a particular religion.14
Indeed, religious persecution can take different forms. For instance, the pro-
hibition of being part of a religious community or of celebrating the cult in 
public or in private, the adoption of discriminatory measures against a specific 
confession, forced conversions (Abu Salem, Fiorita, 2016) or impeded conver-
sions towards religions that are not recognized by the authorities.
During the examination of the applications, in cases of persecution for reli-
gious reasons, the personal interview plays a significant role, especially when 
the reasons behind the persecution are, for example, a conversion to a religion 
that was not manifested in the country of origin. When there is no supporting 
13 Court of Cassation I, sentence no. 26056, 1 December 2010.
14 La tutela dei richiedenti asilo – Manuale giuridico per l’operatore, curated by unhcr, 
asgi, Central service of the sprar, 2016, p. 16 (http://www.unhcr.it/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/01/1UNHCR_manuale_operatore.pdf).
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evidence of the persecutions, the interview has to focus on the details of the 
conversion, on the contents of the religion that the applicant wants to profess, 
on the methods of prayer and on all the other elements that prove that his/her 
statements are well-founded. To this end, information on the punishment im-
posed, in the country of origin, in the event of a conversion appears to be use-
ful (Benvenuti, 2011).
Besides, it is difficult to provide evidence demonstrating the persecution and 
regarding the agents of persecution. According to art. 3 of Legislative Decree 
no. 251/2007, while examining the application, in addition to the declarations 
and the documentation presented by the applicant, one must also take into 
consideration the facts concerning the country of origin and the personal situ-
ation of the applicant. In fact, it is important to collect information on the 
countries of origin through the various databases (including the ones man-
aged by easo, by unhcr, and by the National Commission for the right to 
asylum) even though it is not sufficient.
Judges, in fact, usually nullify the reject of the applications decided by the 
territorial commissions, especially when they are based on the non-credibility 
of the applicants, in virtue of art. 3, par. 5 of Legislative Decree no. 251/2007. In 
compliance with the EU directive, it states that “where some elements or as-
pects of the statements of the applicant for international protection are not 
supported by evidence, said elements shall be considered to be truthful if the 
competent authority recognizes that:
a) the applicant has made all reasonable efforts to substantiate the 
application;
b) all relevant elements at the applicant’s disposal have been submitted, 
and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant ele-
ments has been given;
c) the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do 
not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to 
his/her case;
d) the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest pos-
sible time, unless he/she can demonstrate good reason for not having 
done so;
e) the general credibility of the applicant has been established”.
Fundamentally, because of the principle of good faith, asylum seekers do not 
have the burden of proving irrefutably their claims – which would be extreme-
ly difficult to fulfill after escaping from persecution or from a conflict, and 
which would nullify the right to asylum. Any elements of the narration ex-
pressed by the applicant, even if not proven, are considered as credible if the 
circumstances indicated in the article are present.
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In this regard, the Court of Cassation makes it mandatory for those who 
examine the applications to cooperate to ascertain the facts, after having heard 
the declarations of the foreigner and even if these are incomplete or appar-
ently contradictory. More precisely, the Court of Cassation15 has decided that 
the statements that are intrinsically unreliable based on the indicators of sub-
jective authenticity contained in art. 3 of Legislative Decree no. 251/2007, do 
not require an informal in-depth investigation, when the lack of truthfulness 
does not derive exclusively from the impossibility of providing evidence on the 
objective situation from which the described situation of risk arises or when 
the narration is about strictly interpersonal episodes of violence. Furthermore, 
the description of a life-threatening situation deriving from unwritten rules 
imposed with violence towards a gender, a social or religious group, or even an 
enemy family group (e.g. tribal rules), when it is tolerated or tacitly approved 
by state authorities, does require an informal in-depth investigation in order to 
verify the degree of diffusion and impunity of the violent behavior described, 
as well as the response of state authorities. To sum it up, the assessment of the 
unreliability of the foreigner’s statements cannot be based only on his/her im-
possibility to provide evidence, as it is formally necessary to evaluate if the 
representation of situations that allow for subsidiary protection is true in the 
current situation of the country of origin.16
Moreover, the Court of Cassation specified in sentence no. 5224 of 2013 that 
the presence of a credible version of the facts causing possible life-threatening 
situations in case of return to the homeland is the necessary condition for the 
competent judicial body to start an investigation. Therefore, even if the con-
formity of the documents produced by the applicant with the original ones 
and the substantial credibility of his/her statements are disputed, the tradi-
tional principle of the ordinary civil proceedings does not apply. Indeed, the 
judge –except in the case of procedural impediments– has the duty to cooper-
ate in ascertaining the relevant facts by carrying out an unofficial preliminary 
investigation, since it is necessary to counterbalance the asymmetry deriving 
from the different positions of the parties.17
Then, the Court of Cassation18 clarified that, as regards international pro-
tection, the assessment procedure carried out by the judge should firstly con-
sider the subjective credibility of the applicant’s version of the life-threatening 
15 Civil Cassation, Section vi-1, ordinance 10 April 2015 no. 7333.
16 See Court of Cassation, 16 July 2015, no. 14998 and Court of Cassation, 21 July 2015, no. 
15275.
17 Court of Cassation, no. 25534 of 2016.
18 Court of Cassation, no. 16925 of 2018; no. 28862 of 2018.
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facts. Therefore, if the declarations are judged to be unreliable (on the basis of 
the indicators of subjective authenticity of art. 3 of Legislative Decree no. 
251/2007), an informal in-depth investigation into the situations of persecu-
tions in the countries of origin is not necessary, unless the lack of truthfulness 
derives exclusively from the impossibility of providing probative evidence.
An example of what just explained is the 22 January 2016 ordinance of the 
Court of Rome, which granted the refugee status to an Egyptian citizen of Cop-
tic Orthodox religion forced to flee with her family after threats and acts of 
persecution. In order to support her statements, the applicant presented nu-
merous documents: some aimed at demonstrating her personal condition (e.g. 
identity documents and baptismal certificates for all her family members), 
others relating to the socio-political-religious situation of Egypt. However, 
since the judge has to evaluate the effective protection of the right to religious 
freedom, changes occurring at institutional level are not enough. In fact, art. 
64 of the Egyptian Constitution recognizes religious freedom as an absolute 
right and allows the Religions of the Book to practice religious rites and build 
places of worship within the limits set by law. Nevertheless, as confirmed by 
reports by authoritative international organizations examined by the judge, a 
progressive and dramatic deterioration in the protection of human rights is 
taking place in Egypt. Indeed, the ordinance shows that state authorities have 
not done enough to fight discrimination against religious minorities, especial-
ly Shiite Muslims, Baháʾis and Coptic Christians, who, after President Morsi’s 
destitution, were subject to new attacks of sectarian origin and encountered 
many obstacles in the construction of new places of worship and in the main-
tenance of the already existing ones. Therefore, the persecutions suffered, the 
fear of suffering new ones, as well as the information gathered on the country 
of origin, have led the judge to find concretely proven “the circumstance ac-
cording to which the applicants, in case of repatriation, would objectively be 
sent back to persecution”, thus recognizing them the refugee status.
On the contrary, the Court of Cassation quashed a decision of the Court of 
Appeal relating to an asylum-seeker of Christian religion who had stated to 
have lived in Benin City until the death of his parents, killed by the Muslims of 
Boko Haram, and to have moved to Abuja in the house of a friend later killed by 
terrorists. The Court did not specify the reasons why the story was considered 
to be not credible and contradictory. After the applicant’s assertion that vio-
lence for religious reasons happened in an area of the country different from 
the one he was from, the Court did not take into account that he also declared 
to have tried in vain to escape and find shelter in another area of the country.19
19 See Court of Cassation, Section 6-1, no. 12135/2013.
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In March 2015, the Bari Court of Appeal decided the case of a Pakistani Ah-
myahite citizen who had faced persecution along with all of his family mem-
bers: his father was arrested while an intimidation campaign was going on 
against his two children. After having already suffered persecution, the fear of 
having to suffer again increases, except that the circumstances of the individ-
ual case indicate the opposite (art. 3, par. 4 of Legislative Decree no. 251/2007). 
A relevant element to ascertain the validity of such fear (as in the case under 
examination) is the fact that other subjects of the same environment as the 
applicant’s, or other individuals who find themselves in the same situation, 
have already been victims of persecution in that territorial context. In that 
case, in the recognition of the status a key role was played by the ascertain-
ment of a widespread intolerance, which had not been fought by the authori-
ties, and which has affected the life of the whole Ahmyahite community in 
Pakistan.
The Court of Appeal, in opposition to what was decided by the Court of first 
instance, states that “considering the situation of the country of origin and the 
significance of what has been discovered about the risks to the lives of the in-
dividuals (the story is coherent and credible, as can been proven by the leaflet 
reporting a threat of death, as well as the promise of an economic reward for 
those who would find the applicant and his brother – later on, the applicant 
would tell the same story without any uncertainties), in reform of the decision 
under appeal, the applicant must be granted the political refugee status, on the 
basis of the knowledge that, in the event of a return to the country of origin, he 
would face discriminations or life threats perpetrated by members of other 
religions”. With reference to this matter, it was also observed that “the threat 
justifying such protection is not necessarily posed by the State, as it may also 
come from other subjects when state authorities are unable or unwilling to 
provide adequate protection, as stated in art. 6, par. 2 of Legislative Decree n. 
251/2007”.
Similar observations are present in the 11 November 2018 ordinance of the 
Court of Ancona on the appeal against the rejection of the application for in-
ternational protection submitted by a citizen of Bangladesh who was being 
persecuted in his country for religious reasons. We can see how in this case, 
too, the Court considers that “with reference to the evaluation of the truthful-
ness of the declarations, the Commission finds lack of credibility to the story – 
assumption that we cannot support. In fact, the legislative parameters to de-
cide on the reliability of the declarations made by the asylum seeker are 
established by art. 3, par. 5 of Legislative Decree no. 251/2007. Moreover, the 
Commission observes a correspondence between what was highlighted by 
the applicant and the information gathered from the sources (…). In truth, the 
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 applicant’s story appeared to be credible because it was fully detailed, as well 
as confirmed by the information collected (…)”.
Here is another case concerning a Sunni Muslim coming from Pakistan, 
who was the subject of persecution by members of his own religious group 
because of the good relations he used to have with some Shiites. The hostility 
of the Sunnis towards him precluded him from the possibility of obtaining 
protection from state authorities and left him without any shelter: shut out by 
the majority, not belonging to any minority, and neglected by the State. In the 
absence of further evidence besides his declarations, the Court of Appeal of 
Palermo (sentence no. 281 of 15 February 2016), in accordance with art. 3 of 
Legislative Decree no. 251/2007, considered the applicant’s effort to substanti-
ate his claim to be decisive. However, as for similar cases, the ruling clarifies 
that it is not possible to make “any decision that may result in the return to the 
country of origin of a person who could suffer serious harm there”. Besides the 
fact that the person requesting protection does not have to belong to a perse-
cuted minority, since persecution for religious reasons may arise from many 
different events, the Sicilian judge stressed the central role of the credibility of 
the asylum seeker, and drew attention to the subjective opinion of the judge.
Back in 2010, the Court of Cassation, with sentence no. 26056, ruled on simi-
lar cases, introducing two criteria. The first case concerned a Nigerian citizen 
of Catholic faith. His views were considered as contradictory and vague by the 
Court of Appeal of Turin, which stated that, in this type of disputes, the bur-
den of proof mainly falls on the applicant and any lack of arguments could not 
be filled by the powers of instructions of the judicial organ. On the contrary, 
the Court of Cassation reiterated the obligation of the judges to cooperate ac-
tively in the investigation phase, and stated that granting of refugee status can-
not be based exclusively on the credibility of the applicant and the duty of the 
latter to prove the oppression suffered. Furthermore, the Court adds, the truth-
fulness of the persecution can be ascertained thanks to external and objective 
information concerning the country of origin, and it is the connection of these 
conditions to the present case that will help verify the asylum seeker’s 
credibility.
Another interesting decision of the Court of Cassation20 confirms the rul-
ing of the Court of Appeal of Naples rejecting, for lack of requirements, the 
request for international protection due to religious persecution perpetrated 
by the parents of the applicant. While reaffirming that, hypothetically, even 





 parents can be agents of persecution for religious reasons, in this case the ap-
plicant’s statements were not considered as credible: he, in fact, had reported 
that he had always lived with his parents and had attended Christian schools, 
thus leading the judge to believe that it was unlikely that the applicant’s father 
might not approve of the faith that his son had matured in the Christian school 
the parents themselves had enrolled him at.
There are also cases of religious persecution among the different currents of 
thought within the Islamic religion. The 15 November 2017 decree issued by the 
Court of Brescia21 granted the refugee status to a Pakistani citizen who was the 
Imam of a mosque and who used to teach the Koran to children. The Court 
judged the applicant’s story to be credible by linking the religious persecution 
he was facing to his role as a Koran teacher inside a mosque (he belonged to 
the Barelvi religious group) and to having refused to stop his religious teaching. 
In the decree, the Court, while exercising its duty of cooperation, allowed the 
appellant to clarify some aspects that seemed to be unclear during the hearing 
in the previous administrative phase.
The Court of Rome has recognized a Nigerian citizen the refugee status be-
cause of the persecutions of Christians in his country. Thanks to a newspaper 
article presented to the Court and reporting his story of persecution (he had 
received threats by a terrorist organization because of his Christian faith), the 
plaintiff managed to prove the truthfulness of his words. As the Court reaf-
firms, the fact that the threats are not posed by state authorities does not pre-
vent the recognition of the protection. Indeed: “(…) even if the danger the 
plaintiff is exposed to cannot be linked to any activity of the State, the third-
country national can still consider well-founded the fear of suffering serious 
damage in case of return to the country of origin, given the context of religious 
conflicts in many areas of the Country”.22
What is even more challenging, in relation to religion, is the recognition of 
the subsidiary protection to the foreigner or to the stateless person who flees 
from a specific country for the well-founded fear of suffering serious damage 
resulting from death penalty, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or gen-
eralized violence to civilians in situations of internal or international conflict.
The Cassation has granted the status of subsidiary protection (and not the 
refugee status) to a third-country national (in this case, escaped from Pakistan 
not to join the Taliban militias) because the violent pressure he was put under 
was not dictated by the willingness to impose a religious option, but by the 
21 Available at: https://www.dirittoimmigrazionecittadinanza.it/allegati/fascicolo-n-2-2018/
rifugio-2/217-5-trib-brescia-15-11-2017-rifugio/file.
22 Court of Rome, i Civil section, sentence no. 20908 of 21 October 2013.
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need to enlarge an armed organization. Besides, his refusal was not due to reli-
gious reasons.23
It is also worthwhile mentioning both the ruling concerning the recognition 
of humanitarian protection to a Benin citizen, given the significant danger of 
enforcement of the Shariʿa against the applicant in his country of origin, and 
the ruling that granted subsidiary protection to a Pakistani citizen because of 
the risk of possible persecution linked to his religious faith.
The issues relating to the persecutions of new religions and sects and the 
persecution in the case of conversion to another religion are of particular im-
portance. The persecution of sects or “new religions” is observed especially in 
countries where the law provides for oppressive conditions to legitimize the 
action of religious confessions. The term “sect” is often one of the tools used in 
some countries to discriminate or persecute certain new, non-traditional reli-
gious groups, which are not submissive to political power. However, it is not 
allowed to deny the refugee status only because the creed that is subjected to 
persecution is considered as a sect or because sects are not religions, but 
pseudo-religions.24
An example of an upheld appeal is the sentence of the Court of Trieste of 
2 January 2018. It concerned a Chinese woman who reported having left her 
country of origin because, due to her religious faith, she was being sought by 
the authorities – who were persecuting the members of the so-called House 
Churches by arresting and torturing its followers and its promoters. In particu-
lar, the applicant reported being intimidated by the authorities, which led her 
to flee her country. The Court of Trieste had criticized the territorial commis-
sion’s rejection of the request because “without consulting specific sources, it 
estimated that there were no reasonable grounds to believe that if the appli-
cant had returned to China, she would have run the risk of suffering serious 
harm, pursuant to the provisions of art. 14 of Legislative Decree 251/2007” even 
if in that case “the intrinsic reliability of the applicant’s story (…) is linked to 
the extrinsic one. The circumstances described are in line with the informa-
tion acquired; the religiosity of the applicant seems to be deeply convinced: in 
such a homogeneous context, even the more uncertain circumstances relating 
to her escape from her country remain credible”.
As recalled by the Court of Bari, civil Section ii, through the ordinance of 
7 April 2016, the darwishi gonabadi religious current (of the ascetic and mystic 
type of Sufi Islam diffused in Iran and Turkey) according to reliable  international 
23 See Court of Cassation, Section 6-1, no. 12075/2014, Rv. 631321-01.




sources has been persecuted for years by the Iranian government. For this rea-
son, it can be stated that its followers have been persecuted by state forces 
because of their religious affiliation.
Furthermore, it is useful to mention the 22 May 2018 ordinance of the Court 
of Perugia. In evaluating whether a person has the right to obtain international 
protection, judges cannot make their decision exclusively on the basis of the 
personal credibility of the applicant and of the fulfillment of the burden of 
proof relating to the existence of the fumus persecutionis against him/her in 
the country of origin. The judge, in fact, must verify that there actually is a 
persecution of opinions, habits, and practices by basing on external and objec-
tive information relating to the situation of the country of origin. However, in 
order to prove the fumus persecutionis, the applicant can also use elements of 
personal evaluation, including the credibility of the declarations of the inter-
ested party. The judge, therefore, has a duty to carry out an extensive investiga-
tion, obtain all the documentation (even if unofficial) and generally assess the 
actual situation of the country of origin. The specific case was an appeal 
against the refusal of international and humanitarian protection of a Chinese 
woman belonging to the “Church of God Almighty” who was forced to flee her 
country, since the cult she belonged to was being persecuted (Soryte, 2018).
In this case, the Court states again that “the reasons given in this regard 
by the commission are not convincing, as (…) the applicant’s statements ap-
pear to be intrinsically coherent and credible (…) and correspond to the actual 
characteristics of the cult”; “(…) it must also be noted that the applicant has 
tried to provide all the elements in her possession in order to prove that she 
belonged to the cult (…) therefore, for the purpose of recognizing the refu-
gee status to the applicant, the Court must acknowledge that she has a well- 
founded fear of being persecuted for religious reasons, both from a subjective 
and an objective point of view, since the applicant’s statements in this regard 
appear to be in line with the latest news on religious freedom in China (…) 
we must consider that the article 300 of the Chinese Penal Code, which also 
punishes those who participate in superstitious sects, is interpreted by the ju-
risprudence in the sense of punishing even those who are active in a supersti-
tious sect; thus, it is sufficient to be identified as a member of a forbidden cult 
to be arrested and sentenced to prison for even more than seven years, in case 
of serious circumstances”.
The persecution in case of conversion has been as well recognized in many 
cases, both in administrative and judicial cases. In the administrative practice, 
a decision of the territorial commission of Rome is fundamental, as it recog-
nized the refugee status to all the members of a Christian Egyptian family, in 
which the mother was sexually harassed and the father was convicted for 
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 apostasy, was the subject of discrimination in the workplace, and even re-
ceived death threats and was abused by the police in order to force him and his 
children to convert (Benvenuti, 2011). The ordinance of the Court of Bari, ii 
civil section, of 15 March 201725 recognized the status of refugee to an Iranian 
man, whose conversion to the Catholic religion gave rise to religious persecu-
tion and to a warrant for his arrest. The Court recalled that his conversion was 
known to the state authorities, because of his father’s (a Hezbollah) complaint, 
as well as because of the discovery of a box containing copies of the Bible (and 
kept by the applicant, as requested by a friend, inside his computer shop) and 
after a search carried out by the police in the house of the applicant’s family. 
The judge examined the condition of Christians in Iran also through the con-
sultation of an essay on being Christians in Iran today, published in an Italian 
magazine, through the reading of passages from the Koran (where the crime of 
apostasy is unfounded) and in the light of the number of people hanging 
themselves after President Rouhani took office.
Lastly, today in Italy the effective protection against any form of religious 
persecution no longer appears to be guaranteed when it concerns either a citi-
zen of a State included in the list of safe countries of origin or a stateless per-
son who legally resides there. In fact, by making use of the faculty provided by 
the EU directive, art. 2-bis of Legislative Decree 25/2008 (added in 2018) gives 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, in agreement with the Minis-
ters of Interior and of Justice, the faculty to approve a list of safe countries of 
origin. As shown by the information gathered by national, European, and in-
ternational bodies, in these States the risk of suffering persecution, torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or even general violence during conflicts can 
be ruled out thanks to their democratic system, their current laws and the ef-
fective application of said laws; besides, the rights and the jurisdictional guar-
antees provided for in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
in the European Convention for Human Rights, in the International Conven-
tion against Torture and in the Convention on the Status of Refugees are ef-
fectively ensured.
The Decree of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 4 October 2019 designates as 
safe countries of origin Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Albania, Bosnia, Cape Verde, 
Ghana, Kosovo, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia, Senegal, Ukraine, and Ser-
bia. However, such Decree appears to be illegitimate since these countries, ex-
cept for Cape Verde, do not have the required requisites for this qualification. 
In fact, some of these States have a legal order based on a state religion and the 




people who do not belong to said religion, or stop practicing it, cannot fully 
enjoy religious freedom and can suffer legal discrimination, criminal sanctions 
or other forms of persecution for religious reasons (Morocco, Algeria, and Tu-
nisia). Besides, in some of those States, conflict situations are underway for 
religious reasons and certain sexual orientations are considered as a criminal 
offense.
This Decree will not only speed up the procedures for examining the appli-
cations submitted by the citizens of the States defined as safe and by the state-
less persons residing there. Since the applicants coming from those countries 
have the burden of bringing elements showing that, in their personal situa-
tion, their country is not safe, the Decree will also deter the submission of ap-
plications and the possible subsequent jurisdictional appeals. Besides, it will 
cause a decrease in the positive results of the applications.26
26 In fact, the designation of the safe country of origin produces the following effects on the 
applications for international protection presented by citizens of the designated State or 
by stateless persons staying there: 1) The authority examining the application is exempt 
from the obligation to collect the information on the country of origin ex officio, but the 
applicants have the burden of invoking serious reasons showing that, in their specific 
situations, their country is not safe (art. 2-bis, par. 5 of Legislative Decree 25/2008); 2) 
Denying the applications adopted by the Territorial Commission for the recognition of 
international protection due to manifest groundlessness is justified only when the appli-
cants have not demonstrated that there are serious reasons to believe that, in relation to 
their specific situations, the designated safe countries of origin are in fact unsafe, thus 
making them run the risk of persecution or serious damage (art. 9, par. 2-bis of Legislative 
Decree 25/2008); 3) Upon presentation of the applications for international protection, 
the police office informs the applicants that the application can be rejected as manifestly 
unfounded simply because they have not demonstrated the existence of serious reasons 
for considering the designated safe countries of origin to be unsafe in relation to their 
specific situations, thus making them run the risk of persecution or serious damage (art. 
10, par.1 of Legislative Decree 25/2008); 4) The request for international protection is ex-
amined by the Territorial Commission as a priority (art. 28, par. 1, letter c-ter of Legislative 
Decree 25/2008) and with an accelerated procedure: as soon as the request is  received, the 
police station immediately proceeds to the transmission of the necessary documentation 
to the Territorial Commission, which makes a decision within five days (the deadline can 
be extended to ten days or more if the application is deemed manifestly unfounded and 
needs a more in-depth examination). If the application is presented in the border or tran-
sit area, the examination can take place directly at the border or in the transit area (art. 
29, par. 1.1-bis, 1- ter and 1-quater, 2 and 3 of Legislative Decree 25/2008); many of the citi-
zens of the countries included in the list of safe countries of origin arrive in Italy precisely 
in the border areas identified by the Ministry of the Interior Decree of 5 August 2019, that 
is southern Sardinia and southern Sicily (especially the citizens of Tunisia, Algeria and 
Morocco, who make up 40% of the average number of irregular entries from the sea and 
the Bosnian, Kosovar and Montenegrin citizens who enter the border areas of Apulia in 
southern Italy or of Friuli Venezia Giulia in northern Italy); 5) The rejection of the 
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3 Persecution for Multiple Reasons: Religion and Sex, Religion and 
Sexual Orientation
Discrimination and persecution can also be based on reasons other than 
religion.
For example, the persecution against those who fight to change their State 
from a confessional one to a secular one, in which people can freely express 
atheistic ideas, is a persecution both for religious and political reasons.
There are also persecutions and discrimination against women, i.e. for rea-
sons connected with belonging to the female gender, but which are also motivated 
by political and religious reasons. In this regard, it must be highlighted that per-
secutions could also happen if the persecutor supposes that the person be-
longs to a particular religion. In the administrative practice, for instance, there 
was a case of an Eritrean female citizen who suffered imprisonment and mis-
treatment because of her supposed membership to the Pentecostal Church. 
She was granted the refugee status after having verified her credibility on the 
basis of her very declarations.
 application for the international protection by the Territorial Commission due to mani-
fest groundlessness involves, at the end of the term for the appeal (reduced to 15 days by 
art. 35, par. 2 of Legislative Decree 25/2008), the obligation for the applicant to leave the 
national territory, unless he/she has been issued a residence permit for another reason, 
and the adoption in his/her regard of an administrative expulsion order by the prefect, 
which is executed by the quaestor who accompanies the applicant to the frontier; if this 
is not executable, the quaestor can also issue a detention order to keep the applicant in a 
center for repatriation (art. 32, par. 4 of Legislative Decree 25/2008); 6) The enforceability 
of the rejection due to manifest groundlessness cannot be suspended by the mere presen-
tation of the judicial appeal to the court, as it can be suspended only for serious reasons 
and after having issued a decree motivated by the court judge, pronounced within five 
days since the submission of the request for suspension, without the prior call of the 
counterpart and, if necessary, after having gathered more general information. The de-
cree that either grants or denies the suspension of the disputed provision is notified to the 
parties. Within five days since the notification, the parties can file defensive notes. Within 
five days after the expiry of this deadline, replies may be filed and the judge, with a new 
decree to be issued within the next five days, can confirm, amend or revoke the measures 
already issued. In any case, such decrees are not subject to appeal, and only once the re-
quest for suspension has been accepted, the applicant is issued a residence permit due to 
the asylum request (art. 35-bis, par. 4 of Legislative Decree 25/2008); 7) When the appel-
lant is admitted to patronage at the State’s expense and the appeal concerns a decision, 
adopted by the Territorial Commission, that is manifestly unfounded, the judge that re-
jects the appeal indicates in the decree for the payment of the expenses by the State the 
reasons why the claims of the plaintiff cannot be considered as manifestly unfounded (in 
the absence of those reasons, the costs of the proceedings are charched to the applicant 
and not to the State).
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In this regard, another case can be mentioned. By keeping in mind that in 
such cases judges must exercise their broad powers of instructions and collect 
all the information useful to reconstruct the narrative context, the Court of 
Cassation (ordinance no. 24064 of 2013) approved the appeal of a Cameroo-
nian woman, accused of witchcraft in her country. According to the Court, any 
anthropological analysis would have made it possible to ascertain that the ac-
cusations of witchcraft constitute a sociocultural-religious phenomenon that 
is widespread in the community of origin of the applicant, just as convictions 
for common crimes that cover up convictions for witchcraft. From such analy-
sis, it could easily have emerged that the applicant had been convicted on the 
basis of persecution for, in the broad sense, religious reasons (Benvenuti, 2011).
On the contrary, when the condemnations for witchcraft are inflicted by 
 local courts against women to punish serious common crimes, such as mur-
ders, these acts are meant to prevent all forms of self-determination and, even 
if they are not aimed at harming women’s religious freedom (therefore not 
 legitimizing the recognition of the refugee status) they can cause the compres-
sion of fundamental rights and could thus legitimize the recognition of minor 
international protection measures (Acierno, 2019), i.e. the status of subsidiary 
protection or of special protection.
More generally, since any act specifically directed against a sexual gender is 
considered as persecution (art. 7, par. 2 of Legislative Decree no. 251/2007), in 
a case concerning a Nigerian citizen, the Cassation has found that a woman, as 
such, can be persecuted for belonging to a social group and, at the same time, 
for religious reasons – if she rebels against a code of conduct, against duties 
and responsibilities, against men (Madera, 2018).
Genital mutilation, as it is performed against the female gender, can also be 
based on religious motives. In fact, the jurisprudence has observed that since 
their genesis lies in deep cultural traditions or religious beliefs, women’s re-
fusal to subject themselves or their daughters to such practices exposes them 
to the actual risk of being considered, in their country, as political opponents 
or as subjects that reject religious models and social values, and are therefore 
persecuted for this reason. So, they must be granted the status of refugee to 
stop gender violence as well as the discriminatory treatment that would ensue 
in case of refusal to submit to the violence (Cattelan, 2013).
More generally, violence against women can also occur because of religious 
reasons. In this sense, Courts grant subsidiary protection when a female is 
forced to an unwanted marriage and authorities do not oppose it, thus leaving 
any decision to the patriarchal family or a religious structure.
Thus, the Cassation includes in the concept of domestic violence (pursuant 
to art. 3 of the Istanbul Convention of 11 May 2011 on preventing and  combating 
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violence against women and domestic violence, enforced in Italy by the law of 
27 June 2013, no. 77) a case of restriction on enjoyment of fundamental human 
rights imposed to a woman, of Christian religion, because of her refusal to 
abide by the custom of her own village – according to which, after becoming a 
widow, she had to get married to her brother-in-law. The Cassation decided so 
even if the tribal authorities, to which the woman had asked for help against 
her brother-in-law, had allowed her not to marry him – since that was on con-
dition that she left the village, leaving her children and her belongings behind. 
According to the Court, these acts, pursuant to art. 5, letter c of Legislative 
Decree no. 251/2007, meet the requirements of persecution pursuant to art. 7 
of Legislative Decree no. 251/2007, even if implemented by non-state authori-
ties, if –as in this case– state authorities do not fight them or do not provide 
any protection, as they are the result of local customary rules. The ruling also 
refers, at the soft law level, to the unhcr guidelines of 7 May 2002 on gender-
based persecution, whose point no. 25 specifies that persecution occurs even 
when a woman is prevented from enjoying her rights because of the refusal 
to conform her behavior in accordance with traditional provisions relating to 
her gender. In another case concerning a Moroccan female citizen, victim of 
abuse and violence (which would go on even after the divorce) perpetrated by 
her husband, who had been punished by the Moroccan justice with a bland 
criminal sanction, the Cassation27 (always by referring to articles 3 and 60 of 
the Istanbul Convention), albeit to the effects of subsidiary protection, links 
the acts of domestic violence to the issue of inhuman and degrading treat-
ment, asking the judge to verify concretely whether, despite the threat of seri-
ous damage by a “non-state subject”, pursuant to art. 5, lett. c of Legislative 
Decree no. 251/2007, the country of origin of the applicant is able to offer ad-
equate protection.
There are also persecutions and discrimination against people because of 
their sexual orientation, and at the same time because of religious reasons. Per-
secutions for sexual orientation are connected to the fact of belonging to a 
specific social category, and they can also be considered as religious persecu-
tions when there are religious motivations, too. The persecutor can link reli-
gion to homosexuality by using religion to legitimize the persecution and the 
discrimination or to define homosexuality as a sin, as an abomination or as a 
form of apostasy (Ferrari, 2018). There are frequent cases of persecution for 
sexual orientation in the Islamic world, as the social context is marked by val-
ues that are hostile to homosexuality, which can be punished with death pen-
alty, with imprisonment, or with other discriminatory and persecutory acts.
27 Court of Cassation, Section 6-1, no. 12333/2017, Rv. 644272-01.
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The Court of Catanzaro (ordinance of 2 July 2015) recognized the persecu-
tion of a Bengali citizen who was having a homosexual relationship and, for 
that reason, was denounced to the mullah, who issued a fatwa against him. He 
managed to escape, but then he was falsely accused of having caused a fire in 
a shop – which killed an entire family and for which he was sentenced to 
death. The same Court (ordinance of 7 December 2015) also recognized the 
persecution of a Ghanaian citizen who was having a relationship with his 
cousin and who later fled for fear of being killed by his father – an imam who 
had never accepted his homosexuality (Abu Salem, Fiorita, 2016).
4 The Religious Aspects in the Examination of Asylum Applications 
and in the Reception System
The religious affiliation of asylum seekers, which is essential for the recogni-
tion of one of the forms of protection provided by the legal system, however, 
appears to be scarcely relevant during the procedures for examining and de-
ciding on applications, although every territorial commission for the recogni-
tion of the international protection has also been composed, since July 2018, of 
four experts on human rights, including religious rights, and gathers informa-
tion on the situation of the countries of origin (also with reference to the reli-
gious rights) from specific databases managed by the National Commission for 
the right to asylum or by the European Asylum Support Office (easo).
Every Commission, whenever necessary in order to examine the applica-
tion, may consult experts on particular topics, such as health, culture, religion, 
gender and minors (art. 8, par. 3-bis of Legislative Decree 25/2008). Besides, 
during the personal interview with the commission, the applicant can request 
not to use the video recording (also for religious reasons) and the decision lies 
with the Commission, and not with the individual commissioner in charge of 
conducting the personal interview. The decision cannot be contested (art. 14 of 
Legislative Decree 25/2008).
Religion is hardly taken into consideration in the effective management of 
the reception system for asylum seekers and for people granted asylum. In 
centers where foreign nationals seeking asylum are detained (repatriation de-
tention centers or first aid or reception centers or government reception cen-
ters) or in the preliminary reception centers where asylum seekers are initially 
hosted to be identified and to be allowed to submit the asylum application, 
applicants are granted the right to speak to ministers of worship (art. 7, par. 2, 
and 10, par. 3 of Legislative Decree no. 142/2015). In the detention centers for 
repatriation, the freedom to speak to other people within the center must be 
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guaranteed, as it must be ensured the freedom to talk to visitors, such the min-
isters of worship, as well as the freedom of worship, within the limits set by the 
Constitution (art. 21, par. 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree 394/1999). It is not clear 
if this limit refers to the limit set in art. 19 of the Constitution (which concerns 
rites against public morality) or if it refers to some other limits (Consorti, 2011). 
Even inside the governmental centers for asylum seekers, specific spaces must 
be designated for various activities, including activities of worship (art. 9, par. 
3 of Presidential Decree of 12 January 2015, no. 21). Finally, every project to cre-
ate a reception service for asylum seekers, undertaken by Italian local authori-
ties within the framework of the sprar (Protection System for Asylum Seekers 
and Refugees), for which the local authority asks for funding from the National 
Fund for Asylum Policies and Services, has to make sure that the people hosted 
are guaranteed food and the fulfillment of other needs by respecting their cul-
tural and religious traditions (art. 31, par. 2 of the guidelines for the functioning 
of the protection system for asylum seekers and refugees, attached to the Min-
isterial Decree of 10 August 2016).
Even if the Legislative Decree no. 113/2018 has reformed the entire reception 
system, in art. 1, par. 9 of the new tender specifications scheme attached to the 
Ministerial Decree of December 2018 for the management of preliminary re-
ception facilities, of extraordinary reception centers for asylum seekers acti-
vated by the Prefects, and of repatriation detention centers where asylum 
seekers can be held, it is reiterated that the organization of reception services 
is based on the full respect of the fundamental rights of the individuals, also in 
consideration of their religious faith. However, there are no specific details in 
order to explain the implementation of this principle in the various typologies 
of centers: first aid and reception centers, governmental preliminary reception 
centers, hotspots, temporary reception centers for repatriation, and extraordi-
nary reception centers (the Italian cas, which can be both collective centers 
and housing units).
Furthermore, the aforementioned norms fail to indicate which ministers of 
worship are actually allowed in the various centers – which partially limits the 
effectiveness of the norm, for whose implementation it will be necessary to 
resort to the unilateral provisions used for other forms of spiritual assistance, 
even if –so far– no norm inside the various agreements with the religious con-
fessions has yet dealt with such topic (Carnì, 2015).
This gap remains intact for all types of reception centers for asylum seekers, 
who can freely satisfy any religious need outside, while it is apparently bridged 
for the repatriation centers, in which foreigners are detained and therefore 
their personal freedom is restricted, as they are supervised by the police and 
cannot leave without proper permission. The centers for repatriation have the 
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same rules as the penitentiary institutes as to the indication of the subjects 
authorized to visit the centers, with particular reference, for example, to the 
ministers of Catholic worship and other cults, who can visit after being autho-
rized by the director of the center.
The right to profess one’s own religion is fundamental to respect the dignity 
of each individual and, in order to satisfy this need, the legal system has tried 
to grant religious assistance to all those whose personal freedom is restricted. 
As a result, the principle of secularity of the State, meant as the protection of 
each person’s religious freedom, requires the State to guarantee the religious 
freedom of those who are deprived of the possibility of exercising it autono-
mously, so that the ministers of worship must be allowed into temporary de-
tention centers, specific spaces to pray must be ensured, and other religiously 
motivated requests concerning food, clothing and the display of symbols must 
be accepted (Fiorita, 2007). In this regard, the regulation defining the “Criteria 
for the organization and management of the centers for identification and ex-
pulsion”, issued by the Ministerial Decree of 20 October 2014, provides that in 
each cie (now renamed as Temporary Reception Centres for Repatriation) 
recreational, social and religious activities must be organized in specific  spaces 
and, to this end, the manager has to prepare a weekly calendar of the planned 
activities to be shared with all the foreigners living there.
However, the first inspections carried out in February-March 2018 by the 
national Guarantor of the rights of the detained persons and of those deprived 
of personal liberty in all the centers for repatriation have shown that, in every 
center, the rules mentioned above regarding the exercise of each person’s re-
ligious freedom and the access of the ministers of worship appear to be sub-
stantially unobserved. The report issued by the Guarantor28 is critical: all the 
centers visited had no space to be utilized as a place of worship (for example, 
the daily prayers of people of Islamic religion would take place in the corri-
dors, while no space at all was guaranteed to the Christians) and the possibil-
ity of religious practice was severely limited because no minister of religion 
could visit. Therefore, the national Guarantor recommends that a program of 
activities should be outlined in full compliance with the cie’s single Regula-
tion and, due to a serious lack of said recreational, social and religious activi-
ties, it invites the Ministry of the Interior to carry out a strict monitoring of the 
managing bodies’ obligations derived by the contract regulating the supply of 
28 Italian Guarantor of the rights of the detained persons and of those deprived of personal 
liberty, Rapporto sulle visite tematiche effettuate nei centri di permanenza per il rimpatrio 
(cpr) in Italia (February-March 2018), available at: http://www.garantenazionaleprivatil-
iberta.it/gnpl/resources/cms/documents/c30efc290216094f855c99bfb8644ce5.pdf.
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the  aforementioned activities.29 However, it seems that only the Prefecture of 
Bari was willing to push the managing body to use specific spaces in the center 
of Bari as actual places of worship.30
Consequently, it seems that, in order to put security first, the needs con-
nected to freedom and assistance, including the religious and the spiritual 
ones, are overshadowed: these needs are protected at the highest constitution-
al level, but nevertheless seem to be relegated to elements of form – which 
confirms that, in practice, guaranteeing public order turns out to be more im-
portant than protecting the inviolable rights (Consorti, 2011).
This notion is confirmed if two particular aspects are taken into account.
On the one hand, it is clear that there is an underestimation of the religious 
dimension in the management of the reception centers for unaccompanied for-
eign minors. In fact, the Guidelines to apply for financial aid for the National 
Fund for Asylum Policies and Services for the reception of unaccompanied 
foreign minors first demand that each center respect the cultural and religious 
traditions of the guests. Besides, in order to meet the cultural, linguistic and re-
ligious needs of minors, they demand the use of linguistic and cultural media-
tors in every service provided, so that they can bridge the gap between the two 
cultures, i.e. the one of the welcoming context and the one brought by the mi-
nors (Ministerial Decree of 27 April 2015, Annexes 2.1 and 2.5). However,  article 
18 of Legislative Decree no. 142/2015 does not specify if the exercise of religious 
freedom has to fall in the category represented by “the living conditions that 
must be guaranteed to each minor, with regard to the child’s protection, wel-
fare and development, including the social one”, or that the child’s previous 
religious habits must also be taken into consideration in the evaluation of the 
minor’s best interest; it does not even specify that among the various needs 
of minors hosted in the reception centers there are also the religious ones. 
The needs connected to the effective exercise of religious freedom do not even 
seem to be precisely indicated in the list of fundamental rights of the minor. 
Moreover, no detail regarding the religious aspects of the child’s life is express-
ly stated in the Ministerial Decree of 1 September 2016, which sets up the gov-
ernmental preliminary reception centers destined to unaccompanied  foreign 
minors. All this can cause unpredictable effects on how these minors (under 
29 Italian Guarantor of the rights of the detained persons and of those deprived of per-
sonal liberty, Norme e normalità. Standard per la privazione della libertà delle persone 
migranti. Raccolta delle Raccomandazioni 2016–2018, p. 29, available at: http://www.ga-
rantenazionaleprivatiliberta.it/gnpl/resources/cms/documents/ef9c34b393cd0cb6960 
fd724d590f062.pdf.
30 Italian Guarantor of the rights of the detained persons and of those deprived of personal lib-




the supervision of guardians and managers of the reception centers) relate 
to the different places of worship, the ministers of worship and the religious 
education at school and out of school. The constitutionally guaranteed re-
ligious freedom requires that, in the “best interests of the child”, religious 
education must be taken into primary consideration, as well as the minor’s 
linguistic needs and the minor’s requests for changing or deepening the reli-
gious experience.
On the other hand, an underestimation of the religious aspects in the recep-
tion of asylum seekers is evident, both in everyone’s life and in the overall man-
agement of each center. In fact, it must be remembered that all reception cen-
ters for asylum seekers must adopt appropriate measures to prevent all forms 
of violence, including gender-based violence, and to guarantee the safety and 
the protection of both the applicants and the staff working at the centers (art. 
10 of Legislative Decree no. 142/2015). Besides, the reception measures take 
into account the specific situation of vulnerable persons, such as minors, un-
accompanied minors, disabled persons, the elderly, pregnant women, single 
parents with minor children, victims of trafficking in human beings, persons 
suffering from serious illnesses or mental disorders, persons subjected to tor-
ture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence 
or violence linked to sexual orientation or gender identity, and victims of geni-
tal mutilation. In fact, people who have suffered torture, rape or other serious 
acts of violence are guaranteed appropriate medical and psychological assis-
tance or treatment (art. 17, par. 1 and 8 of Legislative Decree no. 142/2015).
At the same time, seriously violent behaviors perpetrated by the hosted 
people legitimize the revocation of the reception measures (art. 23 of Legisla-
tive Decree no. 142/2015). These rules explain why the religious belonging of 
the guests of the reception centers for asylum seekers always seems to be taken 
into consideration, in order to prevent any danger to the safety of both the 
guests and the staff deriving from possible interreligious tensions. These dan-
gers (which are concrete, as they can also be observed in other EU countries 
welcoming asylum seekers) can affect the lives of the asylum seekers who have 
fled the persecutions or the religious discrimination occurring in their country 
of origin. Of course, it could turn out to be potentially dangerous for them to 
find themselves living in a reception center alongside other foreign guests 
 belonging to a hostile religious confession. The possibility of episodes of intol-
erance and violence, in these circumstances, could increase and endanger the 
safety of all the guests at the reception centers.
Moreover, in the projects aimed to build sprar centers that have been ap-
proved so far, there has been no analysis of the religious aspect, except for the 
administration of food (in order to respect the dictates required by the  different 
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religions) and for the designation of mediators to partially fulfil the need for a 
cultural and religious integration.
Nevertheless, some calls for tenders for the management of extraordinary 
reception centers for asylum seekers require that guests be allocated by taking 
into account their religious affiliation in order to prevent any tension between 
guests belonging to different religious denominations. For example, in the at-
tachment to the Public notice of call for tenders of the Syracuse Prefecture of 
14 January 2016, it is indicated that “the Prefecture maintain the power to man-
age the reception in the structures of the chosen subjects according to criteria 
meeting the needs of protection of the dignity, the safety and the physical in-
tegrity of the applicants, especially if vulnerable, as well as any need to safe-
guard public safety. For instance, the same structure will not include at the 
same time the following: a) guests of different ethnicities or of different reli-
gions that are in conflict or in a strong state of tension”. This means that, in-
stead of providing guidelines for the management of conflicts that could hypo-
thetically arise within the structure, the Prefecture makes a prognostic 
judgment, with the aim of preventing possible critical issues.
The failure in preventing difficulties concerning the interreligious coexis-
tence in the reception facilities for asylum seekers appears to be a serious con-
tradiction with reference both to the effectiveness of the protection of  religious 
freedom, and to the safeguard of right of asylum – as these people flee from 
countries where they cannot exercise their freedom. As a result, the formal 
recognition of the foreigner’s religious freedom is ineffective if it is not 
ensured even in the person’s daily life.
5 The Constitutional Aspects of the Religious Dimension of Foreign 
Nationals in Italy
Since religious freedom belongs to anyone who lives in Italy independently of 
their citizenship, it is very important to examine the discipline of the religious 
dimension of everyone’s life, which can also be applied to the foreigners who 
have been forced to migrate to Italy.
In fact, the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution is associated 
with an equal social dignity and with the equality of each person before the 
law, without any discrimination based on religion (art. 3 of the Constitution). 
This has two meanings:
1) Primacy of the laws in force in the Italian Republic, which everyone must 
observe, as prescribed by art. 54 of the Constitution, without considering 
oneself as exempt from the need to observe the norms of one’s own 
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 religion. Any conflicts with other religions can be prevented by the rules 
adopted pursuant to articles 7 and 8 of the Constitution, which regulate 
the relations between the State and each religious denomination in a 
specific and differentiated way. This makes it possible to temper the ob-
servance of state norms to the religious norms;
2) Public authorities are prohibited from provide for and implement differ-
ential treatment on the basis of religion, unless it is expressly provided 
for in the Lateran Pacts with the Catholic Church or in the agreements 
stipulated with other religious denominations (see below).
Therefore, in Italy, any norm contrasting with this fundamental principle of 
non-religious discrimination is not applicable. Thus, as a result of the prohibi-
tion provided by art. 16 of law 31 May 1995, no. 218, norms of foreign legal sys-
tems cannot be applied if they cause discrimination based on a particular reli-
gious affiliation or a non-religious affiliation – this is the case, for example, of 
some laws in force in States whose legal order is based on the Islamic Shariʿa.
The prohibition of religious discrimination does not mean that every reli-
gious confession and that every believer has the right to obtain the same treat-
ments guaranteed to other religions, but it means that every person has the 
right not to suffer any discrimination based on religious affiliation, on the 
change of religion, or on atheism. Moreover, art. 3 of the Constitution does not 
prevent the legislator from introducing reasonably different treatments to reg-
ulate “not substantially identical” situations. Besides, in compliance with the 
“supreme principles of the constitutional order”, some norms can be waived by 
other particular norms which have constitutional coverage – for example, 
those established by the Concordat with the Catholic Church (referred to in 
art. 7 of the Constitution) and those found in the agreements with non- 
Catholic confessions (which are mentioned in art. 8 of the Constitution).
In art. 3 of the Constitution, the prohibition of discrimination is connected 
to the principle of formal equality and is accompanied by positive obligations 
for the public authorities, which have to remove the obstacles which constrain 
equality and freedom. Consequently, the Italian legal system provides for rules 
that prevent and contrast discriminatory practices implemented both in the 
relations with public authorities and in the relations between people.
Firstly, incitement to hatred or discrimination for religious reasons are 
crimes, also because of the international obligations in force in Italy following 
the ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 
December 1966, which prescribes as punishable under criminal law the dis-
semination of ideas based on racial hatred, the incitement to commit violence 
for racial reasons and the participation in associations whose purpose is the 
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incitement to discrimination or violence on racial grounds. By implementing 
these international standards, Decree Law 26 April 1993, no. 122, converted, 
with modifications, by law 25 June 1993, no. 205, introduced criminal norms 
punishing propaganda and instigation to commit crimes on grounds of racial, 
ethnic and religious discrimination. Said norms ended up in 2018 into art. 604-
bis of the Italian Penal Code. Furthermore, any organization, association, 
movement or group having as its purpose the incitement to discrimination or 
to violence for racial, ethnic, national or religious reasons is prohibited.
Secondly, many laws provide for measures to prevent and combat discrimi-
nation, including any discrimination for religious reasons carried out in the 
relations between private individuals. In particular, the Consolidated act of 
provisions concerning immigration (Legislative Decree of 25 July 1998, no. 286) 
defines the behaviors that constitute discrimination, also for religious reasons. 
Article 43 defines as discriminatory “any behavior which, directly or indirectly, 
entails a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, 
national or ethnic ancestry, religious beliefs and practices, and that has the 
purpose or the effect to destroy or compromise the recognition, the benefit or 
the exercise, in conditions of equality, of human rights and fundamental free-
doms in political, economic, social and cultural fields and in any other sector 
of public life”. Article 43 also provides that, in any case, an act of discrimina-
tion is carried out by “anyone who illegitimately imposes more disadvanta-
geous conditions or refuses to provide access to employment, housing, educa-
tion, training and social services and social assistance to the foreigner legally 
residing in Italy only because of the status of foreigner or because belonging to 
a specific race, religion, ethnicity or nationality”. Article 44 gives those who 
consider themselves as victims of discrimination perpetrated by a private indi-
vidual or by a public administration for religious or ethnic reasons, the right to 
appeal to the judge to stop the prejudicial behavior.
Finally, the same Legislative Decree, with the aim to prevent and combat 
discrimination, provides that the Italian Regions, in collaboration with the 
Provinces and each Municipality, and with the associations of immigrants and 
social volunteers, set up information and legal assistance centers for foreigners 
who are the victims of discrimination on racial, ethnic, national or religious 
grounds. In implementing the law, the national fund for migration policies also 
finances annual and multi-year programs prepared by the Regions for carrying 
out activities aimed at preventing and removing all forms of discrimination.
Nevertheless, the national Office for the promotion of equal treatment and 
the removal of discrimination based on race or ethnic origin (unar), in its 
2015 report observed an increase in the cases of discrimination on grounds of 
religion. In the following report, it is noted that the reports of discrimination 
Bonetti298
<UN>
based on “religion or personal opinions” have increased compared to 2015 and 
that the subtype that mainly originated discriminatory behavior is Islamopho-
bia (5.3%), which consists of “an exaggerated fear, hatred and hostility towards 
Islam and Muslims, as well as of negative stereotypes that lead to prejudice, 
discrimination, marginalization and exclusion of Muslims from social, politi-
cal and civil life”. The distinction with other subtypes, such as anti-Semitism 
(1.1%) and Christianophobia (0.2%), shows a growth in the phenomenon of 
discrimination against people of Islamic religion or perceived as such. The 
2017 report counts 354 cases of discrimination based on religion and personal 
opinion, and that the highest number of discriminatory behaviors are due to 
Islamophobia (74.3% of the typology), followed by anti-Semitism (18.9%).
In any case, since the principle of equality before the law without distinc-
tions of religion also means that no one can escape the application of the law 
on the basis of their religious affiliation, no one can also avoid complying with 
the criminal law or believe that they can be acquitted of any crime only be-
cause their actions or omissions are based on real or alleged precepts of one’s 
own religion.
In fact, no one can claim as an excuse the ignorance of the criminal law (art. 
5 of the Italian Penal Code), except in the case of unavoidable ignorance – 
which, according to the jurisprudence, does not apply for the crimes commit-
ted for religious reasons, and therefore the religious factor does not have suffi-
cient relevance with regard to non-liability to punishment.
The Court of Cassation was called upon to assess how relevant the fact of 
belonging to the Islamic religion was in ascertaining whether all the constitu-
ent elements of the crime of family abuse were present. The Court,31 after hav-
ing linked the issue to the cultural offense phenomenon (which is character-
ized by the conflict between the precepts of culture, of tradition and –at least 
in the Islamic world– of the law of a particular country, and of those of the 
host country) notes that, with respect to this conflict, there are two opposing 
perspectives. The first is the assimilationist one, based on the need for foreign 
nationals to be incorporated in the legal system of the country of arrival, after 
having renounced their own ethnic and cultural roots. The other is the integra-
tionist one, oriented towards the preservation of identities, as it is based on the 
recognition of the coexistence of different cultures as a positive value. In most 
jurisdictions, such conflict is solved by making both perspectives coexist. In 
the Italian legal system, alongside the aggravating circumstance envisaged by 
art. 3, par. 1 of Legislative Decree no. 122/1993 for crimes characterized by 
31 Court of Cassation, sentence of 26 November 2008, no. 46300, with a note by F. Pavesi in 
Giur.it, 2010, 2, p. 416.
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 ethnic, national, racial or religious discrimination and hatred, inspired by the 
“integrationist” perspective, there are crimes that punish female genital muti-
lation (art. 583 bis of the Penal Code) and bigamy (art. 556 of the Penal Code), 
which can be considered as expressions of the “assimilationist” logic.
The Court continues by observing that, even for cultural or culturally- 
oriented crimes, the judge has the duty to simultaneously guarantee the pro-
tection of the victims (it is irrelevant whether they consent or not to the in-
fringement of their inalienable rights32), the respect of the right of the accused 
to a rigorous verification of the facts and a correct application of the rules, and 
the delivering of an appropriate verdict for each case. This is because the role 
of cultural mediator that the doctrine attributes to the criminal judge has to be 
fulfilled by respecting the rules. In particular, the “integrationist” logic finds a 
limitation in the respect of the main principles of interpersonal  relationships – 
i.e. in the protection of the fundamental and inviolable rights of the person, as 
imposed by art. 2 and 3 of the Constitution. On the basis of these premises, the 
Court of Cassation affirmed that the subjective element of the crime of family 
abuse could not be ruled out by the circumstance that the offender was of Is-
lamic religion and therefore he would claim a particular power as the “head” of 
the family unit, because such concepts are in absolute contrast with funda-
mental rules of the Italian legal system.
These considerations have been even more relevant with reference to the 
issue of what to wear. In this regard, it should be remembered that in personal 
freedom and in religious freedom, the freedom to decide what to wear is im-
plicit. It can be limited only by law and only when the type of clothing worn or 
not worn turns out to be against morality, i.e. against the common sense of 
decency (public indecency), or when clothes make the identity of a person 
unrecognizable, or when objects that can offend or even weapons are worn as 
clothing. With regard to the clothes worn by foreigners for religious reasons, 
the legal questions concerning the Islamic veil and the Sikh kirpan are still not 
resolved peacefully in the absence of an agreement between the State and the 
two religious denominations.
In the Italian legal system, the Islamic female veil does not raise any particu-
lar problems if it leaves the face uncovered, since every situation in which the 
woman (Italian or foreign) receives a different treatment only because she 
wears an Islamic veil is illegal and punishable with an anti-discrimination ac-
tion. However, the discrimination against women wearing a veil is considered 
to be legitimate when hiring at a workplace for which not to wear the veil is a 
32 Court of Cassation, criminal section, 20 October 1999, no. 3398.
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determinant requirement,33 as stated prior to the preliminary selection for 
employment, or when employers want to connote their business, directly 
working with the public, in the most neutral way with respect to religion (a 
question resolved by the European Court of Human Rights by affirming the 
legitimacy and the reasonableness of this apparent discrimination).
Instead, the use of a full veil preventing the face from being seen (thus not 
allowing the identification of the person) can be considered as an offence, 
since it violates the prohibition to use any means to hinder the recognition of 
the person in a public place, when it happens with no good reason and during 
events taking place in a public place – an exception is made for sporting events 
where such use is necessary (art. 5 of law no. 152/1975). Said violation is punish-
able as a criminal offence not only in cases of willful misconduct, but also for 
negligence, and it can lead to imprisonment from one to two years or to a fine 
from 1,000 to 2,000 euros.
The use of the Islamic veil can also be considered as a violation of the pro-
hibition to appear masked in a public place, provided by art. 85 of the Consoli-
dated act of provisions on Public Security and punished with an administra-
tive sanction.
Nonetheless, the jurisprudence rightfully applies such sanctions in a restric-
tive way. That is both when the veil is temporarily removed for identification 
purposes and when the not punishable conduct may be carried out to fulfil a 
religious prescription (even if the Koranic prescription for women is a mere 
suggestion and does not require a complete obscuration of the face). As said 
behavior is displayed in order to exercise the constitutional right to freely pro-
fess one’s religion, it is not sanctioned, as the Penal Code excludes any punish-
ment for those who have committed a crime with the aim to exercise a right.
On the contrary, the administrative and jurisprudential orientation prohib-
iting the full veil is more severe. Several mayors have taken specific measures, 
including contingent and urgent ones, to prevent and eliminate serious dan-
gers threatening public safety and urban security (as permitted by art. 54 of 
Legislative Decree no. 267/2000), which have prohibited the use of the veil 
(Caravaggion, 2016). In this regard, the Council of State –by rejecting the ap-
peal that had been lodged against a prefectural provision which had quashed 
an  ordinance, issued by a Mayor, that had forbidden the wearing of the veil in 
a public place– stated that the use of the veil covering the face (the burqa, but 
especially the hiğāb) is not generally aimed at avoiding recognition, as it 
33 See Court of Appeal of Milan, labour section, sentence of 20 May 2016, no. 579, comment-
ed in L. Pedullà, L’abbigliamento religioso tra identità e compatibilità ordinamentale, in 
Federalismi.it, no. 24, 2016.
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 constitutes the implementation of a tradition of certain peoples and cultures. 
Consequently, the judge does not have to make value judgments on the mere 
use of such symbols, but just has to verify whether the veil is worn to prevent 
recognition without any justifiable reason. Article 5 of law no. 152/1975, ob-
serves the Council of State,34 allows that “a person wear the veil for religious or 
cultural reasons, as public safety is ensured by the obligation for such person 
to remove the veil, if necessary, to be identified”, at the request of an autho-
rized public official. Even criminal judges have always acquitted women who 
had promptly lifted the veil to allow their identification before entering a 
courtroom.35 On the other hand, the resolution no. x/4553 of 10 December 
2015 adopted by the Lombardy Regional Council, which prohibited people 
with covered faces to enter the main regional buildings, was considered as law-
ful, as it specified that religious traditions could not represent a valid reason to 
justify exceptions, pursuant to art. 5 of law no. 152/1975 relating to safety inside 
the regional buildings. The Court of Milan, in fact, considered the measure to 
be non-discriminatory because the disadvantage for Muslim women was 
strictly necessary to ensure identification with public security purposes, which 
are objectively justified and legitimate.
The ruling of the Court of Milan was criticized by the doctrine, according to 
which the above-mentioned regional provision does not cause a mere disad-
vantage but, rather, a serious limitation to some constitutional rights. In fact, 
since hospitals are regional facilities, as well as the headquarters of the Lom-
bardy public housing agency, a Muslim woman who is wearing the veil finds 
herself forced to choose between two distinct constitutionally-guaranteed 
fundamental rights, i.e. religious freedom and the rights to health, assistance 
and housing (Caravaggion, 2018).
Even the carrying of the kirpan (the ceremonial dagger of the Sikhs) seems 
to be forbidden, since it infringes the prohibition (provided by art. 4 of law no. 
110/1975) to carry, without any justifiable reason, certain types of knifes per-
ceived as offensive weapons. Besides, this issue has been dealt with in different 
ways, over time – as the jurisprudence shows.
The judges would initially have dismissed such cases, as the Sikhs could use, 
as a justifiable reason, the right to freely profess their faith. Later on, instead, 
the Court of Cassation declared the illegitimacy of this conduct, believing that 
34 Council of State, Section vi, sentence of 19 June 2008, no. 3076.
35 See Court of Treviso, Office of the Preliminary investigations judge, ordinance of 3 March 
2005 and Court of Cremona, sentence of 27 November 2008, on which see G.L. Gatta, 
Islam, abbigliamento religioso, diritto e processo penale: brevi note a margine di due casi 
giurisprudenziali, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, June 2009, pag. 3 et seq.
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religious practices should respect the fundamental principles of the Italian 
legal system, indicated in art. 8 of the Constitution, which includes the pro-
tection of people’s safety and security ensured by the legislation regulating 
the use of weapons, and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights concerning the discretion of the employer to not hire people carrying 
weapons. The doctrine criticizes these decisions by observing that the limi-
tation within which the fundamental principles of art. 8 of the Constitution 
can be exercised concerns the internal organization of the various religious 
confessions – and not the individuals’ right to exercise their own freedom of 
religion, which is limited by art. 19 of the Constitution only in the case of ritu-
als against public morality. Besides, the employer’s discretion could lead to 
paradoxical consequences, as gardeners (for example) could actually carry the 
kirpan to work, without no intention of showing it in public (ibidem).
6 The State’s Relations with the Various Religious Denominations
The Italian Constitution guarantees the freedom of religion not only in its in-
dividual dimension, but also in its collective expression through a diversified 
system of relations between the State and the various religious denomina-
tions, in a context of state secularism.
First of all, it is important to note that the Constitution uses the notion of 
religious denomination, but does not indicate its constituent elements. The is-
sue is essential when it comes to minority religious groups, new groups, groups 
that are not very well known or that are even secret – and which, because of 
those characteristics, are sometimes discriminated and persecuted. This is sig-
nificant also with regard to the religious denominations professed by foreign-
ers forced to leave their own country because of their belonging to sects or to 
local or new animistic groups. In this regard, doctrine is divided: some demand 
that every denomination have a normative and organizational structure simi-
lar to that of the Catholic Church or other “traditional” Churches (Gismondi, 
1975; D’Avack, 1978), while others refer to the autonomous decision of each 
group to qualify as a religious denomination (Randazzo, 2006).
The Constitutional Court, however, clearly excludes “the unreasonable re-
sults of an uncontrollable self-qualification”36 and believes that the confes-
sional nature of a community of faithful can derive from many factors. Some of 
them are the following: the possible presence of an agreement stipulated with 
the State, pursuant to art. 8 of the Constitution; previous public recognition, 
36 Constitutional Court, sentence no. 467/1992.
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such as the attribution of legal personality to a representative body (on the 
basis of the law on “accepted cults” of 1929); a statute that clearly expresses its 
main features; or even the common consideration.37 Moreover, in the absence 
of an agreement with the State, the criteria indicated by the Court, as part of 
the doctrine believes (Randazzo, 2006), should be considered as a whole, and 
not as an alternative. This is to avoid putting self-reference first (through the 
statutory element) or even the State’s point of view (through previous public 
recognition) or, finally, the sociological aspect (through the common consid-
eration element). In particular, the sociological criterion of the “common con-
sideration”, suggested by a part of the doctrine (Barillaro, 1968), is difficult to 
observe when it comes to both new religious movements (whose distinctive 
features are not yet known by public opinion) and other religious movements 
that are present in other countries (even though as a minority) and have been 
brought to Italy by persecuted foreigner nationals.
The self-definition of the religious group must be in line not only with its 
external characteristics, but also with the animus of its members, i.e. with their 
willingness to act as an autonomous formation in the pursuit of a religious 
purpose (Colaianni, 1990). In fact, people who gather under the same religious 
denomination do so because they embrace a creed that is different from any 
other – thus organizing themselves within a distinct structure (Long, 1991). 
They, in fact, have their own specific view of the world, as well as of the rela-
tionship with the transcendent – both sustained by an autonomous doctrinal 
and dogmatic knowledge and by a special organization (which can be mini-
mal, at times, but nevertheless characterized by an independent consistency 
and a precise identity) (Finocchiaro, 1975; Cardia, 1983; Mirabelli, 2006). How-
ever fundamental, the State’s evaluation appears to be quite difficult to ascer-
tain. Indeed, it cannot only “acknowledge” the situation, nor can it cast doubts 
on that doctrinal knowledge (as the Council of State pointed out in opinions 
relating to the recognition of the legal personality of the Italian Congregation 
of Jehovah’s Witnesses and of the Italian Buddhist Union). Rather, it has to 
judge the animus of the community by examining the purposes pursued and 
the organizational structure that has been built (Botta, 1994).
Moreover, the established doctrine accepts the notion according to which a 
religious denomination is characterized by a community united around the 
elements of crystallization, development and expression of faith. It differs 
from other social formations because of its collective identity, anchored in an 
attitude towards a transcendent dimension (Colaianni, 2000).
37 Constitutional Court, sentence no. 195/1993.
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This being clarified, the first constitutional principle concerning the disci-
pline of the public dimension of religions is the distinction between the juridi-
cal order of the State and the spiritual and religious order of religious denomina-
tions. This principle is derived from both art. 7 of the Constitution, which 
provides that the State and the Catholic Church are independent and sover-
eign, each within its own sphere; and from art. 8, which provides that religious 
denominations other than Catholicism have the right to self-organization ac-
cording to their own statutes, provided these do not conflict with Italian law.
That principle of distinction between orders has two consequences:
a) the religious, spiritual and doctrinal area, as well as the internal organiza-
tion of every religious denomination (statutes, indication of religious au-
thorities, management of places of worship, religious activity, and ad-
ministrative, financial and territorial set of rules) belong only to the 
religious groups. Public authorities, in fact, have no power of interfer-
ence, nor can they use the law to impose to the different religious de-
nominations the timing and the methods to adopt their internal rules or 
even their contents. Public authorities only have to acknowledge the 
choices freely adopted by every religious denomination;
b) the fundamental principles of the Italian legal system must be respected 
by all religious denominations, which cannot wish to directly influence 
the republican legal system itself, nor make their rules prevail over state 
norms.
The second relevant constitutional principle in the relations between the Ital-
ian State and the various religious denominations is the equally important 
freedom of each religious confession, as provided by art. 8 of the Constitution. 
It does not mean that all confessions are subjected to the same juridical disci-
pline, but rather that their members can freely profess their beliefs and carry 
out the respective activities with no limitations other than those provided for 
by the Constitution and by the laws (Del Giudice, 1964).
As for the theme of religion, religious affiliation is of essence, consider-
ing that any kind of discrimination based only on the number of members is 
“unacceptable”38 as it is the “intensity”39 of the social reactions that may fol-
low the violation of the rights of the different groups. Since every religious de-
nomination must receive the same juridical treatment, a differentiated treat-
ment is legitimate only if connected to the different needs or  organizational 
 peculiarities of a confession and does not derive from a purely discretionary 
choice of the State.
38 Constitutional Court, sentence no. 440/1995.
39 Constitutional Court, sentence no. 329/1997 and no. 508/2000.
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The third relevant constitutional principle in the relations between the Ital-
ian State and the religious denominations is that of bilateralism. The Italian 
Constitution provides, in fact, for differentiated regimes in the relations be-
tween the State and the Catholic Church, and between the State and any other 
religious denomination, governed by special bilateral agreements.
On the one hand, the relations with the Catholic Church, recognized as in-
dependent and sovereign in its order, are regulated by the Lateran Pacts stipu-
lated in 1929, whose amendment agreed by both parties does not require any 
constitutional revision (art. 7 of the Constitution). Unilateral amendments by 
the State are allowed, but bilateral ones are preferred. Thus, the agreement 
revising the Lateran Concordat (signed on 18 February 1984 and approved by 
law 25 March 1985 no. 121) adapted the rules of the Concordat between State 
and Church to the republican constitutional system by establishing frame-
work norms on the basis of which other agreements were later concluded. 
Such agreements focused on the subject of ecclesiastical goods, support 
of the Catholic clergy, teaching of religion in schools (see also  Chapter 21), 
religious festivities, management of cultural heritage, and ecclesiastical 
appointments.
However, the relations of the State with any other religious denomination 
can be regulated by specific agreements that must be approved by law. Today, 
there are specific laws approving agreements between the Italian State and 12 
religious denominations other than the Catholic one. They are the following:
a) the agreement with the Waldensian Church and the subsequent amend-
ing agreements (signed on 21 February 1984, 25 January 1993 and 4 April 
2007 and respectively approved by law no. 449/1994, no. 409/1993 and no. 
68/2009);
b) the agreement with the Union of the Seventh-day Adventist Chris-
tian Churches and the subsequent amending agreements (signed on 
29  December 1986, 6 November 1996 and 4 April 2007 and respectively 
approved with law no. 516/1988, no. 637/1996 and no. 67/2009);
c) the agreement with the Assemblies of God in Italy (signed on 29  December 
1986 and approved by law no. 517/1988);
d) the agreement with the Union of Italian Jewish Communities and the sub-
sequent modification (signed on 27 February 1987 and 6 November 1996 
and respectively approved by law no. 101/1989 and no. 638/1996);
e) the agreement with the Christian Baptist Evangelical Union of Italy and 
the subsequent modification (signed on 29 March 1993 and on 16 July 
2010 and approved respectively by law no. 116/1995 and no. 34/2012);
f) agreement with the Lutheran Evangelical Church in Italy (signed on 20 
April 1993 and approved by law no. 520/1995);
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g) agreement with the Sacred Orthodox Archdiocese of Italy and Exarchate 
for Southern Europe (signed on 4 April 2007 and approved by law no. 
126/2012);
h) the agreement with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (signed 
on 4 April 2007 and approved by law no. 127/2012);
i) the agreement with the Apostolic Church in Italy (signed on 4 April 2007 
and approved by law no. 128/2012);
j) the agreement with the Italian Buddhist Union (signed on 4 April 2007 
and approved by law no. 245/2012);
k) the agreement with the Italian Hindu Union (signed on 4 April 2007 and 
approved by law no. 246/2012);
l) the agreement with the Italian Soka Gakkai Buddhist Institute (signed on 
27 June 2015 and approved by law no. 130/2016).
The agreements reached so far have similar contents, including rules 
concerning:
a) the spiritual assistance in institutions such as the armed forces, health 
facilities, and prisons;
b) the right of pupils not to attend Catholic religion classes;
c) the recognition of diplomas conferred by institutes of theological 
studies;
d) the right to freely establish schools of all levels and other educational 
institutions (guaranteed also by art. 33 of the Constitution);
e) the recognition of the civil effects to marriages celebrated by the minis-
ters of worship of the respective religious denominations;
f) the tax treatment of the various religious denominations and their finan-
cial relations with the State, on the model outlined for the Catholic 
Church by law 20 May 1985, no. 222;
g) the protection of religious buildings and of assets pertaining to the his-
torical and cultural heritage of each religious denomination, as a guaran-
tee of their own cultural identities;
h) the free exercise of one’s own ministry by the ministers of worship 
 appointed by the religious denomination;
i) the recognition of the festivities of each religious denomination.
The agreements that have been stipulated so far offer to the other religious 
denominations similar guarantees and freedoms as the ones conferred to the 
Catholic Church by the current Concordat of 1984. They concern, for example, 
the management of the religious denomination, the religious group’s full right 
of internal jurisdiction and regulation, the freedom of communication, as well 
as the right to provide religious assistance in particular institutions, such as 
military bases, hospitals and prisons. Besides, they guarantee certain rights 
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only to the faithful of certain communities: in particular, the right of Adven-
tists and Jews to sabbatical rest, the right of the Jews to respect specific food 
prescriptions, and the right of Adventists and Buddhists to conscientious ob-
jection to military obligations.
The text of an agreement with the Christian Congregation of Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses in Italy was signed twice (on 20 March 2000 and on 4 April 2007), but it 
was never approved by the two Houses of Parliament, also because in the par-
liamentary scrutiny some precepts of that religious group were considered to 
be against some fundamental principles of the Italian legal system. In fact, the 
draft law for the approval of the new agreement signed in 2014 was finally nev-
er presented to the Chambers.
The draft law approving the agreement with the Church of England associa-
tion (mainly representing the Anglicans) signed on 30 July 2019 has not yet 
been presented to the Parliament by the Government. Negotiations have also 
begun for the agreement with the Romanian Orthodox Diocese of Italy.
As for the agreement with the Islamic religious group, proposals of agree-
ment formulated by various Italian Muslim bodies have so far not led to the 
start of negotiations with the Italian Government, mainly because of the lack 
of a unified representation of the Islamic denomination and of a legally ap-
proved internal statute. In order to promote a process aimed at filling these 
gaps, since 2008, the Ministers of the Interior have set up study advisory bod-
ies, also composed of representatives of various Italian Islamic organizations 
and of Muslim experts.
The negotiation of an agreement with the Sikhs appears to be hindered by 
two opinions of the Council of State, according to which this religious group 
has rules that contrast with some fundamental principles of the Italian legal 
system.
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court has clarified that the agreements do 
not grant additional privileges to the religious denominations that have con-
cluded them, nor do they prevent the religious groups that have not yet stipu-
lated them from exercising their religious freedom. In fact, since the attitude of 
the State can only be of equality and impartiality towards all religious groups,40 
these agreements regulate the relations of the various religious denominations 
with the State as for some specific aspects concerning the individual groups 
or when exceptions to the ordinary law are needed. Public authorities, in 
fact, cannot impose such agreements to the different religious groups in or-
der to benefit of the freedom of organization and action  guaranteed by the 
40 Constitutional Court, sentence no. 508/2000.
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 Constitution, nor to make them take advantage of the favorable norms regard-
ing religious denominations.41
Therefore, the State can regulate, in a bilateral and differentiated way, its 
relations with each religious denomination, as provided for by art. 7 and 8 of 
the Constitution, in order to fulfil specific needs, to grant particular advantag-
es or impose particular limitations, or to give relevance, in its legal system, to 
specific acts of the religious denomination in consideration. Consequently, it 
would be a violation of the constitutional principle of the equality of freedom 
to grant advantages to one religious group if not connected to its specific needs 
(Onida, 1978).
In any case, state and regional laws cannot “discriminate between religious 
denominations on the basis of the sole circumstance that they have, or have 
not, regulated their relations with the State through agreements”. Indeed, “reli-
gious freedom is one thing, and is guaranteed to everyone without any distinc-
tion, while agreements are another”,42 so that the freedom of religion –of which 
the freedom of worship is an essential part (art. 19 and 20 of the Constitution)– 
cannot be subordinated to the stipulation of agreements with the State.43
7 Religious Freedom with Reference to Family, Education of Minors, 
Religious Assistance in Prisons
Numerous practical issues linked to the cohabitation of different religions con-
cern religious aspects that have affected the legal status of foreigners and of 
asylum seekers. Some issues relate to family formation and to the celebration 
of marriage. First of all, it must be remembered that religious freedom (art. 19 
of the Constitution), the prohibition of discrimination based on religion and 
gender (art. 3 of the Constitution), the juridical and moral equality of spouses 
(art. 29 of the Constitution), the right and the duty of both parents to educate 
their children (art. 30 of the Constitution) are fundamental principles of the 
Italian legal system. Said principles are incompatible with any rule, in force 
in other States, preventing the marriage –or imposing the dissolution of a 
 marriage– when the partners have different religion, or one of them refuses to 
convert to a particular religion, or providing a preferential legal treatment to 
one spouse (e.g. possibility of polygamous marriage,  dissolution of  marriage 
41 Constitutional Court, sentence no. 346/2002.
42 See Constitutional Court, sentence no. 63/2016, with reference to sentence no. 52/2016.
43 See Constitutional Court, sentence no. 52/2016 and no. 63/2016.
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with  unilateral repudiation, exclusive custody of children or exclusive posses-
sion of the assets of the other spouse). These rules are against public order, i.e. 
against the fundamental principles of the Italian legal system, and are there-
fore inapplicable by the Italian judge –pursuant to art. 16 of law no. 218/1995– 
who has to apply the Italian regulations and not the ones in force in the coun-
try of origin.
Moreover, laws on marriage in force in another State have an indirect effect 
on the Italian legal system as for the impediments to the celebration of mar-
riage. According to art. 116 of the Italian Civil Code, foreigners who want to 
celebrate their marriage in Italy must possess the permit issued by the compe-
tent authority of their country – thus showing that there are no impediments 
to the celebration of the marriage, according to the law in force in the country 
of which the foreigner is a national. This obligation causes at least two poten-
tially prejudicial effects on the right of every person to form his own family. 
People affected by this are the following:
a) The ones who are seeking asylum or have been persecuted cannot obtain 
this certification from the diplomatic-consular representatives of the 
State from which they have escaped, also because they would jeopardize 
the credibility of their application for international protection. Accord-
ing to art. 25 of the 1951 Convention on the status of refugees, this impos-
sibility can be compensated by the Italian diplomatic representation in 
the foreigner’s State, but also –in Italy– by the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees.44
b) Asylum seekers, holders of subsidiary protection, all those who would 
never obtain the permit – i.e. people who do not have any identifica-
tion documents, or fear being identified and persecuted, or must obey to 
a foreign law establishing, as impediment to marriage, the belonging to 
a specific religious denomination or conviction for crimes linked to the 
violation of religious norms, the conversion to another religion, and the 
expression of religious criticism or atheist convictions. For these people, 
it is possible to appeal to a faculty envisaged by art. 98 of the Italian Civil 
Code: the Court, at the request of the two people who want to get mar-
ried and who declare, in compliance the Italian law, that there are no 
impediments, can lift them from the mandatory marriage publications.
Another topic concerns the right to educate one’s children according to the dic-
tates of one’s religion.
44 See the forms provided by the offices of the unhcr in Italy to obtain the documentation 




In respect of people’s personal and religious freedom and of minors’ right to 
health, the above-mentioned right to education is guaranteed by international 
standards and by the freedom of religion (art. 19 of the Constitution), by the 
parents’ right to educate their children (art. 30 of the Constitution) and by 
the right to build private schools (art. 33 of the Constitution). The implemen-
tation of these rights is ensured both by the rules governing relations between 
the State and the various religious denominations and by the rules on school 
equality (see Chapter 21). In particular, art. 1 of law no. 62/2000 provides for a 
balance between religious needs and constitutional principles: “Private schools 
are guaranteed full freedom with regard to their cultural orientation and their 
pedagogical-didactic direction. Independently of the specific educational 
project of the single schools, teaching has to be based on the principles of free-
dom established by the Constitution. Private schools carry out a public service, 
as they welcome everyone who accepts their educational project, including 
pupils and students with disabilities. The educational project of the school has 
a precise cultural or religious view. However, extra-curricular activities that 
require the adherence to a specific ideology or to a specific religious denomi-
nation are not compulsory for any student”.
As far as religious and family matters are concerned, the contrast between 
foreign laws and the fundamental principles of the Italian legal system has 
manifested itself also in relation to other themes, relevant for the life of all 
foreigners in Italy, including asylum seekers, i.e. the care of children and the 
dissolution of marriage.
With reference to the responsibility of the parents, the Court of Cassation45 
stated that, in deciding on the custody of children in case of separation of the 
parents, the Italian judge cannot apply the Iranian law (national law of the fa-
ther), which allows the father to gain the exclusive custody of the children, 
since such law is inapplicable in the Italian system, due to the aforementioned 
limit represented by public order. This criterion is different from that set by art. 
155, par. 1 of the Italian Civil Code, by virtue of which decisions relating to chil-
dren must be adopted with exclusive reference to the moral and material inter-
est of the minors. Independently of the actual ability of the parent to take care 
of one’s offspring, the Iranian law clearly contrasts with the gender discrimina-
tion prohibition (art. 3 and 29 of the Constitution) and with the principle of 
secularism – which does not allow to use the religious belief of the parents as 
a criterion for choosing the foster parent.
As for the foreigners’ right to family unity, the Court of Cassation has stated 
that the foreign parent can request the reunification with his/her dependent 
45 Court of Cassation, civil section, 27 February 1985, no. 1714.
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children (according to art. 29 of Legislative Decree no. 286/1998) if he/she is 
able to financially support them. However, in doing so, said parent does not 
also gain the –exclusive or concurrent– parental responsibility of minors. On 
this topic, it is worth mentioning a case relating to a Moroccan citizen who was 
repudiated by her husband in accordance with the Moroccan law and was de-
nied the legal protection of her children, as requested by her husband. Under 
such circumstances, she could ask for reunification with her children only on 
condition that she provided them with a suitable accommodation in the Ital-
ian territory and that she earned a sufficient income to satisfy this requirement.
Every foreign minor in Italy is subject to compulsory schooling under the 
same conditions as Italian citizens (art. 38 of Legislative Decree no. 286/1998). 
Thus, another issue concerning the religious education of foreigners, includ-
ing asylum seekers, is that of religious education in public schools.
Art. 9 of the 1984 Amendment Agreement of the Concordat between the 
State and the Holy See, affirms that the State, “recognizing the value of reli-
gious culture and considering that the principles of Catholicism are part of the 
historical heritage of the Italian people, continues to ensure, within the frame-
work of school aims, the teaching of the Catholic religion in educational insti-
tutions of all types and at all levels”. However, it leaves it up to either the 
 students –if aged 14 or over– or their parents to decide whether to attend such 
classes. Therefore, the teaching of Catholic religion in public schools involves 
a faculty that the parents (or the students who are 14 years old or older)  express 
at the beginning of the school year. And that even if the teachers of Catholic 
religion are paid by the State and their grading is an integral part of the stu-
dent’s overall scholastic evaluation. Besides, alternative educational activities 
must be provided for those who do not attend those classes. The Constitu-
tional Court has specified that it is no “obligation” and that, for this reason, the 
school workload cannot increase for those who choose not to participate. In 
fact, alternative activities cannot be made compulsory –  otherwise, a primary 
subjective right is violated, thus causing a compensable damage.46 Besides, 
class schedule must be organized in such a way as to avoid any discrimination, 
even if said class does not necessarily have to be placed in the first or in the last 
hour of the school day, since the characteristic of non-obligation may also in-
clude the choice to leave the school during that hour.47
In addition, as stated in the agreements with the religious denominations 
other than the Catholic one, each religious group has the right to respond to 
any requests made by the students, their families and the schools, as far as the 
46 Court of Cassation, united civil section, no. 11432/1997.
47 Constitutional Court, sentence no. 13/1991.
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study of the religious facts and their implications are concerned. However, it 
must be noted the lengthy jurisprudential controversy concerning the exposi-
tion of the crucifix in the classrooms. Some wanted to have it removed from 
the walls of the Italian public schools because, as a symbol of a religious group, 
it was considered an instrument of religious propaganda incompatible with 
the secular state and potentially offensive for atheists and for those belonging 
to other religious denominations. With regard to the exhibition of the crucifix 
in public places (classrooms, courts of justice, electoral offices), the jurispru-
dence has expressed conflicting orientations. In fact, some have deemed the 
obligation to be no longer in force, having been provided by secondary rules 
that have been introduced during the fascist regime in a constitutional system 
that used to consider the Catholic religion as the religion of State, and are now 
incompatible with the current constitutional and international norms.48 Oth-
ers have affirmed that it cannot offend anyone since it is not the religious sym-
bol of a religious group, but rather a symbol of the historical roots of the Italian 
people, which expresses “the religious origin of the values of tolerance, mutual 
respect, enhancement of the persons, promotion of their rights, of their free-
dom, of the autonomy of their moral conscience towards the authority, of hu-
man solidarity, and of rejection of all discriminations. All of this characterizes 
the Italian civilization”. Therefore, the exposition of the crucifix evokes values 
that “emerge from the fundamental norms of our Charter and, specifically, 
from the ones mentioned by the Constitutional Court about the secular nature 
of the Italian State”.49 Besides, some other, by basing on the principle of 
48 Court of Cassation, criminal Sction iv, no. 439/2000. It stated that the rules on the display 
of the crucifix should implicitly be understood as repealed due to their religious domina-
tion matrix, also because the presence of this symbol in classrooms used as polling sta-
tions would risk causing “a serious disturbance to one’s conscience” and its imposition, as 
linked to the symbolic value of an entire civilization or of the collective ethical con-
science, would go against the “clear prohibition” imposed in this matter by the principle 
of equality referred to in art. 3 of the Constitution.
49 Council of State, Section vi, sentence no. 556/2006 and Council of State, Section ii, opin-
ion of 15 February 2006 (issued in the extraordinary appeal to the Head of State proposed 
by the Union of atheists, agnostics and rationalists against the directive of 3 October 2002 
by the Ministry of Education on the display of the crucifix in classrooms). In this opinion, 
it is admitted that, today, the crucifix “must also be seen as a religious symbol”, and com-
mon to several denominations (all Christian ones). However, it would be “in opposition to 
the very origins of our Constitution, as well as to the sentiment of our people, to exclude 
a Christian sign from a public structure in the name of secularism, which also finds one of 
its distant sources in the Christian religion”. Nor could the subjective right of religious 
freedom be invoked, because its “protection cannot be extended to the psychological 
sphere, that is, to the dimensions of individual conscience and feelings, which would lead 
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 autonomy of each scholastic institution provided by the Constitution, believe 
that all classes should decide for themselves.
Finally, the religious dimension of foreigners, including asylum seekers, is 
especially relevant for people inside Italian prisons (in which there are many 
foreigners). Prisoners must be treated with humanity and respect for the dig-
nity of the person, with absolute impartiality, without discrimination as re-
gards gender, sexual orientation, race, nationality, economic and social condi-
tions, political opinions and religious beliefs, and must follow models that 
favor autonomy, responsibility, socialization and integration (art. 1 of law 26 
July 1975, no. 354).
Furthermore, penitentiary institutions must be equipped with rooms that 
are suitable for the needs of the prisoners’ individual life and, if possible, 
rooms to carry out religious activities (art. 5 of law no. 354/1975). Prisoners 
must be guaranteed a diet that respects their religious beliefs (art. 9 of law no. 
354/1975), so that in deciding the food to administer to prisoners, which must 
be approved by a decree of the Minister of Justice, the prescriptions of the dif-
ferent religious faiths must be taken into account (art. 11 of Presidential Decree 
no. 230/2000).
More generally, prisoners’ treatment also involves religion (art. 15 of law no. 
354/1975). Indeed, prisoners have the freedom to profess their religious faith 
and to practice its worship. In penitentiary institutions, the celebration of 
Catholic rites is guaranteed and at least one Catholic chaplain is assigned to 
each institute. Prisoners following a religion other than the Catholic one have 
the right to receive, at their request, the assistance of ministers of their own 
religious denomination and celebrate their rites (art. 26 of law no. 354/1975). 
Prisoners, in fact, have the right to participate in the rites of their religious 
group, provided they are compatible with the security of the institution and 
not contrary to the law, according to the provisions of art. 58 of Presidential 
decree no. 230/2000:
a) prisoners have the right to display, in their room, images and symbols of 
their own religion;
b) during free time, prisoners are allowed to practice their religions, pro-
vided that they do not engage in dangerous acts for the community;
c) in order to celebrate Catholic rites, each institute has one or more cha-
pels, according to the requirements of the religious service;
to the recognition of a right to a sterile environment, in which we are all preserved from 
receiving messages against personal sentiments”.
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d) for religious education and for the practices of worship by members of 
other religious denominations, even when in the absence of ministers, 
the institute’s management offers suitable spaces.
The institute’s management, in order to guarantee to prisoners religious edu-
cation and spiritual assistance, as well as the celebration of the rites of other 
confessions, arranges for the ministers of worship requested by the different 
religious groups, and always indicated by the Ministry of the Interior, to per-
form their duties inside the prisons. Finally, the daytime isolation of prisoners 
sentenced to life does not exclude their admission to religious services (art. 73 
of Presidential decree no. 230/2000).
In the 2019 Report to Parliament, the National Defender for the rights of 
persons whose personal freedom has been restricted has recommended the 
Government (so far, without any implementation) to promote in “high securi-
ty” prisons, thanks to specific scientific competences, projects and programs of 
de-radicalization of the people who have been sentenced for crimes aggravat-
ed by the terrorist aim of the so-called religious fundamentalism.
The rules examined so far make us understand why from the principle of 
equality for any religion (art. 3 of the Constitution), from religious freedom 
(art. 19 of the Constitution), from the prohibition of special burdens for reli-
gious bodies (art. 20 of the Constitution), from the equal freedom of every 
religious group before the law and from their full freedom of internal organiza-
tion (art. 7 and 8 of the Constitution), the Constitutional Court has deduced 
that the Italian legal system is characterized by the principle of state secularity, 
meant not as indifference of the State towards the religious experience, but 
rather as the protection of pluralism, in support of the maximum expansion of 
freedom for all, according to criteria of impartiality.
In this regard, some doctrine (D’Amico, 2008) has developed a method that 
can be defined as “secular” to resolve conflicts between opposing and appar-
ently irreconcilable rights, which is the resort to constitutional principles. Fun-
damental aspects of this method are:
a) the involvement of different institutional actors, i.e. the legislator, the 
Constitutional Court, the common judges and the citizens, since there is 
not one unique way to defend the rights;
b) the rejection of laws that attempt to “moralize” by imposing “values”;
c) the acquisition by the institutional actors of the scientific data and 
their attention to reality, to be taken into consideration in an objective 
manner;
d) attention towards the respect for the rights of minorities, especially if 
they are “weak”. And, of course, these weak minorities include asylum 
seekers for religious reasons.
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Chapter 10
On the Role of Religion in the Decision to Migrate
Laura Zanfrini
In this chapter and in the following two, the attention will move from the soci-
etal level to the individual one, focusing on three main topics.
Firstly (Chapter 10), we will concentrate our attention on the role of religion 
as a push/pull factor influencing the decision to migrate and, consequently, as 
a factor contributing to trace the distinction between forced and voluntary mi-
grations. Moving from the current debate about the increasing “porosity” of 
this distinction, we will discuss how the evidence from the fieldwork can help 
us describe and understand the role of the two key concepts represented by 
Religious Identity and Religious Liberty (see Chapter 2).
The second topic is represented by the procedure for the analysis of asylum 
applications (Chapter 11). Given the legislative framework in force in Italy (as it 
has been described in Chapter 9), we will discuss how the actual  implementation 
of rules and procedures allows the emergence and the acknowledgement of 
those aspects variously connected with asylum seekers’ religious belongings.
Thirdly, we will discuss (Chapter 12) the space dedicated to the religious di-
mension and to the spiritual needs of migrants, also during the delicate phase 
of the first reception and re-elaboration of the migratory trauma, as well as the 
“functions” and meanings that (forced) migrants for religious reasons attribute 
to religion, seen both in its individual declination and in the collective one.
Methodologically, Chapters 10–12 are based on the following sources:
a) A literature review on the discussed topics;
b) Data and suggestions emerged from five focus groups discussion (fgds),1 
which have globally involved around 40 key informants selected among 
executives, officials and operators of the reception system for asylum 
seekers; spiritual leaders and pastoral agents of different religions; repre-
sentatives of Italian and international organizations and associations in-
volved in the reception of asylum seekers; managers and members of the 
assessment commissions for asylum applications; local administrators; 
executives and officials of police stations and prefectures. The fgds were 
held in Milan and Rome, from January to July 2017 and subsequently 
transcribed;




c) Six semi-structured interviews with religious leaders and pastoral opera-
tors2 belonging to different catholic organizations involved in the recep-
tion of migrants and asylum seekers. These interviews were conducted 
from May to October 2017, at the domiciles of the interviewed and subse-
quently transcribed.
d) 20 in-depth interviews,3 carried out from March 2017 to December 2018, 
with migrants and asylum seekers who, regardless of the entry channel 
and of their current legal status, have been significantly affected by their 
religious belonging; in other words, religion is a variable that influenced 
both their decision to migrate and the development of migration and in-
sertion processes. Individuals to be interviewed were selected thanks to 
the suggestions coming from various experts and informants (including 
operators of the reception system, religious leaders, pastoral operators, 
attorneys in charge with asylum seekers assistance, and researchers). 
These interviews have been conducted either at the researchers’ work-
place or at other public places such as cafés, places of worship, and cul-
tural associations. All the interviewed were clearly informed about the 
aims of the study and gave their verbal agreement once assured that no 
identificative elements would be inserted in the final report of the re-
search or in any other public release of its results.
Notwithstanding these selective criteria and the large spectrum of informants 
activated, the conduction of the interviews proved to be more difficult than 
expected, mainly because of the relevant linguistic barriers. Some of the se-
lected interviewed turned out to have a modest knowledge not only of the Ital-
ian language (despite in some cases they had been living in Italy for several 
years), but also of other languages known by the research team (English, 
French, Spanish, Arab). We also tried to involve a translator during the inter-
view or in the process of transcription –particularly in the case of migrants 
coming from China– but the quality of the reports proved to be, in many cases, 
not adequate, thus making us have to remove them from the sample. Some 
other migrants appeared to be reluctant to describe their religious feelings and 
experience, despite the strong preparation of the interviewers and the clear 
illustration of the object of the study. This attitude could have to do with the 
bias already discussed (Chapters 1 and 2), which produces a rather negative 
consideration of religion and of religious belongings. As a consequence of 
these difficulties, we renounced to recur to a sophisticated methodology for 
2 Semi-structured interviews were conducted by Silvia Serafini as part of the fieldwork for her 
final master degree dissertation.
3 In-depht interviews were conducted by Francesca Mungiardi and Annavittoria Sarli.
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the text analysis, as initially envisaged, and we chose to only transcript parts of 
the interviews.4 These, in any case, are particularly interesting and suggestive 
of the importance of the religious and spiritual dimension.
Finally, despite these weaknesses, remarkable insight emerged from the 
study, which confirms the general hypothesis of the research and provides new 
suggestions for their explanation. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the 
field-work turned out to be quite touching, not only from a professional point 
of view, but also as human beings. Narratives were always moving, and it also 
happened that the interviewed would cry and ask for a break to get themselves 
together. The researchers involved were profoundly hit by these testimonies, 
which definitely confirmed the awareness of the importance of the discussed 
topics. In a few cases, the interview marked the beginning of a new friendship 
between the researcher and the interviewed.
1 Faith Based Organizations as a Push/Pull Effect in the Migration to 
Italy
As described in the introductory chapter of this book (Chapter 1), our research 
has moved from the hypothesis that religion plays a significant role in the deci-
sion to migrate, much more than it is usually grasped. More precisely, together 
with the forms of mobility specifically driven by religious motives –in their 
multiple declinations–,5 religion is supposed to play a greater role than usually 
acknowledged. Within the context of contemporary literature and theories 
(Massey et al., 1993), the institutional theory offers the theoretical framework to 
capture the role of Faith Based Organizations (from now on: fbos) as both 
push and pull factors, as well the networks theory highlights the importance of 
interpersonal links and social capital, possibly based on a common religious 
belonging, in reducing the costs and risks of migration, and in making the lat-
ter more feasible. As far Italy as a destination country is concerned, there is 
much empirical evidence on the key role played by religious institutions and 
4 In some cases, we were obliged to adjust the syntactic of the text, in order to make the Eng-
lish translation understandable.
5 Including some forms escluded from the present study, but surely interesting from a socio-
logical point of view, such as that involving Muslim people who left Europe to go to an Is-
lamic country in order to break with a social model which contradicts their puritan aspira-
tions (see Adraoui, 2015). Not to mention the phenomenon of religious radicalization that 
has caused the expatriation of so called foreign faighters.
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religious affiliations in structuring specific migration chains originating from 
various countries of the world.
The same Italian migratory transition –from being a predominantly emi-
gration to a predominantly immigration country– was announced, during the 
1970s, by the influx of young women recruited as house-maids thanks to the 
presence, in their home countries, of Catholic missions, schools, and hospi-
tals. Their arrival gave rise to various migratory networks doomed to acquire, 
with the passing of time, an extraordinary self-propelling power (among the 
most known, the chain linking Italy to the Philippines: Zanfrini & Asis, 2006). 
 Another suggestive example is the influx from Senegal, mostly composed of 
young men affiliated to the Muridiyya Islamic brotherhood, a component of a 
larger migration system linking the sending communities with the multiple 
poles of the Senegal’s Diaspora (Schmiddt di Firedberg, 1994). This latter offers 
one of the most impressive examples of how migratory models, migratory cul-
tures, and migratory systems can institutionalize around religious affiliations, 
thus offering even to very disadvantaged people, coming from marginal re-
gions, the possibility to migrate and participate in transnational networks.
As illustrated by these same examples, religious links and connections help 
to explain not only the upsurge of specific migratory channels, but also the site 
and characters of the adaptation process. Finally, some of the subject involved 
in the study suggested that there can be “vicious” links between migration and 
fbos, if not a sort of contamination with the so called “migration industry” 
and –in the case of “fake” fbos– with its illegal and criminal components (e.g. 
those involved in human trafficking, sexual exploitation, drug dealing, or in il-
legal transfer of remittances). This aspect has not until now emerged from “of-
ficial” sociological research, but it has been directly denounced by some of our 
key informants and interviewed migrants:
In Europe … (…), most African Churches are just for money, so people go to 
church and give offers, but there are others that are from God. I’m not sur-
prised about these things, because it’s written in the Bible that when the 
time comes, so many priests act in the name of God, but are not from God. 
So, I’m not surprised, because it is written in the Bible. (Man – Nigeria – 
Catholic Christian)
(…) unfortunately, the immigration channel to request international 
protection is used by criminal networks, obviously in an inappropriate 
way, especially for women. I am talking about those who use this chan-
nel because they are fleeing from war and then arrive here. Now, I do not 
know the percentages, but they are certainly not all of those who arrive, 
and it is a channel used by criminal networks, by networks dealing with 
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 prostitution, and even by those who give alms. Now we are trying to un-
derstand … (Woman – social worker in the reception system)
A particularly emblematic example is provided by the case of Nigerian women 
forced to prostitution, many of whom are held hostages by their exploiters 
through woodo curses threatening their family members at home.
As controversially suggested by an African Catholic priest, met thanks to the 
teaching activity of this chapter’s author, together with family members, also 
religious leaders contribute to shape the path and the course of migration, as 
they “encourage, advise and direct the course of affairs not only for the would-
be migrants but also for their own personal interests and advantages that they 
hope to share at the end of the successful journey” (Man – Ghana – Catholic 
Christian religious leader).
Realizing how desperate many Ghanaians want to migrate to the West, 
many pastors and religious leaders who are more interested in preach-
ing prosperity than in salvation are now encouraging mass migration by 
offering endless prayers for prospective migrants. In almost all religious 
programs in Ghana by the so-called Charismatic Churches, except for 
the mainstream Churches, such as crusade, all night vigils, conventions, 
and preaching, pastors pray that the dreams of travelling to the land of 
the light-skinned man are fulfilled. Some of these are broadcast on ra-
dio and on tv. With fake testimonies (…) people are persuaded and 
believe in them (…) because the “men of God” have spoken. How these 
poor people make it to their destinations is not the pastors’ concern. 
What they are usually concerned about is the fat monthly “tithe” the 
would-be migrants would be pumping into their churches’ coffers or 
directly into their pockets once they get there. Out of ignorance, selfish-
ness or greed, they fail to use their commanding position to educate 
people about the perils and discomfort of migrating to the so-called 
civilized countries.
Some pastors, quite ridiculously, are ready to pray for the fulfilment of 
the dreams of someone ignorantly planning to travel to unknown desti-
nations (…). In brief, many pastors have turned into powerful agents of 
mass migration of Ghanaians to other continents through their prophe-
cies and predictions addressed to people who are weak but ready to go a 
long way to see “Heaven on Earth”. (Man – Ghana – Catholic Christian 
religious leader)
According to what has emerged during the fieldwork, the suspect of an im-
migration triggered by “religious” links is particularly pertinent in the case 
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of  Chinese affiliated to the “Church of God Almighty”. Since its establishment 
–dating back to 1991– this fbos has been the object of strong persecution by 
the Chinese government, which has condemned hundreds of thousands of its 
affiliated to prison, and in a few cases to death penalty, thus encouraging most 
of them to expatriate.6
In China, repression is really very strong. I have been persecuted several 
times. Even now, I have some wounds and scars. For these reasons, I 
wanted to leave China. Actually, I had no choice, I was forced. Those rea-
sons were enough for me to leave China. (Man – China – Church of God 
Almighty)
Exactly during the time-spam of our study, the presence of migrants affiliated 
with this Church has become more visible also in Italy through the arrival of a 
group of people (mostly women); some of them are now assisted by Evangelic 
churches. Since they are often “hosted” by co-nationals who exploit them as 
cheap labor force, someone suspects that they arrived through some sort of 
smuggling organizations specialized in offering to the victims of religious per-
secutions the possibility to escape. The fact is that some of these women are 
still very worried about their situation. They tend to avoid any contact with 
Chinese people (and are therefore reluctant to ask for Chinese translators, de-
spite their lack of linguistic competences), because they fear to be denounced 
and eventually forcibly sent back to China; at the same time, they are afraid of 
the possible repercussions on their left-behind family members, thus showing 
the “transnational character” of the phenomenon of religious-based persecu-
tions, which reverberates, as suggested by this interviewee, also in everyday 
relations between the faithful.
I’m always afraid to meet other Chinese people. Sometimes the Chinese 
of Paolo Sarpi (author’s note: a district of Milan with a strong concentra-
tion of Chinese people) are businessmen and have strong relations with 
China. They often go to China for work. I also have a family in China and 
if they know me I do not want this to harm my family in China. Even 
among us, Christian brothers and sisters, we do not ask personal ques-
tions, we do not want to know details. (Woman – China – Church of God 
Almighty)
As we will describe later, in contemporary Italy, dramatically involved in the 
management of “mixed fluxes”, this kind of phenomena –on which, however, 
6 https://www/cesnur.org/2017/almighty_china_report.pdf.
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accurate and in-depth information is still lacking– contribute to fuel the idea 
that this kind of actors could encourage the arrival of bogus asylum seekers.
Still, fbos can exercise a pull effect as well. This is particularly true, once 
again, in the case of Italy, thanks to the presence of the universal capital of 
Catholicism –Rome and the Vatican City–, where various pontifical universi-
ties and general houses of religious congregations are based and are able to 
attract different categories of migrants (from the members of the religious 
communities to the international students). Particularly on the occasion of 
special events (such as a Jubilee), the Holy See magnetizes the arrival of a huge 
number of “pilgrims”, who sometimes only have a one-way ticket, and who are 
usually interested in settling in the country, most of the times to rejoin some of 
their friends or extended family members. Moreover, Italy represents a partic-
ularly attractive destination for the so-called fidei donum, who are Catholic 
priests involved in a specific form of “circular migration”, which often turns 
into a permanent settlement. For the priests coming from the “global South”, 
the possibility to complete their education in Rome is sometimes interpreted 
as the harbinger of a future “career” within the ecclesiastical hierarchy.7 Final-
ly, many of the religious who go to study in Europe do not return to their home 
countries, either because they are destined for other tasks, or because they 
simply refuse to return.
Decidedly more relevant, in quantity terms, is the role played by many Cath-
olic (or other Christian confessions) pro-migrant organizations, since they 
concur to create a “migrant-friendly” environment, which supports newcom-
ers and vulnerable migrants, including undocumented ones, immediately after 
their arrival and in their process of adaptation. Just to cite an iconographic 
example, since the 1980s until today, migrants who have come to Milan have 
often carried with them a piece of paper with the address of the first aid ser-
vice managed by the local Caritas, close to the Central Station.
Significantly, this supporting environment proves to be advantageous for all 
migrants, regardless of their country of origin and of their religious affiliations, 
and any migrant has the opportunity to directly take advantage from goods 
and services provided by religious charities and other kinds of fbos (including 
the legal assistance offered on a free basis to the asylum applicants and to the 
denied asylum seekers who decide to appeal for a re-examination of their 
claim). In order to appreciate the relevance of these kinds of actors in the 
7 Antwi-Boasiako, B. (ay 2016-17). The Causes of Migration: The Ghanaian Experience. Roma: 
Faculty of Pastoral Theology of Human Mobility, simi, Università Urbaniana (work prepared 
for the exam of the teaching of “Sociology of Human Mobility”).
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 contemporary Italian landscape, it is sufficient to report how, on June 2018,8 
21,429 asylum seekers/migrants (among which more than 700 unaccompanied 
minors) were hosted in one of the 2,100 ecclesial structures in the 180 Catholic 
dioceses involved. 2,589 were hosted directly by the parishes, the remaining 
part within the Sprar (protection system for asylum seekers and refugees), the 
Cas (extraordinary reception centers) or the center for minors managed 
through an agreement with the Ministry. Significantly, about a quarter of the 
hosting initiatives were entirely financed by their own funds. Furthermore, 
particularly in the Northern regions, migrants represent a large portion of the 
beneficiaries of initiatives addressed to the homeless, the poor, and other vul-
nerable people managed and financed by Catholic institutions. Single parish-
es, as well as Catholic movements and associations, are largely involved in a 
range of “pro-migrants” activity, from the help in the search of a job to the 
learning-support offered to foreign students. The composite landscape of Prot-
estant Christian Churches as well is significantly involved. For example, we can 
note the commitment displayed in this field by the Waldensian Church. 
Through the inclusion services managed by the Waldenasian Diakonia, it of-
fers reception services for migrants who are hosted thanks to different pro-
grams, which follow the guidelines requested, and which are managed by Sprar 
services with a “diffused model” of reception (Chapter 9, §4). According to the 
last available data, in January 2019, more than 700 migrants were hosted in one 
of the reception services – the majority of which arrived through the “Humani-
tarian Corridors” program (see later). Moreover, the Waldensian Diakonia has 
recently partnered with Oxfam Italia and, together, they have opened the so-
called “Community Centers” in Turin, Milan, Arezzo, Florence, and Catania, 
conceived as social meeting places offering consultancy services to the mi-
grants and the local population.
Once again, thanks to the mobilization of some religious organizations (in 
the framework of an ecumenical initiative), humanitarian corridors were 
lunched in order to permit the secure travel and the legal entry of asylum seek-
ers coming from unsafe countries. A first pilot project was launched, in Decem-
ber 2015, thanks to a collaboration between the Community of Sant’Egidio (a 
Catholic organization), the Federation of Evangelic Churches, the Waldensian 
and Methodist Churches to consider the arrival in Italy, over two years, of a 
thousand refugees from Lebanon (mostly Syrians who fled the war), Morocco 
(where most of those coming from sub-Saharan countries affected by civil 
wars and widespread violence land) and Ethiopia (Eritreans, Somalis and Su-
danese). The Corridors are the result of a Memorandum of Understanding 
8 Survey realized by the Italian Episcopal Conference on Dioceses active at 30 June 2018.
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signed by the proponents, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Interna-
tional Cooperation, and the Ministry of Interior, but are nevertheless funded 
by the organizations that promoted them, and implemented thanks to the 
commitment of other non-governmental actors. Beneficiaries have been se-
lected on the basis of their level of vulnerability –regardless of their religious 
or ethnic background– and are provided with legal assistance for visas, hospi-
tality and accommodation for a reasonable period of time, economic support 
for the transfer to Italy, and support in the integration process. Following this 
experience, this approach has been established with the particular engage-
ment of the Migrantes Foundation, i.e. the body of the Italian (Catholic) Epis-
copal Conference in charge with migrants’ pastoral assistance, so as to allow 
the arrival of new contingents of refugees (Caritas Italiana, 2019). Within the 
framework of an ecumenical effort, involving both Catholic parishes and 
Waldensian and Methodist Churches, 4,000 vulnerable people will be wel-
comed over four years. It is useful to observe that, besides offering a safety mi-
gratory route, this experience provides a positive example of how to integrate 
newcomers through the activation of local communities.
Moreover, fbos frequently act as advocacy actors, recommending the au-
thorities and civil society to adopt more generous policies and more tolerant 
practices towards arriving and sojourning foreigners, including the undocu-
mented ones. During the last refugee crisis, this position –embodied by the 
apex of the Catholic Church, Pope Francis– has translated into various forms 
of mobilization: from the initiatives aimed to receive and assist asylum seekers 
to the involvement in the rescue operations, not to mention the large presence 
of Catholic actors and institutions in the occasion of sensitization marches in 
support of the right to be welcomed. Various Christian leaders and institutions 
have yet repeatedly disputed the very distinction between economic and hu-
manitarian migrants, in the face of the deep injustice of the contemporary 
global regime. Religious organizations have been among the most consistent 
voices supporting the idea that plight of refugees (particularly from the Middle 
East) require an ethical and political response emphasizing the centrality of 
hospitality and solidarity (Petito, 2017). And it is significant to observe how one 
of the reasons evoked is religious-based, that is a principle of universal broth-
erhood. The following assertion is just one of the many that we collected dur-
ing the study.
One of the main reasons why it is difficult to describe the religious theme 
as a determining factor for forced or unforced migration is linked to the 
absence of legal access routes to Europe, unless it is through an asylum 
request. There is a mix of factors that determine the escape, so when you 
Zanfrini3�4
<UN>
find yourself in Italy having to apply for asylum, the religious theme can 
come out among others. The Geneva Convention can’t handle the com-
plexity of the flows. The question of mixed flows should not be resolved 
in the distinction between economic and political migrants, but in a mul-
tiplicity of factors that the same person has in his/her individual capacity. 
Clearly, in some cases, one factor prevails over the other, but there are 
also situations determined by accessing Europe in a legal manner. When 
this is not possible for economic reasons, the religious motivation is the 
one invoked. (Woman – Pastoral operator – Waldenasian Diakonia)
Without entering in the analysis of their motivations (which can be of ethical, 
humanitarian, or even of theological nature), the point that must be stressed is 
that, in this manner, fbos contribute, more or less consciously, to attract new 
migrants, if not to institutionalize migration patterns outside the legislative 
framework in force, including the rules governing the acknowledgment of the 
status of refugee (such as other statutes of protection). Together with the prac-
tical difficulty in rejecting and expelling (irregular) migrants, this position has 
certainly concurred to the wide tolerance manifested by Italy towards them, 
notwithstanding their formal status. Moreover, at institutional level, the grow-
ing porosity among different “types” of migrants was implicitly acknowledged 
through the introduction (and the large use of) the “humanitarian protection”, 
that is a third possible outcome of the asylum demand (besides the acknowl-
edgment of the status of refugee and of the subsidiary protection), frequently 
granted, for “humanitarian” reasons, to those migrants lacking conventional 
criteria to be acknowledged in need of protection, but who are impossible to 
expatriate.9 As a matter of fact, during the refugee crises, all around Europe, 
not only a high number of asylum seekers received a status that is different 
from that of refugee, but also different countries recorded very different ap-
proval rates and tended to grant different statuses (Eurostat, 2017). In this con-
text, Italy stands out both for the very high number of applicants who were 
granted humanitarian protection, and for the very high number of appeals and 
successful appeals.
These trends certainly influenced recent changes to the regulatory frame-
work contained in the so-called “security decree” (see Chapter 9, §2). How-
ever, what is interesting to observe is that even after the “restrictive turn” in 
the government’s approach towards asylum seekers, many fbos (supported by 
the official voice of the Catholic Church, constituted by the Italian  Episcopal 
Conference) have immediately declared that they will continue to help mi-
9 Decree Law no. 113/2018, so-called “security decree”, has drastically reduced the possibility of 
obtaining humanitarian protection.
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grants, even when the latter lack the legal requisites to be hosted in the official 
reception centers. Together with other civil society’s actors, fbos of different 
Christian denominations have mobilized not only by making their properties 
available in order to accommodate migrants expelled from the official recep-
tion system, but also by checking the availability of private citizens and fami-
lies to welcome them in their homes. All this proves that not only fbos certain-
ly contribute to make Italy an “attractive” country, but also that many migrants 
–notwithstanding their religious belonging and beliefs– find in (Christian) 
fbos one of the most important reference actor during the first steps of their 
adaptation process.
2 Religion as a Belief, Religion as an Identity, Religion as a Way of Life
Above and beyond the role of fbos and of the migratory chains and migratory 
systems that they have contributed to establish and strengthen, our study has 
assumed that religion can be a powerful variable to understand migration 
choices and trajectories, since it influences both individual (and family) iden-
tity and individual (and societal) freedom (Chapter 1). In this perspective, it has 
been traditionally deemed in the analysis and management of forced migra-
tions. The main reference on this regard is constituted by the Unhcr Guidelines 
on International Protection: Religion-Based Refugee Claims under Article 1A(2) of 
the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of  Refugees 
(2004), inspired by the work of J. Gunn (2003), and providing a multi-level 
Source: ismu elaborations on data from the national asylum commission, 
http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/it/ documentazione/
statistica/i-numeri-dellasilo














2016 4,808 12,873 18,979 51,170 3,084 188 91,102
2017 6,827 6,880 20,166 42,700 4,292 662 81,527
2018 7,096 4,319 20,014 56,002 7,740 405 95,576
2016 5.3 14.1 20.8 56.2 3.4 0.2 100.0
2017 8.4 8.4 24.7 52.4 5.3 0.8 100.0
2018 7.4 4.5 20.9 58.6 8.1 0.4 100.0
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 definition of religion, on which the procedures of asylum recognition, in differ-
ent destination countries, are substantially based. The three definition items 
are the following:
a) religion as a belief (including non-belief);
b) religion as an identity;
c) religion as a way of life.
What is interesting to observe is that, in the narrative of (forced) migrants, 
these three items turn into special resources when they have to come to terms 
with their very personal and collective experience. In this perspective, religious 
affiliations affect the decision to migrate not only because they are the “causes” 
of violations, persecutions, and discriminations –as we will describe later–; but 
also because they provide the migrants with the lexicon to understand their 
own (individual and collective) life trajectory, and possibly their migratory 
trajectory. Finally, they are powerful signifiers to define oneself as a “forced” 
migrant, largely independently of the migratory channel actually used.
So, religion is a belief which provides would-be migrants the force to resist 
despite the persecutions and, possibly, the reason to see the “opportunity” to 
migrate, as in the dramatic experience of these two interviewed, both escaped 
from the threat of being killed:
In Pakistan, people have a very strong faith, no one can stop them … but 
the faith of Christians in Pakistan is too strong, even if there are difficul-
ties, even if there are bomb blasts, even if they are kidnapping people, 
they keep praying, they keep celebrating Christmas, Easter … they do not 
stop. (Man – Pakistan – Catholic Christian)
How I know that I could escape through Italy? When we are in the church, 
the fathers would tell us: pray for the people who are in the hospital, pray 
for the people who went from Libya to Italy and then died, many people, 
so everybody pray for them and start fasting, so God will help them. 
I started asking questions: how did these people die? Crossing from Libya 
to Italy? Why? Then they told me. Then, from that, I understood. So, in 
the morning, 1st January 2015, I left my country. (Man –  Nigeria –  Christian 
Pentecostal Church [former Catholic Christian])
As a belief, religion makes the concept of a person’s freedom clear –and, in a 
certain way, provides a sense to the decision to migrate for religious reasons–. 
In general terms, this concept refers to both the freedom to believe and the 
freedom to practice one’s faith:
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(…) in the Baháʾi faith, the principle is that mankind has the right to 
choose what to believe, what to do. Instead, in the Islamic faith, every-
thing is decided by the clergy, so the fear is to lose one’s …. power. So they 
are afraid that other people will become Baháʾi or … have others … influ-
ence other people. (Woman – Iran – Baháʾi)
Perhaps it was made in a different way, because in Iran we do not have a 
place to see each other, we do not have a very free way to practice our faith. 
But here it is much easier, much more natural. (Woman – Iran – Baháʾi)
Furthermore, this concept seems to concern the freedom of choosing one’s 
personal way to believe and practice, thus contrasting a misleading conception 
of religion, where the latter is reduced to an instrument of social control, which 
exactly denies the very strict association between religion and freedom, as 
clearly asserted by this Yemeni woman:
It was not a problem that I am a Muslim, the problem is that I am a differ-
ent Muslim. I’m not the Muslim that they want me to be. They are not 
Muslims according to one specific model; they are Muslims according to 
another model. So I told you that religion is a private relationship. I think 
so: it’s a private relationship. Nobody has to tell me that I have to put the 
veil, or that I have to say the prayer, or that I have to dress this way, or that 
I have to stay at home and not go out because I am a woman, because 
God says so. This is what I do not want. (Woman – Yemen – Muslim)
This point is even more palpable in the case of those who choose to not be-
lieve, as suggestively expressed, though ungrammatically, by this (ex) Coptic 
Catholic coming from Egypt. His assertion stresses the right essence of Christi-
anity, made of personal freedom and care for the others:
So if I am an atheist today it is thanks to Jesus Christ. Because I, this gave 
me freedom. If this person I say are in Italy or in another country, find the 
clean road because people care so much, even if they are atheists, why? 
Because they care about their neighbor. (Man – Egypt – former Coptic 
Catholic Christian)
Secondly, religion is a source of individual and collective identity, an identity 
whose awareness is reinforced exactly through the persecution, and which 
gives to the latter a theological meaning:
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We, Christians in Iraq, have lost our country, our houses, everything we 
have built. It is very hard, but in this situation we have been able to dis-
cover that we are truly at home in the faith. (Man – Iraq – Chaldean Cath-
olic Christian)
Not by chance, it happens that people and communities who share a long-
standing culture of migration and persecution keep an iconographic heritage 
of this experience in their collective memory. Coptic Christians in Egypt, for 
example, used to engrave their religious roots in the skin, through a little crux 
tattooed on the right wrist (Ha, 2017). Almost a metaphor of the function of 
resilience carried out by faith and religious identity (see also Part 5). As this 
informant reminded us, deciding to get a tattoo of the crux on the skin can also 
be a strategy to escape the risk of a marriage with a non-Christian partner, thus 
marking the edge beyond which it is not possible to accept any abuse or ha-
rassment, when it comes to preserve exactly one’s identity.
This is especially true in Egypt. The Coptic Christians in Egypt have the 
crux tattooed on the hands, while we (in Eritrea, author’s note) especially 
the women, wore the crux tattooed on our foreheads, and this was born … 
was born as a form of resistance to the Islamization of the region, to say 
that … Christianity and Christ is in our blood, in our … that is, it is not 
separable, so we cannot … it is a sign of fidelity and of not betraying our 
faith, even in the face of those who force us, so … because they beheaded 
those who refused to convert, at the beginning of the Ottoman invasion.
Interviewer: So centuries ago, anyway…
Yes, yes, it was born many centuries ago. For us, for example, it was 
born in 1500, so when Islam saw that it did not work by force, they chose 
to marry the local women to convert them, at least the children would 
become Muslims, so also the fathers, the mothers of these girls have the 
crux tattooed on their foreheads saying that if the Muslim who will marry 
this girl, if he marries her with the concrete crux, then it was a form of 
resistance that they implemented to also say that our daughters are 
Christian in blood and skin, so if they were to marry, then if they had to 
marry, he had to take off her head, to marry her, so she wanted to say that 
it could not be done. (Man – Religious leader – Catholic Christian)
In the bloody scenario of contemporary Eritrea (one of the major countries of 
origin of asylum seekers arriving in Italy), it is known that, for many youths, 
migration is the only strategy to escape the “life-long” military service imposed 
by the regime; however, in the case of certain religious minorities –particularly 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, often deprived of the same citizenship because of their 
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refusal to provide military service–, this motivation is strengthened by one of 
a religious nature, relating precisely to their duty to refrain from taking up 
arms. Significantly, migrants with very different origins (from Iran to Tibet, 
from Pakistan to Nigeria) and belonging to different religions have clearly ex-
pressed this same concept: it is exactly the need to preserve one’s own (religious) 
identity that gives sense to the decision to migrate: an exit strategy –the only 
available strategy– to protect one’s faith even before one’s survival:
(…) We must not be aggressive, but we must continue to fight for our 
rights. This fight must be very peaceful, no aggression must exist and then 
the only thing, the only thing we do not accept is when they ask us to 
falsely declare our beliefs. What we believe we resist. For example, when 
you put a gun under your throat and you must declare yourself a Muslim, 
you still say no. My belief, fundamental beliefs must not be rejected. 
However, secondary things, which are still important, we accept them so 
as not to create an aggressive atmosphere. (Man – Iran – Baháʾi)
(…) from Tibet, in 2004 I left my country because there is a problem with 
the Chinese. Before that, I went to India, when I was little I went to In-
dia to study, because in Tibet there is a problem with culture, because 
the Chinese do not want us to study the Tibetan language, they want 
us to study the Chinese language too, but we do not want to, because 
when I do not speak Tibetan I become, I change in Chinese, I  study 
Chinese, Chinese history, everything, so I become a Chinese. (Man – 
Tibet –Buddhist)
Interviewer: When you received threats, didn’t you think: I will stop my 
political and religious activity, to be safe? Didn’t you have this idea? Or 
did you want to be free?
Yes, he said: you stop your activity, stop activity in religion, especially 
religion. Yes, political, but religious, stop, is not possible, I am a Shiya, I 
am Muslim man, this is my right, this is not possible to someone, say you: 
don’t pray, and I say: it is ok, I don’t pray, this is not, this is not possible. 
(Man – Pakistan – Muslim)
They know my problem, that they killed my father, and they tell me to go 
and worship this … so they know. They know. People were praying to say: 
God will protect me. God will protect me. They know. Some people would 
tell me: you’ll better join these people, they will kill you. You’d better join 
them, even … they will kill you, they will kill you. I said: I will not join 
them, I will not join them. I’m a Christian. (Man – Nigeria – Christian 
Pentecostal Church [former Catholic Christian])
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A specular experience is that of people coming from non-religious families and 
societies, who declare to have “discovered” a religious identity that they did not 
have the possibility to experience before migrating (or before deciding to mi-
grate). Also in this case, it is exactly the migratory experience that has permit-
ted the emergence of a latent need to believe and to provide the individual 
biography with an immanent meaning. During the fieldwork, various migrants 
coming from China have expressed this kind of feeling:
(…) Only by embracing religion we can truly understand where we come 
from, the origin of man, we can make sense of our origin, our existence. 
(Young Woman – China – Evangelical Christian [synthesis provided by 
the translator])
Actually, in the case of migrants coming from atheistic contexts, religion is an 
extraordinary and unexpected resource that breaks into a biographical journey 
marked by sufferance and oppression. Among our interviewed, Chinese who 
have adhered to various forms of Christianity represent a case in point; not 
incidentally, in their chronicle, religious freedom –even just the mere fact of 
being able to freely talk about religious arguments– is often conceptually su-
perimposed on the possibility of living in a democratic society.
In Italy, I felt the true freedom to believe and practice. I can say with cour-
age that I am a Christian. Christians are respected here. No one will laugh 
at them. I can boldly enter the church, praise the Lord without worries. 
I can watch videos of religions online. I could not enjoy all these rights in 
China. I don’t need to hide the Bible, I can sleep peacefully, I’m not wor-
ried that the police will come and take me at any time. I can share the 
experience of the Lord with fellow believers from other countries with 
Facebook, YouTube (…). In China, because of the monitoring by the Chi-
nese Communist Party, we Christians do not use these means of commu-
nication, the telephone cannot be used. We can’t even use the computer. 
There is no Facebook, Internet is impossible. We can only pray for each 
other. (…) In Italy, everything is different. (Woman – China – Waldensian 
Christian [former Zhao Hui Church])
Thirdly, religion crystallizes a specific way of life. The most reported expression 
refers to the multiple ways through which this concept translates into a form 
of mutual support and protection fed by a principle of brotherhood. As em-
phasized by many interviews, this character is able to reproduce itself in every 
place, and to overcome the barriers represented by:
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– Social classes:
(…) before I began to believe, I thought that only if a person had a certain 
social level could have consideration from others. If they did not, they 
were not worthy of being considered. I really had this idea and for this I 
was always fighting. When I began to attend the Church of God Almighty, 
I saw that it was not like that at all. In our community, some were leaders, 
they had a firm, others had a humbler job, they did the cleaning, others 
were teachers, but we were the same. In this way, we did not feel suffer-
ing, I felt that we lived like real human beings, all equals, in a situation of 
justice. (Woman – China – Church of God Almighty)
– National borders:
(…) throughout the Baháʾi community, throughout the world there is a 
form of system that every Baháʾi, wherever it is, found in the world and 
will have its supportive community. For example, when we arrived in Ita-
ly we were welcomed by the Baháʾi community and for us it was like a 
kind of community of belonging and support. (Couple (Man and Wom-
an) – Iran – Baháʾi)
(…) I chose Italy for one reason only: because there is the Vatican. My 
thoughts … then I come here, I am protected, because I live inside my 
Church, because there is the Vatican (…).
So I was for the first time at Mass celebrated in Italian, I did not under-
stand anything, but I felt everything inside. Then here I made the Com-
munion, I came out of the Church and I cried, and I said: “Long live my 
Church. This is truly a universal Church. It is not a word, but a fact”. (Man – 
Egypt – Coptic Catholic Christian)
I was very, very happy to meet them, I’m very, very happy, because they 
are teaching, it is the same teaching that I had before in Nigeria. It is Bi-
ble, we read the Bible, they teach you how to live your life, don’t do bad, 
do good, don’t follow bad people, don’t smoke, don’t do this. So I see them 
as good people, which is why I follow them, which is why I baptize, and 
when I entered the church, in the church there are also good people. They 
are helping me.
(…) When time come you hear balan-balan (he imitates the sound of 
the bells), then you know it is the time, I attend the evening Mass in Cath-
olic church to pray to God, all the church is the same, because they are 
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preaching the Word of God, they are preaching the same, to follow Jesus 
Christ, to do good. As Catholic preach about Jesus, this church is  preaching 
about Jesus, Catholics preach to be good persons, to repent, don’t do bad, 
this church also preaches to be good persons, don’t do bad. So, when you 
see, you will know it is the same. (Man – Nigeria – Christian Pentecostal 
Church [former Catholic Christian])
– As well as overcoming the distance traced by the passage of time:
There were some Iranian families who went to Greece forty years ago, 
fifty years ago, or even the Greeks who were Bahá’s. So having this Baháʾi 
community in Greece has helped me a lot, well, even in Italy, because you 
already had some friends, even if you did not know them (she smiles), 
but there were these people who could help you, you trusted them, and … 
it was very easy. [Woman – Iran – Baháʾi]
Finally, as has also emerged from previous studies (see, for example, Levitt, Ja-
worsky, 2007), religion connects migrants over time, allowing them to remain 
part of a chain of memory with the coreligionists from the past, present, and 
future.
3 Religion as a Direct “Cause” of Migration
There is certainly a situation of irregularities in religious freedom in most 
of the countries of origin of asylum seekers. If we analyze the scenario, 
there are serious problems of abuse, apologetic interpretation, lack of 
equal dignity, freedom of worship. (Man – Religious leader – Muslim)
In the previous paragraph we have described how the concepts of belief, iden-
tity, and way of life mark the life-trajectories of (forced) migrants, making 
 migration –independently of the specific decisional context– a sort of accom-
plishment of an existence characterized by the need to affirm one’s own 
(religious) identity and projected to the realization also of the spiritual dimen-
sion of the human being.
However, to understand how these elements can influence the decision to 
migrate, and possibly give rise to a request for protection, it is necessary to take 
a further step. In this paragraph, we set the goal of classifying, through the evi-
dence gathered with field work, the cases in which religion can become a di-
rect or indirect cause of migration, following a distinction largely employed in 
the migration studies.
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According to the existing literature, the direct causes are first of all repre-
sented by a sending context clearly compromised by the presence of religious-
based conflicts and of religious-based persecutions, which pose an immediate 
risk to be murdered, injured or violated. As a matter of fact, since the strong 
majority of people in the world live in countries where they experience high 
restrictions on religion,10 democratic nations are expected to become increas-
ingly involved in the arrival of migrants escaping their country for this kind of 
reason. Considering the current migration fluxes directed to Italy, the most 
patent example is that of Nigeria, where both Christians and non-conformist 
Muslims are often perceived as potential victims of Boko Haram. Born in 2002, 
this terroristic organization has subsequently joined Isis, subverting the politi-
cal situation of the country and producing plenty of forced migrants. The fol-
lowing testimony gives us a raw example of how a risk reduced to the rank of 
geo-political data in the analysis of the Italian media, materializes in the con-
crete life of people who, despite having escaped, will always remember it in 
their personal history:
During the course of the past two years, I lost two colleagues to terrorist 
attacks from Boko Haram and it wasn’t even outside the city, it was inside 
of the city. There was one who was involved in the suicide bomb attack 
and he died, and there was another who was shocked to death by a mem-
ber of Boko Haram in the center of the city. After the second death, the 
company decided to stop operating and they moved to other offices in the 
country and they closed the office in Meiduguri, so I lost my job. (Man – 
Nigeria – now attending an Adventist Church)
However, the fieldwork has provided many other cases in point. Christian mi-
grants, left to the margins of the attention by the Italian media –rather “at-
tracted” by Muslim immigration and by all the connected questions– reappear 
here as the unarmed victims of dramatic violence committed against them in 
different countries, from Africa to Asia:
(…) the father told us that they had tried to kidnap one of his children. 
Muslims. They just took the child in motion and he was saved by a neigh-
bor who threw himself on him, pulling the child away from the motor-





not…”. And he said that “Muslims kidnap our children or give them back 
in exchange for a ransom in dollars or there is organ trafficking”. Then he, 
to make us understand, said: “Open them”; we did not even understand 
because he could not say the word “organ trafficking”. (Women – Nuns – 
Christian Catholic)
So something happened, they were planning, so at one point we started 
hearing a shout outside, we were hearing because our neighbors are 
Christians, so we understood their language and they were…
Interviewer: So you heard someone shouting outside?
Yes, they were shouting that my father should go, leave the house, leave 
the house … and those people were running away … and some people 
came and they wanted to use the knife so I jumped away … my father was 
inside but I was the one who jumped outside the window … but my father 
managed to defend himself … he was the one who cut the hands of the 
chief ’s son, so when I jumped outside the window, there I heard they 
were shouting at Allah … I asked where is my father, where is my father 
but then I discovered my father was dead too, so they were telling me to 
go away from the community, so I went to the bus stop, they might cut me 
and kill me, so I didn’t have an alternative, so there were some cars to 
Niger, so it was one of those cars I was in, so I come to Niger, so that I can 
show I come to Niger and it was from Niger that I started the journey. 
(Man – Egypt – Christian)
Interviewer: How is the situation of Catholics in Pakistan? What happens 
to Catholics?
It is a little bit difficult because when Catholics are going for work or 
for their jobs it’s difficult because Muslims think we cannot live in the 
same place because they think they are superior. They think that their 
religion is superior. There are many many things because sometimes they 
burn Christians in fire; sometimes they cut their head. (Man – Pakistan – 
Christian Catholic)
We are believers; the other Chinese came here to make money. China is 
a country with an atheistic government; we grew up with an atheistic 
education. The books we studied when we were young said that this 
world is without God; so many people do not know the truth. Later, when 
we met God we became Christians, but the Chinese atheist party did not 
allow us to believe in God, to walk on the right path. For this, they were 
arrested, persecuted and even killed. (Woman – China – Church of God 
Almighty)
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As in the emblematic case of Egypt, frequently cited during the fieldwork, 
open persecution and violence can represent the “evolution” of a situation 
 traditionally marked by discrimination towards minority groups. So, in the 
case under discussion, the advent of Muslim Brothers has made the country 
one of the most hostile towards Christians in the world, rendering their con-
dition more and more dangerous. According to the interviewed migrants, per-
secution towards Christians has spread extensively in society, and has taking 
on multiple forms. From the humiliation inflicted on Christian students –
obliged to study and repeat koranic verses during the school time– to the 
practice of seducing young female Christians, “just to take their virginity and 
then abandoning them” (Man – Egypt – Coptic Orthodox), not to mention the 
repeated terrorist attacks that claimed dozens of victims among the faithful 
gathered in the Church for the Mass. This context has favored the reactivation 
of already established migration chains linking Egypt and North Italy (Chap-
ter 17), giving rise to an Egyptian immigration where the share of Christians is 
largely overrepresented compared with the situation in the origin country:
(…) we have families, like these Egyptian ones, who have come away for 
persecution reasons. Another who … for example, the classmates of a girl 
… where the first bomb, that was in Egypt, Christmas Eve, Cairo, Alexan-
dria, where the mother and the three little girls were going out (…)and all 
the classmates of this little girl, who was then small, now in high school, 
died. And this is the reason why they escaped, they came to Italy in 15 days, 
to reach her husband was this. (Women – Nuns – Catholic Christians)
(…) especially in the period from 2010 to 2014, in Italy there was a migra-
tion linked to discrimination; at that time there were the Muslim Broth-
ers in the government … practically, there was an attack to the Church 
every week, so at that moment immigration in Italy had a peak. (Man – 
Pastoral operator – Catholic Christian)
Furthermore, as observed by this key expert, the public perception, largely 
shaped by the selective attention of the media and of the political debate, of-
ten tends to ignore the “production” of asylum seekers due to different kinds of 
“religious wars”.
The religious wars are the engine of history and today they are also touch-
ing Europe. Our time is characterized by “holy” wars of religion. For ex-
ample, the Chechen conflict, largely ignored by the media, but a reality 
that continues to exist and produce a large number of asylum seekers. 
(Woman – Officer of the asylum seekers’ reception system)
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A second direct cause of migration can be identified in a sending context char-
acterized by serious violations of religious rights of minority groups.
These include, first of all, the right to believe:
(…) after they arrested me, they took me to the secret police, because he 
said that with my association … we help the terrorists to get into Camer-
oon … that’s not well known, because Buddhism is not a bad religion, it’s 
not a religion of violence, but because he has power, he sent the army to 
arrest me (…).
There is this psychology to make you afraid, every time when you go 
around, they show you with their fingers: “It’s him, there he is, he’s a 
Buddhist, he’s the Buddhist, he’s the Buddhist”. (Man – Cameron – 
Buddhist)
Until 2013, when the Chinese government restricted control over Chris-
tians, we were spied upon. Within a night, they arrested all those who 
did the work of “guidance” within the churches in Zhejiang Province. 
After this fact, the others and I who were still free moved to other prov-
inces, I stayed 14 months, but I was always locked in the house, I could 
not go out, talk to other people. I was disconnected from the world, I 
could not call home, I did not hear from my family. At that time, to bet-
ter control the government, they began to control the residences. Every 
time someone knocked on the door, I was afraid and, in this context, 
I began to think that I could not stay in China, that I was always in 
danger. I kept moving, changing house. I do not even know how many 
houses I’ve lived in. So I started thinking about emigrating, coming to 
a democratic country, to keep on believing. (Woman – China – Church 
of God Almighty)
With regard to the right to believe, special attention must be given to the topic 
of conversions. As this testimony illustrates –one of the many that we could 
bring back– the belonging to an “undesirable” religion is sometimes tolerable 
when it is a legacy of a family history, but it becomes a fault to be punished 
when it is the upshot of an individual choice. This is a sort of counter-test of 
the profound link between religion and individual freedom.
We have not asked for (international protection) but many Iranians make 
this request, they are those who (…) have converted to the Baháʾi religion 
because according to the Islamic rule, if one comes out of the Islamic re-
ligion they can kill them quietly and then it is more dangerous for those 
who convert than for us who were born so. (Woman – Iran – Baháʾi)
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Secondly, the right to publicly manifest one’s own religious beliefs:
We cannot even speak as we speak now. Everywhere there are cameras. 
Not only in the rooms, but also outside, in the neighborhoods. And so the 
government can come to know anything. Now they are also putting cam-
eras in rural areas. (Woman – China – Evangelical Christian)
We stayed hidden for a long time, but at some point we decided to go 
out to serve in a suburb, far from the city. There, sometimes, the soldiers 
arrived at night to take away the young people. We seminarians were of-
ten in the church and the soldiers did not enter here, so we managed to 
hide. But the situation was heavy and dangerous and the area was on the 
border. We discussed with each other and we decided to cross the border 
to go to Ethiopia, rather than go back to the city and keep hiding. (Man – 
Eritrea – Catholic Christian)
And of course the right to take part to collective celebrations:
In Libya forget about Christians! (he laughs) You can only pray in your 
room. (Imam – Nigeria – Catholic Christian)
In China (…) we did these things in the house, secretly, we had to close 
the windows and the door well. We sang the hymns of the Word of God in 
a low voice. When we wanted to talk about the Gospel we were arrested, 
tortured, killed. It was very dangerous, so we had to leave our country, our 
family. (Woman – China – Church of God Almighty)
A third direct cause is constituted by a sending context characterized by various 
kinds of discriminations and abuses towards minority groups.
One case in point is represented by the presence of (legal) barriers limiting 
the possibility to enter some sectors of the educational system and/or of the 
occupational market. According to the testimonies gathered, the impossibility 
to access the university is one of the most recurrent examples:
(…) why did we arrive in Italy? Because for reasons based on religion we 
could not go to university, because university in Iran is exclusively for 
four main forms of religion and ours does not enter this ranking…
(We are) both of the Baháʾi religion, so we have … In Iran there is a 
form of movement in which the Baháʾi boys … try in some way … then … 
because of the convention, from 2005 if you wanted to enter  university 
you had to enter your name, surname, father’s name, identity card 
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 number and religion … so you are immediately rejected on the admission 
test … (Couple [Man and Woman] – Iran – Baháʾi)
There are a lot of difficulties in Pakistan for Christians to go to university. 
When you go to university the level of difficulties grew up, because in 
most universities there are a lot of Muslim groups, so sometimes they 
forced the other students to join them as a groups, sometimes they are 
terrorism groups, they use drugs, they use guns, they fight and they kill 
other people … they are not scared of police because they have too much 
money, so when the police come to arrest them, they have the money to 
pay … (Man – Pakistan – Catholic Christian)
When she embraced religion she (the interviewee) involved some friends 
in reading sacred texts. Then they began to plague posters in which peo-
ple were discouraged to believe in religion. That’s why one of her friends 
was scared and decided not to continue, and she told the teacher every-
thing. The fact of having religious students at school can be a danger to 
the students themselves who are precluded from the chance to graduate 
and job opportunities, but it is also a danger for teachers, because they 
risk being denied the opportunity to continue teaching. (Woman – Chi-
na – Evangelical Christian [synthesis provided by the translator])
Another case is constituted by the different kinds of limitations in the exercise 
of political and social rights, and particularly by the exclusion from certain 
welfare amenities, including the possibility to attend school:
(…) I was in fifth grade and there was a specific school for talents, a kind 
of high school, and I passed the entry exam but they did not let me in 
because I was Baháʾi. It was the first time I had to face this … because at 
that age you’re hardly still a Baháʾi, you’re very little. But they told me: 
“Since you are Baháʾi, you cannot enter”. (Woman – Iran – Baháʾi)
(…) there are many obstacles that the regime also creates to the Catholic 
Church, especially after the law issued in 1995, where the regime avails all 
the activities of a social, charitable nature, and the aid to those in diffi-
culty, but also in the field of health care, in education, then all the parts 
of charity that concern the action of the Church. There are very strong 
obstacles created by the regime, which a few months ago came to close 
eight clinics run by the Catholic Church and closed a school in the capi-
tal, a school of the Catholic Church which among other things was the 
school attended by our seminarians from the minor seminary, so there 
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are a number of obstacles; for example, the regime closed all the 
 information, the Catholic Church published different types of magazines, 
newspapers, and all this was closed by the regime, so in Eritrea today 
there is freedom of worship, but not religious freedom. (Man – Religious 
leader – Catholic Christian of Eritrean rite)
Not to mention the recurrence of abuses and injustices, in the form of, for 
example, a boycott of entrepreneurial or working activity (an example report-
ed during the focus group discussions is that of Hindu fishermen in Bangla-
desh, who have faced a sudden death of fish), expropriation from their prop-
erties, the application of discriminatory methods of evaluation, or even 
threats to their own safety and that of family members. As evidenced by some 
individual stories, since their tender age many interviewees have begun to 
experience the condition of victims of completely unjustified abuses and 
violence:
(…) the government intelligentsia began to investigate who the pastor 
was, and they realized it was me. And so the persecution began (…). They 
come here and tell me: get out of here, out! We’ll kill you! The persecution 
began. We had made 2,400 meters (…) we had the machinery, we had 
bought it … I had just committed to it, when suddenly a military commis-
sion said that they would expropriate this land. I said no, that they could 
not do it (…) because I had an ecclesiastical-social project; I wanted to 
make a church, a technical school, an orphanage and a canteen. They 
could not do this; I showed them the numbers, the data regarding the situ-
ation that was characterizing that area. A young entrepreneur, a profiteer 
… they sent the National Guard, they expropriated the land, they hit me, 
they threw me on the ground, me, my wife, the Christian brothers who 
were there. The people revolted in the neighborhood. They started pulling 
tear gas bombs. We resisted, but eventually they took me along with 25 
other people, and they took the ground. (Man – Venezuela – Protestant 
Evangelical Religious leader)
(…) Dad said, “They’re not hurting us, but they do not allow us to work. So 
they do not allow me to be a man and raise my family”. So, he came to 
Italy.
(…) even xxx, the hairdresser’s shop, is from this Egyptian father. He 
had important cloth shops in Cairo, him and the brothers –who still have 
them in xxx– and they came away because the Muslims cut their trade 
relations and brought them to close up. So he came away, even with an 
invalid brother. (Women – Nuns – Catholic Christians)
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This was also a big problem because when a Christian is intelligent 
they give different scores just because you are Christian. (Man – Pakistan – 
Catholic Christian)
(…) they wanted us to join them (the interviewed’ mates) in music, be-
cause we were musicians. We studied music in church … when I was 9 
years old, after that when I was in college I played different functions, my 
parents were asking to join them in music but we rejected their offers, 
and they were jealous because we were good also at sports. I was an ath-
lete, I was a runner, so they were jealous and our problem started like this; 
my Islamic teacher told me to read some Koranic verses, because there is 
a book of Islamic verses and it is obligatory to read their verses. So my 
teacher told me to read it but it was a little hard for me because Koran is 
only in the Arabic language, so I read something that I was not good at, I 
made mistakes and he was a little bit angry with me and he batted me 
and he told me not to make mistakes again. He thought I made mistake 
on purpose … like I know how to read, but I made mistake. After that, it 
was not a problem, but after three or four lessons it was a break time … 
three or four students beat me during the break time, they entered the 
room and started beating me because I had made a mistake.
Interviewer: When students were beating you, did they have to hide 
from the teacher or could they beat you without any trouble?
No, they don’t hide because in Pakistan Muslim students can do what-
ever they want. They have too much money, so they can do whatever they 
want. Even teacher sometimes beat students. (Man – Pakistan – Catholic 
Christian)
After these events I was afraid and therefore I did not go anymore. The 
director advised me to renounce the faith, so I was forced to leave my job. 
The manager also told me that if he arrested me again he would not help 
me out of prison anymore. (Woman – China – Church of God Almighty)
Finally, some interviewees reported to have been victims of discriminations in 
the access to given occupations and professional roles, due to the presence of 
“glass ceilings” or to vexatious behaviors. Although certainly not as dramatic as 
violence and direct persecution, these situations are revealed to us, through 
the story of those who suffered them directly, as strong obstacles to personal 
and professional projects, to legitimate career ambitions, or simply to the ex-
pectation of enjoying a fair treatment.
(…) the high level must be Muslim, regardless of whether you are capable 
or not. In fact, the reason I left is because every time I submitted job 
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 applications I passed all the possible and impossible exams with a good 
mark, the only thing that remains … my surname is xxx, I am a Christian. 
And on the identity card this is what is written. (Man – Egypt –  Coptic 
Catholic Christian)
(…) most are out of the country, let’s say half, because after we graduated 
it was not … the situation was not very good even for work. And even for 
those who wanted to continue studying there were not so many options, 
so many opportunities. And then, when I finished, I started working in a 
private company, but after a year they knew that we are Baháʾís and they 
expelled me. (Woman – Iran – Baháʾi)
(…) unfortunately, there is also the difficulty that the company supports 
you up to a certain point. It does not make all the struggles it does against 
the State. If the State threatens the company saying it cannot have a 
Baháʾi employee … it’s difficult. For example, the company where I 
worked for six years had the problem that you could not build your career 
any further because otherwise you could spread the rumors in the corri-
dor … and what happened to me was that, at a certain point, I realized 
that either I had to do the job I was doing as a junior for a lifetime or I had 
to choose something else … (Woman – Iran – Baháʾi)
There was no real persecution, there was never a … a ban to go to Mass, 
there was nothing like that. For two reasons: he was engaged in many 
other wars, not in that against us. The second: we could not bring danger 
to him. He was afraid of the Shiites, who slaughtered them, of the Kurds 
of the North, who slaughtered them, the Christians were the good ones 
that … (…).
So to speak, like sheep (…), because in order to live together you have 
to do this. So there were no problems, persecutions in that period there, 
say 10 or 15 years before the war, to enter. On the other hand, discrimina-
tion and various things remain, such as the results of school exams, a job, 
if you present yourself and introduce other Muslims, you always reach the 
second place. Those are indirect things, but okay, we lived together, let’s 
say. We lived together. (Woman – Iraq – Chaldean Catholic Christian)
In all these cases, the role of religious affiliations can easily be seen as the rea-
son for the persecutions and abuses suffered. It is therefore relatively simple to 
hypothesize how they can submit a request for protection based on religious 
motives. However, based on the testimonies gathered during the study, it is 
easy to grasp how the violation of individual rights and dignity often passes 
through subtler practices, which hide behind the appearance of legality. In a 
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very simple manner, this Egyptian man, for example, describes the exposition 
to abuses and vexations that marked his everyday life:
For example, when you present yourself to make documents, they ask 
you: “What’s your name?”, “My name is R.”. But it is not known whether 
you are a Christian or a Muslim. “And what is your father’s name?”, “My 
father’s name is T.” But he has not yet discovered whether I am a Christian 
or a Muslim. Up to the fourth, fifth (generation), to great-grandfather, to 
know if you are a Christian or a Muslim. If they find out you’re a Christian 
“No, documents are still missing”. It is always like this. (Man – Egypt – 
Coptic Orthodox)
In this other testimony, a young girl coming from Iran describes how the aware-
ness of their strong vulnerability is part of the everyday life of some religious 
minorities’ members, to the point of encouraging a sort of spirit of resignation 
and a sense of vulnerability and danger that accompanies daily existence, re-
gardless of whether or not they directly suffered persecution:
(…) because we are used to living like that, we are used to them every day, 
maybe they come to take us, so the way of life in Iran for the Baháʾís is like 
that, always waiting for someone who (she laughs) comes to the door to 
pick you up. So in the end you’re used to living like this. (Woman – 
Iran – Baháʾi)
These testimonies bring us to the next paragraph, in which we will analyze 
how religion can become a relevant factor in the genesis of the decision to 
migrate well beyond the “codified” situations. In other words, the concept 
of religion as the direct cause of a forced migration, today, is challenged by 
the growing complexity of human (forced) mobility, in its turn influenced 
by the intricacy of the sending countries’ scenario. In this context, religions 
and religious memberships are a sort of filter through which trying to grasp 
the two phenomena.
4 How Religion Intermingles Many Contextual and Personal 
Variables
The first observation worth making is that, in agreement with the internation-
al literature (and with what we have deeply analyzed about specific contexts: 
see Chapter 5 and 6), religious factors are by and large intermingled with 
 ethno-racial, cultural, political, and economic factors, up to the point that it 
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can be difficult to isolate their relevance. Once again, this aspect finds an 
immediate –and “suffered”– confirmation in the testimonies gathered during 
the fieldwork. The following statements made by three “religious” men from 
three different continents provide a good example. The former explicitly refers 
to political power and its contamination with terrorist organizations. The sec-
ond calls into question the links between political authorities and organized 
crime, by alluding to an instrumental use of religious issues to get rid of any 
potential dissident. The third concerns the legacy of colonization, as well as 
the tendency to overlap Christianity and the West, thus making today’s Chris-
tians pay for the sins of yesterday’s Christians.
This was before my killing problem. Then sometime after I come here, 
then coming again: where is Sajjat? Where is Sajjat? Looking for me, my 
account is blocked and everything, this is not for religion, this is 
political.
Interviewer: But is the responsibility always of this terrorist group?
No, the Government is the responsible. Terrorists have only tried to kill 
me, they don’t like Shiya.
Interviewer: So for your religious issue the problem is with a terrorist 
group, for your political activity the problem is with the Government…
Yes, Government, but the Government is linked to terrorists. Govern-
ment control … Government is responsible to make everything stop, but 
Government is … it didn’t stop this. (Man – Pakistan – Muslim)
A dean, a military friend of mine, a dean of the president’s escort, told 
me: “xxx, save your life because they kill you. And your life has a price”. 
Ten days later they kidnapped me. I do not know who he was, I cannot say 
who he was, but they kidnapped me, they hit me, they put me in a cell, in 
a place but I do not know if it was a cell … I stayed there ten days, then I 
did not know anything, then they released me and told me: “if you do not 
go away, we’ll kill you, you, let’s kill your wife, your children, and we’ll say 
it was ‘el ampa’, delinquency”. At this point, I had to think for my children, 
for my wife. A person who lives in Italy, an evangelical, knew about this 
and sent me the ticket. (Man – Venezuela – Protestant Evangelical Reli-
gious leader)
My starting hypothesis is that somehow religion comes to identify a 
group of people not so much as a religion, but as a group of people that is 
uncomfortable, that I do not want, that I hate, that I do not, to which I do 
not want to allow entry into my community, and this is why the religious 
aspect, from my point of view, is not persecuted, that is, there will 
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 certainly be cases in which Christ is why he persecuted the Christians, 
but I think, at least as a working hypothesis, which in most cases is be-
cause those people who are Christians constitute a group of former colo-
nizers, that is the disturbing minority group, people who put you in ques-
tion … (Man – Religious leader – Catholic Christian)
Another case in point emerged from the study is that of Tibetan Buddhists, 
victims of the “assimilationistic” policy of the Chinese government. Here, the 
violation of religious rights and the persecution of the faithful is only an ingre-
dient of a wider long-standing conflict, in which the independence of Tibet 
and the preservation of its cultural identity is at stake. But even in the famous 
case of Nigeria, the explosion of violence against Christians and the advent of 
Boko Haram rank as the pinnacle of an involutionary path. As it emerges from 
this dramatic testimony, in highly compromised situations, the same distinc-
tion between majority and minority gives way to a context of general terror 
and insecurity. And religion ends up trivially constituting the pretext around 
which grudges and long-standing conflicts crystallize:
(…) in the Northern part of Nigeria we have a lots of different crisis, dif-
ferent types of problems: ethnic problems, religious problems and so 
forth and in the Northern part of Nigeria, where I come from, Christians 
are basically a minority and in the Southern part Christians are the ma-
jority, so during my time in Nigeria we normally faced a lot of … for ex-
ample, clashes between ethnic groups and between religious groups and 
usually because the Christians were like the minority in the North they 
were usually the ones who suffered the most and discussions happened. 
I got admission to the University of Maiduguri, the University of Maidu-
guri was part of, is located in the city where the terrorist Boko Haram 
originated from and is a predominant Muslim city, even the school is a 
predominantly Muslim students’ school and after the rise of Boko Haram 
in the city, the city was like no longer the same. There were so many inci-
dents of terrorist attacks, suicide attacks, some students have been killed, 
Christians –not only Christians, but also Muslims and any Muslims who 
don’t agree with the doctrines of Boko Haram were also victims– were 
killed. (Man – Nigeria – Christian now attending a Baptist Church)
It has not always been like that but it escalated. So I was staying with my 
father so mainly we attended this Catholic church so that Catholic church 
is not so far from the Mosque and sometimes when we go for Bible story 
on Friday evening and the priest always preaches peace and not to fight 
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but at this stage any small thing would become a religious problem. (Man – 
Nigeria – Catholic Christian)
Moreover, the “simple” contraposition between Christians and Muslims –that 
is the way in which these situations are often perceived by the Italian public 
opinion– results in obscuring a very complex state of affairs. As it emerges 
from the story of this interviewee, the mere fact of coming from a region with 
an Islamic majority can turn into an unshakable stigma, paradoxically consid-
ering as a threat those who flee from the risk of persecution:
(…) sometimes because of ignorance, many people in the South feel that 
everybody that comes from the North is a Muslim and they have that 
stereotype that everybody who is a Muslim or who is from the North is a 
terrorist, so there is this sort of divide between people from the North 
and people from the South and it’s not easy to really adapt to that way of 
life. It’s not that is not possible, is possible but is something that can take 
time. For example, when I was trying to relocate and to find another place 
to live and find a job I was in Lagos which is the commercial capital city 
of Nigeria and there was a place I went to look for a house and the land-
lord of the house refused to give me the house because he said I was may-
be a Boko Haram member and these are like some of the stereotypes that 
people from the North can face: you are from the North and the Muslims 
don’t like you because you are a Christian, and in the South people don’t 
like you because they think you are a Muslim, so when people in the 
North, they share similar cultures, not really identical, but people in the 
North have a certain way of living that is totally different from the lives of 
those from the southern part of Nigeria (…) many of them don’t even 
believe that there are Christians who live in the northern part of Nigeria, 
so this was one of the problems, maybe the major problem that contrib-
uted, for me; I wanted to leave Nigeria and find some other place. (Man – 
  Nigeria – Christian now attending a Baptist Church)
Religion, when it takes on the appearance of singular phenomena –such as 
Ogboni, a sect rooted in Nigeria–, crystallizes dramatic widespread violence. 
Following the chronicle of our migrant informants, it is quite impossible to 
understand if practices such as persecutions towards unarmed people and sac-
rifices of every kind of creature (including human beings) obey to religious 
precepts and edicts or to power strategies; as well if they come from the gov-
ernment’s initiative or from anti-system militants. According to some of our 
key informants, it also happens that these organizations are replicated in Italy, 
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as a way to involve migrants and asylum seekers in deviant activities such as 
drug dealing and to recruit victims of sex exploitation. In this case, the demand 
of asylum turns out to be an instrument used by both victims and execution-
ers, thus making the relationship between migration and religion even more 
complex; not to mention the difficulty in examining asylum applications, as 
we will analyze later.
Another interesting example is offered by a Pakistani interviewee, who ob-
tained a status of protection after having provided the Commission proofs of 
the menaces of which he was victim because of his membership in a reli-
gious/political Islamic organization. His case actually demonstrates how dif-
ficult it can be to define the concept of “minority group” within a context that 
does not offer protection, despite the clear exposition to serious risks. In this 
case, the interviewee declared to have survived after a car-accident caused by 
his persecutors, in which his brother died and his cousin was seriously in-
jured. The accident happened after several threatening letters. According to 
his interpretation, the reluctance of the police to take his report seriously was 
due to the strong connection between the political authorities and the Sunni 
component, traditionally antagonistic to the one to which the interviewee 
belongs.
Yes, I am threat, I go to police, Chekoala police, I give letter, and police 
record everything, I have made application, I said: please, I’m not safe. 
And I have … they said they give me help, what they can do, but (...) police 
don’t care, police say ok, ok, I said I have this problem, I have this letter, 
I have this telephone number, please take it, but they don’t.
Interviewer: Why do you think they didn’t care?
He is Sunni, the Government is Sunni, this Government, Government, 
No … So I have myself escort, my cousin, my brother … (Man – Pakistan – 
Muslim)
Moving in a different context, the following testimony describes the rapid de-
terioration of the situation in Iraq, after the arrival of the US arm. The inter-
viewee suggests how the “martyrdom” of Christians has to do with unknown 
logics of power, evidently hidden behind the rapid materialization of anti-
Christian terrorist organizations.
After the arrival of the Americans in 2003, many attacks against the 
churches began, they were things referred to internal war, religious war, 
but in reality it is always guided by some external hands as for example if 
we come to the present Isis, not Isis itself, there is always a power over Isis, 
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because Isis is not formed in a day and a night and said: “Here we meet and 
do something”. It is always a programmed thing. Ok, here. And so it was 
these attacks on churches, so many killings of priests, bishops, in public, 
on the street, they were beheaded, many lay people were killed, churches 
were bombed, robberies happened, they entered during the hours of 
the Mass and threatened people, they exploded bombs. (Woman – 
Iraq – Chaldean Catholic Christian)
Just to cite another example, a young man who comes from Cameroon, and 
who has declared to be a Buddhist, has described a sending context strongly 
influenced by a societal élite hegemonized by French masonry. Strong discrim-
ination suffered by people not affiliated to this organization would have a part, 
according to his interpretation, in the genesis of migration. Indeed, adherence 
to this power structure involves strong limitations to personal freedom. It is 
interesting to note how, in his story, religion can have a different meaning de-
pending on the situation: on the one hand, it can be an instrument of enslave-
ment to the logic of power (a sort of “opium of the peoples” of Marxian mem-
ory); on the other hand, a lever that awakens consciences:
Whenever I was at my home for Buddhist meetings, one or two secret 
agents came to follow the meeting and tried to get some good or bad in-
formation, but always to hurt you, because something that is understood, 
becomes something that he does not get along with the government. 
They like people who are stupid enough, who do not wake up to the real-
ity of society. Once there is someone who awakens consciences to say 
that it is useless to wait there and say prayers that do not help you, but it 
is better to get busy, trying to make money for them is not good. We must 
have people who always say yes. That’s why I did not get along with them. 
I had to leave this place and I went very far. (Man – Cameron – Buddhist)
Here, again, we can appreciate, in all its ambivalence, the strict relationship 
between religion and freedom. That is, we can appreciate how the theme of 
religious freedom –and of its violation– constitutes a litmus test of individual 
freedom tout court; alternatively, as the reflection of our interviewee seems to 
suggest, a litmus test of the future prospects of an entire country and of an 
entire generation. This solicits us to re-discuss, in depth, the distinction be-
tween voluntary migration and forced migration: should the concept of forced 
migration be limited to the situations in which individual survival and  integrity 
is seriously in danger? Or should it be extended to every situation of serious 
limitation of individual freedom and lack of democracy?
Zanfrini348
<UN>
So that’s where it’s done, but I did not accept it. I decided to run away 
because I did not want to work with him and because they persecuted me 
so much and followed me to my house in the meetings that took place in 
my house and … all this there, I had this feeling of fear while walking on 
the road I used to take to go to my job because I was afraid … There, one 
always feels that one was arrested because he said this … There is not this 
freedom of speech, there is not this freedom of thought. And young peo-
ple do not dream, they do not have this support to say that: “I want to 
become like this gentleman, that…”, No, because if you go to the Camer-
oon Government website, the Minister, the Director, are all elderly. They 
are old, all. (Man – Cameron – Buddhist)
Finally, this woman coming from Iraq –who proudly declares that she did not 
follow the “easier” route to request political asylum, “because if my country 
does not offer protection, I cannot ask another country to protect me”– 
 illustrates, in turn, as, in a context of insecurity, minority groups are most at 
risk, even independently of a precise wish to persecute them:
So, indirectly, because when I left the country, the country was in piec-
es after the entry of the Americans in Iraq the year before, there was 
total chaos at all levels, social, economic, infrastructure, protection, po-
lice, we did not have, still if you have a thief in the house you do not 
even have a number to call, and still things work like that. And … I had 
finished the specialty in 2003 and as a law in Iraq all specialists from 
one to two years post specialties are assigned to remote places, in the 
countryside, border, to serve the centers there, because otherwise the 
doctors are not there, then go back to the city of origin, of the resi-
dence. So, in 2004, I fell on the list of distribution, I was assigned a city 
just in the border with Iran, between Iraq and Iran, then go to that 
place there was almost impossible, because the attacks, the attacks 
were almost every day, a tide. But more than this I thought the fact that 
I’m Christian, I do not wear the veil, so you can already see aestheti-
cally, I’m not dark, I have a fairly clear color, that is, we can see that we 
are Christians.
Interviewer: Also from color?
Even from the color, yes, we are a clearer complexion, us. And then I 
said…
Interviewer: Can I ask you what it’s called … ethnicity, your?
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No, no, I’m Catholic, Chaldean. Chaldea proper, of the ancient origin 
of the Christians. And … so I thought that just to go there by bus takes me 
a week, makes me go back a weekend at my house, it brings me so many 
risks. Both internal and external objects because there has already been a 
bit of guerrilla warfare among the races, then it is always the Christians 
who go in between, even if we do not get involved, we always enter the 
middle. (Woman – Iraq – Chaldean Catholic Christian)
Lastly, to augment even further the level of complexity of the issue under dis-
cussion, we have to consider how religious-based violations and persecutions 
often occur also in transit countries, and during the most dramatic phases of 
the migration journey. Therefore, some respondents reported how, during 
their travel and in the time spent in the refugee camps, they became victims 
(or spectators) of different kinds of violence and abuses, because they were 
identified as members of given religious groups. In the dramatic chronicle of 
this interviewee, bogus religious beliefs can turn into violent fetishes, trans-
forming victims (the migrants who escape from their country) into execution-
ers, who “immolate” other (impure) migrants as a sacrifice in order to reach 
their “promised land”.
In Africa, you have fetish, you have ghosts that you use to destroy people, 
or your mission is to come to Europe to destroy, so you are not clean with 
that. Inside the boat, you start to manifest, you start to confess, you start 
saying things why you want to go to Europe. So, there’s a power in the sea, 
that you can’t … Maybe you have some medicines in your pocket and take 
it to Europe to destroy other persons, so you start manifest, maybe rolling 
on the ground, behaving like a fish, or a snake, and people who are there, 
know this sort of things, have seen that before, so … so they will simply 
take the person and put the person inside the water. So things like this 
happen. Because in the boat there are more than fifty people, maybe one 
or two people who have this kind of power, when they get in the middle 
of this water, they must manifest.
(…) Most of the times you see ladies … they start falling on the ground 
and behaving like snakes, or start shouting, so this makes us understand 
that these people are not clean. And if we don’t throw these people in the 
water, the water, the boat will become full of water, so what they do fast is 




5 The Variety of Religious-Based Persecution’s Agents
The muddle of religious factors and political factors does not exhaust the intri-
cacy of the contemporary scenario. Reflecting the growing complexity of the 
current landscape –on which we will enter in more detail later (Chapter 11, 
§3.1)–, our fieldwork proves the variety of both threats and persecution’s agents 
which can produce (forced) mobility, well beyond the traditional refugee ar-
chetype. As well as the widest range of risks, which can justify the request for 
protection. Governmental authorities –or the other power structures– are 
surely a crucial actor, when they directly oppress the members of given reli-
gions, limit citizens’ religious freedom, encourage or permit a discriminating 
treatment of minority groups, and impose a climate of suspect and intolerance 
by means of a radical application or religious rules. Nevertheless, several oth-
ers may be the persecutory agents. We have already cited the case of Nigerians 
who escape from the violence perpetrated by Boko Haram: in this example, the 
persecutor is not the State, but an organization that controls part of the terri-
tory of the State (while the latter does not want or cannot offer protection).
It is particularly interesting to note that religious authorities and religious 
leaders are often referred to as the main cause of the troubles experienced by 
future migrants. Moreover, in the turbulent context characterizing many of the 
countries of origin of the current migratory flows towards Italy, the concept of 
religious authority is often very distant from how it is framed in Europe. The 
chronicles, often confused and emotionally overloaded, of our interviewees, 
shed light on forms of “pre-modern” religiosity. Forms that make it rather dif-
ficult to trace the boundary between “authentic” religious feelings (although 
expressed in radicalized ways) and the pretentious use of religious obligations 
to harass “sacrificial victims”. Just to cite an example, one of our interviewees 
–a young man coming from Nigeria–, reported that he was obliged to escape 
from his country since he had been selected to succeed, after his death, to the 
man involved in the worshiping of the “ghost”:
My story is that the reason why I left my country and I come to Italy is that 
after the man that worships the ghost of our land died on 5th November 
2013 they buried the man on 15th November 2013. On January 10th 2014, 
in the evening by 8 o’clock, three elderly men came to our house and told 
us that the ghost had chosen me to worship him. And I told them: “Why? 
Because I am a small boy. How can the ghost choose me, instead of them, 
that elderly man?” They tell us that the ghost  chooses by small age and 
I told them that I am sorry, that I will not worship those ghosts, because 
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I’m a Christian, and they go. And they also come again on 20th January 
2014 and tell us, they come in the evening by 8 o’ clock, the same time, 
and I also tell them that I won’t worship this God, because I’m a Christian. 
Then go. They also come on 30; they also come on 30 January 2014 by 8 
o’ clock in the evening and tell us the same thing. I tell them that I will 
not worship those ghosts, even my father told them that his son would 
not worship those ghosts, because we are Christians. (Man –  Nigeria – 
 Pentecostal Christian Church [former Catholic Christian])
Due to his refusal, the interviewee had to watch the murder of his father, who 
had opposed to this request. His chronicle is particularly impressive, since it 
demonstrates the manner in which religious persecution can suddenly break 
into one’s life.
So, since I was born I never participate in their … idles, worshiping the 
ghost. Even my family were Christians, I attend the Catholic Church in 
my village (…).
You know how evil operates? Those are rituals, when they have rituals, 
people from another people come, you don’t know them. Even the time 
when this thing happened, they give me the 10th of December, when I’m 
on the way, going to the market, I would see people I don’t know, they 
wanted me, I have to obey them, they were threatening my life, I don’t 
know the person, but the person is threatening my life, he is not in that 
village, he just met me in the market and he is pointing me…
(…) anywhere they see me they would kill me, because I didn’t come, I 
didn’t follow them in worshipping the ghost. (Man – Nigeria – Christian 
Pentecostal Church [former Catholic Christian])
We have already observed that what is violated is often not the right to believe, 
but the right to convert to a different faith, a minority or otherwise opposed 
faith. On the contrary, this interviewee offers us a specular testimony. Once 
again, in his narrative, considerations pertaining to religion are mixed with 
others types of considerations, in this case of an economic nature (the impos-
sibility of inheriting goods for those who do not belong to the “right” religion). 
Yet, “formally”, it is his refusal to convert that becomes the cause of persecu-
tion, giving it a halo of legitimacy.
So, what happened is that there was a serious crisis in Jos so that I lost my 
dad for that. It was like a war between the Christians and the Muslims and 
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my mother she is a Christian so we decided to go back to the village and I 
decided to be a Christian because I don’t love Muslims so when the village 
they were like trying to kill me because I was supposed to be a Muslim 
since I was the son of my father. We were three, me and my sisters.
We all decided to be Christians, so the problem is that the village say 
we must be Muslims but we say no, we are not going to be Muslims, but 
they say we had to and the problem is that my father inherit this property 
but we cannot inherit it without being a Muslim, so they were trying to 
kill my parents but I couldn’t go with them because I have a family: I have 
a wife and a daughter, but I had to leave them so that my son and my 
daughter are with my mum. My wife left me because of the problem. She 
has to leave me because they were imposing us to be Muslims, she never 
wanted to be a Muslim so if she was with me she had to be a Muslim so 
for not being a Muslim she left me. (Man – Nigeria – Christ Church)
Civil society’s actors may be another persecution agent, particularly relevant 
within non-democratic contexts. Here, the threatened subjects are not provid-
ed with adequate protection by the authorities. Moreover, these very authori-
ties are the ones who legitimize abuses and discriminations on a religious basis, 
even rewarding them as expressions of loyalty to the regime. As we have already 
observed, the school system constitutes, in this regard, one of the most sensi-
tive environments, together with the field of economics, where religious affilia-
tion can become an easy alibi to justify discriminations, abuses, and frauds.
When I was in middle school, my classmates beat me and teachers criti-
cized me, disrespected me, treated me badly because I was a believer and 
did not respect my beliefs. Once they beat me so much that I ended up in 
the hospital. (Man – China – Church of God Almighty)
(…) stalking, the fact that a person fires from a business because being a 
Christian was derided or discriminated against is very subtle. Hence, per-
secution in interpersonal relationships is important, especially if there is 
no rule in these countries to protect against this discrimination. In inter-
preting relationships, persecution can occur, but it is enough for me to 
ask the public authorities that the matter is resolved. But if there is no 
such legislation in the countries of origin or it is not intended to be ap-
plied, it is again a persecution. (Man – Expert)
Furthermore, even family members and local communities have emerged, 
during the fieldwork, as frequently involved in imposing, in the name of  alleged 
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religious precepts, choices and behaviors contrary to individual will. Arranged 
(forced) marriages are a case in point, together with the lack of parents’ con-
sensus towards a freely chosen nuptial union, particularly in the case of inter-
religious marriages.
Finally, as demonstrated by the following examples, the family itself can 
perpetrate abuses and violations in the name of religion. Once again, it is very 
easy to understand how reasons of economic convenience, social “respectabil-
ity”, political opportunity, and superstition, often tend to prevail over genuine 
religious sentiments.
They insist I became a Muslim because of my father property. So, we 
don’t give you your property without being a Muslim and they were try-
ing to kill my wife, so she left. When my father died, we think the best 
place to go was to go back to his village, and the problem started in the 
village, while I think I was safe but I was not. This is a Muslim village 
and a Christian village … both. And in my father family they wanted 
me to be a Muslim and it was the family of my father who insisted me 
to be a Muslim. But I want to be a Christian. (Man – Nigeria – Christ 
Church)
My family, they believe in fetish religion, so from the beginning, when I 
was young I didn’t know all about what it meant to be in a fetish religion, 
I decided to follow Christ. So it became a problem with my father because 
I’m the first one of the family. Normally as the first one of the family after 
my father is dead I’m supposed to take from my father, I’m supposed to 
continue the fetish religion from my father. But for me I don’t like the re-
ligion, because it is contrary with Christ, so I decided not to follow up 
with this religion. Anyway, my father was still alive, so before he died I 
was supposed to be in this religion called Ogbony. It is popular in Edo 
State. The majority in Nigeria does not know this religion, because it is 
with Edo people, who usually have this religion. These people have this 
religion because they want to be famous, rich…
When I was born, for the first eight years, nine years, my father went 
to their meetings, to their meetings whenever they meet, all of them 
came with their sons, their first sons, who will take over from them, we 
sit down with them, sometimes when they want to do something terri-
ble they go to a place where we cannot go, until we are more than eigh-
teen, then we are fully initiated and we can go to that place where they 
make these strong, strong sacrifices. When I was young, I used to go 
with my father, until thirteen years, when I knew the difference between 
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Christianity and these things, I stopped going. Then when I got to that 
age when I was supposed to be initiated, at eighteen years, then he start-
ed, at the beginning he tried to persuade me peacefully, but when he 
saw that persuading me was not, that he won’t not make me one of 
them, he decided to make it with force. Then the young ones came, like 
six of them, trying to force me, to get me to the shrine, because they go 
to a shrine, where they keep their ghost, but I refused, then they started 
beating me up, trying to force me, they molested me, and I was able to 
run away, and I went to my friend’s place, but they came to my friend’s 
place and I was so lucky that I noticed earlier that they were coming, so 
I ran away from there, and I went to Niger, I spent some days in Niger, 
well I spent some, you know, many years in Niger, before my father’s 
younger brother, he also lives in Niger, so he learned from my father that 
I was in Niger, then problems started again. (Man – Nigeria – Catholic 
Christian)
As the reported cases suggest, when acting in the name of religion, the viola-
tion of individual rights –be it mediated by political and/or religious authori-
ties, or by an actor of civil society or even by the same family– calls into ques-
tion the relationship between genders and generations. In other words, besides 
being influenced by the relations between social classes and between political 
and religious groups, violations of individual rights often reflect the patriarchal 
structures of many societies, the gender regimes, the expectations connected 
to generational roles. Therefore, it is not surprising that to be frequently called 
into question are matters pertaining to marriage choices (in particular, the 
choice to marry a partner of a different religion), to the relationships between 
fathers and children, to the rules that regulate hereditary transmission and the 
transmission of roles within the community; not to mention the fear to suffer 
genital mutilation, excision, forced sterilization.
My mother, she is a Christian, but … she is not able to fully practice a 
Christian life because she got married to my father, so in Nigeria a wom-
an, it is not like in Europe where a woman can say something, in Nigeria, 
when you come to my State, a woman does not say, what her husband 
says, that’s what she walks with. (Man – Nigeria – Christian now attend-
ing the Adventist Church)
(…) I come from Yemen, from the South of Yemen and I’ve been here in 
Italy for almost 5 years, and I came … I left my country because I had to 
leave because I do not find my soul there … Let’s say I’m a woman and I’m 
different I am free, and I want to be as I want … I have a bit of a Western 
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woman, but let’s say in an oriental, conservative environment where 
women do not have many rights, they have no rights, let’s say. That’s why 
I decided to leave. (Woman – Yemen – Muslim)
Once again, it is immediate to grasp, through the testimonies of our interview-
ees, the close link between religion, individual freedom, and the quality of de-
mocracy. The latter intended not as an academic concern, but as something 
that pervasively affects individual lives and prospects. The same Yemeni wom-
an sums it up well.
In my country, if the man does not accept the divorce then the woman 
cannot have it. It is not a decision from two sides, it is always man. If he 
wants to divorce, yes, but if he does not want to leave you like that, half 
way. You are no longer married but you are not divorced. These are the 
laws when we do not have civil laws like in Europe. In our Muslim coun-
tries, the law is not civil but it is based on religion, what is written in reli-
gion, so we do not have this parity between man and woman because 
they use religion to make law and instead if we use this because we know 
that religion Islamic is almost 1,400 years ago … and all that is written in-
side the Quran is good for that era, there is written of things we say as law, 
ok there are, but this was fine for that era of 1,400 years ago but not you 
can apply it now. (Woman – Yemen – Muslim)
Finally, as we will analyze in the next chapter, asylum seekers’ reception sys-
tems are more and more challenged, today, not only by the “simple” violations 
of religious rights and religious freedoms. An important share of contempo-
rary migrants –independently of the migration channel for which they opt– 
wants to escape a radical interpretation of religious prescriptions, such as that 
imposed by some authoritarian regimes. Here, the concepts of religious iden-
tity and religious freedom appear in their suggestively, and not unequivocally, 
interconnected nature. As argued by these last testimonies, the violation of the 
principle of personal freedom can assume different forms and degrees, includ-
ing a persistent sense of oppression. And, as efficaciously synthesized by the 
second one, maybe migration is not a forced choice, but just a simple wish: it is 
the best thing to do, an exit strategy to realize those personal goals made un-
achievable by an oppressive societal context.
(…) I always had so many questions, “Why do we have to cover ourselves? 
Why do we have to do this? Why?”. And then sincerely after a while I grew 
up I do not know, I felt that … all day always I had to think, this is right or 
wrong, so … life had become too heavy, distressing. Because, I know, 
Zanfrini356
<UN>
 maybe you said a little lie, but you already felt guilty because you said 
“now God is staring at me” (…).
So it’s not that you say “Okay, Ok, I do not follow and I do not care and 
it ends there”. At whatever level of your life you arrive there are discus-
sions you have to do. And then if … like … if you do not overcome these 
discussions maybe you lose an opportunity of your life (…).
Then in the field of art it is very difficult, because for example you can-
not find the books, the paintings come … that is, the naked body is forbid-
den, so maybe, I know, I wanted to study the history of art in Europe … 
but I did not found the books, or if you found them they were already all 
censored. (Woman – Iran – Protestant Christian [former Muslim])
So I thought about it and said: “Now I have three choices in front of me. 
Or I go and risk my life as a life and as a woman, because there is also the 
possibility of violence and things that happen … and they happen! Or I’m 
at home and I’m a housewife, but I’ve studied medicine for six years and 
five years of specialty, if we talk only about medicine it took me eleven 
years, and I’m at home, which is something … frustrating. The third 
choice I escape from this country”. So I thought about it, I wrote a little 
about the three things and I said: “The best one seems to me the third”. So 
it’s not a wish, but a … the best thing. (Woman – Iraq – Chaldean Catholic 
Christian)
At the end, once put in a humanistic perspective and from the point of view 
of the people directly involved (Chapter 2), it becomes quite impossible to 
clearly distinguish between voluntary and forced migration; particularly when 
this distinction calls into question a dimension such as religion and its strict 
relationship with personal identity and personal freedom. Correspondingly, 
it is easy to understand how the extraordinary complexity of contemporary 
(forced) mobility –as it is emblematically illustrated by the evidence discussed 
in this chapter– turns out to be quite difficult to process through standard-
ized procedures, such as the procedures regulating the acknowledgement of a 
status of protection. Besides, it is extraordinarily complex to rightly grasp and 
recognize the role of religion in the asylum seekers’ trajectories and choices. 
These issues will constitute the object of the following chapter.
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Chapter 11
The “Space” of Religion in the Assessment  
of Asylum Applications
Laura Zanfrini
As anticipated in the previous chapter, one of the main purposes of this part of 
the study is to inquire how the process of asylum applications’ assessment 
leads to the emergence and the acknowledgement of all those aspects con-
nected in many ways to asylum seekers’ religious belonging. In Chapter 9, we 
have illustrated the Italian legislation in force, in its contents and its weak-
nesses. Here, we will examine the attitude of the various stakeholders involved, 
with an attempt to provide an answer to the following question: do these as-
pects constitute a relevant variable in acknowledging the need of protection, 
possibly even beyond what established by the legislative framework?
This goal implies having to deal with a bigger question regarding the criteria 
useful to define the “borders” of forced mobility, which helps to distinguish 
between voluntary and forced migrants. As it is well known, this distinction, 
on which migratory regimes have been traditionally based, today is strongly 
challenged from both a political and an ethical point of view. The authors of 
Chapters 2 and 4 have already analyzed some of the main issues involved, and 
the manner in which those have been influencing the legislative evolution at 
both the international and the European level. Here, it is useful to remember 
that it is exactly because of the progressive inclusion of new categories of peo-
ple and circumstances into the systems of protection that the line between 
voluntary and forced migrations has become increasingly porous and disput-
able, to the point of putting in question its own existence (for a deeper analy-
sis, see Zanfrini, 2019). Our hypothesis is that this trend influences the attitude 
of all the actors of the reception system, from the commissioners in charge 
with the asylum demands’ evaluation to the operators who “prepare” the asy-
lum seekers for the interview.
1 Religion(s) and the Borders of Forced Mobility
As we have already described (Chapters 3 and 9), unlike other types of mi-
grants, variously defined by the laws of individual countries, the refugee figure 
is based on a precise –internationally recognized– legal institution, contained 
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in the Declaration on the Status of Refugees. However, given the growing com-
plexity of human mobility at the global scale, nowadays asylum seekers re-
semble less and less the Ideal Type of refugee inspired by the 1951 Geneva Con-
vention. First of all, forced migration has usually a collective, not individual, 
configuration (Zolberg, 1989), and reflects a shared need to flee from situations 
of crisis that have unpredictable consequences and evolution. Moreover, the 
threat from which one may flee is not necessarily the State, but it may be rep-
resented by an agent of civil society, or even by a family member, as we have 
also observed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, the fear of persecution no 
longer only concerns imprisonment, but it also refers to the widest range of 
human rights, including, for example: the fear of being subjected to steriliza-
tion or excision or of being imposed into forced marriage, violations of the 
rights of homosexuals, or even survival jeopardized by only announced envi-
ronmental catastrophes (Black et al., 2011; Kumin, 2007; Pickering, 2011). Migra-
tion is sometimes not only forced (i.e. due to the lack of other possibilities of 
survival and development), but even compulsory, which is triggered by various 
forms of trafficking and enslavement. Moreover, because of its circumscribed 
nature, the Convention’s definition of “refugee” is poorly equipped to protect 
people who cross international borders in the context of wars and civil unrest 
(Iom, 2017). Finally, protection systems have been built in compliance with a 
male archetype, a circumstance that makes said systems inadequate to meet 
the needs and the specific risks posed to female migrants (Pickering, 2011). Not 
to mention their inadequacy in front of the growing incidence of minors, 
sometimes unaccompanied, who are the most vulnerable among the vulnera-
ble (Valtolina, 2014). This complex scenario –amply mirrored in the characters 
of migration fluxes currently addressed to Italy– must be taken into account in 
order to apprehend the relevance of various aspects connected to religions, in 
their interrelation with other variables such as gender, age, family status, sexu-
al orientation, and so on.
Religion is one of the causes of persecution specifically evoked by the 1951 
Geneva Convention, together with race, nationality, belonging to a given so-
cial group, and political opinions. However, its role must to be contextualized 
within the complex reality of contemporary human mobility, and particu-
larly  within the so-called migration-asylum nexus: this expression describes 
how fluxes due to different reasons and inscribed in different legislative re-
gimes display themselves through similar modes, such as through the same 
routes and entry channels (including the demand for asylum), within the 
same international context. Hence, the relations among different religious 
groups, and their unpredictable evolution, are on the background of many 
collective arrivals; moreover, they are strictly interconnected with ethnic and 
 socio-economic variables, as we have commented in the previous chapter. As 
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clearly  demonstrated by the following statement, this circumstance can result 
if not in the “omission” of the religion issue, surely in the “temptation” to pre-
categorize those asylum seekers whose claims are based on religious reasons 
according to their gender, country/region of origin, and, paradoxically, right on 
their religion
In the case of migrants coming from North-East of Nigeria, if Christians 
are considered refugees for the Geneva Convention, if Muslims are dis-
tinguished according to the areas. Women are refugees by themselves. 
Women in southern Nigeria are Christians, but the problem is the traf-
ficking of human beings. The fear of Islamic fundamentalism as a drive to 
emigrate has never been connected. A theme to think about, but I think 
the problem of Nigerians is not religious. (Woman – Official of the asy-
lum seekers’ reception system)
This declaration, on the other hand, seems to suggest that the “mere” fact of 
coming from a potentially risky context can be a reason to become eligible for 
international protection. In this way, Christians escaping from Nigeria, particu-
larly in the case of women, are offered a special treatment, despite the fact that 
the same expert had observed that “the problem of Nigerian women is not of 
religious nature”, and despite the fact that most of them come from regions 
different than those actually under the control of Boko Haram (but where its 
expansion is dreaded).
Furthermore, protection is envisaged also in the case of those who do not 
belong to established religions, as in the case of adepts to religious sects. Ac-
cording to the testimonies of our key informants, as we have already reported, 
an increasing number of Chinese, women in almost all the cases, declare to be 
victims of various forms of persecution because of their affiliation to “God Al-
mighty”, a Chinese sect which sustains that Christ has come a second time, 
with a female body; he/she is still living, but no one knows where he/she is 
now.
(…) girls who need immediate care of souls, a direct relationship with 
the Pastor or the Pastora (the female pastor, author’s note), because they 
need to tell their own story and be directed to those mechanisms that 
will allow them to have a residence permit. They are asylum seekers for 
religious reasons (…). Young girls … from their stories it is clear that they 
have been persecuted; in China there are Churches of State, the others 
are out of the norm, so they are persecuted. These girls are part of do-
mestic Churches, tiny churches, which are in homes, but neighbors are 
spies. The girls are arrested, they try to collect money and they come to 
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Milan, Turin, Florence, where there are other people who can give that 
logistic support that they pay. (Woman – Religious leader – Evangelical 
Christian)
However, as pointed out by this executive of the Italian reception system, it is 
extremely difficult, not to say impossible, to grasp the contexts of origin of asy-
lum seekers in all their complexity, despite the possibility of consulting the 
database made available to them (§2). And adequately classify actors, reasons 
and consequences of persecution on a religious basis. While unanimously de-
claring their adherence to a guaranteed approach, the key experts involved in 
the study reveal all their difficulty in dealing with this issue and, at times, the 
tendency to be guided by preconceived visions of the importance to be paid to 
the different religious affiliations, to the point of crossing the risk of ethnocen-
trism. Thus, it is interesting to observe how, in the formulation of this expert, 
“tribal rites” are downgraded to the role of something that cannot be consid-
ered as a “real” faith.
The situations are varied so it is impossible to make a unitary reading. 
Example: Pakistani boy (Shiite) who had fallen in love with a Pakistani 
girl (Sunni). The Imam refuses to celebrate the marriage because it would 
have polluted the purity of the faith. The boy goes to a civil court, but a 
commando at a checkpoint kills the girl. Today in the Islamic area there 
are phenomena of persecution against the Azeris who are worse than 
those towards the Christians (…). In many countries there are prohibi-
tions to enroll children in school, to practice trade. There are areas in 
which one is persecuted for being Christian, areas in which there is an 
element of discrimination, or where situations of confrontation occur 
due to animistic phenomena, for which it is not clear whether it is a prob-
lem of faith or linked to tribal rites. (Man – Officer of the asylum seekers’ 
reception system)
It is quite clear how, once confronted with given kinds of narratives, the dis-
tinction between forced and voluntary migration becomes even more porous 
and arbitrary. What’s more, it frequently happens that the same narrative is 
repeated in a quite identical manner, thus feeding the suspect of its bogus 
nature.
There are very few credible religious claims. The interviewer’s task is to 
investigate not only what is being told, but also to understand if the 
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 person is at risk of persecution regardless of what he tells. (Woman – 
 Officer of the asylum seekers’ reception system)
We will return to this phenomenon further on, since it is one of the most criti-
cal points. What is interesting to note is that it is explicitly denounced by the 
migrants themselves, as in this testimony where the interviewee observes how 
phenomena like human sacrifices do exist in certain African regions, but in a 
number surely lower than the one reported to the commissions.
(…) you know when people come to Europe and seek for asylum or inter-
national protection, they did something to tell the commission … for the 
commission to believe in them so if it happens to one person and person 
comes and tells in front of the commission: “This is my story”, then the 
next person is like: “Oh, that’s what that person said, so I’ll go and tell the 
same story” and he goes and tells the same story, and you know it’s just 
like my own story when I told my own story, I was told that –not by com-
mission but by other people– that Nigerians come and they said that left 
Nigeria because of Boko Haram and some of them don’t even know any-
thing about Boko Haram, they don’t even live in the northern part of Ni-
geria, they don’t even speak the language that we speak in the northern 
part of Nigeria, so what do you … they have never been affected by Boko 
Haram, but because they know that other Nigerian have got the permis-
sion or international protection because of their experiences of Boko Ha-
ram they feel like, ok I’ll tell the same story. So the story of human sacri-
fices, yes, it’s possible that some people have actually faced human 
sacrifices, but if you interview maybe 20 people from Edo State and 15 tell 
you that they left because of human sacrifices then it is a lie. Even the 
chances of you meeting somebody who was involved in human sacrifices 
and escaped is maybe one in two hundred, if you ask me … it’s just that 
everybody needs a story to give … but I don’t think that human sacrifices 
happen like that in Nigeria, no it doesn’t, it’s very rare. (Young man – 
 Nigeria – Christian)
Another Nigerian interviewee is even more drastic when he affirms that Eu-
rope is a powerful pulling pole, even independently of effective “true” reasons 
to migrate; so attractive to encourage a widespread tendency to lie:
I don’t know about people that go there, tell lies and have documents, but 
I know that people tell lies. Most people lie, everybody lie. So most people 
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lie to get the documents, because most of the times, most of us, most Ni-
gerians, most blacks, they don’t leave home because they have problems, 
that’s the truth, they leave home because they think that Europe is beau-
tiful, Europe is free, you can live a free life, you can be happy … (Man – 
Nigeria – Catholic Christian)
The risk of an instrumental reference to religious arguments, by any “bogus” 
asylum seeker who tries in this manner to “confuse” the commissioners, has 
repeatedly emerged during the focus groups. The recurrence of narratives 
identical to each other is often referred to as a clear symptom of this phenom-
enon. In any case, despite the different perception of some applicants (who 
may fear that this circumstance would negatively influence the commission 
approach, making it more suspicious), our key informants have unanimously 
concluded that this risk cannot influence the assessment activity.
The Court of Cassation has clearly said that repetition does not mean 
that there is falsehood. It is up to the one who decides to do the necessary 
investigations. It is not that if the story is repetitive then it is not true. 
Many may have been involved in Boko Haram’s village fire. Group perse-
cution is a true, real phenomenon. (Man – Expert)
In this regard, a point repeatedly underlined is that the commission must al-
ways evaluate each single position, and encompass all the possible kinds of 
violations, included those quite impossible to prove. One case in point is rep-
resented by the declaration of a conversion to a minority religion not mani-
fested publicly because of the fear of becoming a victim of harassment (with 
very few exceptions, our informants have excluded the possibility or recurring, 
in these situations, to the help of religious authorities in order to obtain some 
“proofs” of the feasibility of the conversion).
Then comes the question that has already been dealt with by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union: whether or not it is obligatory for the for-
eigner to demonstrate that he has already exercised his religious confes-
sion in his homeland. And the Court has rightly said: but not even for an 
idea, because in that country a minority confession is persecuted but if I 
declare my membership I will be persecuted. So it is clear, says the Court, 
we cannot force ourselves to submit to the persecution. Religious free-
dom, like other positive liberties, entails the right to manifest or not to 
manifest, freely to say one’s own belonging. And also the right to keep it 
confidential (…).
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They can say that the request must be rejected only because if the for-
eigner remained in his own country without demonstrating, he would 
not be persecuted. Because, says the Court, it would end up legitimizing 
persecution and/or legitimizing an abusive restriction of religious free-
dom that is guaranteed in our legal systems. (Man – Expert)
Finally, the suspect of a “bogus” use of religious arguments is widespread 
among both the experts and the officers in charge with the applications’ as-
sessment. However, even if they are aware that this phenomenon is playing a 
specific role in delegitimizing the asylum system in the eyes of public opinion, 
they assert pragmatically that this risk is part of the “rules of the game”. Or, as 
suggested by a unhcr officer, it is even a further signal of a progressive erosion 
of the distinction between forced and voluntary migration:
(…) an expansion of secure migration channels supported by local com-
munities is needed. Where there is a risk of life, those with religious re-
sponsibility often become unbalanced and it is delicate to enter the realm 
of the conversion process. (Woman – unhcr officer)
Despite the fact that, today, asylum seekers are mainly coming from Islam-ma-
jority countries, it is decidedly more frequent to find a reference to the viola-
tion of religious rights in the applications of asylum seekers affiliated to other 
religious traditions, starting from the Christian ones. The most quoted cases 
concern: Chinese (female) migrants who declare to be victims of persecution 
because they belong to Christians sects (in particular to the Church of God 
Almighty), Christians flying from Northern Nigeria, and Coptic Egyptians and 
Iranians converted to a different religion than the Islamic one.
(…) we find ourselves managing an emergency in which a series of com-
plex factors exercise their influence. Some religious claims in the pure 
sense paradoxically at this moment are only advanced by the Chinese. 
Chinese who adhere to Christian sects. In the office, I have a package of 
applications presented by women who do not know how to evaluate 
because they have problems of dialogue and of information on the 
country of origin. (Woman – Official of the asylum seekers’ reception 
system)
This circumstance does not cause Christian applicants to experience a positive 
discrimination when they enter the procedure. As we will describe in the fol-
lowing paragraphs, as any other applicant, they have to face a system that, 
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 despite a genuine intention to cover all the situations connected to a violation 
of religious rights and religious freedoms, suffer different forms of bias.
Actually, independently of their religious membership, the interviews with 
migrants provide considerable evidence, as we have seen in the previous chap-
ter, of the many religious-connected factors that concurred to the decision to 
migrate, even though only in a few cases these factors are emphasized during 
the dialogue with the commissioners. Not to mention the fact that most of our 
sample entered Italy and obtained his/her stay-permit through a procedure 
different than the request for protection: a further signal of the tremen-
dous gap between contemporary migration trends and established migratory 
schemes. On the other hand, the personnel in charge with the analysis of the 
asylum applications seems to be particularly sensitive not only with those sit-
uations in which religion appears to be the direct “cause” of migration, but also 
with those that we can define as indirect religious-connected causes of (forced) 
migration, even if they could be not easily acknowledgeable from a formal 
point of view. This is particularly true as far as those situations in which the 
living conditions turn out to be strongly compromised by the presence of dic-
tatorial or autocratic regimes, based on a fundamentalist view of religious 
precepts…
The persecution must be considered in an enlarged dimension. Why do 
people leave the Middle East? There are fundamentalisms (I think about 
Syria), but also dictatorial systems that exploit the fear of the Islamist 
adversary (Egypt: there is no real persecution, but civil war). One can 
thus see the effect of religious fundamentalism in perpetuating autocrat-
ic regimes: migratory flows not to escape persecution, but a religious fac-
tor, however, is at the origin. (Man – fbos leader – Catholic)
…or where, in the name of religious teachings and guidelines, strong limita-
tions to the personal freedom are imposed, particularly to women and other 
subordinated groups, thus transforming religion into a mechanism of social 
and political control:
We evaluate to investigate the case of Nigerian women. The Islamist fun-
damentalist presence hostile to women and a growing history of women’s 
migration cannot be by chance. But to what extent are these factors also 
linked to the unconscious level? The fact is that I want to survive, and it is 
difficult to survive in a certain country if you are a woman; and if you are 
Muslim, but not in the way the fanatics want it. (Man – Religious 
leader – Muslim)
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Furthermore, the focus group discussions took in consideration those ap-
plications referring to a possible involution of religious minorities’ conditions, 
connected to the current geo-political context. The most quoted case is that of 
Nigeria, with reference to asylum seekers coming from geographical areas that 
are still outside the control of Boko Haram – which they fear will expand its 
territory even further.
All the key informants have agreed with the conclusion that the mere risk of 
future persecution is a sufficient argument to receive a demand; also because 
it is definitely rational to search protection before it will be too late for escap-
ing! (the many Jews who fled from Europe at the dawn of the Nazi delirium are 
proof of this, since many others did not have time to seek shelter).
Finally, what has clearly emerged from the study is that the Italian system of 
protection (including in this expression all the categories of key informants 
involved) seems to be globally immune from the influence of the present con-
text, where applicants are increasingly perceived as bogus asylum seekers who 
“use” religion as a pretext to produce false chronicles; besides, said system does 
not even seem to be prejudiced by the outcomes of previous demands, most of 
which had been actually rejected (see Chapter 10, §1). The key informants have 
stated that every kind of persecution and violation, directly or indirectly linked 
to the applicant’s religious profile, must be seriously taken into account, re-
gardless of the risk of a forged chronicle. Since religious freedom is defined as 
a fundamental human right, every kind of violation (from a violent persecu-
tion to the simple fear of declaring one’s own religious beliefs) must be covered 
by the procedures of protection. The same should happen as far as the mere 
risk of persecution is concerned: as we noted above, many informants evoked 
the historical antecedent of Jews, reminding that only the ones who had been 
welcomed before the mass deportation to concentration camps had the chance 
to escape from persecution and survive.
Lastly, the commissioners are expected to explore this issue whenever the 
situation of the country of origin, as well as the “tone” of the account provided 
by the applicant, make it pertinent and relevant. Very few of the key infor-
mants have sustained that, since we are dealing with a very intimate and per-
sonal sphere, it is recommendable to avoid any arguments not spontaneously 
emerged. On the contrary, most of the experts involved think that, at least 
when the situation of the sending country makes it pertinent, it is always ad-
visable to scrutinize this issue. In other words, even if the applicant does not 
refer specific facts connected to his/her religious identity and beliefs, it is the 
commissioners who have to examine them, since it would represent an impor-




Even if the applicant does not state a religious motivation, because per-
haps he is not aware that this may be a reason, the commission, which 
has knowledge of the situation in the country of origin, highlights it and 
has a duty to investigate that aspect. (Man – unhcr Official)
Despite all this, two main critical aspects have emerged from the fieldwork. 
The first one, on which we will focus the attention in the next section, is of a 
“technical” nature. The second one, object of the following one, has to do with 
the political/ideological dimension of the issue and with the manner in which 
it feeds back on the evaluation setting.
2 Technical Biases
Given the extraordinary complexity of the current scenario, it is easy to under-
stand how the different actors of the reception system, including the commis-
sioners in charge with the applications’ assessment, lack a comprehensive 
knowledge of the situations of both origin and transit countries, not to men-
tion the intra-national variety of risks and problems. It is not a coincidence 
that they admit their difficulty in talking about subjects that they do not com-
pletely master. According to their reading of the subject, the religious land-
scape of origin countries is not only tremendously complex, it is also “filtered” 
by the ambiguous and embellished representations diffused through the me-
dia system, which can influence the commissioners’  perceptions –despite 
their desire  to remain neutral– or even induce them to underestimate the risks 
to which people coming from given countries were exposed (we will return to 
this point in the next section).
First of all, as stressed by this interviewee, Italians’ perception suffers from 
a strong cultural distance with respect to the sending countries’ social 
landscape:
Interviewer: For us, in Italy, it is very difficult to believe that they really 
perform human sacrifices. Because we think that…
Do you know the reason why it is very difficult for you to believe? Be-
cause you are far from Africa. Do you understand? You are very, very far 
from Africa. When you watch television and see what is happening in 
Nigeria you will believe! You are in a country that respects the law. If Ni-
geria respects the law, all these things would not happen in Nigeria. Italy 
respects the law, they respect their law. You can’t see Italy fight, I’ve never 
seen Italy fight. They can talk. But for Nigeria everything is possible there, 
for them to do. To kill somebody is nothing to them. When you watch 
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television, what is happening in South East, now, for my region, what is 
happening there, even Italy’s Government knows what is happening in 
Nigeria. (Man – Nigeria – Christian Pentecostal Church)
Another critical point has to do with the manner in which religion and spiritu-
ality are understood and experienced across the various socio-cultural con-
texts. Just to cite a case in point, Catholicism in Armenia is not the same as 
Catholicism in Italy; rituals, prayers, devotions are deeply embedded in the 
local history and traditions. Therefore, when the commission puts questions 
based on the “Italian version” of Catholicism, they can result understandable 
for an applicant coming from a different milieu. This kind of “cultural bias”, on 
its turn, is just the first piece of a mosaic of a deeper ideological bias that we 
will further discuss in the next paragraph.
Technically, the regulations in force offer the possibility of resorting to a 
cultural mediator with the aim to feel the gap between the applicant’s experi-
ence and feelings and the commissioners’ mind-set. However, many infor-
mants have observed that, despite being indispensable, the use of a cultural 
mediator (or, quite often, a simple translator) turns into a supplementary prob-
lem, since he/she might be considered to be not completely trustworthy when 
dealing with specific topics. The following testimonies provide some emblem-
atic examples of how, in the perception of applicants who are waiting for the 
interview, current procedures are not reliable enough to protect migrants from 
given countries who have had to face persecution to the point that they fear 
they might find it in the destination country too:
I’m still waiting and also nowadays I see the result is negative for so many 
persons from Pakistan, also Christians, one of my friends went to Com-
mission two times but he was rejected. He was a Catholic Christian.
Interviewer: Did he tell you why? Was he able to tell his story com-
pletely or what?
He told his story completely but sometimes there are Muslim 
 translators/mediators so…
Interviewer: Do you think they are Muslims?
Yes, they are Muslims, even when we applied for asylum we asked for a 
Christian translator but we get our reply that there was no option for us 
to have a Christian mediator. (Man – Pakistan – Catholic Christian)
I’m worried. Here in Milan, they do not make you tell the story well, they 
interrupt you, there is little time. Then the interpreters are Chinese and I 
heard from confreres who sometimes do not translate what you say be-
cause they think it is not right and so they interrupt us and do not tell the 
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committee. Some things are not translated. (Woman – China – Church of 
God Almighty)
Afghan Muslims think that Pakistan’s Muslims are not well, but I do not 
know why, because some time ago, 20, 25 years ago, Afghans came to Pak-
istan for asylum, when there was war and because sometime before, 25 
years back, they came to Pakistan as refugees, but when they were there, 
they were going to go back to their land, so now we have a problem, so 
when there are mediators from Afghanistan there are problems for Mus-
lims from Pakistan…
Interviewer: And did you ever talk to a Muslim from Pakistan who had 
a mediator from Afghanistan?
Yes, I have one friend who had one mediator from Afghanistan about 
one year back, he was … he spoke a different language so it was difficult 
for him. (Man – Pakistan – Catholic Christian)
On the other hand, even if in good faith, when they lack a specific competence 
about religious matters, translators cannot be able to decode concepts and in-
stitutes embedded in a specific religious tradition and milieu. As observed by a 
key informant (an attorney in charge with the assistance of asylum seekers), a 
non-believer translator can encounter many difficulties in decoding religious 
and theological concepts and in rendering them in a different language, under-
standable by the commissioners. The same is obviously true when it comes to 
translating for the applicant the questions posed by the commissioners. An 
expression such as “Jesus’ transfiguration” (which can be used by the commis-
sion in order to test the authenticity of a conversion) can be impossible to 
translate by a non-Christian translator (but also by a Christian translator who 
is not so familiar with religious matters). Only very professional and trustwor-
thy translators admit their inadequacy in this kind of circumstance, eventually 
suggesting they should ask for the help of an expert (this possibility is permit-
ted by the legislation, even though it is scarcely used by the commissions, due 
to the high number of applications that have to be evaluated).
Religious beliefs, identities and ways of life are definitively a sensitive topic. 
As a matter of fact, “religious” variables are in many ways interconnected with 
ethno-racial, political, and economic ones, as we have amply observed. Un-
equivocally pertinent, from an empirical point of view, this circumstance can 
turn into a “rational stratagem” to avoid facing this specific issue.
Encouraged to deepen the analysis of this topic, our key informants have 
described the religious experience as shaped and structured not only by the 
political and cultural context of the sending community, but also by the sex/
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gender of each asylum seeker, his/her age and the specific phase of his/her life 
cycle, his/her age cohort (since many sending countries have been recently 
characterized by a significant evolution/involution of their religious land-
scape), not to mention his/her level of education (only well-educated appli-
cants are normally able to understand complex concepts and expressions).
Some Syrian refugees, who have a motivation to escape in which there is 
religious relevance, interpret this cause differently than the previous gen-
eration of Syrian refugees. The interpretation of one’s right to freedom, 
one’s own religious interpretation, is conceived in a different way. The 
context of Syria has changed and the type of interlocution must also 
change. (Man – Religious leader – Muslim)
In an “ideal world” this would imply, for example, the possibility to resort to a 
“specific” cultural mediator, or to adopt an individualized approach, thus per-
mitting each applicant not only to describe his/her own experience and feel-
ings, but also to elaborate them. Just to cite an example, people coming from 
specific contexts can find it impossible to discuss sensitive subjects with some-
one of the opposite sex. For all these reasons, the discussion within the focus 
groups has reached the conclusion that dealing with religiosity and spirituality 
would require specific hearing techniques, different from those employed to 
talk about less sensitive topics.
Then there is the theme of re-reading the motivations that lead to the 
problem of persecution. Religious confession is a trait of the person who 
in some places leads to discrimination, such as ethnicity, lineage, family. 
But there is difficulty in telling it (…). It is hard to go deep when the mo-
tivations are complex. The persecution for religious reasons must be ex-
plained, contextualized. Explaining that a moderate Muslim who is 
 persecuted by extreme Islamist fringes is difficult. The theme is there, I 
do not know if it can be pigeonholed: everyone has his own path. 
(Woman – Local government official)
Ultimately, this issue seems to be paradigmatic of the challenge of processing 
an extraordinary variety of human experiences through standardized proce-
dures; not to mention the short time devoted to each interview, which does not 
offer the possibility to deeply analyze individual experiences and feelings.
There are some guidelines, but in Italy we are subjected to an immense 
logistic challenge for the number of languages and interpreters we need, 
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for the time, etc. It is not that we do not know what would be better and 
more appropriate, but we need a balance with what is reasonable and we 
are able to do in fact. The interpreters, the commission, deal with issues 
which do not need only geopolitical competences, since they are 
 characterized by a detail of complexity that is not said to be managed. 
(Woman – fbos operator – Catholic Christian)
3 Cultural and Political/Ideological Biases
Besides technical biases, our study led to the emergence of other kinds of bi-
ases, which are connected to various contextual variables.
First of all, the reception system –starting from the commissioners– does 
not always possess a suitable knowledge of the complex religious scenario of 
the asylum seekers’ origin and transit countries. Testimonies reported in the 
previous chapter provide ample evidence of this complexity. As we have al-
ready discussed, the people involved are commonly aware of this critical issue, 
which is somehow irremediable, despite the significant efforts made in order 
to enrich the level of information and competence of the commissioners.
However, evidence provided by the study support the hypothesis that we 
also have to deal with the risk of a “cultural bias”. Not only because, as we have 
already described, it is tremendously difficult to decode highly sensitive expe-
riences and feelings, such as the religious ones, in a way that would turn out to 
be comprehensible even to a foreign examiner. What’s more, migrants and asy-
lum seekers sometimes bring with them –or speak about– religious beliefs and 
practices that are completely far from the Italian mentality. As observed by this 
Cameroonian intercultural mediator, established perceptions about religious 
problems –such as a supposed conflict between Muslims and Christians– tend 
to dominate common opinion, thus banishing many local varieties of “reli-
gious” traditions, precepts, and duties.
(…) is the ignorance of those traditional factors, because everyone thinks 
in terms of Muslims and Christians conflict, they do not know that in the 
tribes there are these things that happen, as I for example in my country, 
if you have been chosen as future king, you cannot run away from that 
responsibility, they look for you everywhere, so maybe if someone runs 
away, they come here, they say: “But it cannot be true”, instead it often 
happens that there is also someone who escapes from that responsibility, 
to be … it is a traditional responsibility and there are perhaps Christians 
who do not want to go into that too spiritual thing in the village, so they 
prefer to leave, but they will tell you: “It cannot be true here”. So it’s a little 
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difficult to understand the type of situation, if they do not go right on the 
field to see … (Man – Cameron – Intercultural mediator in the reception 
system)
One case in point is represented by those applicants who declare problems 
connected to their belonging to communities devoted to animistic cults. Since 
the latter can sound “exotic” (if not primitive) to a Western (Italian) mentality, 
it is easy to understand how this case, if not in the applicants’ perception, can 
be underestimated. It is not a coincidence that in the current anti-migrants’ 
discourse, the applicant who declares to have escaped because of the risk to be 
sacrificed by his/her community’s members (or to be obliged to sacrifice some-
one else) has become a sort of paradigmatic example of the bogus nature of 
many applications. As a matter of fact, besides having fed the stereotypes 
about non-Western religious customs and backgrounds, the recurrence of this 
kind of chronicle has contributed to “devaluate” the claims based on religious 
arguments.
Conversely, various key informants have indicated a second critical phe-
nomenon, by signaling that many asylum seekers would tend to skip religion, 
if not to omit it during the interview. Europe and Italy are actually perceived as 
secularized societies, to the point that omitting “this part of the discourse” is 
sometimes conceived as a strategic behavior, one that raises the possibility for 
the demand to be approved. According to a shared perception, commissioners 
would be stereotypically considered as unsympathetic towards religious argu-
ments. As denounced by this Nigerian man, in the present Italian cultural 
landscape, other issues –such as homosexuality– would encounter much more 
consideration. According to his testimony, this would even involve a sharp dis-
crimination towards asylum seekers whose claims are founded on religious 
motives. Probably in an unconscious manner, his experience reflects a com-
mon trend in democratic societies, where in the name of an “equality para-
digm” in social consciousness, religious rights are too often given little weight 
(Durham Jr., Thayer, 2019).
I explained to them the reason why I came to Italy. When I talked about 
Christian religion, that I had religion problems, they wouldn’t listen, be-
cause I think they don’t know about it, but when you talk about maybe 
lesbian, that sort of things, they give you documents fast, but this is the 
reason why even if I told them they gave me the negative one.
(…) In my opinion … They say that when you go to the commission, 
they take some time to investigate, but … my understanding is that this 
world that we are living in belongs to the devil, so time will come that 
God will come and take his people to Heaven, so if I believe in my own 
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understanding that if you have problems that concern God in Italy they 
don’t, they don’t take you seriously. I don’t believe they investigate … if 
you say that you want to become Christian and you left your country, this 
makes them upset. But if I was homosexual now, I go to the commission 
and I tell them I’m homosexual, now, they give me five-year shop shop, 
because I have many friends, and also friends when I was in the camp 
before, because they are homosexuals, they go to commission and most 
times they had documents, but when you talk about Christians, and you 
come for religion, they don’t even want to listen. (Man – Nigeria –  Catholic 
Christian)
On the other hand, commissioners are sometimes stereotypically perceived as 
“Catholics” –since Italy is known as a Catholic country worldwide– and there-
fore prejudicially deemed as characterized by a potentially discriminating at-
titude towards people belonging to other religious traditions. As it is easy to 
imagine, in the case of Muslim asylum seekers, this kind of feeling is nourished 
by a general climate of “Islamophobia”, which sometimes would encourage ap-
plicants to keep their religious sentiments. This bias has definitely counterpro-
ductive effects, since it fuels the perception of a narrative where something is 
missing, as observed by various key informants, both Muslims and not 
Muslims.
The impression is that the asylum seeker, in his complexity and personal 
tragedy, in having to find the answers to the questions of his interlocutor, 
adapts himself to the perception of the interlocutors. The interlocutors 
are mostly Westerners, officials, insensitive to the explicit confessional 
dimension, or Catholics. When some representatives of xxx (an Islamic 
fbos) happened to visit some centers, in particular circumstances, like 
Ramadan, and no, I had the impression that a psychological adaptation 
scenario took over: there was the surprise of being in front of me, a Mus-
lim, perhaps Western, and thus discover another type of language and 
content, but also the need to let off steam. (Man – Religious leader – 
Muslim)
What we have also noticed is that the immigrant too has a distorted view 
of the West, on how the Muslim religion is accepted, so sometimes the 
immigrant when he enters does not immediately declare himself a Mus-
lim, because he is afraid that maybe there are prejudices or things like 
that, and you have to break this difficulty a bit first. (Man – Pastoral 
 operator – Muslim)
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After the attacks in Paris, the fear of receiving denial as Muslims grew; 
hence the denial of their religious identity during the interviews. 
(Woman – Officer of the asylum seekers’ reception system)
On this regard, it is significant to observe that many –if not all– of the key in-
formants involved in the study share the opinion that religious-connected fac-
tors surely play a role bigger than that recorded by official reports and data. 
Trying to explain this gap, only in very few cases our informants referred to the 
possible inadequacy of legislative and procedural instruments to grasp the role 
of religion:
(…) it’s just a matter of regulation; they do not fall under this legislation. 
It is a bit to the conscience of the judge, but of stories like these you hear 
every day, every day and many are true, many are invented … In favor of 
R. we have some documentation, and for this we hope and we trust in the 
fact that the judge against the documentation brought … had also brought 
it to the committee … I trust that … R. is always very precise, every ques-
tion, dates … is always very precise, does not go into confusion, but unfor-
tunately the judge made us understand that … there is not really a law in 
Italy that … is prepared to evaluate and then give or not the status of refu-
gee for situations of this kind, and unfortunately many refugees arrive 
here in these circumstances, but (this kind of law) does not exist … I don’t 
know if I explained myself. (Woman – Italian – Social worker of the re-
ception center)
Decidedly more frequently, the focus was on some characters of the contem-
porary Italian cultural landscape, which unavoidably influence the asylum sys-
tem’s attitude, the interview’s setting included. In general terms, some infor-
mants have observed that the contemporary hegemony of economicistic 
approaches led to understanding migration strategies as they were guided by 
an economic rationale, thus producing a harsh under-evaluation of any other 
dimension involved in the decision-making process, starting from the 
 spiritual-religious one. What’s more, according to different categories of infor-
mants –from religious leaders to operators of the reception centers, and to the 
same officials of the asylum system– the celebration of secularism –that is, of 
laicism–, and the political-ideological instrumentalization of religion, are two 
key aspects of contemporary European and Italian society which newcomers 
have to face. Furthermore, these aspects even affect the interview’s setting, 
within a paradoxical spiral fueled by specular “modesty” to approach this 
theme. It is not a coincidence that such disregard would mainly involve 
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 Christian applicants: a paradoxical consequence of the hegemony attributed 
to Islam in the public and media discourse about migrants and refugees: what 
has been defined the Islamization of European immigration debates (Papa-
demetriou et al., 2016). This circumstance would inhibit, according to some key 
informants, the concern towards other religious traditions (and towards the 
variety of Islamic traditions as well), through a game of mutual “complicity” 
between commissioners and asylum seekers. To sum it up, despite its relevance, 
the religious dimension turns out to be largely “invisible” in this setting, reflect-
ing its invisibility in the public sphere. This circumstance should make us 
aware of how, if on the one hand it is possible to commit serious persecutions 
and abuses in religion (and the experience of forced migrants is there to prove 
it), expelling religion through “secularized” procedures can be just as prejudi-
cial of individual rights.
Finally, this sort of “reluctance” towards religious items –further fueled by a 
widespread perception of their instrumental use– produces a double counter-
factual outcome.
From the asylum seeker’s point of view, the fear of not being understood, 
and eventually rejected:
I’m worried because I know it is not easy for the commission to accept 
truly that I left my country for religious conflict and if you see I run out of 
the country for my life so I would be safe and not killed. (Man – Nigeria – 
Catholic Christian)
From the asylum system’s point of view –or, to be more precise, the most acute 
members of this system– the awareness that, by doing so, we run the risk not 
exactly of violating the asylum seekers’ rights, but of lending support to a po-
litical instrumentalization of the issue, which loses sight of the most impor-
tant aspect. As this official says, the instruments of protection, often consid-
ered as a threat to “our” Christian identity, or a temptation for possible usurpers, 
are the seal of our civilization and of our identity.
Very often, we see the tools that protect the migrants as a threat to our 
status quo. We lose the message that we also help many Christians … 
there is no awareness of the situation, which has become more political 
than technical. (Woman – Officer of the asylum seekers’ reception 
system)
As a matter of fact, the issue here discussed provides a paradigmatic example 
of a broader one, related to the protection of individual (religious) rights in 
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multi-cultural and multi-religious settings. In this regard, as stressed by some 
experts (Mensky, Topidi, 2016), legal empowerment is an interesting approach, 
since it can provide a solution against the essentialism of religious minorities.
Finally, if you look at the “success” of the process of adaptation, banishing 
religion is not a good strategy. The procedure of asylum request –from the 
phase of preparing the interview until the phase of following the possible rec-
ognition of a status of protection– can turn into a fundamental occasion to 
elaborate traumatic experiences, possibly through the “filter” of one’s religious 
beliefs and experiences. A point that leads us to the fourth chapter of this part, 
that is devoted to the (supporting) role that religion and spirituality can play in 
the welcoming and integration process of (forced) migrants.
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Chapter 1�
On the Role of Religion in the Process  
of Adaptation of (Forced) Migrants
Laura Zanfrini and Mario Antonelli
As illustrated in Chapter 1, our study has moved from the hypothesis that 
religiosity, in both its individual and collective expressions, can represent a 
source of support and of personal and family wellbeing; more specifically, it 
can help life’s and integration’s “career” of (forced) migrants, particularly of the 
migrants whose biographies have been strongly marked by religious belong-
ings and beliefs.
Other chapters of this book focus the attention on the role of religion and 
spirituality as far as the migrants’ psychological wellbeing is concerned and, 
particularly, their influence on the primary socialization of children belonging 
to (forced) migrant families, and their potential in the process of identity’s 
construction (Chapters 19 and 20). In this chapter, we will investigate their role 
in the first phases of (forced) migrants’ adaptation process, as well their ac-
knowledgment by the different actors of the reception system. Finally, in the 
concluding part of the chapter, we will investigate the role of religious agency 
in the process of refugees’ public space making.
1 Religion as a “Balm for the Soul”
In the previous chapter, we have already discussed the manner in which the 
commissions in charge with the evaluation of asylum demands succeed (or do 
not succeed) in intercepting the role of asylum seekers’ religious affiliations. 
From the applicant’s point of view, as suggested by this interviewee in a very 
stumbling talk, the spiritual dimension can also represent a crucial support in 
facing such a stressing setting:
Before I took my interview in the commission I went there (to the Bud-
dhist temple), because I do not understand how it works, but fear for 
them not to give a … and therefore fear. So I went there, I asked: “Please 
help me for the … for the interview, because I need a force”. Because when 
they ask all the history, how to throw up all your problems (I have) inside, 
who’s left behind, you do not want to see, like a book, when you open all 
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the problems, so I do not want to look at all this, but that is a time you 
open that all problems, problems that my father, my mother, every prob-
lem, because this is all important for them to understand. So, I need an 
energy to do that … go with this problem. So I asked for Drawma, ask Tara 
for that to become strong. (Man – Tibet – Buddhist)
He is echoed by other interviewees who affirm that, by relying on their God, it 
is possible to overcome any concern about the outcome of the asylum applica-
tion –or of the appeal, in the case of the second interviewee, when the first 
application was not successful–. Significantly, the latter interviewee insists on 
his intention to relieve the commissioners of the responsibility for not accept-
ing his demand, by repeating, almost like a mantra, that he does not blame 
them; almost as if he wanted to recode a procedural event through a religious 
lexicon.
No, I’m not worried (about the interview with the Commission), I’m waiting 
for that day to come. I speak to the Father … I feel comfortable because 
He will give me what I want. I have faith. (Man – Nigeria – Christ Church)
Interviewer: Are you worried about the appeal? Because it is next week…
I’m not worried, so I believe in God because … I’m not worried … I told 
you, God is the one that has ultimate power, so I believe in God,
I … I don’t … they gave me a negative answer. I think maybe … they 
want to go to my … I didn’t blame them for the negative that they gave 
me. I don’t blame anybody, for the negative. They know the best.
Interviewer: But maybe they couldn’t understand very well your story?
Yes. They couldn’t understand it, they want the lawyer, maybe they 
want the lawyer to come, and read the story for them, but I have already 
told them the truth, and I stand in this that I told them, this that I told you 
now is where I stand, I don’t have anything else to add to it. Tomorrow I 
stand in this story, it’s not changing, it is what I told you, it is what I told 
them. Maybe the negative is they want … the story, they want to under-
stand it well. So, I didn’t blame them. (Man – Nigeria – Christian Pente-
costal Church)
Specularly, in a very fatalistic way, this interviewee considers the denial of his 
application as coherent with God’s will. As we will illustrate later, fatalism is a 
common character of the migration phenomenon, particularly when the 
choice to migrate appears to be “irrational” and decidedly unsecure. In this 
specific case, in order to  understand the respondent’s paradoxical stance, it is 
useful to remember how migration is not an easy or cheap choice, but a strong 
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investment involving many family members and which often implies getting 
into debt. The fact of attributing the last word to an ultra-terrestrial identity 
can be a psychological stratagem to make such a big failure more tolerable. 
Curiously, he does not refer to his personal situation or to the elements of his 
story on which his asylum demand was based. On the contrary, he simply con-
cludes by affirming that it was not the time that God wanted him to get the 
permit: when God wants it, he will obtain the documents.
I think, I think it’s not the time that God wants me to get … that they get 
me the permit. I think … because Bible makes me understand that man 
proposes, God disposes. Everything in life gives glory to God, because I 
can propose, but God disposes, so I believe that God has not disposed my 
proposition, this is why they didn’t give me the documents. But if the 
time comes that God wants me to have the documents, I will have it. 
(Man – Nigeria – Catholic Christian)
Lastly, this Pakistani interviewee observes that the same God “who granted 
him permission to stay” will continue to assist him, helping him to solve the 
multiple problems with which he has to live. In this case, too, it is curious to 
note the affirmation according to which it is God who gave him the permit … a 
five-year permit!
I don’t care, I have a lot of proofs for my problems, I show, and he knows 
I have in original, believe me, plus I am sick, but I’m a gentle person, I 
don’t lie too much, I say truth everything, and I thank God he believes me, 
he gives me permission, he gave me five years, this for me is … I’m lucky 
he believes me. (Man – Pakistan – Muslim)
In the face of the exponential growth of suffering, and of unjust suffering, 
which leads to the abandonment of one’s own land, two questions emerge, 
which are anything but academic: why the suffering of migrating and its dra-
matic unfolding? What does God want and what does He do for that confes-
sion for which I find myself in a situation of extreme tribulation? From the 
data offered by the interviews, a sort of atheistic protest does not emerge as a 
result of this double query. The problematization of God and of his actions 
and, therefore, an abandonment of the related religious practices, does not 
seem to be a foregone answer. Rather, a feeling and an interpretation of this 
unjust suffering emerge, according to the imprint of a religious resignation 
with a fatalistic character.
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On the one hand, one is even willing to ascribe to God the sufferance expe-
rienced, not because of His arbitrary wickedness, but because of his providen-
tial plan which, in view of a correct progression of personal and collective his-
tory, devises painful events for me and for others, in order to fix human 
wickedness and thus correcting the disorder produced by men.
On the other hand, religious feelings and religious practices seem to be 
based on a widespread understanding, transversal to the various confes-
sions, of the omnipotence of God. The latter is immediately identified in an 
“absolute power” that ends up lightening human freedom and its “powers”. 
The “direct” action of God in the events of history is so accredited that, 
correspondingly, the action of the man is discredited: for better or for 
worse. Personal and collective history appears to be subjugated by the “al-
mighty” God who dominates the world and manages its events in a fatalis-
tic way. The deity acts as an ominously capricious omnipotence, available 
for a man-made relationship of manipulation. The “divine” appears to be 
tremendous in its inscrutable omnipotence and fascinating in its seductive 
immediacy. One’s own freedom and the freedom of others are in some way 
absolved from their very responsibilities and from their right/duty to make 
history. What happens to me and to everyone is immediately related to the 
only cause, God; what happens is supinely accepted, as it is what He wants, 
without any margins for the affirmation of one’s own commitment or of 
others’. In this perspective, the fatalistic contraction of the religious bond 
makes it possible to think of the divine as being tamed at the price of 
some propitiatory sacrifices and some prayers. Without saying that the reli-
gious man, under the aegis of this religious figure, feels authorized to con-
sistently represent God through the form of despotism and prevarication 
over others.
A different approach is the one followed by this interviewee. Faced with the 
failure of the project to obtain a status of protection, he declares that the 
Church is the only place where one can feel free. In his testimony, the status of 
“slave” –due to the lack of documents– is opposed to that of a free man who 
can experience the dignity of every human being.
(…) when I arrived to Milan, in the camp of the Red Cross, I met with 
some Nigerians who are Christians, so the very first day I started going to 
church.
Interviewer: And what was your feeling?
I was feeling happy. I was really happy, because church is the only 
place I go that I feel happy.
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Interviewer: Also in Nigeria before?
Yes.
Interviewer: Is it different to go to church here in Italy and in Nigeria?
No it is not different.
Interviewer: It is the same?
It is the same. The only difference here is that we are slaves.
Interviewer: Why?
We are slaves.
Interviewer: What does it mean?
To be slaves?
Interviewer: Yes. We know what it means, but why do you feel a slave 
here?
To my understanding, when you are in Europe and you do not have 
documents, you are not privileged in most things in life. So automatically 
you are slave, when you are not privileged in most things in life. Here we 
are slaves.
Interviewer: And do you feel this also in church?
No, this is what I’m saying. That the church is the only place where I 
feel happy because in church I feel I am free with God. I’m free even 
though I’m a slave, but I’m not a slave beside of God. (Men – Nigeria – 
Catholic Christian)
Trying to put in a theological perspective these paradoxical moods, we can ob-
serve, following the analysis of this Catholic priest, that it is the very experi-
ence of migrating that raises the awareness of human vulnerability. Beyond 
the most dramatic situations –such as those involving forced migrants– the 
experience of migrating becomes a sort of paradigm of the “migration” which 
every human being is expected to follow to get to the “promised land”. The fact 
of turning to God during the most dramatic phases of one’s own life is not only 
coherent with the human condition tout court, but also with the most authen-
tic faith experience.
I believe that when a man is put in a condition of particular fragility, he 
magically rediscovers those values that perhaps are a bit dormant and 
therefore in some way are the great pillars of our lives. A little like health: 
as long as one is healthy, he does not notice the gift he has. When he is ill, 
he realizes that without health it is a mess and therefore he must try to 
return to health. And so is the theme of faith: many times the seafarers, 
people who do not attend the church at home, do not practice, but when 
he climbs a priest on board that for four months they do not go to a 
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church, they hear someone helping them pray etc. the priest celebrates 
Mass and they all go because it is an important moment, because it is a 
way to be with the Lord, to be together with others, each one in the name 
of his own faith. So I think the fragility of distance from home, the uncer-
tainty of the future and so on. In some way, it makes us particularly sensi-
tive to what is precisely the spiritual and religious dimension. When we 
are, I have experienced in my sailing twice the sea to force 9… And you 
really think those are your last moments of life, pray. One says: “It’s too 
easy!” No, it is right, the Lord when you need it, as a child thinks of his 
father and his mother when he needs them, even if only of a caress and 
therefore, those who are far away are particularly attached to their faith, 
their own traditions. (Man – Religious leader – Catholic Christian)
In psychological terms, this kind of narrative proves the supporting function 
played by religion and spirituality along the entire migration route. However, 
once put in a religious perspective, the search for a peaceful place where to live 
can easily be superimposed by the search for inner peace. And the stormy sea 
to cross is not only the one separating Africa from Europe, but also the one that 
is stirred up in the depths of strongly worn-out people.
Certainly, also a road to reach an inner peace, because we say that precise-
ly they are thirsty for peace. Not only to find a place of peace, but also to 
find pacification, there is a more peaceful sense of interior, because they 
come, however, beyond the journey, even from situations of instability. 
And so … they are tormented a little bit inwardly. So I think also in the re-
lationship with God, but I think for myself, even just to find some peace in 
my heart, even moments of silence. For them, a friend of mine, a Nigerian, 
she tells me that when she asked her what she likes to do in her spare time, 
she told me: “I love to have spaces of silence to read the Gospel”, and she 
explained why she says: “I feel a lot like a sea moved inside and in those 
moments of silence in which I read, I try to listen to what the Lord wants 
to tell me, I calm down”. (Woman – fbos operator – Christian Catholic)
Given these premises, it is not surprising if every step of the migration journey 
can be “oxygenated” by the spiritual dimension, becoming an empowering fac-
tor. This point is even more interesting if we consider that, in many sending 
countries, religious affiliations (in the case of minority groups’ members) and 
religious obligations (in the case of majority groups’ members) often act as 
“disempowering” factors, as we have illustrated in the previous chapter.
Let us consider some emblematic examples.
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In this moving account of a former seminarian, spiritual assistance is pre-
sented as what gives refreshment –where “it was very hot”– and gives hope 
when, in the darkest moments, one runs the risk of losing his/her strength. The 
story reported here suggests that, through the pastoral action, religion can help 
to insert a project’s component and a hope for the future –like preparing chil-
dren for first communion– into the web of those existences suspended in a 
sort of limbo, such as the existences of people interned in refugee camps.
Then they helped us get help or to a unhcr hospital in a small town 
called Shire. Here my friend healed and we went to a refugee camp where 
we stayed for a year: to xxx, in the North of Ethiopia. There we began to 
serve the Catholics, because there were no pastors and we were seminar-
ians close to the end of the studies, so we knew the liturgical service. In 
this way we have been able to help people without hope, because un-
hcr’s help was not much. We built a small church in the field and we 
stayed for about a year. People needed hope so much: it was very hot, they 
lost their strength. It needed some form of encouragement. Doing service 
means making people communicate with God, then to empower them. 
In a short time, the church we had built was filled with believers, includ-
ing some Orthodox. Some Orthodox deacons have taken an example 
from us and have begun to imitate our initiative. We got in touch with the 
Diocese in the Ethiopian capital from which they agreed to send us a 
priest twice a month for a Mass. We also had catechism classes, to pre-
pare the children for the first communion. Then I went to the capital and 
I spoke with the Bishop, who came to visit the camp. (Man – Eritrea – 
Catholic Christian)
Evidence from the fieldwork provides many other interesting examples. As 
suggested by these testimonies, religion is a sort of “balm for the soul”, that is 
the certainty that Someone is taking care of you. It happens during the most 
perilous journeys, when one’s survival cannot be taken for granted, as in the 
emblematic case of migrants who have tried to reach Italy by boat:
(…) I believe that in the journey, I know of many stories in the boats, that 
while the boat was waiting for a safe harbor, whether they were Chris-
tians, Orthodox, or Catholics, whatever, they had Mary’s medals in their 
mouths and they prayed. I believe that in those dramatic moments, where 
you think you can lose your life, it is clear that this is a time when faith 
plays an important role. (Man – Religious leader – Catholic Christian)
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Interviewer: In what way do you think your faith has helped you?
Because I had this strong decision to overcome, cross the sea, and stay 
alive, because … I said that I have this mission to stay alive, I should not 
die now, and this strong decision in my opinion has brought me here with 
all this. (Man – Cameroon – Buddhist)
But this also happens during the long periods spent in Libya, waiting to be able 
to leave for Europe. Let us observe how, in the first testimony reported here, the 
evangelical promise “where two or more are gathered in my name, I will be 
there” finds an echo in a story that seems to evoke the dramatic hours that an-
nounced the passion of Christ. In the second testimony, instead, the emphasis 
is on the invincibility of those who entrust themselves to God.
I pray, even the time I was in Libya, on Sunday we prayed, all of us, in the 
night we prayed, but we did not go outside the church, where do you go 
to church? They would come and kill you! (…).
We organized together at home, we pray to God. God is there, God is 
there, God is there, when he is one, he is there, in the middle of you, he is 
not afraid. If you are alone, you are not alone, God is with you, because 
you remember when you want to pray, you are alone, you are praying, you 
are worshiping God, praising God, when you start praying you see the 
Spirit of God, you can speak in trance, when the spirit of God comes, you 
also speak in trance, you will speak the language that you cannot under-
stand, when you … Your body will be shaking, you will know the power of 
God is like, I know … when you are one, or two, or three, in your house, 
you pray to God, you are not alone, God is there, even if you are in the 
cave, pray to God, is there, because God is a spirit. (Man – Nigeria – 
 Christian Pentecostal Church)
They are serving, they cannot kill me, I know the God that I’m serving, it’s 
only God that moves my life, it is not them. The power is in me, the power 
of God is in me, it is better than the one that is in them. (Man – Nigeria – 
Christian now attending a Pentecostal Church)
As we have noted above, the emphasis on the omnipotent divine protection 
mostly generates resignation and fatalism; without saying that a certain sense 
of invincibility (the relationship with God as a guarantee against evil and death) 
should be easily dismantled by history, which tells of countless martyrs of every 
religious confession (and of countless deaths during the migration journey).
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On the other hand, the first testimony highlights a constant of the religious 
dynamic, on which we have already called the attention: the intimate link be-
tween precariousness and faith. It is certainly improper to identify migrants 
with the poor tout court. However, the link between the precariousness experi-
enced in the dramatic events –occurred during both the migration and the 
process of adaptation– and faith –in its most elementary gestures– surely 
emerges here. Every need relating to the fundamental experiences of living 
and of living together –especially when it is dramatically disregarded– is a 
gateway capable of nesting the movement of faith. It is true for the hungry, 
where the expected food is denied; it is true for the homeless, when there is 
nothing but the street or, at best, a precarious hospitality; it is true for those 
who do not have a job or a salary, both expected and absent or not worthy of 
the man; it is true for those who are alone, when family and social relation-
ships are somehow made inaccessible.
Immediately after landing in the receiving country, as confirmed by the fol-
lowing testimony, God appears to be the only one who can understand those 
who speak in a different language, the “Italians’ idioma”, and the only one who 
offers his companionship. A sort of confirmation of the above-mentioned 
profound vein of religious experience in relation to the drama of solitude, 
so severely documented by the linguistic strangeness that precludes the 
relationship:
Where I live there are all refugees, you do not know anything, you do not 
even speak the Italian language and they do not speak the language of 
my country (…). So I found this place to go there some time, when there 
is a problem, feel bad, it is not a body, but you feel your heart hurting, 
missing family, country, friends … even you do not find a person here 
you say that, all problems … important just for God. So, I like going there. 
(Man – Tibet – Buddhist)
I came to an unknown country, but the Lord did not leave me, I had the 
company of the Lord. (Woman – China – Church of God Almighty)
God is “here” when the everyday life leaves a large gap to bridge, as far as the 
dreams that accompanied the decision to migrate are concerned…
(…) I get up at 4:30 in the morning and talk to God, like talking to a father. 
God is not in heaven. God is here and listens (…). My son tells me “Daddy 
I’m hungry”. I ask: “Do you believe in God?” If you talk to God, father, fa-
ther, I need this, I came to Italy because I need you, I do not want to stay 
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here but this country supports me … (Man – Venezuela – Protestant 
Evangelical Religious leader)
… and when something goes wrong, when difficulties or family problems arise, 
thus making the sense of nostalgia even more acute:
(…) certainly, just arrived, because however there is all the talk to elabo-
rate the detachment, just as M. said before, to be in a very different con-
text, the nostalgia of home then surely in that phase and then in a mo-
ment of personal weakness I believe. In a phase in fact maybe a distant 
relative dies, you cannot go to the funeral. Often it is clearly experienced 
as a tragic moment because many cannot come back for matters of docu-
ments, of money … so surely when life gets harder or you lose your job, I 
think of all those situations in which you feel weaker and you need to be 
more supported by the religious community and by God. (Woman – fbos 
operator – Christian Catholic)
This last testimony invites us to consider the value of a religious community of 
reference and belonging. Once the migrant has landed in the receiving coun-
try, the religious community with its place of worship represents the “prom-
ised land” for a lifeless identity: an environment that is favorable to the recog-
nition of oneself, to exorcise the hell of anonymity, to experience freedom. 
Through the network of positive relationships and ritual celebrations, a new-
comer can hear his/her name in the religious place; it is heard what is whis-
pered by God, pronounced by his “sacred minister”, it is read on the lips of 
those who participate in the same cult. All this, in spite of the fact of being 
undocumented, which seems to decree slavery, of the dissolution of personal 
identity, of the impossibility of fulfilling one’s own responsibilities. While one 
feels enslaved by being in the hands of others, who do not know your name or 
cannot pronounce it, in the sacred space one can express his/her own docu-
mented identity and one’s freedom can be redeemed while being in God’s 
hands.
In front of the dramatic persistence of many needs, the sense of religious 
community is associated with the sense of God. Numerous testimonies agree 
on expressing this connection: the intimate union with God –in listening to his 
speech, in the prayers said to ask for something or give thanks– is intertwined 
with some community figures who favor that union to the social level that is 
also involved in what the faithful seeks – whether it is a home in which to live, 
a city to move to, to work and go shopping in, or a school where children can 
study. A fortiori, this link proving the social depth of the religious phenomenon 
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is noteworthy in the testimony of migrants who mostly come from cultural 
contexts in which religion has not known the privatistic depreciation con-
sumed in the West. Contrary to the individualistic involution of the religious 
phenomenon in Western countries (Chapter 3), in the faith experience of mi-
grants, their “staying in God”, in fact, is generally bound by their “being in the 
community”.
It is (the need to go to the church) because I have to go and thank God for 
his protection. (Man – Nigeria – Catholic Christian)
I feel, this is my prayer, this is, I feel better, when I pray then I feel better, 
pray, reading the Koran, this is my belief, this is my belief, so like you, you 
go to church, you read the Bible, then you feel a little better. (Man – 
Pakistan – Muslim)
Finally, as efficaciously synthesized by this young Eritrean, on the one hand, 
religion supports every step of the migratory journey, and permits to “cross the 
border”; on the other, the migratory journey, with its burden of human suffer-
ance, increases migrants’ personal faith and makes them much more inclined 
to religious practices. In his moving testimony, a clear religious sentiment 
emerges:
Religion is an important help for us to make this path. Religion is an im-
portant help for us to take this dangerous road. Every person experiences 
difficult stories when they cross the border. Someone remains killed. 
Some see people dying in front of them. It is because you believe in God 
that you decide to face such dangerous situations to come to Europe. Be-
lieving in God helps to make this decision. Relatives abroad send money 
that helps to escape, but it is not thanks to the money that you get here. 
It comes thanks to God. For example, my cousin was not very interested 
in religion when he was in Eritrea, but crossing the border he saw things 
so hard that when he saved he wanted to thank God and began to pray. 
He crossed Sudan, the Sahara, the Mediterranean, and now he is in Ger-
many. Now he thanks God, he has become a very believing Christian. 
Many people learn a lot along the way: trust in God and have good rela-
tions with Him. When they come here they keep their faith, but in Europe 
they do not have pastors. (Man – Eritrea – Catholic Christian)
In this light, it is also possible to understand the special rank of the sacred 
minister of the migrant community. In a community recognized as a safe place 
for storing the few personal belongings in which one’s identity and one’s 
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 memory can still be found, the figure of the religious leader functions as a safe 
place for one’s conscience, when it feels the need to be blessed and reassured. 
That safe place is at its most vital when the migrant comes from a land and a 
tradition where a strong sense of the divine entails a deep respect for the reli-
gious authority. Staying as close as possible to the minister is a source of joy 
and satisfaction, as he works in order to let the life of the faithful be blessed by 
God – which feels even better when the sound of such blessing is in his/her 
mother tongue. Because of his sacred nature, the minister of the community 
acts as a mediator between “me” and God’s words and actions. He is seen as the 
most precious safe place for one’s troubled conscience, when it is afflicted by 
everything that it still does not have; he represents God’s holiness, God’s hospi-
tality and generous blessing.
However, according to a shared experience, as acutely observed in the inter-
view reported below, the prospect that religiosity becomes increasingly tenu-
ous, if only at the level of daily practices, is an epilogue far from impossible. 
Thus, the link between need and faith is reaffirmed once again, and it is fueled 
by the troubled events of migration. The dramatic situation of privation con-
cerns the most ordinary forms in which life unfolds and is expressed in that 
repetition of the word “without”: without family, without work, without lan-
guage, without money. Nevertheless, when “without” becomes “with”, the 
experience of faith predictably suffers an attenuation, at least as far as daily 
gestures are concerned.
From the interviews that dwell on the “need/faith” connection, the informa-
tion that we have just highlighted transpires. And also, at least in perspective, 
a paradox that makes us reflect in a number of ways. As mentioned in the tes-
timony reported in Chapter 10 (“many pastors and religious leaders who are 
more interested in preaching prosperity than salvation”), the preaching that 
“strategically” equates salvation in terms of “prosperity” is increasingly wide-
spread in the countries of origin of migrants. However, this kind of preaching, 
as well as the kind of “theology” that innervates it, now echoes in Italy too. 
Certainly, it is not only economic prosperity to be in play; more deeply, what is 
at stake is the general well-being, at the level of psychological harmony, of a 
peaceful recomposition of the relational network, especially as far as family 
and marital life is concerned, and of financial success. A sort of paradox can be 
glimpsed when a religious proposal founded on the “myth” of prosperity prom-
ises the achievement, through religious performances, of a well-being that, ac-
cording to the most notable sacred experiences and texts, should restrict even 
more “the eye of the needle!”
In this respect, this testimony introduces an argument that will be devel-
oped in the final part of the chapter, where we will analyze the manner in 
which the migrants challenge “our” faith.
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(…) then I had moments, ups and downs, and sure that when I arrived it 
was a very difficult time for me, I found myself alone in a rented house in 
Milan, without family, without work, without language, without money, 
without anything and I had moments that I was very down but I have to 
say, those moments that made me read the Gospel every day, much much 
better than now … other sides … now I’m taken by a thousand other 
things … enter the daily life of the West that is not really healthy, it gives 
you and takes you … (Woman – Iraq – Chaldean Catholic Christian)
2 Religious Assistance in the Reception Phase
Another important aspect analyzed during the fieldwork is the “space” that 
can/must be given to the religious rights and the spiritual needs of asylum 
seekers and refugees hosted within the reception institutional system. In gen-
eral terms, all the key informants have agreed on the opportunity to include 
both of them in daily operations, thus confirming the peculiarity of the “Italian 
version” of the European secularized society (Chapter 9). As a matter of fact, 
Italian application of secularism is very distant from the French “laïcité”, and 
implies the need to recognize and protect individual religious belongings. Co-
herently, none of our key informants has raised doubts about the fact that the 
religious and spiritual dimensions should also be recognized in the institution-
al system. Furthermore, almost all of them have confirmed how important it is 
to involve spiritual leaders and religious organizations in the reception pro-
cess, according to a holistic approach, currently judged to be the best one in 
order to favor both the overcoming of the displacement trauma and the posi-
tive integration in the new society. As suggested by this operator, spirituality 
can also have a “therapeutic” impact, when it comes to dealing with trauma-
tized people:
(…) when we talk about a complex case, we take into consideration reli-
gious belief or belonging. We would like the involvement of the ministers 
of worship. For a person who is very ill and has that identity structure, it 
may be easier to engage with the minister of worship than the therapist. 
(Man – Operator of the reception system)
At the same time, the solutions adopted are always different, reflecting the het-
erogeneity of approaches that distinguish the Italian reception system, largely 
entrusted with the initiative of the actors of the civil society. What is still 
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 lacking is the formal acknowledgement of the role of the religious leaders 
within the reception path, besides the indications provided by the legislation 
in force (Chapter 9, §4). As a consequence, we can record an ample variety of 
“creative”  solutions, together with the tendency to “confuse” spiritual assis-
tance with psychological support or other kinds of empowering interventions, 
as we will analyze later.
On the other hand, there are many problematic issues and knots that need 
to be undone. Just to cite some examples, some key issues amply discussed 
during the focus group discussions are represented by:
– The opportunity to create rooms specifically for prayer inside the reception 
centers (rather than directing guests to worship in other places present in 
the local community);
– The preference for confessional worships, rather than for interreligious 
ones;
– The criteria for the selection of the spiritual leaders authorized to exercise 
their functions within the reception centers, and how to manage possible 
risks of circumvention and radicalization;
– The opportunity to promote ecumenical and interreligious meetings and 
initiatives, also as a way to raise the awareness towards religious pluralism;
– The methods for managing religious conflicts and interpersonal skirmishes 
due to the conflicting context of the origin countries, while avoiding their 
reification in the destination ones.
Overall, the issue regarding the “space” of religion within the reception system 
provides a brilliant example of a more general issue, concerning the need “to 
determine the boundaries of religion, religious jurisdiction(s), individual au-
tonomy and equality” (Menski, Topidi, 2016: 8), which becomes even more 
challenging when vulnerable people are involved. On the basis of the study’s 
evidence, the impression is that these issues are surely emerging, but still need 
to be addressed properly, as they were dealt with in different ways, depending 
on the sensitivity of the center’s operators and managers, as well as on the 
characteristics of the hosted population. Curiously, the reception centers en-
trusted with the management of religious (Christian)-inspired organizations 
are not necessarily those that pay the greatest attention to the provision of re-
ligious services. In particular, the choice of some Catholic organizations not to 
“exhibit” any religious symbol in the rooms used for the reception of asylum 
seekers, in the name of a universalistic principle and out of respect for non-
Christian guests, has been highly debated. On the other hand, some “lay” man-
agers (including the services managed directly by local public bodies) have 
included religious services among the facilities offered to their guests.
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On their part, as we have already observed (Chapter 10), various religious 
organizations have developed a particular sensitiveness towards migrants and 
refugees. Here, again, we can note an extraordinary convergence of the posi-
tions of the religious leaders of different traditions. Their shared approach is 
inspired by the following points:
a) the spiritual one is an innate dimension in human nature, shared by peo-
ple of every religion and also by those who declare to be agnostic;
b) a welcoming system will not be as such if it does not recognize this di-
mension and is not prepared to respond to spiritual needs as well as to 
other primary needs;
c) recognizing and taking care of this dimension is fundamental not only 
because it responds to the need, expressed or latent, of every person, but 
also because the satisfaction of this need makes the process of integra-
tion less difficult and favors peaceful coexistence (on this point see also 
Chapter 15).
Then rightly we are all pressed by the emergency, by the immediacy of 
primary needs, but then always missing a piece, people who arrive in dif-
ficult situations are first of all also integral people, here, complete people, 
who also have a religious dimension, sacral, spiritual, which is the one 
that can actually help. (Man – Pastoral operator – Muslim)
(…) spiritual dimension … all men and women of the world have it re-
gardless of the faith they profess, regardless of religion. The spiritual 
dimension is that which someone calls only psychological, but in the in-
herent nature of each one. And this I believe is part of this duty that we 
have to welcome these people as people … that is, welcoming a person 
does not mean welcoming a body, it means welcoming a story, a sensitiv-
ity, and certainly, in some way, this … when we talk about projects, expec-
tations, hopes, after all we are talking about the spiritual world. So the 
attention to this means I do not do the practices, I’ll give you a job, I’ll give 
you … it’s … it is walking near these people, entering for a moment with 
their life in their lives here.
(…) What does this mean? Whatever necessity one has, it can be a sock 
rather than a pair of shoes, but it can instead be an outburst or a request, 
a … even simply a friendly shoulder on which to cry or with which to 
laugh. Therefore, our operators are called to, I say to “mark a man”, these 
people. These people must really feel … because then everything starts 
from there, no? Any speech starts from there. (Man – Religious leader – 
Catholic Christian)
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(…) because the care of the spiritual dimension in my opinion leads me 
out of the person, can bring out from the person the best, the highest, the 
deepest, the most authentic there can be and therefore can be for this 
reason a great integration factor: because it improves, it makes us better 
say that the possibility of living, of expressing our faith, makes us better. 
So I think it’s a great factor of integration. (Woman – fbos operator – 
Catholic Christian)
At the same time, our key informants have insisted on the sensitivity of the 
topic under discussion. It has emerged, in particular, that the respect for the 
religious rights of both majority and minority groups is not sufficient to solve 
the challenges of interreligious coexistence. In fact, the tortuous existential and 
migratory paths have left open wounds that often find in the “religious” issue 
the reason to flare up. The circumstance of having left behind authoritarian 
 regimes, or even autocratic ones, has indelibly marked the relationship with 
religiosity and, in particular, with the faithful of other religions. The concept of 
religious pluralism, which we are inclined to consider as obvious – beyond the 
resistance that is observed in translating it into the daily practice of the same 
European  societies– is anything but obvious for those coming from confession-
al States. According to some of the experts involved, the first reception, if not 
because it often implies the need to cohabit with asylum seekers of other reli-
gions, is therefore the right phase during which to set the education to religious 
pluralism. Regardless of the reasons that led them to emigrate, and of the role 
that religion played in that decision, it is precisely the context of the incoming 
countries that shows the relevance of this type of action, also as an antidote to 
the problems that could arise in the future. As a matter of fact, European re-
ceiving societies are today more and more called to manage the expectations 
of minority groups –avoiding that their requests instrumentally turn into an 
anti-immigration argument– while also laying the foundations of a cohesive 
society.
As a matter of fact, it is now widely known that the early stages of reception 
are made up of crucial moments in which to recover an emotional balance and 
a working capacity, as well as to lay the foundations of the path of integration. 
Just as in the context of a holistic approach to integration, there are many di-
mensions of recovery and of personal well-being that need to be considered. 
At the same time, some key informants have underlined how the foundations 
for integration in a secular society based on respect for religious pluralism 
must also be laid from the beginning of the reception path. It is significant to 
observe that this very concept was expressed by a Catholic priest, a Muslim 
Imam, and an expert on migration law. It might seem paradoxical, but  precisely 
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those who suffered “because of” religion are not said to be tolerant towards 
other religions.
(…) they are very solid people precisely in their spirituality on the one 
hand and people who are struggling, however, to say how to live that mu-
tual respect precisely because they have not been respected. As a person 
who has been raped in his own corporeity and then becomes particularly 
suspicious and then I would say that the two … when easily either a per-
secuted Christian or the persecuted Muslim must speak of those who 
persecuted them for pseudo reasons of faith do not have the condescen-
sion and tolerance that we have that in some way we have never been 
offended by the different parties. (Man – Religious leader – Catholic 
Christian)
People who require asylum and the majority of migrants, however, are 
not coming to Europe for that reason. But anyway they will need a re-
framing of what religion is, what religious pluralism is, how to integrate 
into a secularized society … because they do not know it, whatever reli-
gion they may have. We need more an educational scenario than an exis-
tential scenario. The motivation to escape is not predominantly that, but 
this does not mean that civil society and institutions must do not take 
care of religious acceptance. (Man – Religious leader – Muslim)
The essential thing is to educate to diversity, to respect, because for many 
who come from confessional contexts, or with a state religion, it may 
seem shocking, precisely, but we must bring the reasoning on the oppor-
tunity. It becomes a vision of life, the possibility, finally, of conceiving a 
free public space, free from constraints and free from the impossibility of 
parrying. (Man – Expert)
Finally, as acutely suggested by this interviewee, the simple existence of a free 
and pluralistic society is not a sufficient condition to achieve a peaceful coex-
istence. Freedom is a right, but it is also a “duty” and a responsibility, the aware-
ness of which is not automatically acquired once landed in a free and demo-
cratic society:
(…) here they have freedom but do not understand what it is … because 
freedom is not … sorry I give an example: “Freedom is not I do that fuck I 
want”. It is not true, this is not freedom … that is, I interpreted it in the 
first few months, when I went out at 9 pm in Corso Sempione to walk 
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alone, without being afraid … now there is the fear, however, to say, I have 
never been able to do this in my country, this is freedom, freedom that 
you put on what you want, but not that you have to go naked because you 
say “I am free” … respecting the dignity, the place … to say what you want, 
to express yourself as you want … this is freedom, it is not as it is under-
stood by many … (Woman – Iraq – Chaldean Catholic Christian)
On the other hand, as we will analyze in the following paragraph, it is equally 
significant to observe how education to religious pluralism is a need that also 
concerns the host society:
(…) we are Catholics, but we are Catholics of Eastern rite, so we have a 
different tradition and also a different calendar, our liturgical calendar, so 
we are a minority … even among the minorities of other ethnic groups, 
other Catholic migrants, but that they are of Latin rite, therefore easily 
inserted, integrable into the Church, also in its liturgical calendar and all. 
Instead we have a completely different tradition, so we are seen, often 
then people confuse, for the simple fact that we have another rite, we are 
confused with the Orthodox, instead we are not Orthodox, we are Catho-
lics, and even there is … in the calendar the fact that we celebrate Christ-
mas on a different date, Easter on another different date, sometimes cre-
ates conflicts with some parish priests, because they do not understand 
why we do not celebrate Christmas or Easter with them. It is necessary to 
explain … some refuse to accept it, but … there are a number of difficul-
ties, even as minorities in the minorities, which we must face. (Man – 
 Religious Leader – Catholic Christian of Eritrean rite)
3 How (Forced) Migrants Challenge Host Society’s Churches
As we will analyze in Chapter 16, through the account of a paradigmatic initia-
tive launched by the Archdioceses of Milan, the issue of religious pluralism 
particularly challenges the Italian Catholic Church, since it has until recently 
benefited from a situation of undisputed hegemony within the Italian reli-
gion landscape. Despite the historical presence of various religious minorities 
(Chapter 9), Italian public institutions and private organizations had often op-
erated in an environment reflecting a sort of “invisibility” of religion, basing on 
the presumption that Italy was a mono-religious country, and this  situation also 
influenced the attitude of many religious leaders and single believers. How-
ever, in the last decades, as a consequence of immigration, religious  minorities 
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have grown significantly: the issue of interreligious co-existence, tradition-
ally underexplored, has emerged, putting the country into a better position 
for gaining awareness of the unfolding processes by which it is increasingly 
becoming a multi-faith society. Besides the challenges represented by the 
presence of minority religions (particularly Islam, which today covers around 
5% of the population residing in Italy), and by the huge presence of Chris-
tian Orthodox (around 2%, mainly migrants coming from East Europe),1 this 
has implied the need to confront with different ritual and liturgical traditions, 
brought by the arrival of Catholic migrants who, as highlighted by the above-
reported testimony of an Eritrean priest, are often completely unknown by 
Italian Catholics, or even confused with other confessions. In general terms, 
faithful of non-(Roman) Catholic tradition are today solicited to become more 
familiar with the concept of religious pluralism, and better equipped to con-
front with other confessions and religious habits. Before discussing this topic, 
we have to consider the manner in which host society’s Churches have been 
reacting to the arrival of migrants and asylum seekers. More precisely, it is ex-
actly by analyzing their approach towards newcomers that we can grasp the 
challenging nature of the relationship between migrants and established Ital-
ian Churches.
As we have already pointed out (Chapter 10, §1; see also Chapter 14), (Italian) 
Catholic Churches and faith-based organizations of different inspiration share 
a common effort in welcoming migrants and refugees. In particular, many reli-
gious groups have implemented, independently from the official reception sys-
tem, various initiatives specifically addressed to (forced) migrants and refu-
gees. This aspect was not among the main topics we planned to investigate 
within this part of the study, but it has repeatedly emerged during the field-
work. Indeed, every time they have been solicited to describe the religious and 
spiritual needs of refugees and asylum seekers, the religious leaders involved in 
the study have ended up in depicting their own engagement in this field.
(…) that is, to meet migrants according to their needs. So, Italian language 
and culture, promotion and defense of health. How important it is to ac-
company migrants and accompany them on a journey of health, because 
migrants come here to work, as Italians abroad often bring home money, 
send money home … instead they must be accompanied in health, they 
are neglected in health. So we have the defense project, the prevention of 
cancer for women, and I think of the Ukrainian communities, because 
first-generation Ukrainian women are older in age, they are almost my age 
or slightly younger. And so the risk of breast cancer is considerable, then 
1 ismu estimates on istat and Pew Research Center data.
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coming from the Chernobyl area, nearby, etc. but here is the  prevention of 
health that projects together with the local health authorities, both with 
the diocesan Caritas, the health center of the diocesan Caritas, projects 
designed together to defend the migrant, for the health of the migrant 
and therefore the communities, to create in the communities, beyond the 
study of the Italian language, the places of prevention for health, where 
nobody is afraid to ask questions, to be oriented to specialized centers, to 
be invited to take exams … there is a fear of approaching hospitals from 
many migrants that is dangerous to their health, so this, the defense of 
health, language, because language is the first thing, integration is the lan-
guage … go to the market and know how to say pepper or eggplant is a 
different thing. (Man – Religious leader – Catholic Christian)
What’s more, in their description, spiritual and religious assistance is often 
mixed up with different forms of social assistance, empathetic sustain, or 
“tutoring”/“coaching”. As a matter of fact, both the experience of interviewed 
migrants and of the managers of hosting centers and religious communities 
prove how the assistance addressed to meet religious sentiments intermingles 
with the basic everyday needs and expectations. Even the above-reported in-
terview confirms that it is not possible to offer care related to the sacred link 
with the Deity if not through the answer to these needs and expectations. Ac-
cording to what has emerged, it is only through the latter that the religious 
sentiment is generated, with all its rituality and living experience. Significantly, 
the interview contains a specific reference to health and language, body and 
relationship, rest and feast, motherhood/fatherhood and work; whatever the 
identity of a person, where does this identity ignite its freedom if not here? 
Where else can it bow to the transcendent for a “thank you” or for “help”? If not 
here, in these elementary living experiences? Are there other places where the 
intuition of a God and the taste for his performing could strike? It is asserted, 
in these interviews, that the attention for the sacred bond of those who are 
welcomed and accompanied in integration paths can be seen in the rigorous 
assumption of those fundamental forms of existence that the experience of 
migration makes problematic and impractical. There is no cure for the sacred 
bond in its formally religious expressions without the passionate care of those 
dimensions of experience and their sacred profile. An Evangelical Christian 
pastor, who was involved in one of the focus groups, even employed the ex-
pression “Christian counselling” to allude to an institutionalized practice based 
on the use of the Bible in searching the answers to offer to the people in need. 
This is a model that has already been extensively tested and which should now 




Coherently with this kind of approach, migrants’ spiritual needs are often 
reduced, in the description made by the religious leaders, to the migrants’ need 
to practice their cult according to their past experience and traditions. This 
means, first of all, the possibility to attend the celebrations in the migrants’ 
mother tongue, with traditional rituals, songs and liturgies, and to meet and 
spend free time in spaces provided by their places of worship. A point that has 
almost inevitably led to the memory of Italian emigrants abroad:
Who is used to celebrating the liturgy in a very festive, very dynamic way, 
so we can sing songs, clap hands, etc. our style is a little Genoese that is 
very sober and therefore risks discouraging many people who come from 
the Catholic faith but then maybe many have been absorbed in some way 
or by Evangelicals or Pentecostals, however also seven pseudo Christians 
because they approach their way of praying more to what was the way of 
praying in their country. So these communities have chaplains, the term 
that is not used but I do not know what other term to use, ethnic chap-
lains, chaplains of their lands, which speak their language, which use 
their customs and habits just for … just as there are in the world the mis-
sions were called Italian, they are nothing more than Italian priests than 
in Paris rather than in New York etc. who have accompanied the commu-
nities of Italian emigrants in their growth in faith. (Man – Religious 
 leader – Catholic Christian)
(…) I thought she was crying because she had lost her job, because she 
was far from her husband, because her daughter was studying and she 
was missing them, right? She had been treated badly, I do not know. In-
stead she told me that she could for the first time pray in Romanian, 
 confess in her language, sing with the songs of her tradition. She has con-
fused me, because I had already gone with mine, my mental prejudices: 
so, the daughter who does not have her, her husband works in France, 
work is precarious. No, the first generation wants to hear their own lan-
guages. So hear your tongue in a foreign land, eat Romanian food. We 
started this way, but why did the Italians meet in the Belgian, French and 
German communities and they ate fettuccine?! And it was important 
that they find themselves. (Man – Religious leader – Catholic Christian)
As a matter of fact, despite our repeated solicitations, many religious leaders 
have shown a certain difficulty in dealing with the concept of “migrants’ spiri-
tual needs”; a specific reflection on this aspect is in fact substantially lacking. 
For example, in their description of the role of worships in the face of newcom-
ers’ arrivals, almost all the religious leaders involved in the study have referred 
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to them as places to meet, to support each other, and as places of “identity 
compensation”. Much emphasis has been placed on the initiatives implement-
ed to support the inclusion process (language courses, matching with the labor 
demand, social assistance…). As stated by this Catholic priest, the risk could be 
that of “skipping” spiritual needs, to the point of discovering that they are ex-
actly the migrants who encourage to be less materialistic –or, in evangelical 
terms, “to choose the best part”–:
(…) in a general sense, I believe that all those who do this kind of wel-
come do not have particular attention to this dimension. So we are all 
always very concerned about giving the food, the documents, job oppor-
tunities, without taking into account what then is the real engine of our 
… the pursuit of happiness that can also come from a job, from a home, 
which cannot be only that, then the risk is that perhaps we are the very 
materialistic in the West and therefore easily pretend or do not take into 
account, even worse, the most spiritual part of each of us, so attentive to 
practical needs, that we forget the reason why one looks for a home, for a 
job, then your own happiness. And so this surely would mean that it 
would take a little bit to return to a culture, to the man in his integrity. 
(Man – Religious leader – Catholic Christian)
Quite surprisingly –but coherently with the study background– within this ef-
fort to meet migrants’ cultural, social, and economic needs, there are exactly 
their spiritual needs that risks being unmet. Undoubtedly, the habit to meet 
religious demand where it emerges, that is through the most elementary needs 
dramatically perceived, produces the risk of disregarding exactly the very spiri-
tual dimension. The following testimony is emblematic. At last, the authentic 
spiritual assistance has to be grounded in a human promotion. However, this 
circumstance involves the risk of a possible involution of the religious com-
munities: these are so entangled in sophisticated initiatives of “material sup-
port” that they are disengaged in that proximity that listens to the expectation 
of God – an expectation that ends up turning into the announcement, as well as 
into the interpretation of the sacred texts, the exhortation to faith, a blessing 
and a consolation, and that invites to an intense experience of faith. In the fol-
lowing testimony, a Catholic priest reveals, through a biographic anecdote, 
how it is precisely the immigrants who do solicit to welcome, besides their 
own material needs, those of a spiritual nature.
(…) there were these guys last year in the sports hall, that this ab was a 
pretty infernal place, in the sense that there were 250 of these on the 
camp beds, dumped there, when running, with difficulty we managed to 
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create a structure, we brought them there and these happy ones, finally 
inside a house, the showers, the towel and so on. It was a Saturday after-
noon. At a certain point, about fifteen of them took me aside, put me in 
the middle of a circle, they told me: “We have to ask you something”. And 
I inside me I said: “But what I want there … we had done races, fatal la-
bors, what do they still want?” And then one of them advances and says: 
“We have two requests”. Oh well, “Tell me”. So a little resigned. Then he 
says: “The first we are English speakers, we ask you if you can find one or 
two Bibles in English. The second is this: we are Christians, today is Satur-
day and we would like to know if tomorrow there is a function to cele-
brate Sunday”. And I am a priest and I said: “Look at what a man of faith 
you are”. These tossed, brought in this new structure etc. they remem-
bered that today is Saturday, because then you lose; I always lost the sense 
of time on ships. And their two requests have certainly involved two 
needs that I had not thought about. I thought about them all: towel, 
phone card, read this one … and they told me: “Well, thank you, we are 
happy, but we need these two things”. This was one of the many slaps I got 
in my face! (Man – Religious leader – Catholic Christian)
Indeed, in-depth interviews to a group of people in charge with the pastoral 
care of migrants have permitted us to better clarify this sort of “overlapping” 
between spiritual assistance and human promotion, which starts by accompa-
nying the migrants in their first steps into the new society. Inspired by the an-
cient experience of priests and nuns working with Italian emigrants in the 
“new world”, and then in Northern Europe, pastoral operators have identified 
migrants as people in need, people to whom address their special care and “to 
serve”. According to their testimony, spiritual assistance cannot be separated 
from the simple act of taking care of migrants and their basic needs; thus doing 
–as suggested by one of our interviewees– “you will touch their heart”.
Then the “Migrantes” (The Foundation of the Italian Episcopal Conference 
in charge of the pastoral care of migrants, authors’ note) is the care, the 
support, the accompaniment of migrants in the pastoral centers at the 
service of migrants. It is not a pastoral care ex novo, because it was born 
from the experience of Italians abroad, when the Scalabrinian missionar-
ies and then priests, following the Italian communities abroad, created 
this pastoral care and accompanied the Italian migrants to integrate 
where they were: Canada, United States, Australia, how many problems 
for the first Italian migrants in the great Australian “farms”. There is an 
interesting book by the Migrantes Foundation on mental illnesses, the 
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mental problems of the first Italians in these lost farms. Then how much 
the presence of the priest, the presence of the nuns, I think of the Scal-
abrinian nuns and so on, they have helped and supported the Italian mi-
grants. It’s really a human, spiritual accompaniment … I think of the trag-
edy of Marcinelle2 and how much the priests and nuns had been close to 
those poor women, to their children. For that great tragedy they played a 
very important role of consolation, of support, of help, not of confronta-
tion but of accompaniment, as important. Here all this is treasured and 
experienced for the Church and we live it today as a great experience in 
the reality of the communities present here. (Man – Religious leader – 
Catholic Christian)
(…) there is a need for an accompaniment just a little … something that 
maybe in the reception centers cannot be done, but a little face to face. If 
you happen to be close, I see that other associations, maybe they can do 
it less, we have a little more in this dna, this needs not only to give what 
you need to survive … first then to help them find … but you also know a 
spiritual need can also be rediscovering dignity. For example, a person 
who lives on the street and to whom no one has ever said that maybe he 
could live differently and help him, and it happened, we have several ex-
periences on this and on other things, and help you find your way back 
home … Is it not perhaps satisfying a great spiritual need? (Woman – 
fbos operator – Catholic Christian)
(…) welcome a family, meet them, answer maybe just at first impact in 
that way no? But it is precisely to cross that need there, to meet that man 
there, to be there those gestures through which you then reach the heart. 
When you called, I said: “What do you mean by spiritual assistance?” Be-
cause we do not, in fact I told you, we’re not doing spiritual assistance, 
right? But precisely through our work, no? Our service … we answer the 
need of the man who arrives, through whose relationship we get to that 
spiritual need, of meaning, need of hope, no?
(…) Then we are just certain that serving a need comes to the heart. 
There is not, how to say: “I’ll help you there, but then I want something 
else”. No, no, the experience is also that you are sure that you touch the 
strings of the heart of man … (Women – Nuns – Catholic Christians)
2 The tragedy occurred in the mine of Marcinelle, in Belgium, the 8th August 1956, in which 
hundreds of miners died, the majority of those were Italians.
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So, yes for me personally the spiritual accompaniment, there is … if you 
can call it that, it goes more through the everyday life of the things of life. 
(Woman – fbos operator – Catholic Christian)
Finally, it is exactly through their physical presence that religious operators 
can try to answer refugees’ spiritual needs. As described in this eloquent testi-
mony, showing an empathetic attitude toward those who suffered a lot during 
the journey, and who continue to experiment solitude and isolation, is the 
most immediate way to satisfy their spiritual needs.
(…) this is a discovery that took place after a short time to try to respond 
precisely to those that we understood to be the inner, spiritual needs. Be-
cause the first need seemed to us to be close to a friendly presence and 
someone who could participate in the pain and in some way learn to deal 
with those that were wounds of the heart because most live, as xxx said, 
the separation clearly from the family, from the figures of reference, from 
… ties a little frayed … the drama of the journey for all is very strong. 
I would say that most of our friends told us about the prison in Libya; 
however, the period spent in Libya as something that has marked them 
forever. In personal terms, they all suffered torture, however harassment, 
women in any case … abuses of all kinds. And even during the crossing 
at sea they saw friends die. So they find themselves having to face a very 
great pain, a pain that does not make them sleep at night, a pain that … 
and that’s why they ask first of all a human proximity and someone who 
tries to stay close to them and they say it clearly. I speak … I have no fam-
ily, no friends, I need someone close to me. So they look for someone who 
listens to them, who listens to their story, without having to evaluate it 
in terms of “accepted” or “not accepted”, then to receive it and in some 
way support it. And then in this sense we organize prayers with the com-
munity, we also concretely try to help them to live a spiritual dimension, 
both personal and communitarian, by making a bridge with the realities 
that are present on the territory, the Islamic realities say, with the com-
munities of the mosques present … with the prayer rooms … with which 
we are in relationship. And with the Christians instead inviting them to 
our prayer and to all the moments of reflection on the Gospel for Chris-
tians of course … and then there is this beautiful prayer we say every year, 
which is called “Prayer of hope”, in which we remember all the names of 
the people who died at sea during the voyage and many of these names 
have been given us by them. And this year, for example, a friend of ours 
who is an Imam from the Ivory Coast, his name is M.M., he is a Muslim. 
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They made a moment of prayer with another Imam outside the Church 
of the Annunciation, then they entered and during the prayer he cried 
and thanked at the same time why he was reminded of all the people 
he saw dying on the boat. So, first of all this need for friendship … This 
need to live spirituality, because they are also far from the communities 
with which they lived there. Since religion is also a bond with others, 
especially not just a private matter, they ask for a community dimen-
sion in order to live their religion. (Woman – fbos operator – Catholic 
Christian)
On his turn, in this moving testimony, a Catholic priest describes how the eth-
nic chaplain is the “safe place” which permits to overcome the sense of es-
trangement experienced by newcomers:
So the Latin American community has a room, if you open it, it is full of 
suitcases. (…) when they arrive, they do not know where to put the bag-
gage: one thing is to leave it to payment at the Termini station (the Roma 
central station, author’s note), another thing is in a safe place, that you feel 
at home, the community. Then that room for suitcases, and the suitcase 
in the imagination of the migrant, but it is still so, is certainly more beau-
tiful than that of the Italians of the nineteenth or twentieth century or 
after the Second World War (…), are perhaps more beautiful but the con-
tent is life, there is the whole of the migrant inside. That’s what they 
bring, so it’s precious to them, that of photos, memories, computers, cell 
phones, before there were not now, but there is what you can bring every-
thing. Where do I put it? In a place that welcomes me, the community, so 
that room is much better than the station terms pay. I give it, I put it in the 
Latin American community entrusted to the Scalabrinian Fathers and it’s 
like keeping it in my house until I find a place. (Man – Religious leader – 
Catholic Christian)
Finally, every form of help in the little and big tasks newcomers have to face 
gain a specific theological meaning once put in a spiritual and pastoral 
perspective:
(…) if you find a house that welcomes you, that is the Church, that sup-
ports you, that helps you to study Italian, that takes care of your soul so 
try to make you stay at home even if away from home, it helps you to 
recreate a family even if you do not have a blood family but a family of 
faith, if it helps you to get better, to live your daily life, share your hard 
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work to find a job, share your hard work to find a home, share your effort 
for a residence permit, help you find the channels, for a civil lawyer, when 
you need a criminal lawyer, what you need. It is beside you, it cries with 
you and smiles with you, makes a feast, embraces you if you were perhaps 
in reunion, helps you in reuniting your family. Of course it works for inte-
gration, damn it! Because you feel welcomed, supported, you do not feel 
alone. And loneliness leads you then, if you do not find answers, more 
easily to crime, more easily to do what you would never imagine doing, if 
instead be welcomed, supported, accompanied by a hug, a smile, that is 
some advice on how to go to the police station, which is a patronage that 
helps you for work, that is other families that welcome you when you do 
not have a home, and of course that helps you live better. And if it helps 
you to live better, in addition to prayer, which is very important, then bet-
ter deal with your daily life. Integration is a journey. Of course, yes, we 
must create welcoming communities, ever more welcoming, ever more 
attentive to hugs, smiles, to give just directions and even when we have 
no answers to look for them, not to resign ourselves not to find them, to 
accompany and if it were just crying, even crying together. (Man – 
 Religious leader – Catholic Christian)
Furthermore, as suggested by this Evangelical pastor, material and psychologi-
cal support becomes an instrument of evangelization of those people who 
never patently experienced the presence of God:
The support they receive is linked to the word of God, to the promises 
that God makes in his word to those who believe in him. There is a God 
who takes care of them, he loves them. According to Chinese culture, 
there is no God. The fact that you are someone who takes care of them, 
who listens to them, who supports them, who cares about them can be 
very important. (Woman – Religious leader – Evangelical Christian)
To be more precise, many religious leaders and pastoral operators (particularly 
within the Catholic Church) appear definitely reluctant to the prospect of un-
derstanding the reception aids as a means to encourage the conversion of the 
newcomers. The following testimony is just one of the many proving the ex-
treme “prudence” with which they consider this possibility:
We also had some cases of … fascinated by the beauty of the Gospel he 
asked to make a journey of catechesis, of knowledge of the Gospel. 
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 Someone asked for the baptism but I said: “We are careful not to confuse 
things, not to think that as a welcoming is made by the Church, we are 
here to convert them all. We are all thinking of converting ourselves, then 
we see, now we see”. (Man – Religious Leader – Catholic Christian)
Finally, also linguistic and cultural barriers can be easily overcome when the 
newcomers perceive the presence of God through the proximity of His 
ministers:
People for centuries prayed in Latin without understanding anything. 
There have been many saints in centuries, many good people who under-
stand the Gospel much more than we who are exegetes. So I would dare 
say that precisely for the specifically spiritual part, language is the last 
obstacle because precisely the affection, the welcome, a look, a smile, a 
handshake, a hug that indicate this proximity does not have a different 
language. (Man – Religious leader – Catholic Christian)
Last but not least, as observed by this Catholic nun, by displaying their care for 
the newcomers, religious people are simply taking care of their own 
spirituality:
(…) And then, excuse me, it seems that, perhaps I say one thing … but it 
seems to me that, at least I do not have a concern, when I meet the boys, 
when I meet the families, their spiritual care. I have the concern of my 
spiritual care which is what allows me to look at them and to allow them 
to truly be what I am. (Woman – Nun – Christian Catholic)
Lastly, we will now analyze how the presence of migrants who guard their faith 
according to communicative paradigms and celebratory codes originating 
from their land challenges the Italian communities, until calling them to a con-
version in the resumption of their most authentic traditions and their sacred 
texts. Evidently –this aspect has already emerged abundantly– the call for a 
reform of experience and religious practice also comes from the communities 
encountered in the country that welcomes and radically questions the quality 
of the faith of migrants. Thus, integration finds its most convincing fruitfulness 
in a kind of reciprocity. On the one hand, through its reading of the founda-
tional texts, its celebratory ways, its style of community life, the faith of mi-
grants comes to “integrate” (that is to make it more mature, but also to move 
towards the “whole”) the faith of the hosting communities. The first enriches 
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the second since it reveals and offers aspects of the religious experience that, 
due to different traditions and history, were perhaps scarcely lived or even 
 ignored in the indigenous communities. On the other hand, in the same way, 
the faith of the indigenous communities encountered in the host country 
manages to integrate the faith of the migrants, revealing and offering them 
some values of the religious experience which tend to be neglected in the be-
lieving practice of migrants.
From this point of view, in the various interviews, we seem to glimpse some 
major themes in which this mutual integration unfolds. The religious experi-
ence of migrants gives back to the religious communities of the host country 
the primacy of “feeling” as the heart of the faith; mainly, with respect to a 
“knowledge” and a “doing” that in the West (not only the Christian West) ended 
up dismissing the feeling, equating it with emotionalism and childishness. 
This experience ends up questioning about “joy” as an inevitable trait in the 
authentic relationship with God. Besides, as stated in one of the above-reported 
interviews, it testifies to a freedom and a frankness in proclaiming and practic-
ing one’s faith in a way that knows no timidity or false human respect even in 
a largely secularized world.
At the same time, the religious experience they have intercepted in the com-
munities of the host country offers them a sense of “religious freedom”, with 
practical declinations both at a family and at a social level – we will return to 
this point in the following paragraph. Finally, another value particularly ap-
preciated by migrants seems to be the ability to make –with rigor and passion– 
the connection between the announcement/celebration of faith and the hu-
man promotion in every sector of society.
What’s more, as captured by this moving testimony, the arrival of migrants 
who have never found the faith is even more challenging in both human and 
spiritual terms, since it offers the unique opportunity to listen to the Word of 
the Lord with the ears of those who have never heard it.
When xxx asked me to begin a journey of biblical reading, we began to 
read the Gospel (…). So, at a certain point, I read the parable of the merci-
ful Father (…). And I thought that for thirty years now I have been a Pas-
tor I had never read the parable of the prodigal son to someone who did 
not already know it. And so, thinking back to that parable that speaks of 
a merciful God who forgives you, doesn’t he? That is, of this celebration of 
God … for the first time I listened to this parable with the ears of someone 
who has never heard it. Simply this thing has impressed me and also 
moved me. (Man – Religious leader – Protestant Christian)
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4 Religious Agency in the Process of (Forced) Migrants’ Public Space 
Making
In the previous paragraphs, we have analyzed various aspects connected to 
the role played by religion and spirituality in the process of adaptation of 
(forced) migrants. In this final paragraph, we will discuss how the evidence 
collected during this part of the study can help us to develop the prospect of 
re- humanization of (forced) migrants along the four lines of research identi-





As already described (Chapter 10), many of the migrants interviewed have em-
phasized how religion is a source of individual and collective identity, shaped 
by the intra-familiar transmission of religious values and beliefs (as we will 
deeply analyze in Part 5), but also –and especially– by the experience of dis-
crimination and persecution suffered before emigrating, as well as by the trou-
bles encountered during the migratory journey. Religious identity represents 
a source of resistance and resilience, but it is also the limit beyond which it 
is not possible to accept any violations. Therefore, the concept of religious 
identity provides a meaning to the decision to migrate, even for those who 
“did not know they had a religious identity”: this concept has been unveiled 
only after having migrated to another country, where they first experienced 
both a context of religious freedom and the possibility to be helped by reli-
gious people. Finally, religious identity is a crucial resource providing (forced) 
migrants with an extraordinary ability to face problems and  challenging situa-
tions, as unanimously asserted by the following interviewees, who are coming 
from different countries and have different religious backgrounds:
(…) it was very difficult, but I remember when I was very young, my par-
ents always talked about this thing, this sacrifice that we always have to 
make to resist, just to show that we have our identity, and then they gave 
me force to fight these problems. (Woman – Iran – Baháʾi)
(…) I am right to be Catholic until I die, if I die tomorrow or if I die in fifty 
years … These are my roots, this is my identity. If I remove my identity, it 




Since I was a child, my father told me to read the Bible every day, every 
morning and, before going to his job, he used to read the Bible for five to 
ten minutes and he taught me that when you are starting to learn the Bi-
ble, your problems will be fewer, Jesus will help you and so you can just 
relax. (Man – Pakistan – Catholic Christian)
If we consider the collective dimension of the religious identity, we can ob-
serve that religious affiliations reinforce the sense of belonging to a commu-
nity of peers, i.e. a sort of enlarged family that makes its members feel “at 
home” and loved – a key form of support for those who experience the status 
of stranger, for those who have to deal with everyday frustrations and who fear 
a sense of solitude.
I know the Focolari movement from 1982, in Egypt. Here is something 
that pushed me to grow, because I felt loved, because a foreigner, when 
changing places for religious reasons, does not need money, but to feel 
loved, a sense of family, this is what he is missing. (Man – Egypt – Coptic 
Catholic Christian)
There is another reason for the celebration that is, for the Baháʾi people, 
in addition to participation in the activities and the administrative sys-
tem, to meet and be aware of the daily life of others. The Baháʾís to meet 
only … that is, a party is organized. Maybe you eat … all the people are 
there to increase community solidarity. So the Baháʾi community, at the 
local, national and international levels, is connected through this 19th 
century celebration.
(…) therefore, let’s say that our community for us is like our family and 
as members of the community they are also our family. (Couple (Man 
and Woman) – Iran – Baháʾi)
In this same perspective, religion functions as an identity anchor, and as an 
instrument of defense for those who perceive the hosting society as an anomic 
one, to the point of menacing migrants’ personal moral integrity and their off-
spring’s socialization (see also Chapter 20). Finally, the migrants’ community 
gathered around the Church offers the possibility to maintain a link with one’s 
past and one’s roots, and to safe one’s original identity.
(…) on the one hand, it is a function I think of link to their past because 
even this I think is an important aspect. There is for many of them a fun-
damental aspect of their history, of the history of their family, that is, I do 
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not know a Latin American with its Catholic faith, or today also many 
that are of Evangelical confession, however it is a link with one’s own his-
tory. Or a Muslim as we said before. (Woman – fbos operator – Catholic 
Christian)
It has been said that the religious community often functions as a social place 
of “identity compensation” (§3), or better yet, an identity anchoring. It saves 
from the icy waters of anonymity, since your name resounds in it and, eventu-
ally, it becomes the subject of attributions of rights and duties. A second fun-
damental reason concerns the religious experience as a way of life: the refer-
ence or belonging to the religious community are experienced as bastions of 
resistance with respect to that corruption of moral-religious integrity that the 
host world seems to foster because of its widespread secularization. Finally, 
the circulation of words in the same language, the immediacy in cultivating 
personal and national memory, the custom of celebrating God’s providence in 
the language of the fathers, guarantee the bond with one’s roots. A circum-
stance that certainly seems profitable in terms of identity custody. However, 
the metaphor of the tree and the roots evokes a rigid and static identity: a pat-
tern that is not absent in the so-called “ethnic communities”, where migrants 
usually meet and celebrate their religious rites (§3). With this in mind, would 
the metaphor of a river and its springs be more adequate to express the mi-
grants’ religious identity? It does evoke a “traditional principle” that is still ac-
tive and fruitful (the springs) and that feeds a flow open to promising contribu-
tions and contaminations – thus concurring to the process of migrants’ public 
space making.
As a matter of fact, religious identity becomes even clearer once com-
pared to the situation of the destination country, where religious affiliation 
is lived in a much milder way. Quite significantly, this woman, despite a bi-
ography strongly marked by her membership to a minority, and persecuted, 
religious group –which we could expect to have indelibly marked her exis-
tence– observes how “religion is always something that you must grow inside 
of you”:
(…) then we have a strength that I do not feel so much in Italy that we try 
to keep tradition, even religion as a tradition, in the sense that I am Chris-
tian and I must be and I have to say it, but here in Italy we say: ah, yes, I 
am a Christian but I’m not a practitioner; ah, but I’m not … but I say, but 
what are you not? But thank God you are in a Catholic country! We, at 
this point, are very strong, we are very jealous. Then, even after religion is 
always something that you have to grow yourself, it’s not just something 
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that you inherit from yours, but you also have to work on it, you have to 
feel it too, otherwise it will just be … (Woman – Iraq – Chaldean Catholic 
Christian)
Inspired by this kind of feelings, we can grasp a first important contribution 
provided by the process of refugees’ public space making. As brilliantly de-
scribed by this fbos staff-member, migrants’ religiosity is “more religious” than 
that of the locals. If not for this reason, as discussed in another part of this 
volume (Chapter 16), independently of their motive to migrate, migrants chal-
lenge European secularized society, and particularly those who demand to be 
acknowledged as religious. Fundamentally, as exemplified by the following 
statements, this sentiment has emerged from both the “insiders” (the religious 
leaders and the pastoral operators) and the “outsiders” (the Catholic migrants 
coming from non-Christian countries):
(…) we probably, as a Western society, are a fairly secularized society, 
while in other contexts, basically those who leave, come from a context, 
there is an economic migrant, migrant who comes here seeking asylum 
for humanitarian reasons, leaving a situation a little different even at the 
level of society … so for them, in my opinion, the religious factor is their 
own identity. There’s … like … it’s also very providential. That is why it is 
not like … at least from my experience, from what I think, it is not that 
they first look for the house and work, and then they go to church. In-
deed, they go to church to look for … there is the paradox is a bit that we 
ask the Lord to send us these things and then see … is a religion very 
“religious” in quotes not? At least, I think of the Africans with whom I 
had more to do but also them, maybe the Chinese are more discreet 
from this point of view … but if they pray even three hours a day, they 
do it, they have always done it because it is probably right of their iden-
tity. Is there … maybe you recognize that too, and then even … that is 
also the identity because often, according to me, religion and their eth-
nic identity often merge? So … I do not even know the African commu-
nity, also Arab, there is the Coptic, there is the Muslim and then, in 
short, it is so…
(…) even if in fact it is they who accompany me as a spiritual guide. 
They say: “I have prayed!”. All right, good! Maybe there are those who 
question me more from this point of view. (…) Then they provoke me, 
trusting this Providence, both the Africans to Allah, and they … probably 
we Westerners have lost something, I do not know! So I am constantly 
provoked from this point of view, in short. They tell me: “Saturday we 
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read the Bible for four hours”. Saturday I’m going to have a coffee, I see 
some friends! (Woman – fbos operator – Catholic Christian)
I’ll bring them to church every Sunday; I’ll tell them to read the Bible, to 
join Christian groups, to join Christian culture, because without faith, 
without religion we are nothing. When Jesus is not in your life, you have 
nothing in your life. In Pakistan, when children are 3 or 4, they send them 
to the mosque and to learn, and even children from 4 or 5 learn the Koran 
orally without reading. But Christian children don’t, but I think it is also 
important to learn the Bible also like this, they should learn the Bible by 
heart even when they are 4 or 5, before learning to read. (Man –  Pakistan – 
Catholic Christian)
Furthermore, we can note that the migrants’ presence and their desire to be 
acknowledged as (forced) migrants further develop the concept of religious 
pluralism. The example provided by this Eritrean priest is definitely emblem-
atic. The special identity of Eritrean Catholics is not only mirrored by the 
shared experience of persecution, but also “embedded” in a singular ritual –
the “Gèéz”–, which reinforces the diasporic character of this community. It is 
quite significant to observe that, once again, the appeal to be recognized as a 
legitimate component of a pluralistic society seems to be addressed first to 
other Catholics (see also Chapters 16, 19, and 20).
The number of Catholic Eritreans in Europe is enormous and they are 
accustomed to a different ritual, even to a different language, the Gèéz. In 
my congregation, we also celebrate the Latin Mass, but the Gèéz is very 
important for us. You study it for years, to celebrate the liturgical ceremo-
ny in Gèéz you have to be an expert (…). There are some particular prayers 
in Gèéz that the priests abroad do not know, but we, who did the seminar 
in Eritrea, we do.
(…) It is very important for Eritreans to participate in the Mass cele-
brated with their rite, in Gèéz. The problem is not of linguistic under-
standing: the skeleton of the rite is the same as the Latin Church. The fact 
is that our prayers are linked to our culture. Culture and prayer are in close 
relationship. While we pray, we understand what we are praying for, be-
cause everything is linked to our culture. It helps us to pray a lot with our 
ritual, rather than using a language that has no connection with our cul-
ture. On the basis of my experience, I can say that prayers are very linked 
to our way of thinking, to behave, to judge what is good and what is not. 
All of this is linked to our culture. (Man – Eritrea – Catholic Christian)
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As a matter of fact, religious pluralism, intended as a crucial element of the 
democratic governance, is not only a principle inscribed in the legislation 
(Chapter 9), but also a goal that is still to be achieved in the Italian society, 
which has been rapidly passing from a mono-religious to a multi-faith society. 
Up until recently, the Italian population was fairly homogeneous (or at least 
perceived as such) in terms of ethnicity and religion. As we have already ob-
served, because of immigration, all religious minorities have grown significant-
ly, and the issue of interreligious co-existence, traditionally underrated, has 
emerged, allowing the country to gain more awareness of how much religion is 
encapsulated in allegedly secularized/neutral behavioral and legal patterns 
(Chapter 3). Besides, as observed by this Catholic priest, the Church itself is 
challenged by the pluralism that the migrants bring with them; a pluralism 
made up of different religions, but also of a plurality of traditions within each 
religion confession:
(…) if in the end, the right to equality is guaranteed in the communities, 
what is not sometimes even listened to is the instance of differentiation 
that sometimes arises from the migrants, and I say in particular from 
migrants with a Catholic background. The right, the right to differentia-
tion (…).
(A) sacrosanct instance of differentiation that migrants advance pre-
cisely because they instinctively want their identity, their singularity to 
be recognized and therefore also valued in favor of the whole communi-
ty. (Man – Religious leader – Catholic Christian)
It is not enough that we go and welcome, we must get involved, and this 
is the important thing of interculturalism: that is not only to welcome 
who comes, does not change only what comes, but we also change, in 
welcoming. Our identity becomes somewhat more fluid and I think this 
is the richness, but also the fatigue of interculturalism. Because however 
I have to put into play and I can no longer define myself in a certain way, 
but I have to expect to change. (Woman – Religious leader –  Methodist 
Evangelical Church)
It is rather superfluous to observe that forced migrants, particularly those emi-
grated for religious motives, have a crucial role to play in this process. This, 
however, implies a cooperative stance, that is a cooperative way to intend ones’ 
membership to the new society. In this perspective, we can really appreciate 
the importance of educating newcomers to the concept of religious pluralism, 
since –as we have seen (§3)– they often come from illiberal societies and have 
mainly experienced their religious identity as an antagonistic marker.
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It is exactly through the impact with a democratic society –such as the Ital-
ian one– that many migrants have had the opportunity to experience, for the 
first time, the idea of religious pluralism. Once again, it is essential to observe 
how people of different origins and religious memberships share the same 
concept according to which living in a democratic State provides a meaning to 
the very concept of religious freedom and personal freedom, which are based 
on the principle of the inviolable dignity of each individual.
The social structures of the democratic State enshrine religious freedom as 
an implication of the freedom of thought and conscience; in fact, it has been 
within the same substantially dominant religious structure that many mi-
grants have started to get closer to the idea and the practice of religious free-
dom. At least on paper, the communicative and educational modules in the 
most widespread religious community in Italy, i.e. the Catholic Church, ad-
heres to the announced God in such a way that it reflects the profound mean-
ing of freedom. Faith is the responsibility of everyone’s freedom. Personal free-
dom is meant as people’s freedom to behave independently of both God’s 
teaching and one’s family or community tradition (however relevant it may be, 
it cannot be understood as oppressive and it will not replace one’s capacity of 
judgment and personal decision).
The novelty of this situation changes the parameters of thought and prac-
tice of many migrants –especially of those coming from countries that are 
fundamentally theocratic and/or traditionally characterized by a state religion 
that suppresses the spaces and the voices of other religious experiences. We 
have already observed that, for many of them, the need to migrate has arisen 
precisely because of the overt denial of religious freedom. Now –here is one of 
the most delicate challenges in the integration process– they find themselves 
in a social and political context that is certainly democratic, but in a cultural- 
political situation that does sympathize with various forms of ethnic and reli-
gious discrimination. Today, in Italy, the religious group that is most likely to be 
discriminated against is the one that, in the country of origin of many (forced) 
migrants, used to be in force in its exclusive and persecutory hegemony. Here, 
these migrants, while benefitting from this modulation of the Italian democ-
racy, are sometimes inclined to replicate the same exclusive and persecutory 
forms for which they had found themselves in the need to migrate; in this 
sense, they sometimes adopt an aggressive attitude towards religious minori-
ties. As showed by the following testimony, when they fail to heal the wounds 
of forced migration, migrants risk being overwhelmed by resentment, ending 
up looking for a new emotional balance that would ensure their psychological 
and relational well-being. In these cases, religious teachings risk being over-




(…) for me, it would be the ideal that comes another Hitler against Mus-
lims. Because, however, there are always these wounds inside of you. I did 
not leave my land because I wanted to. I have been forced. This wound 
always remains, until death, no one can erase it. I did not hurt anyone. 
But everyone hurt me. Why do I have to accept it? A. (his wife) was very 
Christian and said that we must love one another. Yes, it’s true. But Jesus 
condemned the tree that does not bear fruit. I, for me, they are the fruit-
less trees. But why do they have to stay? (Man – Egypt – Coptic Catholic 
Christian)
No, if I have children they will be Christians. They will be born in Europe 
so they will not even know about the wrong part of religion. They will 
only know about Christianity. (Man – Nigeria – Catholic Christian)
(…) the things that I do not share very much, even though I’m a foreigner, 
that I should not say it, really, but I say it anyway, is that there is so much 
welcoming to other religions here and indeed we take it with such enthu-
siasm and so much hospitality and admiration, where an Italian may not 
even admire his own true religion, I do not know if I explained myself and 
I do not like it so much because I accept how much I am so lucky to ac-
cept and accept your diversity … then I accept you, that you’re different, 
and instead here you try to give the best to this person just because he/
she’s different, because he/she’s different … okay, he/she’s not bad! Not 
bad! But you are also happy with what you have? And on other side what 
do Muslims do then? They try to take advantage of it in the sense that 
they see this thing and try to impose what they are … maybe they do not 
wear the veil in their country but try to put it in Italy … to say look I’m 
different, I’m Muslim … that is to impose their things … mosque that they 
claim they have it, they have it, how much freedom did they give us in our 
countries? If you go to Saudi Arabia for example, even if there are mil-
lions of Christians, Filipinos working there … there is no right to a church 
in Saudi Arabia, but here we have to give all rights … (Woman – Iraq – 
Chaldean Catholic Christian)
These considerations lead us to the second main dimension involved in the 
process of rehumanization of asylum seekers, that is the concept of religious 
freedom.
On an elementary level, this concept can be grasped through the everyday 
experience, whenever a foreign migrant touches the privilege of living in a 
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democratic society, founded on the principles of universal equality and human 
dignity. As suggested by the following statements, beyond the principle of 
equality between all religious traditions –and therefore the prohibition of 
 discrimination on a religious basis– it is precisely the concept of the inviolable 
dignity of every person, that everyone can claim for the mere fact of being a 
person, which materializes in the daily experience of many migrants:
Here in Italy, it is not as a religion to … everyone treats them like humans, 
they treat well, like a person, alone, like in a family … (…) In Egypt they 
have many weapons, we are saying steps … (Man – Egypt – Coptic Ortho-
dox Christian)
I see the rule here and for Christians and Muslims are totally the same, 
because when you go to questura (police headquarters, author’s note) 
they don’t show any preference for Muslims or Christians, they prefer the 
rules. (Man – Pakistan – Catholic Christian)
I feel like if I’ve saved my life, I feel I found the peace, I feel I’m free to start 
a new life, I feel so happy, I feel so special, what is special is the way they 
treat us, and I like the manner they use to approach, the way everything 
has been done is something a normal human being should emulate.
Interviewer: Can you make an example?
Respect, the way of behaving, when you see someone and say: “ciao, 
ciao come stai? Come stai? Bene?” There is a lot of respect, people leave 
in joy, nobody wants to kill you … everybody is equal. In Nigeria is not like 
this. In Nigeria you have to have absolute respect for people older than 
you, there is a lot of difference between the young and old but also be-
tween the poor and the rich. The poor have always been suppressed … 
the gap is too much. (Man – Nigeria – Catholic Christian)
Secondly, the notion of religious freedom directly calls into question the re-
spect for religious rights, including those of minority groups. Migrants with a 
different religious background share the awareness that only after their arrival 
in Italy they have had the opportunity to fully experience their faith:
In Italy, going to church helps us to pray for documents and so on, it’s an 
opportunity to feel free to pray, to go to church, to pray like this, it’s totally 
different from Pakistan where it’s difficult also to pray. I remember it was 
Easter, after praying I come to my home, I see television, there was a blast 
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in church and almost 82 persons died just because they were Christians. 
Here there is no fear … in Pakistan there is no security for this…. (Man – 
Pakistan – Catholic Christian)
Whenever I can (I go to the Buddhist center), because I feel very well here. 
I had the good fortune to come to a country where there is this  religious 
freedom. Everyone can do what he wants, while not disturbing social se-
renity, so … and … Buddhism being a religion of peace, of … education 
and culture, often when I go there in xxx, yes? It is there that the center 
of the Soka Gakkai is located. I always go there. (Man – Cameron – 
Buddhist)
I have never had problems (in Italy) to express my religious opinion. Nei-
ther with colleagues at the university, nor with my current colleagues. I 
never had problems…. No one has ever offended me or laughed in my 
face.
(…) (In Italy) we learned a lot, but thanks to the very heterogeneous 
Baháʾi community. Thanks to the exercises we have been able to do here 
and which we could not do in Iran because the administrative system 
does not exist there. We knew on paper how it worked but we only expe-
rienced it here. (Couple [Man and Woman] – Iran – Baháʾi)
Thirdly, this concept also involves the protection towards the risk of being vic-
tims of deviated understandings of religious duties and precepts. In the follow-
ing excerpt, for example, a Nigerian man says that there is no way that, in Italy, 
people can encounter any forms of violent and occult religiosity such as those 
he had known in the context of provenance:
Worshipping ghost here? I don’t know. Because, I don’t know. Because … 
How can they worship ghost here? You can’t come here, you start wor-
shiping the ghost. In Italy there are not, I don’t see people, I see in Italy 
people that worship God. I see in Italy people that worship God. Italy’s 
people are good people, because how they do their things, they have fear 
of God, and they have the law, there is the law, the law in Italy is working, 
the law in Italy is not as the law in my country. The law in my country is 
not working. In Italy, the law is working, so they have human sympathy. 
So … I didn’t see them, I can’t … you understand what I mean. (Man – 
 Nigeria – Christian attending the Pentecostal Church)
He is echoed by this other Muslim interviewee, who notes that in Italy it is pos-
sible to live one’s faith freely, despite the stern gaze of other immigrants:
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In Italy being a Muslim … I do not think there is any difference, I do not 
feel different from others. I say that I do not feel different from others 
when I’m with Italians, I feel good. But when I’m with other Arabs and 
Muslims, for example, maybe, sometimes, I drink a few glasses of wine 
and they look at me badly! Because they say: “You are a Muslim and you 
drink wine”! Because wine is forbidden, but it is forbidden if you have to 
go to pray, of course, you must not drink, but if you are with your friends, 
if you are in the party and it is not a time of prayer, excuse me why? Be-
cause wine makes you feel high, and when you want to go pray you have 
to be 100% awake and you do not have to drink wine and so, when I’m 
with them and I drink a glass of wine, I feel the annoyance, but I do not 
care, I go on. (Woman – Yemen – Muslim)
Interestingly, the appreciation for religious freedom is shown also by those 
who were almost unaware of the fact of being subjected to limitations in this 
field. Almost as if those who migrated for other reasons –mainly economic 
ones–, at some point realized the importance of living in a democratic context, 
whose distinctive icon is represented by (religious) freedom and mutual 
respect.
We sing a lot in our liturgies. This is felt and therefore it can be risky for 
those living in contexts like China. For people who have experienced a 
story similar to those of these two girls, it is a relief to come here and be 
able to sing, to do something publicly, without having to hide.
(…) The most important thing found in Italy: democracy, religious 
freedom. For them, it’s the most important thing, they came for this. 
(Couple of women – China – Evangelic Christians [experience reported 
by their Pastor in Italy])
Finally, our study proves that religious agency can certainly be an integral part 
of (forced) migrants’ public space making, the latter intended as a process tar-
geted to the invention of new ways to live together. This prospect, as we will 
describe now, is shared by many of them. However, the harmonious cohabita-
tion of different religious groups is not an automatic outcome of the arrival of 
people with “non-conformistic” religious backgrounds. As we have already dis-
cussed (Chapter 11), providing education about religious pluralism is a funda-
mental ingredient to build a cohesive society, and to facilitate the process of 
newcomers’ adaptation. At the same time, among the most suggestive insights 
emerged from the fieldwork there is the fact that religion and spirituality pro-
vide the migrants with the lexicon, not only to face everyday challenges and 
troubles, but also to understand personal and community lives and give a 
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meaning to their experiences of sufferance. Once put in a religious perspec-
tive, experiences such as those of persecution and exile gain an unusual signifi-
cance, thus giving the migrants an extraordinary resource at both individual 
and collective level. Indeed, while offering the opportunity for a  personal de-
velopment, the spiritual re-elaboration of these traumas breaks down the logic 
of revenge and rancor, and lays the foundation for a generative attitude, ori-
ented towards the construction of the common good. This point leads us to the 
third dimension that is implied in our reasoning.
The concept under discussion is brilliantly expressed by this couple of 
Baháʾi spouses, who trace a direct relationship between the following four fac-
tors: the experience of discrimination, individual empowerment, the rein-
forcement of personal faith, and the engagement for the common wellbeing.
(…) there are unmotivated people, but we can generally say that all the 
Baháʾís are examples of how not to demotivate and not to commit any act 
of aggression! How can I say … perseverance. Baháʾís are examples of per-
severance. You could also look it up in the websites, there are many testi-
monies. Then I wanted to say that we have grown up with discrimination, 
so in our life there is something called discrimination, which exists from 
our parents who first suffered it and then it comes to us…
(…) we ended up here, but basically there is a reason … global and 
profound that is to resist discrimination to get … To grow, to take this 
crisis as an opportunity for growth and understand that these discrimina-
tions are for our beliefs, our religion. So it’s their problem, it’s not my 
problem. They discriminate against me but the problem is theirs. If I get 
depressed, I have a double problem with myself. They are wrong but I do 
not have to be aggressive with them, I have to be peaceful because it does 
not work. We believe that aggression is not useful for any reason, so I can 
grow and understand that my faith and belief is more important than 
anything and so it is important that I find something for the growth of my 
study, my skills and then give service to the same community that dis-
criminated against me. (Couple [Man and Woman] – Iran – Baháʾi)
In the same line of reasoning, a Pakistani man and a Chinese woman provide 
two other interesting testimonies. They both suggest that it was religion that, 
through the testimonies of other believers who took care of them, instilled in 
them the motivation to help others.
In Italy, I learned to help, so I was not good in Italian … but I see some 
Italian people helping me; so, now, when I see some Pakistani people not 
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able to speak Italian, I start helping them … so this is like a circle of help. 
(Man – Pakistan – Catholic Christian)
(…) coming here, I lost things, my father, my sisters. I came here with my 
mother, I lost my home, my education, the university; but I do not care, 
it’s not important to me. Maybe it’s important to live. Religion is more 
important to me. Even working to make money is no longer important, I 
want to volunteer, to help. If you want to do something, it is enough to 
have some people; I want to have God in my life, to have Love and to 
share it with other people. (Woman – China – Church of God 
Almighty)
Other testimonies as well highlight that a liberal society is the natural humus 
which permits religiosity to widespread all its potential for the common good. 
This young woman coming from Iran, for example, stresses that it is the faith 
which, in principle, has provided a meaning to her life; but it is a liberal context 
which has permitted to caught this meaning, through the choice of helping 
people in need and contributing to the prosperity of society:
(…) having my faith has given me a way of … a purpose of life, a way of 
life, how to live and how to help people, how to have a life of service for 
others. Because in the Baháʾi faith this goal is very important to help oth-
ers, to serve, to educate the younger generations, so my religion, my faith 
has given me an instrument to live a life of service, not just going to uni-
versity, wake up, go to university, go to work, come back and do nothing, 
instead of being useful for society. And this thing abroad helped me a lot, 
because it is freer, everything is freer than in Iran, so I could do all this 
activity with the kids, with the kids who had problems, with so many dif-
ferent people, so I was helped to be useful for society, also to have this 
feeling that I have a purpose in my life. (Woman – Iran – Baháʾi)
Another example is provided by this Iranian woman. In her testimony, the ex-
perience of conversion –in this specific case from Islam to Christianity– seems 
to mark, in a metaphoric manner, a transition to a liberal-democratic way of 
life, as well as to a more conscious and mature personal approach to 
religiosity:
(…) especially when you live in a country where you are still alone … you 
feel much more this need, so … If, for example … it happened that … 
when in Islam they say that God decides on all destinies. So, I thought 
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that God had taken my mother away from me, so I should have had it 
with God (she laughs). So, for a while, I did not even want to talk, that is 
… about subjects that concerned God I did not even want to hear them 
because I was saying “How is this possible? Do you have fun playing with 
it?” And then you know, changing this point of view helps you to live 
more peacefully (…). So, changing point of view helps you a lot to accept 
things, to have more serenity, this is important.
(…) That is in the sense that before you saw God in a higher point, 
looking at us, from above, from above … always just looking at you to 
see what sin you’re making, or maybe, I know, you’re always on trial … 
So, seeing God who stands next to you, who helps you on your jour-
ney, is a very big change. (Woman – Iran – Protestant Christian [former 
Muslim])
To sum it up, the interviews disclose a flowering of religious experiences among 
virtuous practices oriented to the common good. Small gestures or public com-
mitments in favor of the polis and of those inhabitants who are in a precarious 
condition and suffer from a lack of linguistic competence and from having no 
house, no job, no social relations, and no documented identity. The democratic 
configuration of the socio-cultural framework encountered in Italy facilitates 
the fruitfulness of religious practices in behaviors of commitment to the com-
mon good. Besides –it should never be forgotten–, the migrant is encouraged 
to translate his/her faith into good practices precisely because of a “contagion”, 
that is as a form of “restitution” of the services offered by the public adminis-
tration as well as of the care and assistance from the religious community and 
its members. When they perceive the proximity of God, thanks to the benevo-
lent and beneficent proximity of the other, migrants are activated in the ben-
efited logic of emulation/participation in which the solidarity potential of the 
religious experience is released in doing to others what has been done to him/
herself.
Significantly, help is offered without any kind of selection or hindrance 
based on the religious affiliation. This experience, which is marked by a broad 
sense of gratitude, fuels the attitude to “give back” the good that one has been 
given, in the form of commitment to the common good – which, in turn, 
should move away from corporatist models. If the religious experience feeds 
on the intimacy with God, in the sense that the believer acts according to God’s 
will, what is considered to be its ultimately authenticating trait can be found in 
the act of “giving something to someone” – i.e. giving back what one has been 
given for free, without expecting anything in return, and starting to “assist” in-
stead of just “being assisted”.
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(…) I think it is a great spiritual need for their desire to move from the 
condition of being assisted, namely being people who only receive help, 
to living that dimension which, for us, is strongly evangelical and spiri-
tual, where “there is more joy in giving than in receiving”, that is, giving 
support to a weaker person, and therefore they have become involved in 
a discourse of closeness with the elderly, with the children of the suburbs 
who voluntarily give us a helping hand with the poor. And it is a conta-
gion, a truly very fruitful alliance, positive for all we say. Imagine an old 
man in the institute, however, who also lived through difficult times in 
Italy, at the time of fascism … then he finds himself immersed in a diffi-
cult culture, a culture that tells you that you must be afraid of the differ-
ent, you have to look at the world with anxiety and fear, the meeting with 
a refugee who loves you, helps him to reassure himself, to open up to the 
other, to the future, and even the elderly are mines for the fact that refu-
gees are far from the family, they also need words of comfort. (Woman – 
fbos operator – Catholic Christian)
Finally, we have to consider the manner in which (forced) migrants build their 
role in the public space also by soliciting a new understanding of the concept 
of citizenship and of its different components. Coherently with our initial as-
sumptions, interviews provide evidence of how (forced) migrants, through 
their citizenship’s practices, are producing a multi-religious social capital 
which, in its turn, can contribute to the creation of a common good. More in 
detail, we can consider three different kinds of practices that, following the 
well-known Hirschman’s trilogy (1970), can be identified as, respectively, voice, 
exit, and loyalty.
The first practice is exemplified by the chronicle provided by this Nigerian 
man, who directly experienced the cruel violence perpetrated by terrorist 
groups in the name of religion. His suffered testimony –in which it is not easy 
to distinguish the content of reality from the metaphorical one– speaks about 
a shared mobilization of Christians and “authentic” Muslims, united in the pro-
test (voice) towards Boko Haram and its illegitimate claim to be recognized as 
an Islamic troupe:
(…) it’s just the … like ignorant people, it’s like stereotypes and things like 
that. And so, when Boko Haram came, it came and they were an Islamic 
group but they also killed Muslims so people were like: no, Boko Haram is 
not an Islamic group, some people like many Christians, especially Chris-
tians from the South, they felt that Boko Haram was just like an Islamic 
terrorist group but people from the North, people like me who have 
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 Muslim friends and know what a real Muslim is, I wouldn’t say Boko Ha-
ram are Muslims, we know Boko Haram are not Muslims; Muslims knew 
that Boko Haram are not Muslims, they are just a terrorist group and the 
way they use is not as something to give them support or something to 
give them credibility. So, I was there like when Boko Haram came and the 
real Muslims and the real Christians were able to unite and face Boko 
Haram and said: “No, this one is a war just against terrorism”. (Man – 
Nigeria – Christian now attending an Adventist Church)
This kind of experience can be observed in the many cases in which believers 
of different religions and with different migratory backgrounds promoted pub-
lic demonstrations, in Italy and all around Europe, in order to contrast both the 
criminalization of (Muslim) migrants and the ideological use of religious mo-
tives to justify terroristic attacks (see, for example, the mobilization “Not in my 
name”,3 rightly after the terrorist attacks in Paris). It can also be seen in the 
many cases where advocacy coalitions were formed with the aim of supporting 
a “post-national” idea of citizenship (Soysal, 1994), based on porous States’ bor-
ders, and of progressively expanding the systems of protection. In the end, 
once experienced as an obstacle to achieve rights and opportunities, religion 
turns out to be a vehicle to conquer them, through individual and collective 
action.
A second example of citizenship’s practice is offered by this Yemeni woman, 
who declared to have left her country because of the deviant understanding of 
religious precepts by the religious authorities, and because of their attempt to 
control both women’s “brains” and women’s “bodies”. During the interview, she 
insisted on the need to respect the principle according to which religious au-
thorities must not exercise political power. According to her, religion cannot 
be reduced to an instrument of social control, or a means to harass the most 
vulnerable people; on the other hand, no one –neither the political authorities, 
nor the religious authorities– has the right to invade the private relationship 
between God and the single believer:
I am a Muslim and, as we all know, Islam now, as a religion, is not true 
Islam. Now, Islam has become politics, an ideology. Some people, certain 
regimes use religion because of their interests, so religion has become a 
hard thing, a rigid thing, a soulless thing and then religion is influencing 
3 A campaign, launched in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, through social media, by 
young Muslims (often second-generation immigrants) intent on taking a decisive distance 
from the terrorists who call for a holy war.
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women and children more and more because those are the weakest parts 
of society, it was always like this, even before in Europe, when Christian-
ity went through hard times, like us, times of darkness. Because they use 
religion to control people and the same thing happens now in the Arab 
world, they use religion, they did not live it like in Europe that now reli-
gion has become something else and they understood it after years of 
wars, of battle, of death of so many people, they have come to the point 
that religion should be left in peace and you must not mix religion with 
politics, understood? You must not. Religion is just religion and politics is 
another thing. You cannot put both things together. Because this is dan-
gerous. It is not only in Yemen, you can be in other countries; I speak of 
the Arab world in general, the Arab world. You can be the Imam of a 
mosque, like a priest, you can be a Muslim Imam and you can also work 
with politics, you can work … this is not good. You can be an Imam and at 
the same time you are a member of the parliament, or a member of the 
military. It’s all mixed up, all a mess. So religion is all ruined, and therefore 
this ugly figure of the Muslim, I am sorry because Islam is not so, the reli-
gion is not so, it is not this bad thing. Religion is a simple thing, it is a 
simple relationship between us and God, privately. No one must enter 
into this relationship. Nobody has the, let’s say … permission to intervene 
in this relationship. Everyone has one’s own relationship with God and 
that’s it, nobody has to control you or block him with the name of God or 
the name of religion. This is what happens in the Arab world. I say it sin-
cerely … (Woman – Yemen – Muslim)
In front of the gap separating her conception of “true” religion and the mis-
leading interpretation made by many religious leaders –“motivated by non-
religious aims”–, this Muslim woman chose to abandon her origin country. 
Once in Italy, she decided, once more, to adopt an exit strategy –she gave up 
attending the mosque–, intended as a line of action (the only possible one) 
useful to affirm her own distance from people who “are not able to represent 
our religion”. In Simmelian terms (see Chapter 3, §4.1), this behavior could be 
described as the choice to take a distance from religion as a way to affirm one’s 
religiosity.
No, I do not go to any mosque here, I do not like it because I went once 
and I did not like to go because there are people there … you do not feel 
at peace, there is discrimination against women, they put women in a 
room and men in another. We are not together … I do not like it that way. 
Then people, those who run mosques are people … I cannot be, to 
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 represent our religion. I’m sorry but this is the truth, I’m sorry. Because 
even with an Imam from the mosque I went with my husband to take a 
picture in the mosque and the Imam did not allow us to take a picture. 
But can you imagine this thing? He said God said it was forbidden. But 
what is this God? Because I cannot hear lies and shut up, this is my char-
acter. So I arrived in Italy at the age of 44, it’s not easy, because they can-
not mess with me at this age; they messed with me when I was young and 
I did not understand anything. But with my age I now have open eyes and 
I understand everything, so here … “Sorry but who said that we cannot 
take pictures?” And he said: “God!” And I said: “So, why do we have direct 
transmission from Mecca? Why is that not forbidden?” And he was silent, 
he could not answer me. On the contrary, he told me that since I thought 
I knew everything, I could go and become the Imam. He made this joke. 
Those are the people who control Italy here … lousy people. (Woman – 
Yemen – Muslim)
In the same line of reasoning, we can see that the very presence of migrants, 
who suffered the violation of their religious rights and of their freedom, chal-
lenges European “tired” democracies, since through their experience they 
could regain the awareness of the importance of religious rights, intended as 
an archetype –as we have already commented– of both individual rights and 
the quality of a democracy. At the same time, through their presence, (forced) 
migrants challenge established religions, and could turn into an extraordinary 
source of revitalization for European Churches and for European “believers”: 
as observed by a young woman coming from Iran, for many European young 
people, who live in a democratic and secularized society, the relationship with 
religiosity could not be so different than that experienced in an illiberal or au-
tocratic society.
And do you know what the first thing is for them? Being able to freely 
express faith without fear of losing your life. Does it seem trivial? Look is 
essential. It is … I saw the Albanians again after years of persecution, be-
ing able to express the faith where the only thing they did, they could 
secretly do the sign of the cross, an Albanian woman said: “P. has taken 
away everything, but this is not me, they could remove it secretly”. They 
could not have any religious signs; they could not have anything, the Al-
banians. Under the dictatorship and in short … they were certainly perse-
cuted very seriously until 1994. But there is the only thing that remained 
for me, before going to bed, secretly, nobody saw me; it was the sign of the 
cross. Then you can freely express your faith without incurring in serious 
risks. Is it trivial? No, it’s vital. It is the first thing: to be able to go to a 
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church, to be able to confess, to pray, to make the sign of the cross, to 
freely express, to put a rosary on the finger, to be able to show Christians 
simply, without fear of the risk of life. Is it trivial? (…). Because the right 
to faith must be defended for all, must be protected for all, everyone has 
the right to express faith in the respect of their traditions, their culture, 
their faith. And we must help those who are all free to express in faith, to 
welcome Christians who in many parts of the world today find it hard to 
express faith. And then we try to express the closeness to all … in a net-
work like I told you before, but above all to allow him to pray and then the 
celebrations with them really become a source of emotion, to be able to 
return to celebrate the Eucharist, not in the basements, not secretly, but 
with the open doors of the church. (Man – Religious leader – Catholic 
Christian)
(…) in my opinion, a kind of brainwashing, which actually has an oppo-
site effect, in the sense that they do this to force you, but you overcome it 
only as an exam, afterwards you do not remember what you had studied. 
And … then nothing. Instead I do not know a thing that … I found a lot in 
common here, then when I was studying at the academy, I saw my friends 
who were mostly Catholic. Then they did all these paths of the Catholics, 
like communion … then, when it was enough, they no longer went to 
church … that is, it seems to me, I do not know, maybe I’m wrong, maybe 
not, but it seems to me that they were like me, maybe I did all these things 
in my Islam, I did things because I had to do them … ( Woman – Iran – 
Protestant Christian [former Muslim])
On the other hand, as suggested by this pastoral operator, it is exactly by wel-
coming newcomers that established religious communities lay the founda-
tions of a peaceful coexistence, inspired by the values of humanism, which are 
the same that gave life to the European democracies:
(…) the custom, for example, of welcoming, sharing the same churches 
(with the Orthodox, author’s note) is the best way to actually transmit the 
kind of attitude we have, so the bishops themselves remain open-
mouthed to hear the description of what happens here and this, in my 
opinion, is one of the signs that we distribute and that we will see how 
they will flourish, but the reception is something that never remains 
fruitless. (Man – Pastoral operator – Catholic Christian)
Finally, moving on to considering the third paradigmatic pattern of citizen-
ship’s practice, this young Baháʾi offers a brilliant example of an approach 
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based on the concept of loyalty. Her personal engagement with (Italian) chil-
dren, independently of their religion, reflects an authentic desire to participate 
in the settlement society, and to contribute in the creation of a common good.
This particular activity that I do is a group that is called Youths’ Group for 
middle school kids; we give a space for them. It does not matter what re-
ligion they come from, what background, what origin, it matters just to 
have a space together and try to pull out the virtues and the positive 
things that they have within them and put them into practice to help oth-
ers. So, channeling positive energy that these kids have, put them into 
practice to be useful for society, to improve the environment they live. So 
every week we see each other and read a book that is a storybook of chil-
dren of their age and then we talk about different concepts, such as 
justice, peace, unity, these things, and then we also have a moment of 
practice, then do something for our environment – for example, going to 
clean the park, going to visit the elderly center, to give them a way to 
serve, to do something for their environment. And I like this a lot, be-
cause I live with them and it’s a lot of fun, they have lots of energy and 
then you can see how you can help these kids, because society considers 
them … that they are very … they are in an age that is very difficult, let’s 
say … instead, when you trust them, they can do everything and this thing 
is very beautiful. (Woman – Iran – Baháʾi)
This kind of stance is the most coherent with a generative idea of citizenship, 
that is a citizenship able to embrace multiple identities, aimed at supporting 
the empowerment of people who mainly risk to be excluded, and fueled by 
participative practices oriented toward the common good (Martinelli, 2013). 
As a matter of fact, citizenship is a process: for everyone, but particularly for 
those who suffered from a sense of strangeness in their own land, and then 
have been experiencing the concept of hospitality. Several of our interviewees 
spoke about their path from a condition (and a feeling) of parasitic presence, 
of marginality with respect to the polis and its social plots, towards forms and 
practices of social protagonism. What’s more, some interviews show that it is 
exactly the religious experience and the belonging to a religious community 
that promotes a generative virtue in relation to the common good, since they 
activate and encourage training in practical forms of citizenship: from the edu-
cation of the children to the care of the environment, from the responsibility 
for a working activity to the tax contribution for the well-being of the country 
in which “you feel at home”. As a matter of fact, as we have already mentioned, 
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this stance is strongly favored by a spiritual understanding of one’s own life-
experience, including the experience of suffering and of (forcibly) migrating. 
At the same time, as suggested by this pastoral operator, it represents the ac-
complishment of the most authentic (migrants’) spiritual need: the need to 
give something to those in need; more particularly, to share, with those who 
have not yet discovered it, the true meaning of life:
(…) I saw it just as a satisfaction of her spiritual need: that of giving some-
thing to those who have less than her. This is already a person … she does 
not work, but the fact that she felt … and told us: “But, you are really pre-
cious, because you give us the idea, the support, the support, but also the 
cue to throw us out. And do us too, because we are a little hesitant in an-
other city. We are not rooted, no?”. Here, and this seems to us the most 
satisfying … of the greatest spirituality because to teach people or not to 
teach, I have nothing to teach, but to tell them how life must be lived well. 
(Woman – fbos operator – Christian Catholic)
It is almost superfluous to observe that this type of posture is not the natural 
result of living in a democratic context. Numerous variables influence the rela-
tionship between religiosity and the attitude towards the host society and its 
well-being: from the values  transmitted by the parents to the personal way of 
elaborating the migratory experience; from the behavior of the people met in 
Italy to the attitude of religious leaders. Their singular combination explains 
the multiplicity of possible individual feelings and behaviors. However, our 
study allowed us to grasp the importance of certain societal conditions and 
actions. Among them, the contrast to the widespread “religious illiteracy” and 
the education to religious pluralism. In particular, regaining the awareness of 
“our” –i.e. the Italian one, strongly shaped by Christianism– cultural and reli-
gious identity constitutes the indispensable premise for the construction of a 
society founded on authentic religious pluralism oriented towards the com-
mon good. We will analyze this point in Chapter 16, through the illustration of 
the synodal experience conducted in the Diocesis of Milan. Here, it must be 
observed how this premise represents, in its turn, a supportive condition to let 
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Chapter 13
Religion and Integration: Issues from International 
Literature
Annavittoria Sarli and Giulia Mezzetti
The available literature on the relationship between migration and integration 
can be divided in two research strands that are based on opposite sets of as-
sumptions developed mostly on the two sides of the Atlantic, namely in West-
ern Europe and North America (Alba, Foner, 2015; Kivisto, 2014; Lewis, Kashy-
ap, 2013; García-Muñoz, Neuman, 2012; Zolberg, Woon, 1999).
The North American literature on migration –particularly the us one– tends 
to see religion as a factor fostering integration, by playing a role in addressing 
migrants’ social needs. Religious identity and participation in public religious 
life are thought to facilitate the Americanization of recent migrants and of 
their descendants, strengthen their sense of belonging vis-à-vis the host coun-
try and increase the level of acceptance of minorities by the dominant group 
(Foner, Alba, 2008).
On the contrary, in Europe the literature sees migrants’ religion as a prob-
lem and a potential source of conflict, in line with a social attitude widespread 
across the continent. In particular, the relationship between religion and inte-
gration tends to be framed in a negative way as religious affiliation, especially 
with Islam, is considered to be a marker of wide social distance and a factor of 
disadvantage in the interaction with the native population (Fiddian- Qasmiyeh, 
Qasmiyeh, 2010).
These distinctive, opposite perspectives about the link between religion and 
integration derive from significant divergences in the two social and cultural 
contexts, which generated two different public discourses on the issue. In fact, 
we are here dealing with contextual discrepancies of cultural, institutional, 
and demographic nature (Kivisto, 2014). These differences, in turn, have pro-
duced diverging influences on social research, in terms of assumptions, of top-
ics to be investigated, and, hence, of findings. Indeed, as Weber (1922 (2003) 
authoritatively pointed out, social sciences are always rooted in and produced 
by the culture where they unfold.
The present chapter sets to examine these contextual differences and their 
influence on the research questions and approaches that have animated the 
study of the relationship between religion and migrant integration, across the 
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two sides of the pond. In §1 and §2, describing respectively the North Ameri-
can and the European contexts, we follow a similar structure: we start by pre-
senting the context and institutional arrangements characterizing the two ar-
eas and we reconstruct the different public discourses that developed in the 
two public arenas; subsequently, we discuss how this impacted social science 
research on these topics. In light of the comparison outlined, in §3 we propose 
some conclusive reflections that put these two “traditions” into perspective by 
tracing recent tendencies that are actually making the two contexts more simi-
lar in their approach to migrant religion in integration processes. On the one 
hand, public discourse in the US started framing migrant’s religion as prob-
lematic when it comes to Muslim migrants and communities; on the other 
hand, across European countries, both institutions (at different levels) and 
civil society started considering religious leaders and communities as poten-
tial allies in facilitating integration and in promoting social cohesion, thus pos-
sibly getting past the idea that religion is intrinsically an obstacle to integra-
tion. This, in turn, may open further directions for research.
1 Religion and Integration in North American Social Sciences
1.1 Salient Contextual Factors
In North America, and particularly in the US, social sciences tend to describe 
religion in positive terms, as a major facilitator of integration and a source for 
overcoming social exclusion. This view has been crucially influenced by a se-
ries of historical processes.
In the US, the institutionalization of religion took place on the basis of the 
religious diversity featured among colonies and then States. Such a diversity 
made it impossible to create a single “State Church” in the newly-formed fed-
eral State. This has led to constitutional fundamentals being codified to en-
shrine essential principles such as religious freedom, substantial equality 
among all faiths, neutrality or equidistance between the State and all confes-
sions, with a clear separation between Church and State. Kuru (2009:11) defines 
this institutional setting as “passive secularism”, whereby such a neutrality on 
the State’s side allows for the public visibility of each religion. Undeniably, un-
til the end of the Second World War, the Catholic and Jewish minorities en-
joyed little acceptance among the Protestant majority and were forced to rel-
egate their religion to the private sphere. However, such an institutional 
framework has allowed religious groups to put forward religiously-based de-
mands, which have become a common feature of American life, laying the 
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foundations for a multi-religious nation from the very beginning (Foner, Alba, 
2008). Based on these assumptions, by the mid-1900s Jews and Catholics could 
be integrated into the American pluralistic system. This process has shaped the 
religious pluralism that many migrants with different religious backgrounds 
still experience once they move to the US–including the more recently settled 
Muslim minority, whose incorporation in the American religious landscape 
presents significant differences as compared to Europe.
Indeed, the evolution of religious pluralism in the US must be seen in the 
context of the nation-building process. Since its creation, the US have labelled 
itself as a country of immigration, and have made migration a founding myth 
underpinning its national identity. As a result, the permanent settlement and 
naturalization of migrants tended to be promoted, which facilitated both the 
migration and the integration process at the earliest stage by strengthening 
migrants’ emotional bond with the receiving society. While the country has 
promoted the “Americanization” of newcomers, it has also recognized the le-
gitimacy of multiple identities – the so-called “hyphenated identities”. Reli-
gious identity has therefore often been perceived as a distinctive feature to be 
combined with a common sense of belonging to the American nation, thus 
playing a key role in the incorporation of migrants into the dominant society 
(Papademetriou et al., 2016; Alba, Foner, 2015).
The passive secularism (Kuru, 2009) featuring Church-State relations in the 
US is at the basis of the central role played by religion in integration dynamics. 
According to this setting, the State allows the public visibility of religion. This 
has been conducive of a positive view of religion, generally conceived as a civic 
value and highly acknowledged in the public sphere. Even if in the US religios-
ity has been declining over successive cohorts (Voas, Chaves, 2016), in the US 
religiosity tends to be exhibited and being religious is considered as the social 
norm: surveys concerning religious beliefs and services attendance demon-
strate high levels of religiosity among Americans (e.g. pew, 2011; Gallup, 2009). 
As Alba and Foner note (2015), Americans tend to overstate their church at-
tendance and degree of religious practice; however, this very tendency testifies 
to the perceived importance attributed to religion on the American public 
ethos. Hence, the religious engagement of migrants ends up favoring their so-
cial inclusion (Kivisto, 2014; Niebuhr, 2007).
This is the institutional and socio-cultural environment where North Ameri-
can social scientists have conceived their research questions, and the ground 
they have explored to formulate their research outcomes. It is easily conceivable 
that, within this framework, religion has generally been observed as a source for 
integration and research has investigated how this facilitating role is played.
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There are also demographic contextual factors that account for this tenden-
cy in North American social sciences: in the US, the majority of migrants iden-
tify as Christians, a feature that is in line with the one of the dominant society. 
Therefore, viewing religion as a catalyst of integration has been favored by the 
perceived “low” religious distance between natives and migrants. On the other 
hand, the predominantly Christian group of Mexican migrants face serious in-
tegration issues (Papademetriou, 2016; García-Muñoz, Neuman, 2012). Subse-
quently, in the American context, the main dividing line marking social dis-
tance between native and migrants tends to be language and cultural belonging 
(Zolberg, Woon, 1999). On the contrary, religion and religiosity are generally 
seen as a potential bridge between different ethnic groups and this common 
perception is mirrored in the approaches adopted by social researchers.
Nonetheless, even such a “religion-friendly” context has not been immune 
to the expression of concerns towards religions that are depicted as more 
 “distant” – and particularly towards Islam, which has been framed as the “en-
emy of the West”. In the US, a negative construction of Islam had been taking 
place in the immediate post-Cold War era, when Islam started being cast as the 
new threat for Western powers: indeed, Huntington’s theses (1993) about the 
existence of a “clash of civilizations” between the West and Islam have been 
gaining currency in most public debates worldwide (Nielsen, 2013). This could 
not but be reinforced by the 9/11 events and by the following string of jihadist 
attacks perpetrated in Western countries. However, paradoxically, for a long 
time such concerns have only marginally regarded Muslim migrants living in 
the US. In fact, they could benefit from the institutional arrangements that fa-
vor the accommodation of new religions (Alba, Foner, 2015). This has also been 
facilitated by the fact that they constitute a small minority and that, contrary 
to the majority of Christian migrants, they have reached a high degree of socio-
economic integration, with levels of education even higher than the national 
average. Rather, the perception of threat has long been imputed to Islam as an 
external enemy within the realm of international relations, which led to frame 
this religion in securitarian terms (Foner, Alba, 2008; Frisina, 2010).
However, as we will discuss in the final section of the present chapter, recent 
analyses have highlighted how this tendency is taking on a more culturalist 
flavor, with Islam –and more precisely American Muslims– being subjected to 
forms of cultural racism, which parallel similar, more rooted attitudes that 
characterize the European context more profoundly. This does not mean that 
manifestations of this type of racism were completely absent in the American 
context in the past decades; however, they concerned fringes of American so-
ciety (Council on American-Islamic Relations, 2016). How this has become a 
more mainstreamed trend will be discussed in §3.
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1.2 Religion as a Catalyst of Integration in US Social Sciences
In the preceding pages, we have analyzed the socio-cultural and demographic 
features that have generated, within US society, positive perceptions of mi-
grants’ religious belongings and their function for social cohesion. As has al-
ready been hinted at, this orientation in collective representations and public 
discourse has undoubtedly played an influential role in shaping the assump-
tions and perspectives of social researchers in exploring the link between reli-
gion and integration. Indeed, the view of religion as a resource in integration 
dynamics can already be traced in classics of the American literature on mi-
grants’ religious life, such as the contributions by Herberg (1960) and Handlin 
(1951) that highlight the particular role religion played in the assimilation of 
Catholic Europeans and Jews who had come to the US –a predominantly prot-
estant society– after World War ii. In this regard, Herberg (1960) observes that 
having found greater social acceptance of religious diversity, rather than eth-
nic diversity, these migrants saw the religious sphere as a privileged space for 
the construction of their own American identity (Herberg, 1960).
Gordon (1964) and Smith (1978) reiterate this consideration by noting that 
the religious connotation of migrants’ identity allows them to maintain their 
cultural specificity while blurring their ethnic and national differences. As a 
component that is not necessarily linked to a specific place, religious identifi-
cation offers the possibility to settle in a new territory without losing ties with 
one’s origins and traditions. Kurien’s “Becoming American by becoming Hin-
du” (1998) illustrates this idea very clearly, as it presents the mechanism by 
which Indian migrants leverage on their Hindu identity, or rather its updated 
version, resulting from the adaptation to the new context, to claim their posi-
tion within the American pluralistic society, while maintaining ties with the 
Hindu tradition. Similarly, Ebaugh and Chafetz (2000) define religious institu-
tions as physical and social spaces where the adaptation to the new environ-
ment can develop along with the cultural continuity needed by migrants.
This approach to religion, which took shape at the time when Judaism and 
Catholicism were being embedded into the US pluralistic system, has charac-
terized all relevant North American literature, and continued to permeate US 
social sciences, even after new waves of migration from non-European coun-
tries have greatly expanded the religious diversity of the American society, es-
pecially since the Immigration and Naturalization Services Act was passed in 
1965 (Portes, Rumbaut, 2006; Casanova, Zolberg, 2002; Warner, 2000a, 2000b).
Thus, drawing on this scientific tradition, which mirrored a  “religion-friendly” 
social and cultural context, North American social scientists have been tend-
ing to observe religion as a source of tangible and intangible assets – a “spiri-
tual capital” that promotes the integration of migrants (Hagan, 2008; Stark, 
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Finke, 2000). As we will see, most of their investigations on the link between 
religion and integration aim at exploring the various components of this “spiri-
tual capital”, shedding light on their function in favoring integration dynamics, 
with reference to several domains of social life.
As thoroughly explained in Chapter 17, individual and collective identities 
are process-based and multi-dimensional, as they are constantly re-shaped ac-
cording to the historical and social context, and are composed of multiple as-
pects that are more or less coherent with each other (Ajrouch, 2004). The very 
process of migrating produces deep changes in the migrant's socio-cultural 
context of reference, thereby generating the migrant's need to redefine oneself 
in relation to the new environment. North American literature widely shows 
how religion can provide valuable tools in this sense (Talebi, Desjardins, 2012), 
both for maintaining one’s own identity in the new context of emigration, and 
for adapting to such a new context, even across different generations.
US scholars observe that, when building their identity, migrants draw on 
their religious sphere by activating several mechanisms. For instance, religious 
organizations are used to replicate major aspects of the culture of origin in 
order to keep the ethnic identity alive and pass it on to second generations. As 
a result, different aspects of the culture of origin are often incorporated into 
religious ceremonies. For example, rituals can be performed in the language of 
the place of origin and be accompanied by traditional music (Ebaugh, 2010; 
Foner, Alba, 2008; Carnes, 2004; Ebaugh, Chafetz, 2000; Warner, Wittner, 1998; 
Min, 1992).
Min’s work (2005) shows, for example, how groups of Hindu Indians and 
Christian Koreans preserve their ethnic traditions by overlapping and combin-
ing ethnic and religious rituals together. With reference to second generations 
of Christian Koreans born in the US, Chai (1998) illustrates that religious orga-
nizations contribute to the reproduction of ethnic identity through the sacral-
ization of traditional values. In other words, people reinterpret their tradition-
al culture in the light of the values of a conservative Christian morality.
Another aspect of religion that was studied by North American scholars in 
connection with identity construction is religious conversion. The latter are an 
increasingly frequent phenomenon – in general terms and not only among mi-
grants, in a cultural context that is characterized by a growing subjectivism in 
religious orientations (as illustrated in depth in Chapter 3 of the present vol-
ume). Conversion has been conceptualized as the adoption of an identity that 
has been chosen independently and consciously for its role in responding to 
existential needs (Hervieu-Léger, 2003). Several studies on migrant conver-
sions in the US highlight that people’s agency plays a crucial role in shaping 
new religious identities and in combining them with other aspects of identity, 
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such as the ethnic or national one (Ebaugh, 2010). For instance, in exploring 
the reality of some Chinese Churches in the US, Ng (2002) notes that, by con-
verting to Christianity, these migrants bring with them their own cultural cat-
egories, their own symbols and their own practices, which are all incorporated 
into a religiosity that is both a distinctive trait of a minority culture and a trait 
shared with the dominant society. In focusing on a similar context, Yang (1999, 
2000) shows that conversions drive people to renegotiate the very meaning of 
“belonging”. By redefining what being Chinese, American and Christian means 
and by identifying and combining the elements of each of these multiple iden-
tities that are most functional to the new context, migrants perform selective 
processes in both assimilating to the host society and preserving ethnicity.
Smith-Hefner (1994) also notes that, among Cambodian Khmer refugees in 
the US, the conversion to Christianity addresses the need to abandon the pre-
vious identity and acquire a new one, thus leaving the pain, the grief and the 
guilt experienced behind. At the same time, however, Smith-Hefner highlights 
a further function: conversion offers opportunities for social mobility, by en-
abling people to access positions of authority and prestige within religious or-
ganizations. Several authors stress that religious participation can address the 
need to build a positive social identity. The roles available within religious 
communities allow migrants to obtain the social recognition that is denied in 
the hosting community. Both on a personal level and in the eyes of members 
of the religious group, the position reached through religious practice enables 
people to cope with the sense of subordination experienced in emigration, 
namely in the social and occupational sphere (Warner, 2000). Smith-Hefner 
(1994) takes the analysis of the functions of religious conversion among Khmer 
refugees even further. According to the author, by becoming Christian, many 
young Khmers get involved in activities and organizations that socialize them 
to a new system of values. As a result, by distancing themselves from their own 
tradition, they have the possibility to reduce the barriers that separate them 
from the mainstream American society. Hirschman (2004) has efficaciously 
synthesized the workings of these processes by arguing that religious organiza-
tions in the US provide immigrants with psychological solace from discrimina-
tion, hostility and, in general, from the traumatic experience of emigrating 
(refuge), access to opportunities for economic mobility (resources) as well as 
social recognition (respectability).
So far, the analysis has focused on how some of these resources are activated 
through an identity building that is able to provide migrants with value sys-
tems, relationships and opportunities for social mobility. Religion, however, 
can also mediate other adaptive processes, as it represents a cultural institu-
tion that helps humans make sense of everyday life and of the challenges it 
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poses (Bankston, 1997). Religious involvement and practice constitute an indi-
vidual and collective process that can enable the maintenance of emotional 
balance. This is particularly true in situations of trauma or stress, both factors 
being often associated with the migration experience. For this reason, several 
US authors underline the importance of the spiritual resources made available 
by religions and underline their positive psychological effects on migrants’ 
ability to cope with uncertainty and difficulties (Kyoung Ok, Lee, 2012; Connor, 
2012; Suárez-Orozco et al., 2012).
These resources consist first of all of the consolidated and rich symbolic 
heritage that people can draw from to give sense to the pain experienced in the 
process of migration (detachment from motherland, orientation in a new con-
text, racism…). Religious organizations often support people in these process-
es of creation of meaning through a set of activities that Schiffauer (2006) de-
fines as spiritual welfare, ranging from purification exercises to spiritual 
assistance. Furthermore, through these organizations, migrants can build so-
cial networks that provide them with psychological support in times of 
hardship.
By analyzing data on the mental health of migrants in Australia, the US and 
Western Europe, Connor (2012) notes a positive correlation between regular 
participation in religious activities and emotional well-being in the three con-
texts. According to his analysis, a close relationship between religion and mi-
grants’ inner balance exists independently of the contextual elements, which 
leads the author to suggest that this aspect be taken into account when design-
ing integration policies, as involvement in religious organizations appears to 
be more effective than participation in other types of ethnic associations.
In the case of migrants who have escaped from situations of mass violence, 
persecution, war or natural disaster, the comforting power of faith is often cru-
cial. Religious values and rituals, indeed, provide a sense of peace and inner 
salvation (Fox, 2012). Populations that have lost their original geographical 
bound and that are now scattered across regions can regroup around religious 
organizations. The latter help them activate social practices that, in turn, give 
a new meaning to people’s life (Talebi, Desjardins, 2012; Zhou et al., 2002).
While spiritual capital encompasses a series of intangible resources, such as 
the strength of faith and its “curative” power, North American literature also 
highlights a series of tangible advantages that, for the most part, are accessible 
through participation in religious organizations. Religious organizations offer 
tools to overcome the initial hardship of integration and draw a path of up-
wards social mobility over time. They promote social support services and, 
thanks to the trust established among fellow believers, they facilitate the flow 
of information on housing, education, entrepreneurship or employment 
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 opportunities (Cadge et al., 2013; Munshi, 2003; Guest, 2003; Campion, 2003; 
Ebaugh, Pipes, 2001; Menjivar, 2001; Bankston, Zhou, 2000). In some cases, reli-
gious institutions become a source of information and social support even for 
migrants with different religious affiliations. For instance, in some contexts, 
the Church plays a crucial role in promoting migrants’ rights, as well as their 
political and social inclusion, thanks to its transnational presence and the ac-
tivism of its members (Kim, 2011).
Several US researchers see religious communities of migrants as places 
where second generations can acquire the social and cultural capital needed to 
succeed at school and get a sound position in the receiving society (Ebaugh, 
2010; Bankston, Zhou, 1996; 1995). In some cases, they do so by organizing edu-
cational activities, such as language courses, to maintain the language of origin 
and learn about the language of the hosting country (Lopez, 2009). In other 
cases, they run private schools that second generations see as an important 
opportunity for social mobility (Smith-Hefner, 1994). Several North American 
authors underline the protective role played by religious organizations vis-à-vis 
migrant children. By promoting various recreational and educational activities 
for children while their parents are working, they often manage to prevent 
them from falling in deviance (Foner, Alba, 2008; Zhou, Bankston, 1998). For all 
these reasons, Cao (2005) and Guest (2003) describe religious communities as 
places where second generations can find social, financial and parental 
support.
In addition, many US scholars describe how religious groups provide mi-
grants with a first opportunity to learn about participatory democracy (Foley, 
Hoge, 2007; Eck, 2001). Through religious activism, migrants have the opportu-
nity to take part in elections and steering committees or learn how to chair 
meetings and organize public events (Foner, Alba, 2008). Religious institutions 
often encourage volunteering, also by opening it up to people of other faiths 
(Ecklund, 2006; Ebaugh, Pipes, 2001; Ebaugh, Chafetz, 2000; Wuthnow, 1999; 
Cnaan, 1997; Min, 1992).
North American literature widely shows that religion may become a re-
source for engaging migrants civically, but also for mobilizing them politically 
(Kurien, 2014; Levitt, 2008; Ecklund, 2006; Ramakrishnan, Viramontes, 2006; 
Lien, 2004; Menjivar, 2003; Chen, 2002; Kurien, 2001). Some religious groups 
promote courses on active citizenship, support citizenship programs and en-
courage the participation of naturalized migrants in elections (Ebaugh, 
Chafetz, 2000; Min, 1992).
Some US authors highlight that different religious ideologies have a differ-
ent influence on how organizations support migrants’ civic engagement and 
political participation. Chen (2002), for example, shows that a Buddhist  temple 
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and an evangelical organization, both run by Taiwanese migrants, can have 
very different approaches to civic engagement, with the Buddhist temple tend-
ing to promote the organization of charity activities for the community with 
greater intensity than the Evangelical Church. One of the main reasons moti-
vating this difference lies in the more heightened perception of “foreignness” 
associated to Buddhist immigrants, who feel pressured to prove their “Ameri-
canness” through acts of public relations more than Christian immigrants do.
As illustrated by some North American scholars, religion can also have an 
important impact on how naturalized migrants are positioned in the political 
landscape of the hosting country, by encouraging new ideological alliances. 
Ethnic and religious identity often determines what forms these political coali-
tions take (Ebaugh, 2010; Lien, 2004; Leal et al., 2005; Espinosa et al., 2003). The 
country of origin sometimes has an influence on the political life of the host-
ing country through migrants’ transnational relations within the religious do-
main (Levitt, 2002). Moreover, religion can lay the foundations for global citi-
zenship by encouraging forms of transnational activism, for example on 
themes such as education, work and health (Levitt, 2008).
This literature review testifies to the multifarious perspectives in which reli-
gion has been described as a facilitator of integration by social scientists in the 
North American context, in line with research questions and designs that in-
tentionally set to explore the role of religion as a resource in the process of 
settlement. However, as we will see in the following paragraph, the peculiari-
ties of the European context produced a completely different perspective, 
which interrogates the relationship between religion and integration in oppo-
site terms, as it frames religion as an obstacle for the incorporation of newcom-
ers, rather than as a potential resource.
2 Research on the Religion and Integration Nexus in Western Europe
2.1 The European Context: Secularization, State-Church Relations and 
the Public Discourse about Migrants’ Religion
While the cultural landscape of the US allows for a more generalized accep-
tance of religion, some core and deeply entrenched traits of Western Europe’s 
cultural, social and political identity make it impossible to view religion as a 
facilitator of migrants’ integration processes, which cause an extremely differ-
ent consideration and treatment of religion as compared to the US. These core 
features result from two main historical developments: on the one hand, “secu-
larization” and the continuously diminishing levels of religiosity of Western 
European populations; on the other hand, long-established institutional 
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 arrangements governing State-Church relationships, which make the enjoy-
ment of religious rights almost exclusive for “old”, mainstream religions. As di-
vergent and unrelated as they may seem, these two tendencies are strongly 
intertwined: in fact, scholars in this field widely agree in tracing both of them 
to the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and its effects.
That Treaty put an end to bloody and violent conflicts between and within 
Protestant and Catholic reigns by sanctioning that the religion of a territory 
would be that of its ruler. That had considerable consequences in two direc-
tions. First, it established an official, direct linkage between modern European 
States and their respective rulers’ religion, thereby creating the ground for es-
tablishing a State Church. Second, it identified a clear condition for the main-
tenance of peace – that is, the expunction of religion from public and political 
affairs, as religion, from that moment on, was not to be made a matter of con-
tention or a reason for waging war between and within States. This paved the 
way for a gradual “banning” of religion from what we now define “the public 
sphere”: the issue lied not so much in religion qua talis; rather, it was repre-
sented by its public dimension and manifestation, with its possible conse-
quences at the geo-political level (May et al., 2014). Religion was then gradually 
confined to the private sphere: faith was assigned a limited –and limiting– 
space. As explained by Introini (2017), this meant positing the very possibility 
to distinguish between what is private and public in religion, by judging the 
latter as particularly dangerous for social order. Therefore, while establishing 
almost exclusive relations with one main confession, the State “obliged” reli-
gious institutions to recognize that there were two separate entities: the State, 
having the monopoly over the management of political affairs, and the Church, 
that ought to deal only with religious affairs, within the space delimited by the 
State. These institutional arrangements regulating the “boundaries” of religion 
are therefore co-essential with the genesis of the modern nation State, based 
as it is upon the “taming” of religion. This is the reason why the Peace of West-
phalia sowed the seeds of secularism, as primarily understood as an intention-
al separation between “the political” and “the religious”.
Today, we can distinguish the consequences and implications of these his-
torical developments for our object of study in two main domains. Firstly, the 
institutional settlements regulating the presence of the “nation’s” Church in 
every European nation-State entailed that there would be no –or very limited– 
religious pluralism within each of them (Kivisto, 2014). Contrary to the US, 
where no single state Church could (and can) be established, allowing for a 
gradual pluralization of the religious landscape, every European nation-State 
would accord special privileges to the Church (be it Protestant or Catholic), 
which entailed a substantial religious homogeneity in each of them, with one 
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dominant, prevailing confession. These privileges seem to be unattainable by 
the “new” religions brought by newcomers – which accounts for substantial 
inequalities in the possibility to enjoy religious rights. For instance, representa-
tives of migrant religious communities may find it practically impossible to 
obtain funds to construct places of worship, or to establish religious schools, 
across Western European countries, or had (and still have) to go through 
very lengthy processes for being acknowledged as interlocutors by local and 
 national-level authorities (Laurence, 2012; Joppke, Torpey, 2013; Alba, Foner, 
2015). The reluctance of European States to accommodate migrants’ religions 
institutionally –and to acknowledge the religious plurality now characterizing 
their societies– is linked to the peculiar economism that has traditionally been 
marking the European migration regime. By importing manpower in the form 
of “temporary migrants” or of “guest workers” in the post-war decades, Western 
European countries have followed a model by which migrants’ presence was 
conceived as purely momentary, aimed as it was at filling labor market’s con-
tingent demand for work force. In such a perspective, migrants have been 
viewed only as workers, which entailed a long disregard for the social, cultural 
and religious components of their identities – and a consequent institutional 
neglect of these aspects in the process of migrants’ incorporation (Zanfrini, 
2019). Although this model typically characterized post-war immigration, its 
effects are still persistent, as the example of States’ (absent or belated) recogni-
tion of religious pluralism clearly shows.
Secondly, and even more importantly, political secularism (separation be-
tween Church and State, and erasure of the Church from political affairs) stim-
ulated cultural secularism (gradual diminution of personal levels of religiosity 
among individuals). According to May et al. (2014), the division between the 
political and the religious, superimposed on the distinction between the pub-
lic and the private, entailed that less and less value would be attributed to the 
religious, because the public/political was considered to be much more impor-
tant (Introini, 2017). In other words, the progressive devitalization of the public 
dimension of religion (necessary to contain its potential as a source of con-
flicts) caused a progressive loss in importance of religion even in the private 
sphere. Incidentally, this would lead to consider those faiths in which the be-
liever is encouraged to cultivate an extremely privatized practice (read, the 
Protestant confessions) as better compatible with the public ethos – something 
that affects the way research is conducted in this domain, as we will see 
below.
This process was also significantly reinforced by the diffusion of Illuminist 
ideals, whose trust in the human’s reason and rationalism would free men from 
the obscurantist conditionings of tradition and superstition – and, ultimately, 
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of religion. Countless sociological accounts explain how the European experi-
ence of the “project of modernity” is co-essential with the process of secular-
ization. Admittedly, contemporary Europe is characterized by a coexistence of 
secularized attitudes and different forms of religious beliefs and practices (see 
Chapter 3), whose vitality is also meaningfully linked to the cultural transfor-
mations generated by globalization and migration. Therefore, while religion 
has all but disappeared, neither in public life nor in private lives (Pollack, Ros-
ta, 2017), factual evidence points to a prevailing decline in “traditional” reli-
gious attendance and behaviors (Hunt, 2005). Indeed, for the majority of West-
ern Europeans, it is commonsensical to represent themselves as non-religious, 
with religious symbols of major, traditional denominations simply being per-
ceived as elements of the cultural heritage. Surveys well illustrate this trend: 
according to a pew study (2018), only 22% of interviewed Western European 
Christians declared to attend a place of worship regularly. Only a fifth –or less– 
of the population of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands would affirm that religion is very important in their lives, as reported by 
another survey conducted by pew (2011).
In light of the above-described cultural setting, it is not surprising that Eu-
ropeans tend to view religion as the most problematic aspect of immigrant 
integration. In nations characterized by religious uniformity (rather than by 
the coexistence of different faiths as in the US), and by increasingly marked 
secularist attitudes, public discourses across European countries inevitably fix-
ated on migrants’ religiosity and degree of practice of religion as the most 
prominent “features” incarnating the “difference” between receiving societies 
and migrants, ascribing to religion all of what most distinguishes Europeans 
from “the Other”. As Alba and Foner (2015) point out, immigrant religion in 
Europe has become a significant marker of social divide and a source of con-
flict as “race” is in the context of the US. In recurrent debates about migration-
related anxieties, the religious affiliation of immigrant populations has come 
to represent a dividing line to the extent that it is deemed the main obstacle in 
their process of integration.
However, it is safe to affirm that this does not refer to “any” religious affilia-
tion, as these tensions concern most exclusively Islam. Indeed, as many schol-
ars have amply demonstrated (e.g. Césari, 2004, 2013; Modood et al., 2006; Mas-
sari, 2006; Bowen, 2007; Celermajer, 2007; Foner, Alba, 2008; Fredette, 2014; 
Beaman, 2017; Alba, Foner, 2015; Bowen et al., 2015; Pickel, 2018) Western societ-
ies, and particularly European ones, have developed a terribly fraught relation-
ship with Muslims migrants and the practice of Islam over the past decades. 
The reason why this is the case partly lies in the fact that Muslims constitute 
(and will continue to constitute) a large part of the overall population with an 
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immigrant background in Western Europe1 –much more, both in relative and 
absolute terms, than in the US, where immigrants are mostly Christians (pew, 
2012)– as anticipated above. In other words, whilst the population of migrant 
heritage in the US presents high degrees of diversification in terms of ethnici-
ties and migratory backgrounds, in various European countries migrant 
 populations mostly originate from Muslim-majority countries. In fact, other 
non-Western religions (Buddhism, Hinduism, etc.) represent extremely low 
percentages of the immigrant population residing in European countries 
(ibid.). This facilitated the perception of Muslims as quite a “neat” bloc of “for-
eigners”, and gradually induced an automatic association between “immigrant” 
and “Muslim” (Allievi, 2005; Brubaker, 2013).
A significant factor that motivated the singling out of immigrants with a 
Muslim background or affiliation as a distinctive “socially distant” group is 
their socioeconomic profile, which is quite low in all European countries (Cés-
ari, 2011; Zanfrini, 2019). For the most part, when they started settling in Eu-
rope, they had poor levels of education and were employed in jobs at the bot-
tom of the labor market; after decades since their settlement, relatively high 
levels of unemployment have affected these groups and patterns of inequality 
and of socio-economic disadvantage still significantly concern their Europe-
born descendants; lastly, they often find themselves segregated in deprived 
neighborhoods and housing conditions.
However, this perception of “distance” with “Muslims” is not just based on 
demographic characteristics. Actually, it results from a tendency to view Mus-
lims, in “Orientalistic” terms, as the enemy of the West, which is rooted in 
 centuries-long confrontations, form Crusades to colonialism, as described by 
Said (1978). More recently, a “revival” of this process of “Otherization” took 
place in the context of the gradual settlement and visibilization of Muslim mi-
grants in European societies during the second half of the 20th century. This 
further reinforced a constructed image of Islam in negative and oppositional 
terms as the “West’s Other” – an image that, by now, has become deeply in-
grained in European countries’ public opinions. The first patent manifesta-
tions of this uneasy relation with migrants’ Islam date back to the late 1980s, 
1 According to the data collected by pew (2012), the share of immigrants coming from Muslim-
majority countries and the share of Christian immigrants are very close, as the former ac-
count for 39% of the total immigrant population residing in the European Union, while the 
latter represent 42% (these figures refer only to immigrants from non-EU countries). On the 
contrary, in the US, Christian immigrants (74% of the total immigrant population) largely 
outnumber Muslim immigrants (5 % of the total immigrant population).
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when the  polemics aroused by the “Rushdie affair”2 in the UK and by the affaire 
du foulard3 in France marked the beginning of heated and enduring controver-
sies that brought to light the gradual rooting of Islam in European countries.
In the public debates that ensued these two sets of incidents, the behavior 
of the Muslim immigrant population was deemed to be challenging core 
“Western” values: in particular, freedom of speech, gender equality (with the 
veil being considered as a sign of oppression towards women), and the separa-
tion between State and religion, allegedly threatened by the request of a sepa-
rate regime of religious rights. Therefore, these events seemed to question the 
very nature and narrative of secular States and of secular societies (Nielsen, 
2013:168). In this sense, they paved the way for an increasingly distrustful de-
piction of Muslims, who have been regarded with suspicion as potentially non-
integrable citizens ever since.
Similar discussions surrounding Muslims repeatedly take place in other Eu-
ropean countries.4 In addition, the centuries-old, exclusive systems of Church-
State relations existing in all European countries made it quite impossible for 
a new religious group, such as Muslims, to be treated on an equal par with 
mainstream religion, meaning that the accommodation of their religious de-
mands have always been objects of heated contentions, as illustrated above. In 
fact, a malaise in accepting the increasing diversification of societies concrete-
ly manifests itself in controversies over those symbols that would definitively 
mark the presence of Islam in the European cultural landscape – as testified by 
the numerous recurring local conflicts over the establishment of mosques 
2 Muslim leaders, communities and organizations organized demonstrations across Britain –
but also in India and Pakistan– in response to the publication of Salman Rushdie’s novel “The 
satanic verses” by a British publisher, as the book was considered blasphemous and offensive 
towards Muslims. Some of these protests culminated with the burning of the book, a violent 
action bearing a strong symbolism, which sparked harsh criticism. The polemic and the spi-
ral of reactions and counter-reactions reached their peak when ayatollah Khomeini of Iran 
issued a fatwa ordering Muslims to kill Rushdie.
3 In this case, the controversy evolved around the gradual refusal of some headmasters to ac-
commodate the demand of some female Muslim teenagers to wear their hijab in public 
schools, with the explanation that this would allegedly endanger the principle of laïcité of 
the State.
4 Specious controversies about the respective limits of freedom of speech and minorities’ 
rights aroused again in Denmark, with the publication of a series of cartoons featuring the 
Prophet Muhammad on the newspaper “Jyllands-Posten” and the following protests that 
took place in many countries across the world. Debates on an alleged intrinsic impossibility 
of gender equality in Islam recur, especially when a country considers the possibility to ban – 
partially or completely– the full veil, or niqab (Belgium, France, Denmark, Germany, and the 
Netherlands). A constantly updated review of the issues and the debates about Islam in Eu-
rope is available on the website www.euro-islam.info.
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(Allievi, 2009) or by the emblematic Swiss ban on minarets voted through a 
referendum in 2009.
More generally, the point of departure of debates on these issues is the su-
periority of the West’s “secular normality”, on the basis of which migrants from 
Muslim-majority countries are assigned an a priori negative, “Muslim” identity, 
as if they constituted a threatening, monolithic and undifferentiated Other by 
virtue of their “problematic” religion – something which makes them radically 
different than the “secular us” (Jeldtoft, 2013:26–27). As a result, any debate 
about the integration of Muslim immigrant populations in Europe is framed in 
culturalist terms (Frisina, 2010; Césari, 2011), as will be developed below. All 
negative trends in this domain are easily attributed to Muslims’ alleged lack of 
will to integrate, due to their backward religion, which, because of its very te-
nets, would make Muslims “disloyal citizens”, intrinsically incapable of ever 
being “truly” modern or European (Kivisto, 2014). For example, where Muslims 
are ghettoized and concentrate in urban, peripheral and more disadvantaged 
areas, Islam is perceived as responsible for their “failed” integration and their 
presumed desire to live “parallel lives”, separate from and in opposition to the 
rest of society.5 Or, jihadist radicalization of disenfranchised youths was ex-
plained only with their belonging to Muslim “enclaves” at the margins of soci-
ety: while it is true that religious movements such as Salafism are on the rise in 
Europe, and especially in poor, more deprived areas (although this phenome-
non remains strongly minoritarian in absolute terms), the debate tends to ex-
aggerate or generalize towards all Muslims these mistrustful depictions.
2.2 Migrants’ Religion –and Islam– in European Social Sciences
Having analyzed the general consideration of religion in the European context, 
as well as today’s public discourse about immigrant religion –i.e. Islam– we 
can now examine how social scientists approached the study of religion in mi-
grant integration processes in Europe.
Concerning the topic of religion in general, we may affirm that social sci-
ences have not been quite neutral, as they contributed to and enthusiastically 
espoused the cause of secularization since the very beginning: the triumph of 
5 In the case of French banlieues, even events that were not connected to religious demands 
have been tellingly interpreted under the prism of Islam: the riots that took place in the pe-
ripheries of French cities during autumn 2005 were initially linked to a supposed “Muslim 
rage”. While the riots certainly channelled rage at and contestation against discriminatory 
institutions, they did not express any demand concerning Islam or religion: actually, they 
represented a massive demand for citizenship, recognition and inclusion (Kepel, 2012; see 
also the special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, n. 5. vol. 35, 2009 entirely 
devoted to this topic).
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“science” over “superstitious beliefs” was seen as key in global the emancipa-
tive project of rationalization and modernization (Introini, 2017; Chapter 3 in 
the present volume). This means that any investigation of “the religious” in 
Europe is framed within the hermeneutic “principle” of secularization, with a 
“secularist bias” affecting the study of these topics.
This had a first fundamental consequence: social sciences in Western Eu-
rope have been much less “sensitive” to treating religious matters and much 
more incapable to grasp their many shades. This obviously impacted the study 
of migrants’ religion, as such a secularist bias caused a “structural” blindness in 
research assumptions (Introini, 2017; Kivisto, 2014), whereby the potential of 
religion for integration, or its role as facilitator of the process of incorporation 
into receiving societies are hardly taken as research questions, almost taking 
for granted that it represents a stumbling block.
A subtle –but highly significant– impact of the “secularist bias” is illustrated, 
for instance, by how research about the religiosity of Muslim migrants and of 
their descendants in Europe has tended to study religiosity through the prism 
of an often-wished-for privatization (Mahmood, 2005; Barylo, 2017; Introini, 
2017; Celermajer, 2007). In other words, there has been a tendency to test 
whether trends of “protestantization” were in place among religious migrants, 
starting from a viewpoint that looks at the extent to which the West has been 
able to “tame” religion and Islam (Sunier, 2014). However, when it comes to Is-
lam, this approach appears profoundly inappropriate and unfruitful. Indeed, 
the study of Islam seems all the more to challenge the conceptual framework 
with which the West and social sciences have “domesticated” the religious 
sphere, because its orthodoxy, belief system and trajectory cannot be assimi-
lated to that of Christian traditions, meaning that distinctions between private 
and public, religious and non-religious do not work in the same way for Islam 
as they do for Christian denominations. Therefore, while these studies were 
important in sketching some significant issues and trends, they nonetheless 
run the risk of offering an incomplete picture of Muslims’ relation to religion 
and self-identifications –one that wittingly or unwittingly tends to consider 
Muslims as “misfits” whose “incomprehensible” religiousness deviates from 
the West’s (supposed) secular normality. For instance, Sunier (2014) argues 
that surveys conducted among people of Muslim affiliation in Europe on iden-
tity and religiosity suffer the problem that they mainly aim at showing that 
Muslims, despite their religion, become integrated –read, are assimilating– to 
presumed homogenous and “superior” Western cultures and values. To put it 
differently: even with the best of intentions, these studies are designed to ad-
dress the question of whether Muslims’ integration into society proceeds – 
thus, always from the standpoint of Islam’s “domestication”.
Sarli and Mezzetti450
<UN>
However, it is not just a secularist bias that impedes to formulate research 
questions aiming to investigate the potential resources offered by religion for 
integration. Indeed, the way migrants’ religion was framed and studied inevita-
bly reflected the above-described negative dominant discourse about Islam. It 
is true that studies which deconstruct negative prejudices and stereotypes con-
cerning migrants’ religion and particularly Islam abound in scientific litera-
ture. Indeed, as documented by Nielsen (2013) and Jeldtoft (2013), the life of 
Muslims and of their descendants in the West has come to represent a compel-
ling object of study. In the past three decades, a consistent quantity of research 
has been conducted across European countries, enquiring about the actual 
conditions of Muslim immigrants, the levels of discrimination they endure, the 
accommodation of Islam in State’s institutions, the significance of religion and 
its social consequences, the positioning and the discourse of Islamic religious 
actors, and the like. These research endeavors did contribute to dismantle the 
Hungtinonian view of Islam as an immutable, incommensurable and problem-
atic religion. Nonetheless, there remain issues concerning the hermeneutic 
premises of these studies, not only because, to a lesser or greater extent, they 
are marked by the above-described secularist bias, but also as they partly mir-
ror the anxieties and fixations of public discourses on this topic: it is precisely 
because the assumptions and starting points of these studies aim at decon-
structing the negative stereotypes of public discourses, that they have the un-
intentional consequence of contributing to legitimize such negative images.
There is nothing strange or wrong in the fact that researchers have busied 
themselves with issues circulating in public debates – it is precisely the duty of 
social sciences to explore societal questions. However, there should also be 
awareness of the contexts that shape and inform epistemologies, determining 
research questions and who, and how, is to be investigated.
There are some overt examples of how public debates have influenced how 
research has been designed and conducted, possibly generating questionable 
results. Césari (2013: 29–39) denounces how, in many surveys, the religiosity of 
“Muslims” is compared to that of an undifferentiated group clustering all “non-
Muslims”, as the latter were homogenous. Not only does this reiterates an ideo-
logical bias by which Muslims are depicted as “something different” than “us”, 
but is also poorly informative: Muslims should be compared to other religious 
groups, i.e. people who practice religion, not to “non-Muslims”, who may also 
include non-religious people.
Other examples are represented by studies which isolate the investigated 
group on the basis of its religious –Muslim– affiliation, thus running the seri-
ous risk of adopting an “ethnic” or a “cultural lens”, and, therefore, of offering a 
culturalist reading of how they fare in their process of integration into the 
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 receiving society (Thomson, Crul, 2007). It is certainly true that many Muslims 
do encounter disadvantage and marginalization; however, these should be pri-
marily studied as problems pertaining to class, social stratification, access to 
education:
the social processes governing the socio-economic status of populations 
of immigrant origin, for example, have more to do with the social origins 
of migrant populations and the dynamics of labor markets, schools, 
neighborhoods than with religion. (…) Grouping populations of immi-
grant origin under a religious rubric in studies of urban marginality is (…) 
potentially distracting and possibly misleading; it risks suggesting a cul-
tural explanation for a primarily socio-economic phenomenon. (Brubak-
er, 2013: 5)
A further example concerns the way in which scholars, too, have contributed 
to the social construction of the meaning of the term “Muslim”: “researchers 
have adopted the focus on Islam across ethnonational origins, ironically often 
because they wish to deconstruct and counter (…) crude generalizations” – 
about, for instance, “Pakistani immigrants” in the UK or “les algériens” in 
France (Nielsen, 2013:170). Even if such research was precisely animated by the 
positive –and often attained– goal of myth-busting stereotypes about Islam as 
“an enemy”, and considerably added to our knowledge about the condition of 
Muslims in the West, it is argued that it nonetheless concurred, wittingly or 
unwittingly, to stress the image of Islam as “something different”, thus having 
the potential paradoxical consequence of ultimately legitimizing and reinforc-
ing the public discourse.
This is the case of studies that focused on Muslim visibilities or on Muslim 
visible actors. Since “public representations (…) share an imaginary of Mus-
lims that enhances the ways in which they are visible –vocal and involved in 
social conflict– to the West” (Jeldtoft, 2013:29), the majority society grants le-
gitimacy only to those who correspond to its stereotypes and selects its Muslim 
“counterparts” on the grounds of their patent “Muslimness”. As a consequence, 
Muslim actors who present themselves as “especially Muslim” in more visible 
ways gain a sort of monopoly, or are given a chance to impose their hegemony, 
in the public realm. This had important consequences also on scholarly work, 
as the portrayal of Muslims only as Muslims inevitably influenced the way re-
searchers have conceptualized their object of study, with research ending up 
privileging visible manifestations of Muslimness as sites of observation –
which, again, resulted in the reinforcement of the dichotomous relationship 
between “us” and “them” (Jeldtoft, 2013:27).
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Indeed, just as public discourses concentrated only on more visible Muslim 
actors, who would frame their presence and demands in more conflictual 
terms, so research has over-focused on forms of Muslim life that are construct-
ed as subordinate or antagonistic vis-à-vis the majority, and by choosing its 
interlocutors among visible, practicing, vocal, devout, pious, active, even mili-
tant, Muslims. As a result, countless studies concern visibilities such as the hi-
jab, Muslim organizations and groupings, Muslim places of worship, Muslim’s 
claim-making and relationship with authorities, youth groups, Quran classes, 
transnational religious movements, and so on. Indeed, much of the existing 
literature has focused on organized forms of Islam, in which a substantial ef-
fort was concentrated on investigating how “these” Muslims challenge their 
minority status by leveraging primarily on the “Muslim component” of their 
identity in order to put forward demands for recognition as Muslims (to name 
just a few, see Mandaville, 2001; Silvestri, 2005; Klausen, 2005, 2009; Kepel, 2012; 
Bolognani, Statham, 2013).
Moreover, it has been underlined that research regarding young Muslims 
has concentrated almost exclusively on the most visible and conspicuously de-
vout –frequently neo-orthodox– ones (Selby, 2016; Jeldtoft, 2013; Brubaker, 
2013; Woodhead, 2013; Jeldtoft, 2011; Jeldtoft, Nielsen, 2011). Whilst this has been 
motivated by the need to “make sense” of the “sudden” –and visible– re- 
Islamization of young western-born Muslims (Roy, 2004; Laurence, Vaisse, 
2006; Kepel, 2012), who were showing to be increasingly interested in a revival-
ist neo-orthodox Islam (Kibria, 2008), this actually translated to a heightened 
focus solely on them.
Focusing on organized Muslims or on these Muslim visibilities was not only 
easier for scholars – as the field is more accessible when investigating identifi-
able, visible organizations and associations (Dessing, 2013; Schimdt, 2011). It 
was motivated by the fact that precisely Muslims’ organizations were “attract-
ing attention”, due to their very visibility and their claim making, which was 
transforming Islam in a public (and sometimes political) identity. While these 
research endeavors sought to challenge the negative dominant discourse about 
Islam, at the same time they inevitably reflected such discourse, with the risk 
of “becoming hegemonic “evidence” of political and public understandings of 
Muslims as particularly (and dangerously) religious” (Schmidt, 2011:1217).
In this sense, denouncing these risks represents an invitation to an increased 
reflexivity in the definition of objects of study and to a heightened awareness 
of the never-completely-neutral role that researchers have, as any other social 
agent, in producing public representations. Indeed, the study of only more 
“visible” Muslims might end up focusing too narrowly on religion, by interpret-
ing everything through the prism of Islam and overemphasizing the religious 
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component of identities. While there are vocal Muslims who identify primarily 
as “Muslims” and wish to show their “Muslimness” in daily lives as their first 
defining feature, this might not be true for the rest of Muslims –and extending 
these observations to them would be artificial and simplistic. In other words, 
studying only visible Muslims might result in a reification of Muslims and Is-
lam, thus falling into the pitfall of essentialization and culturalization and 
playing into the very hands of the dominant discourse, which portrays Mus-
lims, in their entirety, as being “all about religion”, and more importantly, their 
religion as an obstacle to integration.
In response to this trend in research, an opposed approach which gained 
ground in the relevant literature is to be welcomed, as it focuses on those Mus-
lims who do not visibly appear as such and who escape from the discursive 
construction of Muslimness, which sees “Islam” as an invariable, master status 
and the only relevant identifier for Muslims. In seeking to counterbalance the 
tendency to study only the most pious and vocal Muslims, who are often found 
in religious organizations, this second approach has “looked for” Muslims out-
side religious institutions and organizations –i.e. removed from the sites of 
production of “visible Muslimness”– with the aim of exploring how these 
“non-obvious” Muslims make sense of religion in their daily lives and what 
meanings they attach to the practice of religion in their own right, “far” from 
possibly taken-for-granted (self-)representations of Islam. In response, these 
same researchers have pleaded for studying Muslims outside of visible or obvi-
ous Muslim visibilities (Selby, 2016; Jeldtoft, 2013; Brubaker, 2013; Woodhead, 
2013; Jeldtoft, 2011; Jeldtoft, Nielsen, 2011).
Lastly, a final example of how contextual factors influenced research is rep-
resented by the broader spectrum of studies that analyze the Islamic presence 
in the West from the point of view of security issues. Here too, debates evolve 
around the role of religion as a “threat”, particularly when jihadist radicaliza-
tion is under scrutiny. In this case, the “secularist bias” plays out differently at 
the public discourse level and in research approaches. In the first case, the 
public discourse tends to blame the very essence of Islam for radicalization, 
due to its “backward” and “intrinsically violent” tenets, resorting to the Hungti-
nonian refrain which posits a superiority of the West’s civilization over such a 
“barbaric religion”. In the second case, the “secular lenses” explained jihadist 
radicalization not by resorting to religion as the “root cause”, but by pointing to 
other factors, such as today’s culture of violence (Roy, 2016) or political claims 
(Burgat, 2016). These have been considered extremely valid explanations; para-
doxically, this research stance was precisely animated by the commendable 
intention to not offer culturalist explanations of this phenomenon, by not re-
ducing it only to religion. However, this also meant that some specific religious 
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shades of the phenomenon could not be grasped, which, on the contrary, need 
to be somehow taken into account in the analysis of the rise of jihadism in 
Europe (Introini, 2017; Bichi et al., 2018).
More generally, these examples show how, by foregrounding religion in our 
studies, social sciences may run the risk of unintentionally reinforcing nega-
tive representations about Muslims. This is why Brubaker (2013) urges scholars 
to exert a heightened reflexivity when approaching this object of study, in or-
der to not consider “Islam” as a black-boxed explanans. In other words, re-
search should not treat the categories of “Islam” and “Muslim” as tools of analy-
sis, as this can predictably lead to use cultural lenses. Rather than as tools of 
analysis, “Islam” and “Muslim” should be treated as objects of analysis (ibid.). 
This means taking up Allievi’s invitation (2005) to walk the thin line between 
avoiding the risk of reductionism on one hand –i.e. downplaying the impor-
tance of religion and the specificities of the religious experience– and avoiding 
the risk of essentialization on the other hand – i.e. overemphasizing religious 
and cultural aspects and explain all that concerns Muslims in light of Islam.
3 Recent Developments and Issues at Stake in the European and 
North American Contexts
As explained in the previous paragraphs, there are meaningful differences in 
the ways Northern America and Western Europe perceive immigrant religion. 
In Europe, religion has traditionally been considered a bright boundary, a cen-
tral dividing line separating native from immigrants and their offspring, who, 
due to their religion, cannot be considered to be “like the mainstream”. On the 
contrary, immigrant religions in the US have never represented a serious basis 
for contention in the same terms as in Europe – on the contrary, in many cases, 
immigrant religions worked as bridges rather than barriers to inclusion in the 
American context, as illustrated by Foner and Alba (2008), among others. As 
previously discussed, these diverging perceptions and attitudes have inevita-
bly affected the way research has been conducted on both sides of the pond, 
with religion being considered more as a resource for integration in the North 
American tradition, or being problematized (and deconstructed) as an obsta-
cle to integration in European social science.
However, we believe that some recent tendencies that have been developing 
in these two contexts over the most recent years have decreased the differ-
ences between them, if not enhanced possible resemblances, making them 
actually more similar than what it used to be the case. These trends are linked 
to a series of historical circumstances – particularly the jihadist attacks 
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 perpetrated in the US and in Europe in the past few decades, and the so-called 
refugee crisis reaching its peak in Europe in 2015–2016. This conclusive part 
addresses their role in rendering the two contexts now more akin, and sketches 
possible advantageous implications for future research.
3.1 Culturalization and Racialization of Muslims in the US
The first trend that is enhancing the resemblance between the US and Euro-
pean context regards changes in the perception and framing of Muslims in the 
North American public discourse. In the US, the Hungtinonian view of Islam 
as the enemy of the West has long been framed in securitarian terms. As illus-
trated above, the related perception of threat has only marginally been re-
ferred to Muslim migrants living in the US. Rather, it has been attributed to 
Islam as an external player in contemporary geopolitics and as a danger within 
the sphere of international relations. In Europe, by contrast, Muslim migrants 
have traditionally undergone processes of cultural racialization, by which they 
have been interiorized not so much on the basis of a biological characteristic, 
but rather of their anti-modern culture and religiosity (Modood, 2018; Alba, 
Foner, 2015). Since the beginning of the 2000s, however, this difference be-
tween the European and the North American contexts has been gradually dis-
appearing, with Muslim migrants living in the US being progressively racial-
ized and seen as inherently culturally inferior to the mainstream, white 
society.
Mostly following the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks, this demonization of Ameri-
can Muslims, previously limited to fringes of public opinion, has reached wide 
layers of society. This has normalized anti-Muslim narrative and led to the set-
up of structured, well-funded Islamophobic movements. Several authors high-
light how, within the framework of the war on terror, anti-Shariʿa legislations 
were proposed and enacted by many American States: such Islamophobic poli-
tics has fueled, across the country, anti-Muslim attitudes, generating discrimi-
nation of Muslim migrants on the basis of religious/physical signifiers (Nagel, 
2016; Garner, Selod, 2015; Cainkar, 2009) – which most detrimentally affects 
Muslim communities that are exposed to intersectional discrimination, such 
as Black Muslims living in impoverished urban areas (Beydoun, 2017). Particu-
larly, Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric and policies –such as the so-called “Mus-
lim ban” and his proposal to create a Muslim registry– had a decisive role in 
these ongoing processes (Yukich, 2018), especially because this rhetoric was 
skillfully supported and amplified by the alt-right movement, through a web-
site such as Breitbart (Lean, 2017).
Hence, even in such a “religion-friendly” context as the US, migrants’ religi-
osity has started to be unwelcome and seen, like in Europe, as a barrier to 
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 pacific coexistence when the social construction of Islam as a diametrically 
different cultural reality has come into play. This trend has attracted the atten-
tion of US social scientists, who have underlined the utility of  concepts such as 
racism and racialization for understanding Islamophobia in the US and have 
highlighted the need to deepen, through fieldwork-based studies, the impact 
of anti-Muslim sentiment, rhetoric, and behaviors on the everyday life of 
American Muslims with migratory background (Husain, Howard, 2016; Garner, 
Selod, 2015; Cainkar, 2009).
Interestingly, literature also highlights the dialectic relationship between 
islamophobia and general anti-migrant attitudes in the US, and reveals the 
impact of anti-Muslim politics on anti-refugee sentiment across the country 
(Nagel, 2016). For instance, Islamophobia and the fear of terrorism, fed by the 
attacks in Paris and the mass shootings in San Bernardino, California (Decem-
ber 2015), or in Orlando, Florida (June 2016), had a meaningful role in fueling 
the support for the strong republican opposition to the resettlement plan for 
10,000 refugees from Syria eventually carried out by the Obama administration 
in 2016 (Nagel, 2016). Such an interrelation between anti-Islamic and anti- 
refugee sentiment, along with the intensifying racialization of Muslim mi-
grants, represent a further tendency that makes the US context increasingly 
similar to the European one, where reactions of refusal towards the recently-
arrived refugees and migrants are also based on their religious affiliation, as we 
will show in §3.2. This constitutes a significant shift in a context where religion, 
as explained in §1, hardly represented a serious basis of contention in the pro-
cesses of incorporation of newcomers in North America in the past.
However, in the US, this view of migrants as problematic and unwelcome 
due to their religious affiliation gains center stage only in the case of Muslim 
migrants: indeed, the present polemics concerning irregular migration flows 
from Latin America through the border with Mexico do not contemplate their 
religion at all. This does not mean that, since they are mostly Christians, or in 
any case non-Muslims, they are easily welcomed. However, the social and cul-
tural distance between them and mainstream society is constructed on ele-
ments other than religious affiliations.
In sum, in the US migrants’ religion is perceived as problematic for the co-
hesion of American society only when it comes to Muslims. This has happened 
only recently, and it is hard to foresee what effect this will have on US social 
sciences. What is certain, as has amply been illustrated in §1, is that North 
American social research, having concentrated on faiths and on communities 
different than the Islamic one for a long time, could focus on the integrative 
aspects of religion. This led to establishing a proper tradition of research in this 
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field that highlighted the positive role played by religion in migrant integration 
processes.
On the other side of the pond, migrants’ religion has long been considered 
exclusively in negative terms, because it has always been equated with Islam 
(although this does not reflect the reality of figures, as shown in §2). The nega-
tive consideration of this religion implied that research had to overcome the 
widespread attitude of considering religion as an obstacle to integration, but, 
in doing so, it ended up unwittingly reinforcing or legitimizing this preliminary 
assumption, even if it aimed at deconstructing it, for the simple reason that it 
constituted its starting point.
This comparison leads us to underline, once again, that it is precisely the 
social construction of Islam as the monolithic, paradigmatic Other the filter 
that has made it difficult for research to avoid the conundrum of the circular 
and mirroring dynamics between public perceptions and social investigation. 
It may be safe to argue that, when the “threatening”, “radically different” Other 
is out of the focus of research, the potential beneficial contributions of religion 
to social life and the inclusion of migrants can be investigated much more eas-
ily and more fruitfully. When Islam is not the object of research, approaches to 
the study of religion yield research results that seem to provide a more com-
plete picture of the often-beneficial role played by religion in migrants’ pro-
cesses of settlement, which may possibly go unnoticed when research focuses 
on “the problematic religion”.
3.2 Migrant Religion as a Category of Practice in Integration Measures 
Across Europe: a New Attitude?
The other shift that, in our view, is gradually making similarities appear be-
tween the North American and the European context concerns subtle changes 
occurring in the perspective generally adopted in Europe in looking at the “re-
ligion and integration” nexus. This development –with its controversial aspects 
and implications– is the object of the conclusive pages of the present chapter.
As discussed by a number of authors, the traditional negative consideration 
of Islam and the perceived difficult inclusion of Muslim migrants in society 
that, as described above, developed in the European public sphere led to treat-
ing religion –read, Islam– as a category on its own of migrant integration poli-
cies. Through this process, “Islam”, and, subsequently “religion”, have been 
framed as pivotal policy areas in the steering of migrant integration (as hinted 
at also in Chapter 3 of this volume). This has typically concerned religion- 
related measures aimed at meeting the claims of Muslim minorities and the 
institutional establishment of their religion –mosque-building, halal butchery, 
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or teaching of religion in schools… (Brunn, 2012; Joppke, 2009). Such measures, 
usually very contentious, have been generally framed so as to primarily meet 
aims of control and of assimilation. In line with a view that has uniformly cast 
religion as an obstacle to integration across European countries, it is not sur-
prising that the inclusion of “religion” within the realm of migrant integration 
policies bears the mark of the centuries-old consideration of religion as a po-
tentially dangerous “force” to be “tamed”.
Whilst in the past migrants from Muslim-majority countries were mostly 
identified through their legal status (e.g. foreigners, third-country nationals, 
guest-workers), or through their nationalities, this has progressively shifted to 
“Muslim” as a religious group (Mattes, 2018; Yılmaz, 2016; Brubaker, 2013; 
Nielsen, 2013; Bleich, 2009). Needless to say, the choice of policy categories is 
tightly interconnected with problem formulation and has a decisive influence 
on the proposed measures and their implications. In this case, the underlying 
assumption is that, in order to reach integration goals, the religion professed 
by migrants becomes as relevant as –or even more meaningful than– for in-
stance, socio-economic aspects or ethnic-national ties. This approach is 
marked by meaningful criticalities: if the very concept of migrant integration 
assumes that some “others” are to be integrated within the supposedly uniform 
nation-State, then a political practice that targets “Muslims” categorizes these 
“others” based on their religious belonging and risks reinforcing an exclusion-
ary effect, linked to this specific component of their identity, conceived of as a 
collective attribute (Mattes, 2018; Korteweg, Yurdakul, 2009).
However, recent developments that occurred in Europe in the mid-2010s 
triggered some partial changes in the public policies or in the initiatives devel-
oped by a number of European countries with reference to the treatment of 
migrant religion. As is known, Western European countries have been the tar-
get of deadly and vast jihadist attacks between 2014 and 2017. The fear of Is-
lamist terrorism could not but sharpen the perceptions of social and cultural 
distance from Islam and Muslim migrants. A further circumstance took time in 
the same unfortunate period – i.e. the so-called “refugee crisis”. The growing 
number of people seeking asylum in Europe has caused widespread public 
anxieties, with refugees’ religion frequently becoming the main focus of these 
concerns (Buber-Ennser et al., 2018; Zanfrini, 2019). This was clearly reflected 
by the reaction of the self-defined “Visegrad group” (Poland, Slovakia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary) to the policy of redistribution of migrants among EU 
Member States designed by the European Commission. These Central and 
Eastern European countries explicitly and repeatedly expressed their refusal to 
accommodate quotas of migrants, on the grounds that their religious affilia-
tion, mostly Islamic, would pose a threat to their societies.
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In this case, the difference that was stressed was not so much along the fault 
line dividing “the secular us” and “the backwardly religious them”; rather, what 
was highlighted was the Christian identity of the receiving countries, put in 
danger by the arrival of Muslim asylum seekers (Krotofil, Motak, 2018; Brubak-
er, 2017). This adds a problematic shade to the already negative consideration 
of the relationship between religion and integration spread in the European 
culture. Furthermore, it offers the opportunity to develop a provocative reflec-
tion, as one might reasonably ask whether these asylum seekers would have 
been welcomed, had they been Christian.
What is certain, in any case, is that in Europe jihadist violence and the so-
called “refugee crisis” had the indirect consequence of renewing the role of 
religion as a symbolic boundary, that is, as a category marking perceptions of 
self and otherness (Krotofil, Motak, 2018). The occurrence of the two phenom-
ena at the same point in time further reinforced the tendency to identify mi-
grants with Muslims and Muslims with migrants, in conjunction with the as-
sumption that Islam and terrorism are inextricably interwoven (Pickel, 2018) 
or that “jihadism” represents the “quintessence” of “real Islam” (Geisser, 2015). 
This distortive overlapping, defined by Schiffauer (2007) as a “muslimization of 
migrants”, expands the perceived social and cultural distance between “us” and 
“them”. Whilst invisibilizing both natives of Islamic faith and migrants profess-
ing other credos –despite their conspicuous presence– this served the logic of 
promoting a Christian identity narrative especially in Eastern European coun-
tries – which worked as a marker of “internal” unity (Mattes, 2017; Mavelli, Wil-
son, 2016; Johansen, Spielhaus, 2012). Indeed, in the context of a social reality 
characterized by plurality and complexity, religious identity, when taken in its 
cultural contents more than in its strictly spiritual meanings, risks assuming a 
reactive connotation (Brubaker, 2017), being utilized to affirm “reassuring”, es-
sentialized differences between an “ingroup” and an “outgroup” (see Chapter 
3).
At the level of policy-making, this renewed focus on religious identities 
translated into a renovated interest in transforming religion into a “corner-
stone” of integration measures – however, with some ambivalent attitudes. 
Certainly, the attempt to “control” and “contain” religion continues to signifi-
cantly characterize many of these measures. For instance, it is through the de-
velopment of “Muslim” as a category of integration that the prevention of radi-
calization has become a primary objective of integration policies. One of the 
most famous examples in these domains is represented by the approach devel-
oped by the UK government, with its “Prevent” strategy – a national plan 
aimed at countering jihadist radicalization, which has explicitly targeted 
“Muslims”. Many observers have highlighted the strongly stigmatizing effects 
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of this strategy: by targeting leaders of Muslim communities, or by encourag-
ing school teachers and healthcare officers to report about possible “suspect” 
cases of radicalization, this caused Muslims to be increasingly viewed by the 
public opinion as a homogeneously dangerous, suspect group, thus eroding 
trust and social cohesion (Qureshi, 2017; Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016). 
In this sense, the exclusionary framing of the link between religion and inte-
gration policies continues a well-established pattern in policy-making, where-
by migrant integration policies feature “migration-security” and “religion- 
security” nexuses, aimed at addressing the perceived security threat represented 
by Muslim migrants (Mattes, 2018). Such a political agenda keeps serving the 
interests of political parties that rely on the social construction of juxtaposed 
“us” and “them” identities for gaining electoral consensus.
At the same time, however, the potentials of religion for facilitating mi-
grants’ social inclusion start to be taken into account across European coun-
tries. The involvement of faith-based organizations is increasingly acknowl-
edged as a fruitful way for promoting integration, as religious communities are 
recognized in their function of single point of contact for State actors, and 
their organizational structure is seen as a strategic basis for the implementa-
tion of integration measures (Mattes, 2018). For instance, in the National Inte-
gration Plan for Beneficiaries of International Protection launched by the Ital-
ian Government in 2017,6 interreligious dialogue is counted as one of the four 
pillars for the promotion of integration. In Germany, the “German Islam Con-
ference” has been explicitly conceived as an integration device: while at the 
beginning it can be said to have served more the interests of the State in “do-
mesticating” Islam, its efforts have increasingly concerned Muslim’s needs, 
with a recognition of the welfare provided by German Muslims communities – 
e.g. in childhood and elderly care. Moreover, the Conference has also officially 
acknowledged and supported the role played by Muslim organizations in the 
provision of aid and  assistance to the refugees who arrived in Germany at the 
peak of the “refugee crisis” in 20157 (Chbib, 2016).
Again, these approaches may be problematic, as they continue to apply a 
“group” label and essentializing its religious dimension, while risking subduing 
6 See the version of the Plan translated into English: http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/




wohlfahrt.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6; https://www.an-nusrat.de/suem-dik/ (last ac-
cessed: 05 July 2019).
461Religion and Integration
<UN>
religion to control aims (Stålsett, 2018; Tezcan, 2012). Nonetheless, these devel-
opments represent a meaningful innovation in the European landscape and in 
its perspective on the link between religion and integration, as they may open 
up a new field in integration policies, possibly creating further, novel opportu-
nities which, if properly harnessed, may fruitfully bring about positive conse-
quences. For instance, while the prevention of radicalization has more often 
the exclusionary effects described above, it also represented the starting point 
for experiences of cooperation between State institutions, practitioners and 
religious leaders, as documented in the collection of practices constantly up-
dated by the Radicalization Awareness Network (ran), coordinated by the Eu-
ropean Commission (ran, 2017; 2016).
Other interesting cases, in this regard, are offered by Italy and Denmark. In 
Italy, the State signed an agreement with the largest federation of Islamic as-
sociations (ucoii – Unione Comunità Islamiche Italiane) giving the possibili-
ty to Islamic religious guides –four women and four men– to access eight pris-
ons in order to provide spiritual assistance and religious instruction to Muslim 
detainees (Angeletti, 2018), with the aim of countering the possible spread of 
the “jihadist” message in jails – i.e. contexts that have been identified as breed-
ing grounds for radicalization phenomena across European countries. In Den-
mark, the model for preventing radicalization and for reintegrating so-called 
returnees (i.e. individuals who had joined the jihadist insurgency in Syria and 
have returned to their home country), developed by the city of Aarhus, envis-
ages a rehabilitation and mentoring program involving family networks, social 
workers, teachers and religious communities and places of worship (Bertelsen, 
2015). The person who was actively involved in jihadist networks, or is likely to 
get involved, is assigned a mentor, who engages in sustained dialogue efforts 
also of religious and theological nature.8 It is out of the scope of the present 
contribution to assess the premises and the effects of these measures from the 
point of view of the prevention of radicalization. What is of great interest, for 
the purposes of this analysis, is that, in these practices, precisely religious- 
cultural proximity gets valued, with religion being considered as an ally in pro-
moting social cohesion, rather than as an obstacle.
8 See Hanna Rosin, “How A Danish Town Helped Young Muslims Turn Away From isis”, npr, 
15 July 2016 (https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/07/15/485900076/how-a-dan-
ish-town-helped-young-muslims-turn-away-from-isis?t=1564408937981) (last accessed: 05 
July 2019); Tim Mansel, “How I was de-radicalized”, bbc, 2 July 2015, (https://www.bbc.com/
news/magazine-33344898) (last accessed: 05 July 2019); David Crouch, “A way home for ji-
hadis: Denmark’s radical appraoch to Islamic extremism”, The Guardian, 23 February 2015 
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/23/home-jihadi-denmark-radical-islamic-
extremism-aarhus-model-scandinavia) (last accessed: 05 July 2019).
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That religion is gradually being framed as a resource to tap into for fostering 
integration and inclusion is also demonstrated by an array of pragmatic, prom-
ising initiatives and practices realized by local administrations and civil soci-
ety, which often seem to be animated by a genuine belief in the role of religious 
organizations as fully-fledged actors able to play a potentially meaningful and 
positive role in the integration of migrants. For instance, several civil society 
organizations promoting migrants’ social inclusion are putting in place multi-
dimensional interventions considering religion as a key factor to properly con-
sider. For instance, the kaiciid9 organization for interreligious and intercul-
tural dialogue, which gathers high-level representatives from major world 
religions, has initiated a “Program for the social inclusion of people seeking 
refuge in Europe”, with the explicit aim of bringing together representatives 
from faith-based and secular organizations at various levels (local, national, 
and international), for providing capacity-building for the integration of peo-
ple seeking refuge and migrants in Europe,10 based on the assumption that 
“because all mainstream religious traditions promote inclusion and care for 
poor or marginalized people, integration provides a fantastic opportunity for 
coordinated interreligious cooperation”. So far, this initiative has concretely re-
sulted in a pilot project carried out in Vienna, in which dialogue features as 
“key” to integration: with the aid of four dialogue facilitators having a migrant 
background (Syria and Afghanistan), thirteen dialogue sessions with refugees 
have been organized between 2018 and 2019, in order to help refugees “deepen 
their understanding of Austrian systems, services, and culture”. Moreover, the 
initiative is creating a Network with other European grassroots organizations 
for promoting interreligious dialogue for social inclusion, and has produced a 
Toolkit for refugee integration.11
This kind of approach has also been encouraged by EU institutions through 
their soft-steering instruments, and has been adopted by international organi-
zations or by third-sector entities operating in Europe. For instance, the Inter-
national Organisation for Migration (iom) implemented several projects in 
Germany: i.e. the “Integration: A Multi-faith Approach” (iama) project, the 
“Dialogue for Integration: Engaging Religious Communities” (direct) project, 
9 kaiciid stands for “King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious 
and Intercultural Dialogue” - https://www.kaiciid.org/who-we-are (last accessed: 05 July 
2019).
10 See https://www.kaiciid.org/what-we-do/programme-social-inclusion-people-seeking-
refuge-europe and https://www.kaiciid.org/news-events/news/network-dialogue-work 
shop-takes-place-bologna-defines-way-forward-and-membership (last accessed: 5 July 
2019).
11 See https://www.kaiciid.org/publications-resources (last accessed: 05 July 2019).
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and the “Pilot multi-faith and interfaith fora for religious leaders of third coun-
try migrant communities” (rekord) project. They were co-funded by the Eu-
ropean Commission (European Fund for Integration) and supported by the 
German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (bamf), with the aim of 
enhancing the role of religious communities in the integration process.
These recent trends are likely to have implications on the conceptualization 
of the integration and religion nexus, that could be fruitfully explored through 
research. More broadly, the new tendency featuring both civil society and EU 
and national-level institutions to conceive religion as a key resource in integra-
tion offers scholars a rich ground of investigation. In fact, the linkage between 
religion and integration has started to be the subject of some recent contribu-
tions by European researchers, who, more in the vein of the American tradi-
tion, analyze the potentials of religion and of fbos for promoting social 
 inclusion processes, thus deviating from the European tradition, which tends 
to look at religion as an obstacle to social inclusion (Khallouk, 2018; Andrej, 
2018; Ager, Ager, 2016; Mavelli, Wilson, 2016; Snyder, 2012).
One could argue that, through the fears generated by the Islamist terror at-
tacks and the refugee crisis, European societies have (re)discovered religion as 
a meaningful ingredient in social life: while, on the one hand, this continues to 
be framed as a dividing line, drawing on its symbolism to justify “fortification” 
processes (Schmiedel, Smith, 2018), there has also been a re-evaluation of reli-
gion as a dimension of migrants’ life, which should not be neglected for the 
purpose of facilitating their process of settlement.
The attention recently expressed by civil society and some State’s actors for 
religion as a dimension of migrants’ integration undeniably offers rich and 
promising investigation paths to researchers – as some contributions com-
prised in this volume will start to explore. Studying the plurality of migrants’ 
religion with a view to analyzing how the dimension of faith interacts with in-
tegration processes certainly represents an innovative perspective in the land-
scape of European social sciences. In the light of the considerations developed 
in this chapter, we hope that research on these themes will be able to adopt, as 
compared to the past, a more neutral approach to the study of religion –and 
certainly of Islam– in order not to run the risk of beginning investigation 
 endeavors by having to deconstruct religion as an obstacle to social inclusion.
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Chapter 14
Religious Persecution, Migrations and Practices  
in Faith-Based Organizations:  
Some Recommendations from a Qualitative Study
Lucia Boccacin and Linda Lombi
1 Introduction
The chapter focuses on the findings from a qualitative empirical study into the 
degree of visibility of the religious dimension in hospitality offered to migrants 
by Faith Based Organizations (from now on fbos) operating in Italy.1
The departure point of this reflection is the relationship between belonging 
to a fbos and the public thematization of the religious dimension. This rela-
tionship is characterized in contemporary society by a strong ambivalence. In 
fact, believing without belonging appears be the motto connoting the individu-
alized religious experience of Western society today (Terenzi, 2010: xvii), an 
experience where religion remains limited to an intimate, psychological and 
emotional dimension, lodged to a much lesser extent in the social and rational 
dimensions (see also Chapter 3).
On the other hand, the opposite phenomenon is also present in contempo-
rary postmodernity, and may be expressed as belonging without believing. It 
allows a “rediscovery of the traditional majority religion as a symbol of cultural 
identity” (Ambrosini, 2014: 1) in the West, and permits the identification of re-
ligious symbols as an expression of Western culture, even from people and so-
cial components who do not declare a belief or an explicit religious practice. 
Religion thus becomes a way to give form to a cultural tradition that it is felt 
should be defended.
This ambivalence does not lack an almost fanatical tendency to reconfigure 
the social and political structures through a kind of re-sacralization of social 
ties, offering dramatic examples of fundamentalism.
Under the sociological profile, therefore, the wide and articulated debate on 
the role of religion in contemporary society (see among others Colozzi, 1999; 
1 The chapter is the result of a joint investigation between the two authors. Lucia Boccacin was 
responsible for paragraphs 1, 5 and 6, and Linda Lombi for paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. Sincere 
gratitude is expressed to Sara Nanetti for her operative support in the analysis of the empiri-
cal material.
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Casanova, 2000; Kurtz, 2000; Bass and Pfau-Effinger; 2012 and the famous dia-
logue between Habermas and Ratzinger, 2005) tends to indicate, particularly 
in Western societies, a focus on the religious dimension which, however, dem-
onstrates signs of ambiguity and a marked imbalance against an individualis-
tic drift in which membership in associations and communities tends to be-
come evanescent and irrelevant to the religious experience.
It is in this context that the issue of religious freedom becomes a theme, 
both for the individual, in particular in the case of forced migration, and for 
associations and their ability to act in the public space, according to the social 
citizenship view.2
However, which kind of public space for associative membership does exist 
in today’s social contexts, where the fragmentation of the subject reflects dra-
matically on their relationships?
According to relational theory (Donati, 1991, 2011), it is within the relation-
ships themselves that the possibility must be found to legitimize both the per-
sonal religiosity and, in support of the former, the associative experience in the 
public space. All this in a perspective that understands the distinction between 
immanence and transcendence, not as antithetical or with a predominance of 
one over the other, but as the search for interconnection between the two di-
mensions. Overcoming contrapositive visions allows us to observe how the re-
ligious dimension affects the social sphere in people’s lives and communities.
The theme of the relationship between associational membership and the 
religious dimension is at the intersection between the sphere of civil society 
and that of value orientations, assuming that social ties dictated by member-
ship association produce social integration3 and, at the same time, transcen-
dent values of religion, made accessible in everyday life, attribute that inter-
subjective and social sense and meaning to personal life, which alone are able 
to constitute the fertilizing substance of integration processes.
In this perspective, there are significant similarities with the concept of 
common good presented in Chapter 2 with particular reference to the specific 
role that fbos may play, through the interpersonal relationships and social 
memberships that these involve,4 so that “an active tolerance and promotion 
of fundamental human values” (Donati, 2010: 102–103) based on individual and 
intersubjective religious freedom can be pursued. Hand in hand with this con-
cept of religious freedom is that of a secularism understood as a value 
2 On religious freedom and citizenship at the micro level, see Chapter 2; on the issue of social 
citizenship, see Donati 2000.
3 The relationship between the religious dimension and integration in the international litera-
ture is discussed in Chapter 13.
4 On the concept of the common good, see also: Archer, Donati, 2012.
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 originating from the recognition of a common world and combining diverse 
cultural and ethnic groups as an expression of human society (Donati, 2008a).
Through their actions among their members, but also the recipients and the 
surrounding social context in general, fbos can make a distinctive contribu-
tion in promoting civicness (Putnam, 2003) by stimulating political and social 
empowerment attitudes and the development of relationships based on trust 
and cooperation within a tolerant and intercultural perspective (Donati, 2013). 
The latter is based on the acknowledgement of the relationality between cul-
tures, rooted in the principles of fraternity, solidarity and reciprocity. Promot-
ing interculturality means, in other words, recognizing that men and women, 
although they belong to different ethnic groups and cultures, have more in 
common than they have differences, a fact which leads to the recognition of 
the Other as a person with dignity and respect (Meda, 2016).
2 Research Objectives and Design
The research presented in this chapter aims to make a first and not systematic 
survey of the complex relationship between forced migration and the religious 
dimension within the environment of fbos in order to shed light on a theme 
that has been, to date, the subject of scarce attention. Particular attention will 
be paid to the forms of persecution and religious discrimination that may have 
led to the migration choice. This limited thematic relevance is rooted in cul-
tural diversity highlighted in the previous paragraph on the public place of re-
ligion in the West, the most common point of arrival for migrants, and other 
contexts.
The difficulties encountered in general in giving voice to the issue must be 
underlined at this point, both on the side of leaders of fbos, and the migrants 
themselves. The reasons for these difficulties are numerous. Among fbos there 
is a consensus to provide services, interventions and practices to anyone in 
need, regardless of religion and the culture of origin. However, it is this “global 
offer” that limits, in some aspects, the ability to trace the various root causes of 
the migration in its distinctive forms, especially if forced, and, in particular, the 
possibility of pinpointing departures prompted by religious persecution.
In addition to contingent problems such as linguistic barrier, migrants are 
reluctant to emphasize the religious dimension among the reasons that led to 
the choice to emigrate because of the fear that this may lead to possible repri-
sals on family members still in the country of origin. The ability to indicate 
religious persecution as the reason behind migrations rarely occurred, as it 
rarely occurred with other motivations too, during the first phases of the 
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 reception process (on this point see also Chapter 11). It was only later, after hav-
ing established an interpersonal relationship between the contact person from 
reception organizations and the migrant, that the migrant admitted the real 
reason for the departure.
A qualitative approach was applied to the research data. Four case studies 
were conducted, investigated through the administration of eight semi-struc-
tured interviews with representatives of fbos who participated of their own 
free will. The interviews were held between April and June 2017. Interview grid 
was divided into three main sections:
a) the first section attempts to reconstruct the history and characteristics of 
the organization (founding and transformations, major assets, any stipu-
lation of partnership, resources, goals, norms and values held);5
b) the second section investigates the issue of religious persecution, explor-
ing the reference scenario (context analysis of origin, flows, data, reli-
gious groups involved, etc.);
c) the third section analyses the intervention strategies put in place by orga-
nizations, and the outcomes such as in-field projects, results and good 
practices.
The interviews were transcribed ad verbatim and the content analyzed through 
a hermeneutic methodological approach structured to fully exploit the infor-
mation gathered and to propose an exploratory analysis guided by the facts 
and oriented to an understanding and attribution of sense. Subsequently, on 
the basis of content, an initial system of flexible categories was outlined which 
made it possible to build a taxonomy of useful concepts and categories for the 
construction of a coding grid coherent with the interview texts. This prelimi-
nary analysis did not intend to capture aspects of similarity and difference be-
tween the interviews. Instead, it was geared to the observation of the distinc-
tive aspects of the texts. Following the formulation of the coding grid, the 
interviews having a congruent coding were grouped in a single case study. 
Commencing with the initial eight interviews, four case studies were identified 
as respectively addressing actions of advocacy and dialogue with public insti-
tutions (Observatory on Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians in 
Europe, Religions for Peace), integration and training services (Sant’Egidio Com-
munity in Rome and Milan), reception services and response to needs (Opera 
San Francesco in Milan), and proposals for interreligious dialogue (Service for 
Ecumenism and Dialogue of the Archdiocese of Milan and the Italian Hindu 
5 The agil scheme from Talcott Parsons revised through a relational approach (Parsons, 1951; 
Donati, 1991, 2011) was applied.
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Union).6 Table 14.1 summarizes the list of interviews conducted and the alloca-
tion to the various case studies.
The analysis of the individual cases, by applying the codification previously 
carried out, identified co-occurrences among the various thematic areas, 
6 The authors would like to thank the participating organisations and their representatives for 
generously donating their assistance and time, not inconsiderable, to the survey.
Source: Authors’ personal elaboration
Table 14.1  The empirical reference group: case studies and interviews
Case studies fbos Qualification Identifying code
First Observatory on 
Intolerance and 
Discrimination against 
Christians in Europe 
(oidce),  
Vienna
Representative Interview no. 1
Religions for Peace 
Rome
Representative Interview no. 2
Second Sant’Egidio  
Community, Rome
Voluntary  








Third Opera San Francesco  
for the Poor (osf), 
Milan
Contact person Interview no. 4
San Francesco for the 
Poor (osf), Milan
Specialized operator Interview no. 8
Fourth Ecumenism and 
Dialogue Service, 
Archdiocese of  
Milan
Representative Interview no. 5
Italian Hindu  
Union – Milan Section
Representative Interview no. 7
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which in turn define the mutual relations between phenomena, concepts and 
categories. After the registration of co-occurrences, summarizing schemes of 
the process of analysis and narrative expressions present in the texts were 
produced.7
Through an additional coding phase, the most relevant semantic terms in 
the text were revealed. A Greimas or semiotic square was constructed, allowing 
the observation of the elementary structure of signification presented by the 
various narratives (Greimas, 1974).8
The overall results of these analyses will be illustrated here in the following 
order: §3 provides basic information related to the fbos involved in the study. 
§4 will present the findings with respect to the relationship between religious 
freedom, identity and the response to needs. The relationship between migra-
tion and religious persecution in the reception practices of fbos is the focus of 
§5. Lastly, §6 illustrates the findings, with particular reference to the type of 
common good generated by fbos and specificities related to the religious di-
mension that have emerged.
3 Case Studies
The first case study involves two fbos, the Observatory on Intolerance and Dis-
crimination against Christians in Europe (oidce), headquartered in Vienna, 
and Religions for Peace, based in Rome.
The oidce is a non-governmental, non-profit organization engaged in the 
research and analysis of episodes of intolerance and discrimination against 
Christians in the European context. The organization produces an annual re-
port aimed at documenting discrimination and religious intolerance against 
Christians. The discrimination of Christians involves limits in the freedom of 
conscience and freedom of speech. In some European countries, these limits 
extend to the freedom to wear religious symbols in the workplace, to pray or to 
ensure the sexual education of their children according to religious values. Re-
cent reports published by the oidce have also noted the presence of numer-
ous occasions of social intolerance towards Christians fueled by a marginal or 
7 For reasons of space, this contribution will not present the analysis of co-occurrences de-
tected in the interview materials. If further details are required, please refer to the research 
report available from the authors of this chapter.
8 The semiotic square enables a definition of the general pattern of the articulations of a se-
mantic category, giving form to the sense within a micro-universe of meaning, one composed 
of the content of the analysed texts.
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stereotypical representation of Christians during public debates proposed by 
the media.
The association Religions for Peace, also present at the European transna-
tional level, is instead directed more specifically to interdialogue. The aim of 
this organization is addressed to create a virtuous relationship between inter-
religious and international groups involving the representative personalities of 
the various religions. Through an open attentiveness, the diverse religious be-
liefs attempt to identify those common and universal elements able to pro-
mote a compatibility between differences and a lessening of conflict tensions. 
Supported by this value model, the initiatives promoted by the organization 
act on several fronts, ranging from the purely religious aimed at dialogue be-
tween the different communities to the more sociocultural, which includes 
multi-religious assistance in hospitals or in prisons. An initiative that in part 
sums up the values and actions undertaken by the association is the drafting 
and dissemination of a multi-religious calendar highlighting the festivals of all 
religions and including citations from different traditions. The willingness to 
support the interfaith integration process and to contribute to the develop-
ment of a multi-cultural society is also demonstrated through the promotion 
of leisure or recreational activities.
Despite the heterogeneous interventions proposed and the different recipi-
ents involved, both the oidce and Religions for Peace contribute to enhancing 
the scope of religion within the social context, firstly in a perspective of protec-
tion and then promotional. The identification of religiosity as a qualifying 
component is for the two organizations an ideal reason and value on which to 
base their actions.
The second case study includes interviews administered to two volunteers 
of the Community of Sant’Egidio from the centers in Rome and Milan. Among 
the various services offered by the organization, mention should be made of 
the canteen, the initiatives for dialogue, appeals and signatures collected for 
social and humanitarian causes, educational activities and the activities of the 
Peace Agents. In particular, the Community offers Italian language school ser-
vices for foreigners. Learning the language can establish a first point of contact 
in society, aiding the inclusion processes. The classes offered have over time 
improved in quality and recognition, and now provide a verifiable linguistic 
certification for the students. The Community’s language school is an instru-
ment allowing the full realization of the values woven into the organizations 
structure, affirming the dignity of every person and establishing personal rela-
tionships between operators and migrants.
The volunteers in the Agents of Peace movement offer free services for the 
elderly connected with the organization. The Italians and foreigners who work 
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Table 14.�  A summary of the first case study
oidce –  
Interview no. 1  
Religions for Peace –  
Interview no. 2  
History ➢  Association founded in 
1970 (international 
context)
➢  World Assembly in Kyoto 
(relationship between 
religions as related to 
international relations)
Activities 1. Information
➢  Provide information to institu-
tions regarding episodes of 
intolerance and discrimination 
against Christians in Europe
2. Reception
➢  Support Christians victims of 
intolerance or discrimination to 
tell their story
3. Research
➢  Collect data about vandalism 
against Christian symbols
Partnerships ➢  EU- Fundamental Rights Agency
➢  European institutions
➢ UN
➢  Religious institutions
➢  Public entities (Ministry 
of Education, City of 
Rome)






➢  Companies (health service 
clients, workers, prisoners, 
students, associations)





Table 14.� A summary of the first case study (cont.)
oidce –  
Interview no. 1  
Religions for Peace –  
Interview no. 2  
Methods ➢ Annual reports
➢ Newsletter
➢ Newspaper articles
➢  Limited financing 
(Calendar, City of Rome)
➢  5×1000 tax donation 
receiver
Scope ➢  Improve institutions’ awareness 
about appropriate intervention 
measures
➢  Improve general awareness about 
the situation of fleeing from 
persecution and genocide
➢  The relationship between 
religion and peace
➢  Preventing tensions and 
conflicts
➢ Promoting tolerance




➢ Freedom of religion ➢  Commonalities between 
the different religious 
traditions (mutual 
attention)
➢ Sacred respect of life
Critical issues➢  Ill-treatment and discrimination 
of Christian refugees and asylum 
seekers in some European 
countries
➢  Vandalization of churches
➢  Stigmatization of Christians 
through the media
➢  The relationship between 
religion and modernity
➢  Modern individualism 
and idealism
➢  Social anxiety caused by 





➢  Identification of regular patterns 
of discrimination (predictive)
➢  Enunciation of effective 
measures to combat discrimina-
tion and intolerance
➢  Attention paid to 
suffering and to 
freedoms
➢  Enhancement of sport as 
an alternative to violent 
confrontation
Source: Authors’ elaboration
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in the movement, in gratitude, return the reception and attention they have 
received from the Community back to the wider social environment and senior 
citizens in particular through their volunteer services.
The activities focusing on interreligious dialogue include prayers for peace 
and participation in a panel of representatives of different religions. The val-
ues of humanitarianism, civic, solidarity, hospitality, peace and sharing that 
guide the work of volunteers within the Community derive from a common 
religious faith and are transversely promoted in favor of the Other, without 
distinction of creed. The initiatives are defined according to a predominantly 
relational register, and in fact the quality of the events is measured through the 
relationship and mutual confidence established between the participants, al-
lowing a real and symbolic exchange of ideas and values aimed at overcoming 
ethnicism.
If the process of integration occurs through the relationship created be-
tween volunteers and migrants, then in the same way a recognition of the cul-
tural and religious identity of the migrants will require the same relational and 
personal formula. The Community attempts to establish a genuine reciprocal 
relationship through the recognition of the person’s identity, commencing 
with being completely open to a person’s needs. The religious sphere is the 
point of reference for the principle values of the organization’s activities, and 
by proactively promoting this openness to all religious identities, their com-
mitment is fulfilled. In this sense, religion is never presented as a reason for 
division and exclusion, but as an open answer to the needs arising from 
societies.
During the interview with the Rome volunteer, it emerged that the recipi-
ents of Community services included persons who had fled their country of ori-
gin because of religious interventions, including in the areas of origin, through. 
These included Christians from Nigeria, Egypt or Iraq, and also Afghani Shiite 
Muslims. In responding to the religious persecution reported by migrants, the 
Community implements specific interventions, including in the areas of origin, 
through dialogues between religious representatives, appeals and peace 
initiatives.
The third case study involves interviews with a representative of a reception 
center and a specialized operator of the Opera San Francesco for the Poor (osf) 
in Milan.
The Opera San Francesco for the Poor is a reception center characterized by 
services that have expanded gradually from the initial canteen to more com-
plex structures dedicated to social integration. This evolution is linked, from 
an operational point of view, to user requests to meet new and advanced needs 
prompted largely by the migration flows of the Nineties. The traditional 
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Table 14.3  A summary of the second case study
Community of Sant’Egidio – Rome – 
Interview no. 6
Community of Sant’Egidio –  
Milan – Interview no. 4 
History ➢ Active for over 35 years
➢  Evolution over time conditioned  
by the flow of migrants
➢ Active from 1997
➢  Evolution from the lower 
levels of language training 
to higher ones (L2–C2)
Activities 1. Education
➢ Language or vocational training
➢  Insertion into mainstream 
education systems









➢ Interventions in prisons
➢ Aid for religious professions
➢ Shared prayer periods
➢ Memorials
➢ In-class lessons
➢ Mutual respect for celebrations
4.  Combating persecution (the points 




➢ Prayer in public places
1. Teaching
➢  Language learning school 
(Olivetani – Garibaldi)
➢  Insertion into main-
stream education 
systems
➢  Language certification 
exams
2. Social cohesion
➢  Peace Agents (elderly, 
cultural initiatives, 
fundraising through 
dinners and light meals)
3. Religious identity
➢  Shared prayers for peace 
(Assisi)
➢  Discussion panels 
(Muslims, Christians)




➢ Municipality of Rome
➢ Prefectures
➢  University for Foreigners 
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Community of Sant’Egidio – Rome – 
Interview no. 6
Community of Sant’Egidio –  
Milan – Interview no. 4 
➢ Foreign minister
➢  Tavola Valdese dialogue group for 
State relations
Target 1. Origin
➢  Romania, Morocco, the Philip-
pines, Georgia
2.  Migration due to religious 
persecution:
➢ Christians (Nigeria, Egypt, Iraq)
➢ Afghan Shiite Muslims
1. Origin
➢  Latin America, Sri Lanka, 
Eastern Europe, Peru, 
Ecuador, El Salvador
2. Reason for migration
➢  Economic, political, 
defense of values i.e. flee 
forced abortion
Methods ➢ Operator/migrant relationship ➢  Free labor from 
volunteers
➢  Teacher/migrant 
personal relationship
➢  Meetings, prayer, 
discussion panel
Scope ➢  Social cohesion and 
interpersonal 
relationships
➢  Social justice, help and 
support for others
➢  Growth of the sense of 
belonging to Italy, social 
and cultural inclusion
➢  Interfaith dialogue and 
overcoming of ethnicism
Norms ➢	 Free Access Policy (need-based) ➢  Christians, recognition of 
Christ in the poorest
➢  Hospitality, loyalty, 
dignity, social contact
Values ➢ Religious, humanitarian, civic




Community of Sant’Egidio – Rome – 
Interview no. 6
Community of Sant’Egidio –  
Milan – Interview no. 4 
Critical 
issues
➢ Citizenship, jus soli complications
➢  School integration, the gap 
between foreigners and Italians
➢ Cultural mediator





➢ Use of recycled material
➢ Perception of foreigners
➢ Attention to social media
➢  “Adoptive” integration model 
promoting familiarization with 
foreigners
➢  Agent of Peace reach-out 
meetings with the elderly
➢  Positive, productive 
relations with schools
Source: Authors’ personal elaboration 
 recipients of the Opera’s works were the homeless. However, the migration 
phenomenon has resulted in a series of new requirements for assistance, quite 
different from the previous services. The operators, mostly volunteers, offering 
service in the centers have diverse professions, including medical doctors, 
nurses and cultural mediators.
The combination of the religious elements characterizing the Opera as an 
institution and the respect for other religious and cultural traditions are com-
plementary elements of the service. This respect for different religions, begin-
ning with an absence of pork on canteen menus, coexists with the religious 
nature of the association. The recognition and respect for different identities is 
visible, in operational terms, in the quality of the services and the enhance-
ment of the personal dignity of every person.
The ambulatory activities of the Opera San Francesco are addressed to re-
cipients of medical services suffering extremely fragile socio-economic condi-
tions, complicated by psychic fragility and the inability, in some cases, to ben-
efit from the National Health Service. The ability to intercept these problems is 
ensured by the complete accessibility to the basic services, coordinated by a 
freely available psychological counselling contact point where decisions are 
made during the first contact regarding the most suitable cure and treatment 
path to be undertaken by the specialists in responding to the recipient’s needs.
The fourth case study is based on interviews with representatives of two 
fbos, the Service for Ecumenism and Dialogue of the Archdiocese of Milan, and 
the Italian Hindu Union of Milan.
Table 14.3 A summary of the second case study (cont.)
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Table 14.4  A summary of the third case study
Opera San Francesco – Interview 
no. 4
Opera San Francesco – Interview 
no. 8
History ➢  Foundation of Opera San 
Francesco in the 80s as a 
canteen service for homeless
➢ Active since 2008
Activities 1. Social area:
➢ Reception service
➢ Canteen













➢  Municipality (celav) (Local 
Employment Mediation 
Centre)
➢  Caritas (sai) (Immigrant 
Reception Service)
➢  Mangiagalli Polyclinic (sed) 
(Female Services)
➢  Somaschi Foundation 
(Segnavia women’s recep-
tion center)
➢ Onlus Farsi (planned)
Target 1. Status
➢  The homeless, migrants,  
third country nationals
2. Origin:
➢  Eritrea, Tunisia, Mali, Ivory 
Coast, Nigeria, Sudan, 
Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, 
Eastern Europe, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka
1. Status
➢  Socio-economic and 
psychological fragility, 








Table 14.4 A summary of the third case study (cont.)
Opera San Francesco – Interview 
no. 4
Opera San Francesco – Interview 
no. 8
➢  Currently South America, 
Italy, Iran, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, North 
Africa, China
3.  Migration for religious 
persecution:
➢  Somalia, Eritrea, China, 
Pakistan, Mauritania, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka
Methods ➢  Interviews in person to 
interpret the user’s needs
➢ Cards for service access
➢  Increased professionalism in 
services
➢  Employees (50) and volun-
teers (780)
➢  Psychological counselling 
contact point
➢ Personal appointments
➢  Cultural mediation and 
teamwork
Scope ➢  Integration through the use 
of the Italian language
➢ Cultural mediator support
➢ Re-education
➢  Personal integration of 
recipients into society
Norms ➢  Registration of recipients 
with document
➢  Quality of services and 
spaces (canteen, showers)
➢ Registration of recipients





➢ Promotion of human dignity
➢  Meeting between cultures 
and religions
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Source: Authors’ personal elaboration
Table 14.5  A summary of the fourth case study
Service for Ecumenism and  
Dialogue (Archdiocese, Milan) –  
Interview no. 5
Italian Hindu Union (Milan 
branch) – Interview no. 7
History ➢  Reorientation of services as a 
result of the changes imposed 
by migration
➢  Italian Hindu Union founded 
in the early nineties
➢  Religious authority recog-
nized with a Presidential 
Decree Law in 2002
➢  Understanding signed with 
the Italian State in 2012
Opera San Francesco – Interview 
no. 4
Opera San Francesco – Interview 
no. 8
Critical issues ➢  Decreased numbers of 
occasional users and increase 
in chronic users
➢ Repeat service users
➢ Language problems
➢  Responsibilities towards 
minors
➢  Problems with waiting times 
before social integration 




➢  Ability to meet the needs 
through the evolution of 
services
➢  Relationship with external 
local services
➢  Teamwork involving several 
professionals working in 
contact with the patient, e.g. 
psychologist, physician, 




Service for Ecumenism and  
Dialogue (Archdiocese, Milan) –  
Interview no. 5
Italian Hindu Union (Milan 
branch) – Interview no. 7
Activities 1. Ecumenism:
➢  Relationship with the faithful 
of other religions
➢  Identify and assign the 
Churches to share with 
representatives of different 
religious communities
2. Education and training:
➢  Parish assemblies and 
meetings between the 
followers of different religions
➢  Teaching the history of 
religions involving representa-
tives of all religions
➢  Training of prison guards and 
operators of prisons on the 
theme of religious pluralism
➢  Healthcare professionals 







➢  Lessons of Hinduism in 
schools




➢  We care, Hindu communities 
engaged in the care of 
nature, the environment and 
social realities
➢  Preservation and enhance-
ment of the natural 
environment
➢  Assistance for persons who 
have suffered ill-treatment 
(women and children)
➢  Italian language lessons for 
women
➢  Education of men cultivat-
ing a less macho approach
➢ National Day for Hindus
Partner-
ships
➢ Municipality of Milan
➢  Lombardy Regional 
Administration
➢  Representatives of various 
religious organizations
➢ Parishes in the area
➢ Municipality of Milan
➢  Gregorian University, the 
Pontifical Office




Table 14.5 A summary of the fourth case study (cont.)
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Service for Ecumenism and  
Dialogue (Archdiocese, Milan) –  
Interview no. 5
Italian Hindu Union (Milan 
branch) – Interview no. 7
Target 1. Religious communities:
➢  Orthodox Christians, Sikhs, 
Muslims, Jews, Copts, Hindus, 
Buddhists
2. Host communities:
➢  Pastors, pastoral council, the 
community of believers
1. Origin
➢  50,000/60,000 Italians and 
100,000 foreigners from 
India or from Mauritania
2.  Persecuted for religious 
reasons:
➢ Bangladesh
Methods ➢  Offices responsible for 
ecumenism and relations with 




➢  Contact meetings with 
political institutions
➢  Research into the potential 




➢  8×1000 tax donation 
receiver
➢  Temple (place of worship 
and assembly)
Scope ➢  Relationship with Christian 
Churches, active interreligious 
dialogue
➢  Create citizens without 
reference to religious 
affiliation
➢  Model of distributive interreli-
gious commencing with the 
reception
➢  Support for the practice of 
Hinduism
➢  Personal integration of 
recipients into society
➢  Celebration of religious 
ceremonies and weddings
➢  Promoting knowledge of the 
principles of Hinduism
➢  Diversity understood as a 
positive contribution to 
society
➢  Support in institutional 
activities, register of religions, 




Source: Authors’ personal elaboration
Service for Ecumenism and  
Dialogue (Archdiocese, Milan) –  
Interview no. 5
Italian Hindu Union (Milan 
branch) – Interview no. 7
Provisions ➢ Free




➢ The oneness of God
➢  A complete coming together 
and unity among the people 
under the motto “you and I 
are one”, non-discrimination
➢  Every living thing, animate 
or inanimate, is divine 
consciousness
➢ Religion is a way of life
➢ Secularity of the State
Critical 
issues
➢  Tensions between the host 
community and other religious 
communities
➢  Persecution of those who 
convert
➢  Lack of State guarantees for 
religious freedom
➢  Lack of a national law under 
municipal administration on 
freedom of religion





➢  Redevelopment of neighbor-
hoods in a state of disrepair
➢  Overcoming prejudice of 
identity and discrimination
➢  Prevention of religious 
radicalism
➢  Social integration through 
reciprocal knowledge
➢  Italy is the only country in 
the world where Hinduism is 
recognized as a religion
Table 14.5 A summary of the fourth case study (cont.)
The interview conducted with a manager of the Service for Ecumenism and 
 Dialogue in Milan clearly demonstrates the operational approach of the 
Church to interreligious dialogue. The organization’s activities are based on 
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understanding the local religious composition revealed by surveys, as well as 
the collaboration formulas established between the various religious commu-
nities involved in the services for the weak. The purpose of the actions pro-
moted by the Archdiocese is to establish a citizenship that precedes religious 
affiliation, giving new meaning to both identities and differences. Ecumenism, 
which characterizes the main intervention ambit, is aimed at fostering rela-
tions with the Christian Churches and interreligious dialogue. Among the 
range of activities supported by the Service for Ecumenism and Dialogue in 
partnership with the Municipality of Milan are several training initiatives in 
local elementary schools where the history of religions is presented by mem-
bers of the various faiths, including Christians, Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists 
and Jews. The main purpose of this project is to help pupils see religious diver-
sity in terms of an asset, not as a problem.
The second religious body in the third case study is the Italian Hindu Union 
representing Hindus in Italy. The association was formed in Italy by devotees 
of Hindu traditions who over time have established a stable center for the 
State-recognized religion. The main purpose of this fbos is the promotion of 
integration processes between cultures and of initiatives to spread both his-
torical and theological knowledge of Hinduism. Operationally, these objec-
tives are achieved in the opening up of numerous collaborations with public 
and religious organizations. The Hindu Union is a participant in the initiative 
promoted by the Municipality of Milan and the Archdiocese and offers a les-
son in Hinduism as part of the history of religion project. One of the main tools 
supporting the integration process between religions is in fact mutual knowl-
edge and awareness.
4 Religious Freedom, Identity and the Universal Response to the 
Needs of Forced Migrants: Indications from the Construction of the 
Semiotic Square
As with the first case study, an analysis of the interviews demonstrated how 
both groups address the relationship between religion and society, presenting 
a comparison between possible models of interaction and integration between 
the secular and religious spheres. The crucial issue of this report presents a 
twofold semantics detectable with the Greimas square.
The first binary opposition detected in the interview conducted with a rep-
resentative of the oidce is seen when comparing the American and European 
models. For the former, religion appears as a factor serving the public debate, 
one able to enhance social integration. The assumption of religion as a 
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 constitutive component of the social dynamics visible in the public arena al-
lows American secularism to apply a concrete form of religious freedom. On 
the contrary, the prevailing European approach interprets the separation be-
tween public and religious spheres in exclusivist terms, when not oppositional 
or alienating. The impossibility for the Church to have a voice in the public 
debate fosters a new European secularism based on the byword freedom from 
the religion.
The interview with the President of Religion for Peace in Rome notes secu-
larism as a component of modernity, and the relationship between religion 
and modernity can be clearly summarized by applying the Greimas square. 
The golden rule proposed by the organization intends to focus on the mutual 
individualism














Figure 14.1 The Greimas square applied to interview number 1







Figure 14.3 The Greimas square applied to interview number 6
relationships between different religious traditions, a counter-position to the 
existential loneliness and the separation processes offered by modern individ-
ualistic and idealistic philosophies. Modernity has led to a general mistrust of 
the main human fulcrum of intolerance and mutual foreignness. In contrast, 
the great religious traditions agree that a point of convergence may be a sacred 
respect for life. By means of a growth process within religions, oriented to com-
parison, to a respect for diversity and the desire to locate a universalist profile, 
it is possible to act to prevent social tensions and conflict as well to work to-
ward a reconciliation between the multiple identities.
A Greimas square analysis of the second case study involving the two inter-
views with the Sant’Egidio Community allows us to highlight how religious 






Figure 14.4 The Greimas square applied to interview number 3
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how this negative factor may be opposed through shared prayer, encounters 
based on respect for the identity of other religions.
Where religious persecution involves conflict and results in discrimination 
against a religious component, shared prayer addresses the diversity through a 
meeting and mutual recognition of the various religions.
A further application of the Greimas semiotic square to the interviews al-
lows the definition of the opposition between racism and socio-cultural inte-
gration through two predictors, prejudice and the initiatives promoted by the 
Agents of Peace, which are revealed as fundamental to the actions undertaken 
by the organization.
The activities carried out by the migrants as Agents of Peace give and return 
an image of the foreigner as someone familiar to the social fabric, while attrib-
uting a positive value to the membership of the foreigner to the community. 
Through concrete actions, the prejudice is transformed into knowledge, a pre-
requisite for genuine socio-cultural integration.
The analysis continues by commenting on the third case study and the two 
interviews involving the Opera San Francesco for the Poor (osf), an organiza-
tion of religious inspiration. Applying Greimas square to the content proposed 
by the manager of the reception services makes the profound and qualifying 
importance of the organization of hospitality clear. This operating mode is no-
table in the act of acceptance, understood as the immediate passage from user 
registration to offer of service. The norms regarding the reception proposed by 
the osf do not require the validation of the identification documents present-
ed by users. The first contacts with the recipients are not geared exclusively to 
allow the use of the organization’s services. There is also a willingness to accept 
the complete gamma of personal needs and provide the functional tools need-







Figure 14.5 The Greimas square applied to interview number 4
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The interview conducted with the specialist engaged in the organization’s 
Polyclinic revealed even more clearly the personal narratives and life stories of 
the service users. The semantic category of religious persecution in its physical 
and psychological implications is very clearly outlined.
The mode of intervention, in these cases, is divided according to the trans-
verse channels of medico-legal, legal, and psychological. The importance of 
the therapeutic alliance emerges at the center of the care process as a counter-
response to the traumatic experience of persecution. A timely response to the 
needs of the person, in its concrete and psychic expressions, makes it possible 

















Figure 14.7 The Greimas square applied to interview number 5
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The last analysis concerns the fundamental features of the interreligious ap-
proach promoted respectively by the Archdiocese of Milan and the Italian 
Hindu Union. Once more, the salient features offered by the two institutions 
may be understood by applying the Greimas semiotic square. The two models 
of interreligious dialogue, although different in what they assume, display a 
converging social orientation.
The Service for Ecumenism and Dialogue proposes a model involving an in-
tegration, allowing for the increase in migratory flows, of the different religious 
identities present in the social fabric. This is a trend in contrast to the absorp-
tion model and to an indifference in identifying differences,9 which has re-
sulted in the failure of integration models, therefore producing a clear stigma-
tization of any reference to identity. The interventions promoted by the 
Archdiocese of Milan, in dialogue with the Municipality of Milan, aim instead 
at boosting a distribution model geared to reception and inclusion, one able to 
develop differences while respecting reciprocal identities.
The interview with the President of the Italian Hindu Union, in introducing 
the institution’s religious training and the main features that characterize it, 
indicated the presence of important factors of integration inherent in the Hin-
du religion. Hinduism is characterized by the coexistence of a multiplicity of 
cultures, traditions and languages, which can lead to ethnic discrimination. 
However, these divisions can also act as a binding agent and an integration tool 
through the religion’s recognition of the oneness of God. This perception of 
the existence of a single God and its manifestation in every person establishes 










Figure 14.8 The Greimas square applied to interview number 7
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an immediate connection with every other person, disallowing any form of 
conflict.
5 Is It Possible to Reveal any Relationship between Migration and 
Religious Persecution in the Reception and Acceptance Practices 
of fbos?
The phenomenon of persecution for religious reasons assumes a plurality of 
facets in the content of the interviews, which refer in part to the mission pecu-
liar to each organization involved in the study as well as to the different politi-
cal and cultural realities of the origins of the persecution.
In the interview with the representative of the oidce, persecution for reli-
gious reasons is identified as a phenomenon having its geographic-political 
position within an Arab context in Africa and Asia, with persecution addressed 
mainly to the Christian faith groups. This form of persecution recurs in several 
European states with violence and threats against Christian refugees or asylum 
seekers, where it is perpetrated by other migrants. The incidence and extent of 
these events has led the Observatory to recognize a central theme for the fu-
ture: the protection of the most vulnerable asylum seekers, namely the Chris-
tians fleeing from persecution and genocide.
Religions for Peace has detected the widespread presence of a persecution 
that is not defined as strictly religious, as it mainly involves minority groups 
that cannot be categorized according to a religious belief. The centrality of the 
persecution in this case moves from the religious register to the social and po-
litical one, with the identification of the presence of a significant element of 
difference and diversity in the group persecuted. (“It is a persecution towards 
religious groups as different groups, not so much for the content… because 
where there are these situations of extreme violence, regimes or attempts to 
impose regimes etc., the problem is the diversity”, interview 2). In response to 
these situations, the organization supports those who are persecuted by main-
taining stable contacts with minorities, by raising public awareness regarding 
situations of violence and by telling about the presence of humanitarian cor-
ridors. Examples of the groups aided are the Christian Coptic community pres-
ent in the Middle East and the movement of authentic religiosity in Turkey.
Specific data about the origin of migrants because of religious persecution 
emerge from the interview conducted with a volunteer from the Sant’Egidio 
Community in Rome. These migrants are generally Christian groups from 
Nigeria, Egypt or Iraq, or Afghan Shiite Muslims, all minority groups in the 
country of origin. Religion turns out to be, just as in the case of ethnicity, a 
persecution factor. However, it is difficult to define the classificatory limits of 
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the  phenomenon. Within the context of persecution, religion and ethnicity do 
not exhibit features that can clearly mark a clear distinction between the two 
spheres (“often, it has more to do with ethnicity than religions, but here things 
are mixed, it is difficult to make distinctions”, interview 3). In many cases, the 
reasons for migration remain hidden or unexpressed. In reporting the experi-
ences of those affected by religious persecution, the volunteer stressed that to 
enable migrants to reveal their religious background and their experience, it is 
imperative that a trust relationship with the operator be established.
The Copts from Egypt show a similar form of discrimination, which inter-
weaves economic, political and religious factors. They are discriminated for 
two main reasons: on the one hand, because they are followers of a minority 
religious community, and on the other hand because of the fact that they be-
long in many cases to the upper class due to their professional status (they are 
often the professional contact privileged by embassies or Western commercial 
reality) (“They suffer a double discrimination: (…)… you are a Christian and 
rich, that’s why you are doubly discriminated”, interview 6).
The manager of reception services at the Opera San Francesco noted a low 
percentage of people who had fled religious persecution, and the centrality of 
political and social component was highlighted. The religious factor is added 
as a contributory cause (“The migrants come from countries where there are 
on-going civil wars, the political and social conditions are grave. Religion is an 
additional factor”, interview 4). However, as pointed out by the interviewee, 
the issue of religious persecution rarely arises during the organization’s first 
contact with and acceptance of the migrant, emerging only after the processes 
of acquaintance and mutual trust are established, which is a time-consuming 
process. The interview conducted with a specialized operator in the same orga-
nization was able to reveal aspects of the socio-religious interrelationship and 
the persecution experienced in the countries of origin – and, in fact, it was the 
depth and intimacy of health interventions which allowed the detection of 
cases, not particularly numerous, of migration due to religious persecution. 
These cases require a dual therapeutic approach. The effectiveness of the in-
tervention, in view of the intense suffering that the persecution experience has 
produced, relies on a personal and intimate integration of the patient within 
the social context. On the other hand, the interventions reveal the forensic 
documentation necessary for the acquisition of refugee status.
According to the specialist operator interviewed (interview 8), the main 
states of origin of migrants who have encountered social and religious perse-
cution and who turned to the osf Health Services are Somalia, Eritrea, China, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. These migrants are, from a clinical point 
of view, marked by visible injuries related to torture or beatings, and invisible 
491Religious Persecution, Migrations and Practices
<UN>
psychological wounds. The experiences of patients show that the religious fac-
tor is often inseparable from the economic and socio-political components. 
The existence of violent clashes between groups belonging to different ethnic 
groups is often the root cause of abuse towards minority groups. The religious 
identity is then part of the ascriptive characteristics of their communities and 
represents a decisive factor in the balance of power in the area.
A form of circularity between the political, ethnic, religious and social di-
mensions is shown, also thanks to a combination of these dimensions, which 
renders each one of them indistinguishable within the total of the various fac-
tors contributing to sparking the migration process. The reticular nature of 
these elements is confirmed in the case of Iranian women married to Italian 
non-Muslim men. These women cannot return to the country of origin be-
cause they would be subject to discrimination. The condition of these women 
is aggravated when divorced because they face an exclusion from the activities 
necessary for the conduct of an independent life. The example underlines once 
again the close connection between social, economic and religious factors.
Further geographical and social information related to persecution emerged 
during the interview with the Service for Ecumenism and Dialogue. In their ex-
perience, the Sub-Saharan Africa is the area where most episodes occur, and 
the victims are mainly female. However, the religious factor is not identified as 
an underlying cause of migration and arrival in Italy. The main reasons for an 
ebb and flow in migratory processes in these cases are economic or political. 
A previously unrecognized element revealed in the interview relates to the mi-
grant conversions. Although this does not represent a specific persecution in 
the strict sense of the word, it is in fact retaliation against the subject and their 
primary relationships, particularly family.
Again, women are the main victims of such incidents.
The representative from the Italian Hindu Union provided evidence of reli-
gious persecution present in Bangladesh, where Hindus are a minority domi-
nated by violence exercised by Muslim fundamentalists. However, the emigra-
tion in this case is once again mainly attributed to economic and social causes.
Table 14.6 summarizes the main findings from the case studies with respect 
to religious persecution as a migration push factor.
In conclusion, while accepting the diverse points of observation in the sur-
vey, the data that emerge from the interviews as a whole demonstrate the prev-
alence of a migration with a composite of causes and irreducible to a single 
motive. The religious factor, although present as a contributory cause, is often 
inseparable from the given socio-political and economic context.
The interconnection between multiplicities of factors appears as the most 
prevalent interpretation in the interview’s texts. In fact, even in cases where it 
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Table 14.6  Religious persecution and migration paths: a summary based on the case studies
Case 
study


















Persecution is what our 
brothers and sisters in the 
Arab world, Africa or Asia 
face (fbo n. 1)










It is a persecution of 
religious groups as 
different groups, not so 
much for the content … 
there are these extremist 
violence situations, 
regimes or regime 

















Often it is more of 
ethnicities than religions 
but here things are mixed, 
it is difficult to make 
distinctions. Very often, 
the religious factor is 
behind the granting of 
asylum. As they slowly 
gain courage, they tell us 
the reasons for the trip. At 
first no … they need to 














It’s a difficult subject. 
Perhaps they don’t want 
to tell you, perhaps it is 
intertwined with other 
migration factors… Many 
tell us about the political 
problems, many others









talk about the economic 
issues… but they don’t 
talk about these things 
(religious persecution) 
with a Christian woman 
(fbo n. 4)









For religious persecution 
there are the signs… 
invisible wounds and more 
visible ones related to the 
persecution of Christians, 
Muslims … because they 
are not of the same 
religion or of a lower 
caste. Because even there 
the social and religious 








It is very unlikely that 
such a difficult and 
internalized subject 
emerges… The migrants 
come from countries 
where there are on-going 
civil wars, the political 
and social conditions are 
grave. Religion is an 




Table 14.6 Religious persecution and migration paths: a summary based on the case  
studies (cont.)
Source: Authors’ personal elaboration 
Case 
study


















For whoever does not 
want to convert, to travel, 
a trip that may be one 
towards death is the only 
possible choice. However, 
not a large number of 
people affected by 
discrimination arrive in 
Italy. There are other 
causes: economic, politics, 
or sometimes there is a 
combination of factors 
(fbo n. 7)
Italian Hindu 








There was a gentleman in 
tears, desperate, saying 
that they returned a 
relative one piece at a time 
… these are frightening 
things, things that we 
know nothing of … But I 
wouldn’t say that there is 
a strong migrant flow 
towards Italy for persecu-
tion reasons. The 
migration is more 
economic in origin (fbo 
n. 8)
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is themed as the direct or manifest reason for the choice to migrate, religion 
never occurs as an isolated element but is always combined with socio- political 
and economic factors. This constant feature underlines above all the differ-
ences in the context in which persecution takes place and that of the culture of 
the host countries. The conceptual categories allowing a clear distinction be-
tween the religious sphere and the social, political and economic one in the 
Western context help to ensure freedom from any religiously motivated perse-
cution. As noted by the representative from the Observatory for Intolerance and 
Discrimination against Christians in Europe, it is not possible to speak of perse-
cution in the European context. Although there are episodes of discrimination 
and intolerance, the substantial characteristics of persecutory actions do not 
find expression. The public affirmation of violence and the denial of any right 
of any citizen on the basis of religious affiliation are in complete opposition to 
the principles of law and secularism on which coexistence and social order in 
Europe are based and stabilized. This framework, both conceptual and practi-
cal, allows to understand the difficulties encountered in defining the identity 
of a religious factor that manifests itself in the migrant population according 
to codes that are not only religious, but also political, social and economic. As 
a result, the cross-factor, which occurs in all the analyzed interviews, is given 
by the mixture between the religious, political, social and economic, and only 
a small number of cases clearly present religion as a distinctive and qualifying 
factor in migration. Narratives that did qualitatively designate religion as a 
manifest cause of migration were recorded in interviews conducted with the 
manager of the Peace Agent movement of the Community of Sant’Egidio in 
Rome and the specialist operator of the Opera San Francesco. In each case, a 
single migrant person was referred to. By resorting to the previously described 
agil scheme, it emerges that the operating code of both services is defined in 
terms of an interpersonal relationship (A) regulated by temporal continuity (I), 
characterized by attention/care for the other (L), encouraging trust (G):
trust is needed (G) … also through a fundamental key, the personal rela-
tionship between the operator and the migrant (A), the possibility to ex-
press oneself is created (L). The recipient always has one or two aid per-
sonnel in the organization as a point of reference. Time is required, 
sometimes even years (I). (interview 3)
We have to work with the person (L) … at first we worked on practical 
things, the concrete needs, “how do you feel” (A), an alliance first, then the 




The application of agil (Adaptation, Goal attainment, Integration, Latent pat-
tern maintenance) in the interpretation of the content allows an observation 
of the constituent categories of the narratives where religion is detected as the 
manifest cause of the migration process. The media (A) indicate the opening 
to a deep dialogue with the migrants, the interpersonal and direct relationship. 
This contact follows the historical path of sharing and mutual growth between 
subjects, and it is dependent on (I), the temporal continuity of the exchange 
between the subjects. The value (L), which supports the relational structure, is 
represented by the person-centered attention and the care demonstrated to-
wards the other. Finally, the precise purpose (G) is the establishment of a trust 
relationship with the migrant (Figure 14.9).
The time variable in relational continuity is therefore crucial in detecting 
the emergence of religious data and for the accounting of experiences and sto-
ries articulated on several levels.
The reading of this specific relational structure, able to identify the underly-
ing causes of migration in relation to religious identity, makes the definition of 
those contextual aspects possible, thus allowing the transmission of intercul-
tural motivations – a definition that would otherwise remain submerged. The 
analysis of the complete body of the interviews highlighted the difficulty the 











Figure 14.9 Migratory processes and the religious dimension in migrant narratives
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interviewees have in delimiting the field of religion due to the clear discrepan-
cies between their own pragmatic and conceptual references and those 
 projected by migrants. The texts highlighting religion as the direct cause of 
migration choice do not deny the plurality of factors involved but, at the same 
time, they recognize the particular gravity of the religious factor. This recogni-
tion identifies a twofold process of opening between the migrant and the 
 operator. On the one hand, the migrants manifest their experience as a result 
of the establishment of a personal and trusting relationship with the operator. 
On the other hand, the operator involved in the same relationship learns of the 
other’s reality and understands it more and more. The reciprocity of what is 
understood as an exchange generates trust towards the host context and at the 
same time a familiarity of foreigners.
6 Pursuing the Common Good through Interreligious Dialogue:  
a “Good Practice” Instituted by fbos
Although religion as a motive for migration is scarcely supported by the direct 
statements in the texts, its interpretation as a defining element of the integra-
tion process between different confessional traditions is demonstrated not 
only transversally throughout the interviews; it also assumes its own specific 
connotation and articulation. The semiotic squares identified for each case 
study, in denoting the profound significance of narratives, capture the focus of 
the interviews in the interweaving of different religious identities and their 
social recognition. Table 14.7 specifies the values and actions characterizing 
the interreligious dialogue and those relating to religious integration.
The texts that make up the first case study recognize religion as a constitu-
tive element of human beings and of social life. Both organizations have a criti-
cal attitude towards European secularism and the individualistic and idealistic 
profile prevalent in modernity. The two interviews paint a highly complemen-
tary picture regarding the position of religion within the social context. The 
Observatory on Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians in Europe 
aims to protect religious freedom within the European context through the 
observation of the dialogue with public institutions, whereas the Religion for 
Peace proposes new growth areas for religion through an open dialogue and an 
exchange of ideas with the different traditions.
The identification of a public space for association memberships highlight-
ed in the first paragraph of this chapter is sometimes problematic, as seen 
clearly by the oidce protection of religious presence in the public sphere. Po-
tential risk factors include the possible exclusion of the organization from the 
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social context, and the emerging of social aspects of intolerance and discrimi-
nation unfavorable to the co-construction of common public spaces.
Important and parallel to these difficulties are the experiences in which reli-
gion assumes a specific social function, that of peace and of understanding of 
Source: Authors’ personal elaboration
Table 14.7  Values and actions in the interreligious dialogue and religious integration
Case 
studies
fbos Interreligious dialogue Religious integration
Values Actions Values Actions
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social complexity, such as in the case of Religions for Peace. By means of dia-
logue and a mutual recognition of the various denominations, religion becomes 
the form through which a common sacred respect for life is asserted, a respect 
shared by all the great traditions, as well as by the principle eliciting a common 
concern for the particularities of the other. The place occupied by religion in 
the public sphere is therefore crucial in confronting major global crises.
The creation, maintenance and promotion of public spaces for the religious 
dimension does not produce situations that, once acquired, remain stable. The 
spaces require continuous attention, defense, as in the oidce action, and pro-
motion, such as that undertaken by Religions for Peace.
The second case study addresses the issue of religion by following a trajec-
tory in part superimposed on the reading of the preceding case study. It can on 
the one hand be identified in the founding value of the Sant’Egidio Community 
and its services (“For Sant’Egidio, service is the concrete expression of what our 
faith is … you are a Christian, you’re a believer when you recognize Christ in 
the poor”, interview 6). On the other hand, the policy of dialogue and respect 
for all religious traditions pursued by the organization helps to establish great-
er social integration, avoid conflict, alleviate mistrust and improve the social 
climate.
Religion is therefore the point of origin for the Community’s activities, and 
the point of arrival in the implementation of a relationship between the 
 different religious beliefs. Interreligious dialogue is presented as an important 
step in reaching an understanding of the social context (“We pray alongside 
each other, each according to their faith … taking advantage of the time of 
prayer as a spiritual nourishment in order to develop a vision of dialogue which 
in our view is the only one that makes sense when you are faced with the great 
tragedies of the world”) and a mutual recognition of identity.
The religiosity proposed by the Community is not geared to proselytism and 
does not preclude access to operators or users of different faith. It establishes a 
direction towards shared values based on solidarity, hospitality, peace and 
sharing. In this sense, the Community “constructs” an open space for multiple 
identities, which, however, orient towards each other by adopting the same 
symbolic code.
The issue of identification of a public space for religion is in this case sub-
ject to the placement of the religious identity, or rather, the religious identities, 
at the meso level. This placement is adequately symbolized by the work 
of the Peace Agent movement, where the free services received by the 
recipients is returned to the social context through services performed in aid 
of others in fragile conditions. This interchange establishes a double and non- 
denominational bond between the religious values proposed by the body and 
the migrant integration process. The integration is carried out through the 
opening up of an interreligious dialogue, which brings the faithful of the 
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 different communities together. In addition, the foundations and services of-
fered by the Community contribute to the integration of foreigners into 
society.
The religious dimension in the third study is present by inference and is not 
made obvious by a direct relationship between religion and the services  offered 
by the organization. Instead, the identification of a public space for the reli-
gious dimension is latent, perceived rather through the articulated range of 
interventions achieved.
The Opera San Francesco is a Franciscan religious institution. Its many ser-
vices and aids offered to a mainly foreign recipient group belonging to a variety 
of religious confessions contribute to the creation of a public space located 
within the folds of the broad range of operative units characterizing this fbos. 
These spaces at once public and internal may generate an interreligious dia-
logue between the operator and the migrant, which can in turn lead to existen-
tial paths of social integration. The presence of consecrated personnel and re-
ligious symbols is not imposed as a qualifying element of the services offered. 
The choice to professionalize the services and make them available to foreign-
ers has influenced the establishment of an environment devoid of religious 
connotations. The religious element is reflected, however, in the mode of im-
plementation of the interventions, in particular in clinical activities where the 
required personal exchange with the patient inevitably opens an interreligious 
and intercultural dialogue (“You have to enter the culture … then you realize 
that you have to keep a distance. With the presence of the mediator we can 
help … very quickly it is we who become the stranger”, interview 8).
The last case study allows us at this point to address the issue of religion in 
more detail by examining the theme of dialogue between the different faiths 
and the relationship between religion and social integration. The point of ob-
servation of the religious phenomenon in this study assumes a different per-
spective. The interview conducted with the manager of the Service for Ecumen-
ism in Milan demonstrated existing opportunities to establish a dialogue with 
other religious traditions, contributing to the integration of these communi-
ties within the social fabric. The aims of the service reside in the research and 
development of interreligious dialogue, which results in a practical sense in a 
direct relationship with the faithful of other religions. To this end, a model is 
proposed of public space geared to the reception of migrants and respect for 
different cultural and religious identities.
What emerges from the interview conducted with the representative of the 
Italian Hindu Union, however, is a more direct correlation between the reli-
gious dimension and the social integration process, which establishes porous 
borders between the two spheres. The element qualifying integration is in fact 
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identified in the recognition of a divinity in the other (“I see God in you … so it 
is nothing other than you yourself, so therefore this relationship means that if 
you really see the other as such you cannot be violent, you cannot do anything 
to the other person, because it would mean harming yourself, you would be 
harming God himself”, interview 7). The relationship with the different reli-
gious traditions is marked by the same identification process (“We all believe 
in the same reality … if we are asked “Do you believe in God?” we answer “(We 
believe in the God) in which you also believe”, interview 7). Such mingling, 
while not infringing on the boundaries of the secular state, is demonstrated 
through a lifestyle, one intrinsically oriented towards both religious and social 
integration. The public space for the religious dimension in the Union seems 
better constructed at the micro level in relations between the members of 
different religions and less at the State/institutional level (“Hinduism has the 
concept of integration in its dna, we do not discriminate against other reli-
gions, we see God in everything. It has its natural vocation to participation”, 
interview 7).
The Hindu religious process of identification of faiths and of all life does not 
preclude other forms of interreligious dialogue present among the activities 
promoted by the body.
While conceptualizing the mutual relationship between the various confes-
sional traditions from different points of departure, both organizations agree 
on the importance of religion as a social glue and as an integration factor in the 
presence of multiple cultural, ethnic and national identities. They also both 
recognize the possibility of creating a more complete integration of foreigners, 
which accepts the specific differences of identity within the social context. The 
dialogue between religious communities supported by the Service for Ecumen-
ism is a first step in creating an atmosphere of respect for differences in iden-
tity and a recognition of the gains this exchange brings both in the formation 
of an integrated religious knowledge of different confessional traditions and 
by contributing to the coexistence of different communities within the same 
religious or social context. The teaching of the history of religion in schools, 
undertaken by the organization, is supported by representatives of all religions 
and contributes to the formation of a conscious understanding of diversity and 
its positive aspects. At the same time, the sharing of worship spaces between 
religious communities, as well as the establishment of new religious commu-
nities within the broader social context, promotes a mutual understanding 
and acceptance process.
Basing on their recognition of one God and the divinity that unites all hu-
man beings and living organisms, the Italian Hindu Union incorporates the 
integration of religious and social differences within their religious  orientation. 
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They represent two implementation forms of this combination: the  socio- 
cultural reality of India and the adaptability of Hindu migrants. India is a State 
deeply divided socially and politically and marked by strong internal ethnic 
discrimination. The binding element making social integration possible is con-
tained in the common religion and the sharing of places of worship. The Hindu 
migrants tend, however, to express their faith within the context in which they 
live through participation and integration into society (“There are 20,000 peo-
ple in the Hindu community … in Lombardy. But they are not such an obvious 
presence because they are inserted into society, they work … they are therefore 
a very integrated group of people”, interview 7).
The theme of a common good pursued through specific activities and prac-
tices based on the recognition of the religious dimension as an inalienable 
right emerges clearly in both organizational practices.
This trait is the red thread connecting the actions of the fbos considered. 
Through specific actions of voice and loyalty (Hirschman, 1970), via interven-
tions linked to the initial reception of persons forced to migrate, through the 
provision of medium and long term services intended to achieve an acceptable 
quality of life, and the implementation of educational and cultural services, 
the organizations contribute to the realization of a common articulated good 
in which the religious dimension is not expunged but rather contributes to the 
building up of specific public spaces.
religious
dimension













Figure 14.10 Action conducted by the fbos and the explication of the religious dimension
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Overall, from the qualitative investigation conducted and the interpretation 
of the relationship between the religious dimension and action taken of fbos 
from a meta-reflexive perspective, three articulations of the religious factor 
emerge. The first focuses on the singular and unique blends of religious, 
 political and social spheres present in the countries of origin. The second is 
related to migratory cases linked to religious persecution, and the last is the 
extension of the relationship between religion and social integration in the 
Western context represented by the organizations.
Religious identity is thus defined in relation to the culture of the migrant 
population as an element inseparable from the broader social, political, ethnic 
and economic contexts. The organizations are active promoters of a social in-
tegration mode, which sees the religious dimension as an important reception 
tool as well as a connecting factor for intercultural dialogue, a clear contributor 
to the creation of specific public spaces. A very particular approach is useful in 
allowing experiences of religious persecution to be revealed. Close contact 
with the migrant and the establishment over time of a lasting and stable inter-
personal relationship characterized by attention and care on the part of the 
operator may lead the migrants to trust the operators enough to be able to ex-
press themselves. The operators, on their part, gain a closer familiarity with the 
cultural and symbolic codes of the migrant.
The triple articulation of the religious dimension described above (see 
 Figure 14.10) allows the emergence of a relational semantic in the meeting of 
the different cultures and religious traditions (Donati, 2008). The recognition 
of the Other and their identity is the point of departure for the description of 
the religious matrix borne by the migrants. Similarly, the establishment of a 
relationship of reciprocity between different identities enables integration of 
the differences in the context of hospitality (Zanfrini, 2019). This integration 
recognizes the real otherness between the subjects, one rooted in an authentic 
symbolic and instrumental sharing. “The sharing is not between two reflec-
tions (two similar entities mirroring each other) but between two unique enti-
ties which, while retaining their impenetrability without losses (because they 
continue to live their memberships in other social and cultural worlds), reveal 
themselves as different in reference to a reality they have in common, for ex-
ample, the human race” (Donati, 2008: 84). Finally, the reflexivity, which allows 
the detection of those very intimate cases of suffering and discomfort, caused 
by episodes of religious persecution, gives body to a morphogenetic relational 
form, one that evolves gradually through the establishment of a relationship of 
trust and familiarity between ego and alter.
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Chapter 15
Interreligious Dialogue in the Governance  
of Migration and Interethnic Cohabitation
Fabio Baggio
Without the acknowledgement of his spiritual being, without openness 
to the transcendent, the human person withdraws within himself, fails to 
find answers to the heart’s deepest questions about life’s meaning, fails to 
appropriate lasting ethical values and principles, and fails even to experi-
ence authentic freedom and to build a just society (Benedict xvi, 2010).
∵
The words of Pope Benedict xvi are a perfect incipit for this chapter, with 
which we propose to highlight the importance of interreligious dialogue in the 
governance of contemporary migration flows and multi-ethnic cohabitation.
According to data gathered by the Pew Research Center, in 2010, 83.7% of the 
global population said they adhered to a religion (Pew Research Center, 2012a). 
Based on this statistic alone, it is evident how the religious dimension repre-
sents an important aspect in the life of the great majority of people. Conse-
quently, every act of government that wants to be oriented to the good of peo-
ple cannot be exempted from this essential consideration. Also, the governance 
of migration flows and multi-ethnic cohabitation, as a political exercise, must 
include the religious dimension among the areas of greatest interest, promot-
ing interreligious dialogue.
Before moving to the real discussion, we think it is appropriate to present 
some methodological clarifications. A large part of the considerations ex-
pressed further below are the fruit of a personal reflection based on first hand 
experiences in different regions of the world. The spiritual dimension dis-
cussed in this article is, by its very nature, difficult to measure in scientific 
terms: this represents at the same time a challenge and a limit of my study. 
Considering my Catholic faith, we will make frequent reference to the teaching 
of the Church, particularly its universal teaching, without failing to mention 
thought developed in other religious contexts.
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1 The Essentiality of the Religious Dimension
At the historical level, it is undeniable the role that religions –and the values 
proclaimed by them– have had in the construction of the different civilizations 
which have marked the continuous progress of humanity in the various regions 
of the world. The opening to the transcendent, considered in its multiple forms, 
has profoundly characterized human evolution in ages and places that are so 
different that it is hard to believe it is not primarily constitutive to the human 
being. Its dogmatic and cultural structuring and its different institutionaliza-
tions, while developing over time, have resisted attacks of all kinds, often be-
coming a reason for resilience and survival. There are also considerable and 
widely documented contributions from the various religions in the moral, po-
litical, cultural and artistic spheres in all regions of the world. And in addition 
to what is expressed above, it cannot be denied that a large part of humanity 
adheres to a religion and that, again according to the Pew Research Center, a 
significant percentage of people who say they are not part of any religion in 
fact also confess to having some religious belief (Pew Research Center, 2012a).
What has been presented above should be sufficient to demonstrate how 
religiosity –or spirituality– makes up a substantial dimension of human real-
ization that cannot be omitted in any debate that regards the human accord-
ing to Terence (Heautontimorumenos, i, 1, 25). In other words, promoting the 
realization of this dimension of human existence contributes to the full real-
ization of the human being. As Pope Benedict xvi affirmed, “The religious di-
mension is in fact intrinsic to culture. It contributes to the overall formation of 
the person and makes it possible to transform knowledge into wisdom of life” 
(Benedict xvi, 2009). The pope explains a conviction of Christian doctrine that 
is rooted in the Jewish tradition, which considers the denial of the existence of 
God as foolishness, with ominous consequences in moral life: “The fool says in 
his heart, “There is no God”. They are corrupt, they do abominable deeds, there 
is none that does good” (Psalm 14:1.). According to Islam, the human being has 
two series of essential needs: spiritual and material. The first are satisfied 
through faith in Allah; the second by using the resources that Allah has created 
for that purpose in the best way (Ahmad Kausar et al., 2013). Regarding the 
Hindu, Jainist and Buddhist traditions, human realization consists in the ca-
pacity to elevate oneself from the material sphere to the spiritual sphere, 
through a process of personal purification.
In the contemporary age, two trends have affirmed themselves that have 
contributed to challenging the essentiality of the religious dimension in hu-
man realization: the acclamation of the superiority of secularism and the po-
litical-ideological abuse of religion.
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It is evident how in some environments a hostile attitude toward religions 
has spread widely, with religions standing accused of conditioning and inter-
ference in the management of the res publica. Starting from the principle that 
religiosity belongs to the private sphere and has to be kept that way in every 
political exercise, many moral values, which find their reason for being in reli-
gious traditions, have been banned from public debate. In the name of a sup-
posed superiority of being a-religious in the secular sphere, political discourse 
has disappeared, eliminating any reference to spirituality and transcendence, 
leading to the view that religious affiliation in fact makes up an impediment to 
the good exercise of government, and that beliefs are irrational, fruit of super-
stition and anti-modern. All of this has contributed to increasing disaffection 
toward the traditional religions, which have already been tested by processes 
of secularization. Deprived of its collective and moral value, religion has ended 
up among the “optional” aspects of human realization: an elective –and pri-
vate– hour in the calendar of life.
Regarding this, in 2005, Pope John Paul ii warned on the threats of secular-
ism to religious freedom:
A mind-set inspired by a secular outlook is spreading in society. This 
ideology leads gradually, more or less consciously, to the restriction of 
religious freedom to the point that it advocates contempt for, or igno-
rance of, the religious environment, relegating faith to the private sphere 
and opposing its public expression. (…) A correct concept of religious 
freedom is incompatible with this ideology that is sometimes presented 
as the only rational voice. Religious freedom cannot be curtailed with-
out depriving human beings of something fundamental. (John Paul ii, 
2005)
The second trend, which is just as widespread currently, is the exploitation of 
religion for ideological and political aims. Even if history is rich in episodes of 
this kind, it was thought that this sort of “abuse” could not “take root” in con-
temporary societies. Unfortunately, the news reveals the opposite, as the Par-
liament of the World’s Religions underlined some years ago: “Time and again we 
see leaders and members of religions incite aggression, fanaticism, hate, and 
xenophobia – even inspire and legitimize violent and bloody conflicts. Reli-
gion often is misused for purely power-political goals, including war” (Parlia-
ment of the World’s Religions, 1993).
Abused for personal interests, retaliation or revenge, religions are used to 
mark out differences, counterpose civilizations, oppress the most vulnerable, 
and justify wars. But “wars of religions” often become “wars against religion” 
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due to the fact that they contribute to perverting the nature of religious affilia-
tion, depriving it of its aspect of being transcendent, mystic and an instigator 
of good.
Faced with these challenges, the necessity arises to re-establish the essential 
role that corresponds to the religious dimension, restoring the inspiring prin-
ciples of religions and reinstating the great ideals of truth, justice and solidar-
ity. The necessary first step is the recognition of religious freedom. In 2001, 
John Paul ii wrote:
Basic to all human rights is the freedom of religion, which includes the 
right to be instructed in the faith. (…) This requires that governments and 
school authorities ensure that this right is effectively respected. (…) Men 
and women religious, lay people and clergy have labored to achieve this 
end, often with prodigious effort and many sacrifices. Their work needs 
to be consolidated and extended to ensure that all the baptized grow in 
faith and in understanding of the truth of Christ. (John Paul ii, 2001: 22)
As a corollary to the recognition of freedom of religion, with a view to a peace-
ful and enriching cohabitation in multi-cultural societies, John Paul ii (2001) 
encourages all stakeholders to commit themselves to an ecumenical and inter-
religious dialogue, seeking to avoid any type of fundamentalism.
2 The Religious Dimension in the Migration Process
As it is logical to suppose, migrants are worthy representatives of the people of 
their countries at the religious level. Their religious affiliation generally corre-
sponds to the percentages observed in their homeland. With regard to interna-
tional migrants, some estimates already exist that we find useful to consider 
when examining this point.
According to data gathered by the already-cited Pew Research Center (2012b), 
in 2010, of the 210 million international migrants estimated by the United Na-
tions, 106 million were Christians (49%), 60 million were Muslims (27%). The 
rest were made up of Hindus (5%) Buddhists (3%), Jews (2%), other religions 
(4%) and unaffiliated believers and non-believers (9%).
In the 27 countries of the European Union, again according to data elabo-
rated by the Pew Research Center, in 2010, the religious composition of migrants 
who were citizens of non-member countries was the following: 42% Chris-
tians, 39% Muslims, 8% unaffiliated or atheists, 3% Buddhists, 2% Hindus, 1% 
Jewish and 4% of other religions.
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These numbers, however, only give an idea of the importance of religiosity for 
migrants, which very frequently is not limited to a mere declaration of affilia-
tion. The religious dimension, in its symbolic and cultural expressions, is es-
sential for many migrants in the various phases of the migration process: de-
parture, journey and arrival/residence.
In recent decades, scientific production on this theme has been enriched 
thanks to contributions from anthropologists, sociologists, theologians and re-
ligion experts, who have formulated interesting theories, often starting from 
the observation of specific cases. These theories can be classified in three big 
groups based on their main subject: those that regard personal faith as a spiri-
tual and social resource for migrants, those that refer to the role of religious 
communities for immigrants, and those that concentrate on transnational dy-
namics of migrants in the religious sphere (Frederiks, 2016).
In the large part of cases, the analysis of researchers has focused on immi-
grant communities. Some studies have gone into depth also on other phases of 
the migration process. This is the case of J. Hagan and H.R. Ebaugh, who stud-
ied the role of religion in the whole migration process of the Maya population 
of San Pedro, Guatemala, to Houston, Texas. The people who intend to depart 
usually turn to ministers of the Pentecostal Church to obtain advice in their 
decision process. The same people participate in large numbers in moments of 
fasting and prayer (ayunos) in which qualified pastors prophesize, indicating 






















Figure 15.1 Religious composition of international migrants, 2010
Source: Pew Research Center, �01�b: 11
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their families, refer to the ministers again for the necessary preparations. Of-
ten, the ministers are requested to check the honesty of the guides (coyotes) 
who lead the migrants in the long and dangerous journey (Hagan, Ebaugh, 
2003). Again J. Hagan, this time along with H. Straut Eppsteiner, underlines 
how particularly in the cases in which the migration is ventured through ir-
regular channels, and for this reason, is set to be risky, the departing –often 
with their relatives– turn to divinities to obtain strength and protection. This is 
the case for many Catholics in Guatemala and Mexico who make pilgrimages 
to sanctuaries, carry out devotional practices and offer ex voto objects in ex-
change for “spiritual travel permits” (Straut Eppsteiner, Hagan, 2016). Already 
in 1980, P.A. McAllister explained how the Gkaleca, an indigenous group of 
South Africa, practiced special propitiatory rites before the departure of mi-
grant workers, with the aim of obtaining protection and guarantee of return 
from the spirits (McAllister, 1980).
During the second phase of the migration process, or the journey, religion 
continues to be important for many people on the move. In a study published 
by L.J. Dorais in 2007, the interviews with Vietnamese refugees of different re-
ligions (Buddhists, Catholics and Caodaists) revealed how each person had 
found comfort, hope, consolation and strength of spirit in prayer and in reli-
gious practices (Dorais, 2007). From the testimonies that I could gather person-
ally, I was able to glimpse the same faithful abandonment and confident re-
course in many migrants and refugees who braved the Sahara Desert and the 
waves of the Mediterranean Sea. After the adventurous crossing of the Medi-
terranean, for many migrants the path continued toward the North, and with it 
the trust in the transcendent, which was also manifested in the construction of 











































Figure 15.� Religious composition of international migrants in the EU, 2010
Source: Pew Research Center, �01�: 54
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migrants in the so-called “jungle” of Calais, who wanted to entrust their dreams 
to divine providence in a church and a mosque built with their own hands 
(“Corriere della Sera”, 9 August 2015). These are the same convictions that lead 
many Central American migrants to build sanctuaries along the “vertical bor-
der” that is Mexico, to jealously guard pictures of the saint they have entrusted 
themselves to in their pockets, to wear miraculous medallions around their 
neck and to sculpt sacred images in stones along the way (Straut Eppsteiner, 
Hagan, 2016).
The importance of the dimension in the third migration phase, made up of 
the arrival and residence in the country of destination, is surely that which has 
been the most common subject of studies in recent decades. In the case of 
Maya migrants in the United States, studied by Hagan and Ebaugh, communi-
cation with relatives who remained in the homeland is kept alive also thanks 
to religion. The migrants send photos to families in Guatemala so that they can 
be taken to the ayunos. The pastors commonly show hundreds of photographs 
to indicate that the propitiatory rites had their effect. On the other side, the 
pastors of the “sister” Churches in the United States hang photographs on the 
walls of reunited relatives who were prayed for, in this way closing a spiritual 
circle of divine protection. Furthermore, the Pentecostal communities in US 
cities offer immediate social support networks for the new arrivals and con-
tribute to maintaining the feeling and the religious practices of the country of 
origin among immigrants (Hagan, Ebaugh, 2003). Proof of the importance of 
the religious dimension in the migrant settlement process is provided by the 
intensification of the religious practice openly declared on the part of some 
ethnic groups, like in the case of Indians of the Hindu religion in the US inter-
viewed by P. Kurien, many of these said they had rediscovered their religiosity 
in the land of emigration, also introducing expressions of regular collective 
worship which in their homeland were relegated to a few big celebrations (Ku-
rien, 2002). Moreover, contemporary history is rich in similar examples; you 
only have to think of the religious vitality of the Italian Catholic immigrants in 
Argentina between 1800 and 1900 (Baggio, 2000), the robust community struc-
turing of Hindus from Surinam in the Netherlands between 1970 and 1990 (van 
der Burgin, 1991), the cultural and institutional development of Muslim immi-
grants in Germany in the last 50 years (Troll, 2003), and the extraordinary ad-
herence to evangelical Christian communities on the part of Korean and Chi-
nese immigrants in the United States in the third millennium (Ambrosini, 
2007).
It should also be noted how, in the residence phase, the religious practice of 
migrants usually produces a significant impact also on the religiosity of host 
societies, as shown by several pieces of research on the subject. R. Henkel and 
511Interreligious Dialogue in the Governance of Migration
<UN>
H. Knippenberg sustain that, thanks to the religiosity of immigrants, in Europe 
there has been a slowing in the process of secularization and religion has re-
gained a space in the public sphere (Henkel, Knippenberg, 2005). In certain 
geographical areas, some religious confessions are today present only thanks 
to the mass arrival of immigrants, who have caused profound change in the 
religious landscape of some countries. This is the case of Christianity in the 
Gulf countries, brought by Philippine immigrants and Indians from Kerala. 
This is the case also for Hinduism in Britain and Canada (Frederiks, 2016). The 
most recent flows of Christian immigrants into the United States brought with 
them a new way of living and celebrating faith, which is obliging local com-
munities to invent, along with the latest arrivals, new forms of praying, an-
nouncing and serving (Levitt, 2007).
3 Religions in Dialogue
The big religions, even in their diversity, offer a priceless common heritage of 
principles and values if meeting and dialogue is encouraged between them. As 
the Parliament of the World’s Religions, underlines: “A common set of core val-
ues is found in the teachings of the religions, and (…) these form the basis of a 
global ethic” (Parliament of the World’s Religions, 1993).
Some scholars say that the definition of a universally accepted ethical plat-
form should be free from any religious consideration. Only a neutral –or rather 
purely philosophical– series of principles could overcome the divisions that 
exist between various faiths and beliefs (Nielsen, 1990). The development of 
this thought has led to three different philosophical orientations: the modern 
doctrine of natural law,1 normative hedonism2 and moral contractualism.3 The 
French philosopher Jacques Maritain was strongly opposed to the total secu-
larization of ethics, advancing the theory of integral humanism. This theory 
1 “A philosophical-juridical current founded on two principles: the existence of natural law 
(corresponding, that is, to the nature of man and therefore intrinsically right) and its superi-
ority over positive law”. “Giusnaturalismo”, Treccani - Enciclopedia On Line, http://www.trec-
cani.it/enciclopedia/giusnaturalismo/ (accessed October 5, 2018).
2 Normative hedonism says that pleasure is a value and suffering is a disvalue regardless of the 
value of anything they can cause or prevent. See. “Hedonism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hedonism/ (accessed October 5, 2005).
3 Moral contractualism defines as right the action that can be rationally justified by the indi-
vidual and approved on the part of other members of the social group of reference. See P. 
Marrone, “Contrattualismo morale e intellettualismo etico in T. Scanlon”, Etica & Politica / 
Ethics & Politics, 2, 2010, 2, 369–370.
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founds itself on the conviction that the human person is at the same time ma-
terial and spiritual and for this reason the religious dimension, understood be-
yond any confessional sense, cannot be excluded from ethical debate (Marit-
ain, 1996). And it is worth adding that, considering the large part of humanity 
defines itself as religious, it would be unreasonable to exclude the spiritual di-
mension from the start from the determination of the ethicality of human 
behavior.
In the world of today, strongly marked by questionable truths and random 
interpretations, an inclusive approach could better respond to contemporary 
ethical challenges. This does not therefore involve the search for universality of 
principles “beyond” religions, but “together” with them, to reach the point of 
being able to define the rules of a common wisdom, which integrates the mor-
al paradigms of the different philosophies and faiths. For this reason, in the 
ethical debate –and at the same time in every public debate– no one should 
renounce one’s own religiosity (Carter, 1993).
Some attempts in this direction are worthy of mention. In the 1990s, a pro-
cess of interreligious reflection resulted in the document The Declaration To-
ward a Global Ethic that was adopted by the Parliament of the World’s Religions 
in 1993. The global ethics proposed in the declaration are founded on common 
values advocated by the different religions that took part in the process. More 
recent is the proposal by Darrell Fasching and Dell Dechant, who suggest a 
comparative narrative approach to the different religious ethics, of which the 
result is structured in a normative ethics of human dignity and liberation, in 
conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Fasching, 
Dechant, 2001). A third attempt, named “ethics through cultures” proposes a 
purely descriptive approach to morality, with great consideration for cultural 
and religious differences, without any kind of judgement (Brannigan, 1998; 
Guptara, 1998). Even in their diversity, these efforts made toward the definition 
of a universally accepted ethical paradigm coincide in the need to make differ-
ent cultures and religions converse to obtain a result that is globally 
significant.
In the last few years, I have dedicated myself to going into more depth on 
this issue, making use of the study and meeting opportunities that my mission-
ary experience has offered me. I managed to highlight some principles that the 
big religious and philosophical traditions concur on. The first of these refers to 
the existence of principles beyond human contingency. For many religious tra-
ditions, these are fruit of a divine revelation and respond to the will of a supe-
rior and transcendent being. For other traditions, these principles are regis-
tered in the cosmic order and can be understood through a process of 
enlightenment and purification. For many philosophical traditions, universal 
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values exist that can be understood by all human beings beyond their spatial-
temporal condition (Baggio, 2007).
A second principle that many religious and philosophical traditions have in 
common is that of the primacy of the common good over that of the individu-
al. As the Lucca-based Group of the Ecclesial Movement for Cultural Commit-
ment (meic) underlined in 2008:
In fact, all religions, through varied means, spur their own faithful to col-
laborate where they live, with all those who make efforts to ensure re-
spect for the dignity of the human person and of their fundamental 
rights, to develop the sense of fraternity and of solidarity, to be inspired 
by the savoir faire of the community of believers that, at least once a 
week, bring together millions of people, of the utmost differences, in an 
authentic spiritual communion, and to help the men and women of this 
time to not be slaves of fashions, consumerism and profit. The believers 
are therefore called upon to contribute concretely to the common good, 
to an authentic solidarity, to the overcoming of crises, and to intercul-
tural dialogue: they have to participate in public dialogue in societies 
they are members of. (meic, 2008: 38)
The coincidence with the big philosophical traditions of the East and West 
made itself evident in firstly the drawing up and then the application of the 
international conventions that protect human rights and promote their 
dignity.
The third principle of universal destination of goods on the earth, the first 
foundation of the “duty” of solidarity, finds the different religions and philo-
sophical ethics in the world in agreement. The concept of a common wealth to 
share, overcoming historical divisions, can be justified by an explicit will of the 
divine creator or by respect for a cosmic order, which guides human history. 
Following on is a moral obligation of charity and sharing which in all cases re-
sponds to the full realization of one’s own humanity according to a superior 
design. In an immanent philosophical perspective, many currents of thought 
consider philanthropy and solidarity as excellent virtues, even if these do not 
always reach the point of constituting a moral obligation for individuals (Bag-
gio, 2014). It should anyhow be noted that, also in the secular sphere, there is 
no lack of people who advocate for the equal allocation of common resources 
as a duty for all, based on the principles of equality, non-discrimination and 
equal access to development (Atuguba, 2013).
A fourth principle is codified in the duty of hospitality toward the other, the 
stranger or in any case the person who does not belong to the group of 
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 reference. The major religious traditions coincide in situating that obligation 
in the sphere of the sacred; some justify it with the fact that the guest is spe-
cially protected by divinity due to their vulnerability; others base it on the mys-
terious presence of God himself in the guest; others furthermore see a way to-
ward ascension and purification in the practice of unselfish hospitality (Baggio, 
2007). In secular ethics, the offer of hospitality is generally a sign of civility, a 
demonstration of magnanimity, even if it does not reach the point of constitut-
ing a moral imperative. Cases exist, however, in which humanely reception 
cannot be denied. This is the case of those who escape war and persecution, 
for whom the duty of hospitality is set forth by international and national law 
(Gil-Bazo, 2015; see also Chapter 4).
Many religious traditions affirm the principle of the global management of 
the earth, from which springs a common duty to the whole of humankind 
around the correct administration, the healthy use and the harmonious devel-
opment of environmental and natural resources. Some of these, such as Juda-
ism, Christianity and Islam, base that duty on an explicit divine disposition 
since the beginning of the world; others, like Hinduism and Buddhism, justify 
it with the need to maintain cosmic harmony through a profound respect and 
meticulous nurturing of every element. Shared management translates into 
co-responsibility to be implemented with respect for the principle of subsid-
iarity (Baggio, 2014). Also within the secular sphere, this principle is generally 
accepted, to the point of becoming a foundation of the international agree-
ments related to questions of common interest. In this sense, the preamble of 
the Paris Agreement on climate change is emblematic, which affirms as funda-
mental “the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances” 
(UN, 2015a, Preamble).
A sixth principle can be deduced from the sense of transnational belonging 
advocated by different religious traditions. Some of these affirm the existence 
of a “universal citizenship” founded on the adherence to a specific faith rather 
than national belonging. In a transcendent perspective, every earthly country 
in any case is transitory compared to the real celestial land, which you reach 
after death. Other religions more simply consider nationality as a spatial- 
temporal accident in the cycle of rebirths, which reveals the cosmic belonging 
of each being. It should also be underlined that these religions teach respect 
for the existing political constructions but push believers to look beyond every 
historical structuring. Some philosophical traditions coincide with this vision 
of citizenship, underlining the precariousness of every spatial-temporal juridi-
cal determination and they insist on the concept of “global fraternity”. On the 
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other side, one has to admit that, if nationality can be given or taken, it cannot 
constitute a real source of personal identity (Baggio, 2014).
These six principles do not in any way exhaust the wealth of common heri-
tage of global religious and philosophical traditions. However, they represent a 
concrete example of how an approach that is inclusive of religions in the pub-
lic debate can contribute substantially to identifying and sharing essential 
principles and values for a convivial cohabitation, which is particularly neces-
sary in an age that has rightly been defined by some scholars as the age of mi-
gration (Castle et al., 2014).
4 Religion and Multi-Ethnic Cohabitation
Even if we mentioned above the importance of the religious dimension in the 
phase of arrival and residence, we consider it is worthwhile to go into more 
depth at this point on the role that religions often play in the process of inte-
gration with a view to a mutually enriching multi-ethnic cohabitation. In 2016, 
D. Nagy and M. Frederiks observed that this particular argument had not been 
especially studied by researchers, probably based on the unfounded assump-
tion that in the integration process religion was being progressively relegated 
to the private sphere, in this way becoming uninfluential in the dynamic of 
identity reconfiguration (Nagy, Frederiks, 2016). A more attentive bibliographi-
cal research, however, reveals that there is no lack of studies that have tackled 
this topic in recent years. Many of these highlight the positive contribution of 
religion in the process of integration, dwelling on very varied aspects (Lyck-
Bowen, Owen, 2018). As a methodological choice, we limited to analyzing the 
studies that refer directly to the European reality.
Firstly, religion contributes generally toward the conservation of migrants’ 
original identity, which is necessary to start a constructive dialogue in the inte-
gration process, without easy concessions to assimilation pressures. In 2008, 
Annemarie Dupré underlined how in the case of Christian communities in Eu-
rope, for many migrants, religion represented an essential element for the 
maintenance of their ethnic or national identity and, at the same time, a source 
of “transnational” identity, which facilitates moving beyond the former (Du-
pré, 2008). In 2011, Jørn Borup and Lars Ahlin, after having studied the case of 
Catholic Vietnamese migrants in Denmark, observed how religion had played 
a crucial role in the maintenance of the identity of a minority group, even if it 
had not in fact encouraged a subsequent step toward integration (Borup, Ah-
lin, 2011). In 2012, some Spanish researchers, analyzing the migration reality in 
the Castile and León region, concluded that migrant communities originally 
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from Morocco, Sub Saharan Africa and Latin America consider religion –and 
above all religious practice– an important element for their collective and in-
dividual identity redefinition (Valero Matas et al., 2012). In 2013, Claudia Diehl 
and Matthias Koenig noted how for two different groups of migrants in Ger-
many, Turkish Muslims and Polish Catholics, religious practice, initially re-
duced upon contact with a largely secular society, was then recovered to redis-
cover their own identity which had been “diluted” in the initial years (Diehlm, 
Koenig, 2013). A recent study on the reality of Muslim migrants in Europe con-
cludes that, despite the many prejudices and the hostility of the native popula-
tion, religion can encourage significant links between minority groups and 
between the minority groups and the majority group; this can contribute to 
mitigating the stress of the process of adaptation, foster a sense of collective 
belonging in second generations and offer refuge from discrimination experi-
enced in host societies (Papademetriou et al., 2016).
A second aspect highlighted by the studies consulted refers to the positive 
effect of religion on the willingness of migrants to collaborate in the construc-
tion of integrated communities in the countries of immigration. In her analy-
sis, Dupré underlines two elements: on the one hand, the importance of the 
positive experience of inclusion of migrants in religious communities in the 
host societies, which often reproduces a climate of fraternity experienced in 
one’s home country; on the other, the recognition of common religious values 
which, translated in ethical terms, serve to promote peaceful and convivial co-
habitation (Dupré, 2008). In 2013, presenting the results of research on integra-
tion of citizens from third countries in the European Union, Jocelyne Cesari 
underlined how active and structured religious participation generally repre-
sents an element encouraging the political participation of migrants (Cesari, 
2013). Religion can function also as a driving force for the emancipation of mi-
nority migrant groups from particularly stringent political, social and econom-
ic structures in immigration countries, like in the case of the Sri Lankan Tamil 
community in Britain studied by Donald Taylor (Taylor, 1991).
A final element worthy of consideration is that underlined by Majbritt Lyck-
Bowen and Mark Owen in a very recent article, which is the contribution of 
cooperation between religions to the process of integration. According to the 
authors, a multi-religious approach can be of benefit for the improvement of 
services supporting the integration process, and the intensification of collabo-
ration between religious organizations and communities, with positive conse-
quences on dynamics of inclusion, and the creation of a social fabric that is 
more open and respectful of differences (Lyck-Bowen, Owen, 2018).
There are many cases in which religion has been fundamental for the cre-
ation of ad hoc structures and the organization of services for migrants and 
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refugees. In 2004, Charles Hirschman stated that religions play a triple role in 
the life of migrants, codified with the formula of the three “rs”: refuge, respect 
and resources. And it was to obtain one of these “rs” that migrants decided 
generally to affiliate themselves with this or that religious group (Hirschman, 
2004). This interpretation, while with all its limitations, is reflected in that 
which many religious organizations and communities tend to offer their 
faithful in the various phases of the migration process (see on this point 
Chapter 12).
In my missionary experience, I have had the chance to get to know numer-
ous associations, organizations and foundations of declared religious inspira-
tion, which have made assistance to migrants and refugees their main reason 
of being. In the origin countries, they dedicate themselves to providing useful 
information on emigration, preparing the departing and their relatives who 
remain in the homeland, demanding more protection of migrants on the part 
of accountable institutions and assisting migrants and their families in making 
the migration experience a real development opportunity. In the transit coun-
tries, they usually offer refugees and migrants assistance and refuge, seeking to 
satisfy their fundamental needs. In the destination countries, they offer a wide 
range of services both in the spiritual as well as in the social sphere, in many 
cases promoting integration between migrants and native peoples, active par-
ticipation, with respect for differences, as well as the reinforcement of transna-
tional dynamics with positive effects on development of origin communities.
Summing up the conclusions of various studies on the issue, in 2004 Alejan-
dro Portes and Josh DeWind observed that in the US, religious institutions 
contributed in a significant way to the integration process of migrants through 
the support of a positive reception, the mitigation of any negative attitudes, 
collaboration with the accountable authorities toward inclusion, the protec-
tion of minority groups from exclusion, support toward the incorporation of 
new arrivals and equally of their transnational practices and help to migrant 
parents toward ensuring a positive integration of their children (Portes, 
DeWind, 2004) (Chapter 20).
In his 2003 article, Christian Troll noted that from the 1970s in Germany, 
Muslim associations in which the first aim was to guarantee places of worship 
to the migrant faithful had multiplied, but also noted that, over the years, they 
had widened their range of action, elevating themselves to official representa-
tives of their members in the public sphere and, in this way, offering learning 
courses and going into more depth on the Koran. From the 1980s, many of 
these associations came together in federations, often with a strong national 
connotation, to ensure better religious assistance to members, guarantee a 
greater political weight to Muslim communities, initiate dialogue with 
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 Christianity, educate young generations in the doctrine of Islam and create 
and manage Islamic cultural centers (Troll, 2003).
A report published in 2016 by the Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Eu-
rope and by the World Council of Churches illustrated in detail the ministry car-
ried out by some Christian communities in Europe to the benefit of migrants 
and refugees, underlining as spheres of specific commitment their inclusion in 
the life and apostolate of local Churches, the accompaniment of young people, 
social assistance and the work of advocacy (Jackson, Passarelli, 2016).
5 Valuing Religion and Interreligious Dialogue
From what has been presented above, we believe we can affirm that the impor-
tance of the religious dimension in the migration experience appears evident. 
Since it constitutes an important aspect in the life of the great majority of mi-
grants, it has to be considered in all its potentiality in the governance of migra-
tion and multi-ethnic cohabitation. Interreligious dialogue represents a privi-
leged instrument to increase and release that potential, inasmuch as the 
participation of many actors, all authoritative and animated by common prin-
ciples and values, is already a guarantee of success.
In 2014, Pope Francis affirmed that
Religious freedom (…) is a shared space (…) an atmosphere of respect 
and cooperation that must be built with everyone’s participation, even 
those who have no religious convictions. (Francis, 2014)
For the construction and the maintenance of this shared space, it is essential 
to promote dialogue and meeting between the different religions and between 
them and institutions with every means.
Those meetings should be favored both at the level of religious leaders as 
well as at the level of the faithful, so as to harmonize theoretical exchange on 
principles and values with dialogue on concrete questions of day-to-day life. It 
is appropriate for them to be organized in neutral spaces, guaranteeing the 
participants the possibility of expressing themselves in utmost liberty. It is 
convenient also to foresee moments of informal, recreational, sportive and ar-
tistic meeting, to widen the opportunities of expression beyond the knowledge 
of language. Ecumenical and interreligious prayer meetings, furthermore, rep-
resent the highest expression of reciprocal recognition and respect, inasmuch 
as the communication takes place in the sphere of the sacred.
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Sincere dialogue and the enriching encounter between religions and be-
tween religions and institutions can prepare the ground for the development 
of shared initiatives and programs, characterized by a multi-religious ap-
proach. The already-cited study of M. Lyck-Bowen and M. Owen (2018) pres-
ents five concrete examples of that collaboration at the European level.
Refugee Support is a psychological and social assistance program for asylum 
seekers and refugees in Britain. Managed by the British Red Cross, it relies 
upon the cooperation of different religious, interreligious and secular 
organizations.
The second project, entitled Goda Grannar (good neighbors) sprang from a 
spontaneous collaboration between a Christian Church and a mosque in the 
offering of temporary lodging and food to migrants in transit at Stockholm sta-
tion. In 2015, the collaboration was structured in a common program that add-
ed among its services teaching of the language, legal assistance and the direct-
ing of those assisted to the competent public offices.
With the objective of accompanying migrants in the integration process in 
Germany, the project Weisst Du Wer Ich bin? (Do you know who I am?) brought 
together Muslims, Christians and Jews of good will. This project is supported 
financially by the Federal Government.
Dialogue for Integration–a Multi-Faith Approach is a program promoted by 
the Afryka Connect Foundation to improve relations between African mi-
grants and the local population in Poland. This program foresees a series of 
training seminars for leaders of different religions and representatives of 
institutions.
The last project studied by the two researchers is that of the “Humanitarian 
Corridors” through which hundreds of particularly vulnerable refugees and 
asylum seekers are rapidly relocated in Italy. The initiative, promoted jointly by 
the (Catholic) Community of Sant’Egidio and by the Waldensian Church (see 
Chapter 10), saw the effective informal collaboration of some Muslim commu-
nities and mosques on Italian territory.
Interreligious dialogue is a privileged vehicle for valuing the religious di-
mension of natives and migrants, and every political exercise aimed at the gov-
ernance of migration and multi-ethnic cohabitation should consider it. Start-
ing from my experience, I would like to highlight five concrete ways of valuing 
the religious dimension, without any claim of being exhaustive in my 
proposal.
1) The first way of valuing religion in the governance of migration is guaran-
teeing its freedom, both in its profession as well as in its practice. In 2017, 
the Migrants and Refugees Section of the Dicastery for Promoting  Integral 
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Human Development of the Vatican encouraged states to “adopt policies 
and practices that guarantee the freedom of religion, in both belief and 
practice, to all migrants and refugees regardless of their migratory status” 
(Migrants and Refugees Section, 2017, 17).
2) The reason for the encouragement is due to the observation that in some 
countries, by law, it is not permitted to affiliate oneself with or publicly 
practice a religion that is different from that of the majority of citizens. In 
that sense, migrants, who often make up a large percentage of religious 
minorities in these countries, find themselves prevented from freely ex-
pressing their faith, above all when this requires collective participation 
(Chapter 10).
3) It is not enough to recognize freedom of worship as an individual and 
collective right. It is also necessary to ensure its exercise. For this reason, 
States have to concede to the use of appropriate structures of worship, so 
that spaces and things that belong to the sacred sphere that many faithful 
turn to with devotion can be treated with the due respect. This conces-
sion would serve to guarantee the dignity of different cultural manifesta-
tions and contribute likewise to eliminating all forms of religious “secre-
cy” that usually stoke suspicions and fears among the local population.
4) Guaranteeing the exercise of the right translates also in the “political” 
consideration of the special times, celebrations and traditions of each 
religion. The faithful should be put in a condition to be able to carry out 
the devotional practices considered as a duty in the doctrine of the pro-
fessed faith, with all those elements considered “obligatory” (rests, fast-
ing, food etc.) with the aim of religious compliance, always and when 
these do not violate local laws and do not undermine the fundamental 
rules of peaceful and respectful cohabitation.
5) For an effective exercise of freedom of worship, the competent authori-
ties have to eliminate or prevent every form of discrimination of a reli-
gious origin. This can be achieved through a relentless pursuit of every 
discriminatory attitude and specific awareness-raising campaigns that 
have mutual tolerance and respect as their aim. Focusing on the medium 
to long term results, it would be all the more opportune to introduce 
teaching modules in educational curricula of primary and secondary 
schools that allow students to get to know different religions, seeing as 
ignorance is frequently the source of prejudices, which in turn produce 
fears and conflicts.
The guarantee of the exercise of religious freedom, both in its profession and 
its practice, undoubtedly makes up a first step toward the valuing of religion, 
but it does not determine in itself any proactive commitment on the part of 
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the state. The real appreciation of the value of the religious dimension is dem-
onstrated by its inclusion in the formulation of policies and programs targeted 
at the departure, transit, entrance, residence and return of migrants.
In the Message for the World Day of Migrants and Refugees 2018, entitled 
“Welcoming, protecting, promoting and integrating migrants and refugees”, 
Pope Francis explained how the four verbs of the title were the summary of the 
pastoral action of the Church for migrants and refugees. In the paragraph dedi-
cated to “promoting”, the Holy Father underlined how religion makes up an 
essential dimension of integral human development, the search for which rep-
resents the main cause of the large part of contemporary migration flows.
Promoting essentially means a determined effort to ensure that all mi-
grants and refugees –as well as the communities that welcome them– are 
empowered to achieve their potential as human beings, in all the dimen-
sions that constitute the humanity intended by the Creator. Among these, 
we must recognize the true value of the religious dimension. (Francis, 
2017)
It would be interesting, as a scientific exercise, to encourage an objective as-
sessment of the consideration of the religious dimension in migration policies 
and programs of the countries of departure, transit, and destination. The privi-
leged observatory in which I find myself working today has allowed me to draft 
a few attempts in this direction. Rarely have I managed to find significant refer-
ences to religion in the policies and programs that I have analyzed. Often, 
those references were motivated either by the will to prevent every form of 
discrimination toward minority religious groups, or by the concern about 
maintaining a neutral attitude toward each faith (or not to consider it in politi-
cal practice) or by the need for greater control over who professes this or that 
religion.
The inclusion of the religious dimension in the formulation of migration 
policies and programs of the departure countries means the acknowledgment 
of the role of religions in the discernment process leading to the decision to 
migrate and to the immediate preparation for the departure. It also means the 
recognition of situations where the impossibility of confessing and practicing 
a specific religion is the cause of a forced migration. Such situations highlight 
the need for promoting appropriate measures toward resolving this problem.
Migration policies and programs in transit countries cannot ignore the in-
fluence of the religiosity of migrants on their capacity of resilience and on the 
conservation of hope beyond any logical reasoning. Considering the religious 
dimension, “politically” means ensuring places of worship and prayer to all 
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itinerant people and encouraging their referral, when possible, to local minis-
ters of the same religion.
With regard to the destination countries, the religious dimension has to be 
included in initial reception policies and programs, in those of integration in 
the medium to long term and those of returning. Above, we have already high-
lighted the positive potential of religion in this migration phase – potential 
that has to be opportunely released through appropriate and far-sighted nor-
mative and institutional interventions. We would like to underline the transna-
tional significance of the religious dimension of migrant communities, which 
requires special attention and a considered appreciation when elaborating bi-
lateral or multilateral agreements on migration questions.
The inclusion of the religious dimension in the formulation of migration 
policies and programs also regards the international community, which for 
some years has inserted migration among the main issues of its common agen-
da. Unfortunately, it seems that this has not yet happened. In the document of 
the United Nations entitled “Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sus-
tainable Development”, we find just two very short mentions of religion to say 
that this cannot ever be an element of discrimination (UN, 2015b: 19). The 
same applies for the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants from 
2016 (UN, 2016: 13–14). Neither the word “religion” nor the word “faith” ever ap-
pear in the text of the report by the United Nations Secretary General entitled 
Making migration work for all and published at the end of 2017 (UN Secretary 
General, 2017). The final drafts of the “Global Compact on Refugees” (UN, 
2018a: 9) and the “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration” 
(UN, 2018b: 31a) are situated on the same line as the “New York Declaration”.
All of the studies analyzed highlight the fundamental role that religious or-
ganizations are playing in the maintenance of “faith” among migrants and ref-
ugees, offering cultural services and guaranteeing appropriate spaces and spir-
itual counselling. They are often committed to the maintenance of original 
identity, promoting the richness of different cultures. Many have widened the 
range of services offered, responding to the most varied needs of their faithful. 
Even with different ways and with different motivations, the large part of them 
has in any case contributed positively to the process of integration of migrants 
and refugees in the host communities.
The enormous role played by religious organizations in favor of migrants 
and refugees has to be appropriately recognized and appreciated on the part of 
institutions. That appreciation has to translate in terms of legislative, political 
and financial support. In the first place, it is essential that national and/or local 
legislation consider and order their legal existence through clear regulation 
and simple procedures for inclusion in public registers. Religious  organizations, 
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then, have to be appropriately considered in the formulation of policies on 
emigration, entrance, integration and return, with a view to the activation of 
useful synergies toward a better governance of the migration phenomenon 
and the construction of intercultural and plural societies. Institutions, finally, 
have to insert the financing of those synergies in their public spending esti-
mate, guaranteeing religious organizations the possibility of participating ac-
tively in activities and programs in favor of migrants and refugees, as well as 
cover for expenses generated by that participation. The authorities in charge 
have to equip themselves with mechanisms of monitoring and checking of the 
work of religious organizations with the aim of guaranteeing maximum 
transparency.
Between 2008 and 2010, I directed research into the relationship between 
Philippine migrant associations and Philippine institutions, entitled Migrant 
Associations and Philippine Institutions for Development (mapid). The large 
part of the migrants interviewed said they had lost their faith in homeland in-
stitutions, considered “to blame” in some way for their emigration (Baggio, 
2010). On the other hand, the same migrants showed they placed much faith in 
the Catholic Church and in other religious organizations (Asis, Roma, 2010; Vil-
larroya Soler, 2010; Zanfrini, Sarli, 2010). I had the opportunity to personally 
note similar situations related to other groups of migrants and in other geo-
graphical contexts. With regard to refugees, the loss of faith in authorities of 
their own country made up one of the main reasons of their forced migration. 
In many cases, the mistrust is not limited to countries of origin, but extends as 
a consequence also to those of the countries of immigration. Collaboration 
between institutions and religious organizations can favor the re-establish-
ment of a relationship of trust between migrants and public authorities, gener-
ating fertile ground for an open and constructive dialogue. The opportunity to 
institutionalize that collaboration therefore appears evident, inviting repre-
sentatives of the different religious organizations to participate in the commit-
tees and round tables on migration questions and integration processes.
Considering the presence of a considerable number of highly diversified 
stakeholders, it is appropriate for States to promote an inclusive and effective 
cooperation between the different religious organizations. It would be useful 
to entrust the institutions that are responsible with the task of coordinating 
the actions of religious organizations in favor of migrants and refugees, always 
with respect for the relative prerogatives and autonomies.
The importance of collaboration with religious organizations is clearly af-
firmed in the final draft of the “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular 
Migration”: “We will implement the Global Compact in cooperation and part-
nership with migrants, civil society, migrant and diaspora organizations, 
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 faith-based organizations, local authorities and communities, the private sec-
tor, trade unions, parliamentarians” (UN, 2018b: 44). The final text of the “Glob-
al Compact on Refugees”, after having included religious organizations among 
the “relevant stakeholders” in the division of responsibility for aid, at point 41 
affirms that: “Faith-based actors could support the planning and delivery of 
arrangements to assist refugees and host communities, including in the areas 
of conflict prevention, reconciliation, and peace-building, as well as other rel-
evant areas” (UN, 2018a: 41).
The same text also underlines the commitment of States to make the most 
of the potential of civil society, religious organizations and communications 
means “in fostering respect and understanding, as well as combating discrimi-
nation” (UN, 2018a: 84). Echoing that emphasis is the final draft of the “Global 
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration”, which indicates among the 
commitments foreseen by the agreement to:
Engage migrants, political, religious and community leaders, as well as 
educators and service providers to detect and prevent incidences of in-
tolerance, racism, xenophobia, and other forms of discrimination against 
migrants and Diasporas and support activities in local communities to 
promote mutual respect, including in the context of electoral campaigns. 
(UN, 2018b: 33)
For this reason, it is important that institutions make efforts to offer religious 
leaders and directors of religious organizations accessible training opportuni-
ties, aimed at the acquisition of the necessary skills for far-sighted guidance, 
conscientious teaching and a significant functioning in the migration sphere. 
Every investment in this sense will be generously repaid by results in the field. 
These offers of training, when they are capable of attracting representatives 
from different religious groups, could also ensure spaces of shared planning 
and favor the creation of operational networks.
The multiple services offered by religious organizations beyond the purely 
spiritual area are often entrusted to volunteers, whose generosity is not always 
matched by adequate training. To bridge this gap, institutions could create 
courses of certification and professionalization of skills for workers of religious 
organizations. These courses could also provide the same workers greater in-
formation on existing regulation around the services offered and on the pos-
sibilities and/or opportunities to redirect cases.
The inadequate consideration of the religious dimension in the provision of 
services on the part of institutions can produce serious problems, such as the 
formulation of judgements tainted by ignorance of the limits imposed by 
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 religious traditions, discrimination in access to services and the generation of 
hostile sentiment in some minorities. For this reason, it is appropriate for pub-
lic officials to be educated on the essential elements of different religions, in 
particular on beliefs and religious practices that can have a strong impact on 
the social life of the faithful.
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Chapter 16
The Multi-Ethnic and Multi-Religious 
Transformation of the Largest Diocese in the World: 
The Church of Milan and the  
“Synod from the Peoples”
Laura Zanfrini and Luca Bressan
Held in the middle of the largest refugee crisis of our time since the end of 
World War ii, while the city of Milan was dealing with the arrival of thousands 
of desperate –yet filled with hope– people, the minor Synod was immediately 
regarded as an initiative with prophetic meaning.1
The Synod is the instrument through which the Catholic Church enables 
each Diocese, convened in a formal gathering under the rule of the respective 
Bishop, to better define its mission to both announce and be a witness to the 
Christian faith. The recently appointed Archbishop Mons. Delpini chose to 
start the highly challenging rewriting process of the previous Diocesan Synod 
(the 47th) with the chapter on the Pastorale degli Esteri2 (literally “Pastoral of 
the Abroads”, that is Pastoral of Foreign People) and took the occasion to re-
mind the Church of its daily duty to be a witness to the Gospel. Through this 
Synod, the Church was reminded of the importance of practicing hospitality – 
“we can find ourselves welcoming angels without even knowing it”3– and was 
further encouraged to become a “Church from the People”, thus fulfilling the 
ultimate aim of Catholicism.
This Church, as we will illustrate in this chapter, reflects the transformation 
of a city that has been changing considerably since the previous Synod, which 
dates back to the 1990s. In fact, both the Church and the city of Milan are facing 
the urgency to find their own identity. In this search, it is safe to say that the 
1 This chapter is a translation, with minor changes, of an essay already published in an Italian 
version: Zanfrini L., Bressan L., 2018.
2 The previous Synod that took place in Milan was convened by Cardinal Carlo Maria Martini 
and was concluded in 1995. While the latter was meant to outline the general characteristics 
of the local Church, the one launched by Mons. Mario Delpini aimed at redefining every 
single trait of it. Such redefinition began with the examination of the trait that, in the past 
few decades, has been undergoing the most changes, due to the arrival in Milan of many 
people from very different places of the world.
3 Letter to the Hebrews, 13, 2.
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Christian roots preserved by the Ambrosian rite –some kind of “Oriental echo 
in the West” (SC4: Focus group of Professors from the Faculty of Political and 
Social Sciences of Milan’s Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 22 February 
2018)– can offer all the interpretation and communication tools that will help 
them find their place in today’s global society and inside the universal Church.
The present chapter, authored by two members of the Coordinating Com-
mittee, is based on the information and suggestion collected through a public 
consultation launched at the beginning of the synodal process (started 15 Janu-
ary 2018 and continued until 1 April 2018).
1 On the Eve of a New Era: Milan as a Cultural and Religious  
Melting Pot
It is safe to say that the Church, through its many articulations –from parishes 
to Caritas facilities spread all over the diocesan territory, from religious congre-
gations to Catholic movements, from the various associations to the numerous 
charismatic figures of the Catholic world– has been, in the past few years, one 
of the main actors on the Italian and Milanese reception scene (Chapter 10). It 
is surely thanks to the valuable experiences and competences gained over time 
that the local Church has managed to be actively helpful, despite a social cli-
mate marked by the aftermath of the economic crisis and by the growing con-
cern towards migration and its impact on local communities. As proof of the 
Church mobilization, we can observe that the asylum-seekers hosted by par-
ishes and accommodated in facilities associated with religious organizations, 
at the beginning of 2018, account for as many as 2,360. Besides, Catholic aid 
centers are also offering sanctuary to those who are officially denied asylum 
but who remain in the country of arrival illegally and have no other access to 
essential goods. Both newly arrived and long-time foreign nationals are today 
the main group of people who look for help in centers providing assistance to 
the poor – which is paradigmatic of the different needs of a society that is deal-
ing with the consequences of an instability affecting not only the labour mar-
ket, but social relations too.5 Finally, the Church has always been there for 
people in need, even during the recent refugee crisis, in both formal and infor-
mal spontaneous ways. For example, by arranging Italian language courses in 
4 From now on, we will use the acronym sc (Synodal Consultation) when referring to the doc-
uments either written or collected by the Synodal Coordinating Committee between 15 Janu-
ary and 1 April 2018. When available, the exact date was indicated.
5 Caritas Ambrosiana – Osservatorio diocesano delle povertà e delle risorse, La fatica del fare 
comunità di cura. Un’indagine presso i centri di ascolto della Caritas Ambrosiana. 16th Report 
on poverty in the Diocese of Milan, November 2017.
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the local parishes, by organizing collections to help immigrant families, and by 
encouraging private citizens to either welcome migrants in their own houses, 
or –just to give an example– accompany them to their doctor’s appointment or 
to the offices of the public administration, whenever they have to go.
As many observed during the synodal Assembly, it was the Ambrosian 
Church’s hard work, as well as its pragmatism, that actively inspired the whole 
Catholic Church in its constantly prompt and generous responses to the differ-
ent issues that need to be tackled. Moreover, all the Christian believers and all 
the members of the clergy who volunteer to take care of refugees and migrants 
act on behalf of the Church as they follow the example of the “good Samaritan” 
who helps strangers regardless of who they are. However, a corollary of this 
somewhat extraordinary capability to cause mobilization is a substantial lack 
of awareness of the profound changes that the migration issue is also introduc-
ing to the Church.
It is worth noting that, long before the refugee crisis started dominating the 
reception system, as well as the public debate on the short- and long-term im-
pact of migration, Milan had become one of the main cultural, linguistic and 
religious melting pot in Italy and in contemporary Europe, too.6 The sharp rise 
in the number of foreign nationals –an eightfold increase over the course of 
thirty years, i.e. 800,000 foreign residents as of today– has led to irreversible 
transformations in the ethno-cultural composition of Milan’s population, as 
well as to the creation of many national and religious minority groups. Their 
considerable size has indeed modified the city’s “public” profile, even if inte-
gration models –such as those dealing with occupational segregation– often 
make them quite invisible in social contexts. For instance, the first foreign 
community in the rankings in terms of presence on the metropolitan territory 
is the Filipino. As it is a very large community, it can be compared to a medi-
um-sized Italian city, with over 40,000 residents only in the municipality of 
Milan. Besides, the beginning of the Filipino immigration process can be 
traced back to many years ago (the average migratory seniority is twenty years) 
– which is reflected in a large second generation and in an incipient third one. 
The same kind of observations can be made about many other national groups, 
as they are crucial in the outlining of Milan’s current and future configuration, 
also because of their different migration patterns. In fact, some are largely 
male-dominated, some others have a clear prevalence of women; some are 
6 In order to further examine this phenomenon, see the documentation available on the Synod 
website. Cf. especially: Come l’immigrazione ha cambiato la Diocesi ambrosiana interpelland-
one la capacità di guardare al futuro. In this document, you can also find the sources of the 
data discussed above.
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 characterized by temporary and circular migration, some others by long-term 
 settlements sometimes ending up with the acquisition of the Italian citizen-
ship, which, in the province of Milan, reached in 2016 an amount of over 16,000.
Reflecting the high transformative potential that migration has, there are 
data documenting how advanced its stabilization process is, with a migrant 
presence configuration becoming more and more family-based, a large propor-
tion of migrants’ children attending schools (i.e. over 160,000 foreign pupils) 
and, most notably, a high incidence of newborns with a migratory background 
(28% of babies born in Milan have foreign parents, and 37% have at least one 
foreign parent) – which is crucial in determining the generative potential of a 
Diocese that is somewhat growing older and older. However, there are also 
data showing how migrants leaving their countries either alone or with their 
families finally enjoy a fair amount of “success” (e.g. through the achievement 
of employment stability, the purchase of a house, or the start of a small-sized 
business) and reach relevant roles in the cultural and economic spheres. In-
deed, the international students enrolled in the universities of Milan amount 
to no less than 12,000, while thousands of foreign professionals, managers and 
high-skilled workers find employment in industries such as finance, fashion, 
design and healthcare. It is safe to say, in fact, that Italians tend to forget that 
migration is characterized not only by people moving away from the southern 
countries of the world to look for a better life, but also by the so-called transna-
tional hyper-bourgeoisie, i.e. a population that is part of an international net-
work and whose behavioral and consumption patterns –along with its lifestyle, 
expectations and needs– are paradigmatic of a global interconnected society 
and are the result of social relations and changeable personal/professional life 
choices.
2 “The Church acts through the power of the Holy Spirit, not by law”: 
Challenges and Opportunities Posed by the Religious Pluralism
By focusing our attention on religious affiliations, we can see that migration 
flows have not only provoked a growth of all minority religions, but have also 
triggered three phenomena, which have all proven meaningful for the future of 
Milan and the Ambrosian Church.
2.1 An Identity Challenge and an Opportunity for Interreligious 
Dialogue
The first phenomenon, which is the most emphasized in the political and me-
dia debate, is the growth of Muslim residents, who are an estimated 270,000 
over the Diocese territory.
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Such phenomenon, as observed during the consultation phase, has crystal-
lized both the concern –with reference not really to security issues and jihadist 
fanaticism (which many do not consider as a high risk), but mainly to the iden-
tity issue– and the opportunity for an interreligious dialogue, as expected by 
Cardinal Scola (the predecessor of the current archbishop), who centered its 
episcopal ministry on how to reach this goal.
Muslims, in a way admired for the diligence with which they observe fasting 
and offer the daily prayers during Ramadan, are nevertheless emblematic of 
how hard interethnic coexistence can in fact be. To some, they represent the 
threat of a potential “clash of civilizations”: the relationship between men and 
women –and especially the role of women in the Islamic culture–, is one of the 
most critical aspects affecting the perception of a social and cultural divide, or 
even incompatibility, between the Italian society and the apparently integrat-
ed Muslims.
On top of that, it is the presence of Islamic immigrants that fuel people’s 
hostility towards immigration –hostility that must be explained from the 
broader point of view of the transformations occurred in the Italian society 
(SC: Focus with Movimento Terza Età, 16 March 2018). First of all, an ageing 
population; then, a large-scale unemployment, which affects most of all young 
people (who sometimes end up leaving Italy or being exposed to the “unfair 
competition” of newly-arrived migrants); a public debt accumulated over the 
years and subtracting resources from redistribution policies; the transforma-
tion of values and lifestyles, as well as the undermining of the local religious 
identity, which turns out to be inadequate to deal with other religious tradi-
tions (such as, first of all, the Islamic one), often interpreted by their followers 
in a more orthodox way. Some also act on the paradox according to which
it is easier to recognize and respect the traditions of other religions (…) 
than the Christian one. Today, this happens because of an overall false 
sense of decency that somehow compels people to choose not to seem 
racist over looking like devout observant Christians. (sc: Young and 
Adults Group ac, Deanship of Missaglia)
Furthermore, if we move from a collective level to a more private one –for ex-
ample, when it comes to dealing with our7 children’s marital and friendship 
choices or, more simply, with the “excessive” presence of Muslims in schools or 
in our neighborhoods–, the aspiration to behave in compliance with the dic-
tates of the Christian doctrine collides with a widespread concern for the 
7 In this text we use the terms "our" / "us" to refer to the indigenous (Catholic) long-term resi-
dent population.
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 possible problems that any relationships with those who are “too” different 
from us can cause.
However, these exact circumstances can become fruitful opportunities to 
“measure” our own faith and rediscover its contents. It is crucial to underline, 
in particular, the opportunity to search for connections, such as some specific 
aspects and values of a religion that are considered as to be universal and that, 
for this reason, can also be shared by those who originally have different reli-
gious traditions (see also Chapter 15). In order to find those connections, in 
fact, we have to focus on what unites, and not on what divides –and such aim 
is achieved by cultivating ecumenical dialogue, by helping the needy, by pray-
ing at the same time or in the same place (sc: Marceline Sisters of Albania, 1 
March 2018), and finally by promoting those figures who, because of the “uni-
versal” character of their spirituality, can attract other cultures and religions 
(sc: Friars Minor Capuchins of Varese). It also fundamental to point out that 
dealing with people who show a great attachment to their original religious 
traditions, also because of their migrant status, can be a stimulus for Catholic 
believers.8 Lastly, it is important to remind us all that only through a direct in-
terpersonal relationship we can fight prejudice:
If you do not want to meet the other people and you do not move away 
from your personal disinformation, you will express your judgment on 
the “types of religion”, but you will not be able to really see the people 
behind them. (sc: Focus group with students from Università Cattolica, 
22 March 2018)
2.2 A Spiritual Challenge and a Chance for the Development of 
Ecumenism
The second phenomenon is the “appearance”, on the Milanese scene, of the 
Orthodox Christianity (whose followers are estimated to be over 100,000), most 
of all thanks to a large presence of women from Eastern Europe.
8 See, for example, the testimony of this religion teacher: “Once, in the classroom, I asked Cath-
olic and Muslim children to discuss the traditional festivities of their religions. To my great 
surprise, this emerged: Muslim children talked with joy, pride, and sometimes nostalgia, 
about the typical festivities of their country, also recounting the profound meanings behind 
each festivity; Italian Christian children, who represent the Christianity of the West, showed 
a warm faith and barely expressed the profound meaning of Christmas and Easter, boiling 
Christmas down to receiving gifts”. Also see the testimony of a university professor: “I must 
say that, on several occasions, some questions posed by the brothers and sisters of other reli-




As a reflection of the concentration of Orthodox (female) immigrants in 
definitely sui generis jobs (especially home-care assistants), this minority has 
long remained in the shadows until some caregivers (who, in Italian, are usu-
ally referred to as “badanti”, which is a term that has a rather stereotypical con-
notation) started showing up for Mass, discreetly and silently, usually to ac-
company the elderly they assist or because there are no Orthodox churches in 
the surrounding area. The Italian term “badante” (from the verb “badare”, to 
care for/to tend to) on the one hand intends to evoke the gratitude of the Cath-
olic community for the carer’s precious contribution (which can also be found 
in the choice of dedicating one of the meetings conducted by the Archbishop 
in the Cathedral during the 2018 Advent Sundays specifically to them); but on 
the other reveals the tendency to consider them not for who they are, but for 
what they do, in both the social and the religious space. As a result, they are 
stripped of their own individuality, as well as of their own faith, in order to 
place them in a specific professional category and therefore making Orthodox 
immigrants who do not share the same work destiny even more invisible.
Finally, the initiatives promoted to cultivate ecumenism –in particular the 
Week for Christian Unity– do not manage to be organized properly and end up 
being attended by very few people, thus becoming completely irrelevant to the 
pastoral practice of each parish community. With very rare exceptions, there 
are no significant relationships either with individual believers or with the or-
ganized communities.9
And yet, the awareness of the contribution that the Orthodox presence can 
bring to the rediscovery of a more authentic spiritual dimension of faith has 
emerged several times during the consultation; for the benefit of all the faithful 
and, in particular, as many observed, for the benefit of the clergy, “meeting 
other Christian Churches, such as the Orthodox Church, and start an ecumeni-
cal dialogue with them can make the consecrated people rediscover the es-
sence of their lives” (sc: Daughters of the presentation of Blessed Virgin Mary 
in the Temple).
2.3 A Pastoral Challenge and a Chance for Learning How to Engage in 
Self-Reflection
The third phenomenon that we are going to discuss is the arrival of Catholic 
migrants. It is in fact on them –who are the living testimonies of the new 
9 Among these exceptions, we can mention the initiatives undertaken by the Ecumenical 
Group of the Cantù Deanship, the fruitful work of the Council of Christian Churches of Mi-
lan, and the various initiatives promoted –in collaboration with the Orthodox Church and 
other Christian Churches– by the Community of Sant’Egidio.
533Multi-ethnic and Multi-religious Transformation
<UN>
Church from the people– that the attention must be focused, in order to grasp 
the ambivalence –which sometimes becomes indifference– of the attitudes 
towards migrants.
Thanks to immigration, there are about 233,000 “new” Catholics either gath-
ered around the so-called ethnic chaplaincies or included in the everyday reli-
gious activities of the parishes of the Diocese or practicing their religion more 
sporadically.
The first observation that can be made after the consultation is that, despite 
the statistics documenting their conspicuous number, many parish communi-
ties do not really seem to notice the presence of Catholic immigrants, probably 
because of the different lifestyles and the different places of worship they at-
tend, as immigrants either prefer liturgies and places reserved for them or 
manage to go to church without really being noticed – except in specific mo-
ments, such as the baptism of a newborn. However, even on these particular 
occasions they are unlikely to affect the life of the community in which they 
live.
Called upon on the occasion of the Synod, various parishes and deanships 
realized that they did not know much about their parishioners of foreign ori-
gin, and for this reason decided to conduct a “census” to estimate their number 
and better understand their situation. So far, in fact, the interest towards mi-
grants has been shown especially in relation to their needs, without any dis-
tinction between Christian immigrants, agnostics or people of other faiths (see 
Chapters 10 and 12). Indeed, they are seen as the recipients of a “special” pasto-
ral care –the “pastoral care of migrants”– a sort of “compensatory” pastoral 
care (to draw a parallelism with the compensatory pedagogy once used in 
schools) for those who have some “deficits” (at least of a linguistic nature) to 
tackle. It has also been noticed that some people tend to adopt attitudes of 
superiority towards them, or even feel annoyed by them, or suspicious, when 
for example their behaviors are considered to be unsuitable for holy places. 
One of the most striking case is that of an immigrant who used to help collect 
the offers during Mass and who was accused of trying to profit by it. Finally, we 
also need to mention the tendency to dismiss their religious manifestations as 
folkloristic.
As can be noted, there is some sort of resistance and a general sense of mis-
trust when considering giving tasks and responsibilities to the Christians com-
ing from other nations, consequently recreating within the Church that subor-
dination process that takes place in the labor market. Migrants’ sense of 
inferiority, caused by their social role, is expressed in their propensity to self-
ghettoization and gives rise to stereotyped expectations also as far as their 
roles in parochial activities are concerned. On top of that, not only are  common 
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believers not valorized; consecrated people, too, find themselves “filling the 
holes” in the religious orders that are short of vocations, and are appreciated 
only in relation to the tasks that their accomplish, especially if they are in the 
field of assistance.
The suburban areas, however, are significantly affected by the problems 
caused by an either poor or marginal immigration, and for this reason are 
deeply aware of how migration flows are indelibly transforming the composi-
tion of the neighborhoods, of the school populations, of the needs of the in-
habitants, and of the ecclesial community. We can cite the parishes of via Pa-
dova, of the Barona neighborhood, and of the deanery of San Siro, which are 
areas where it is easy to observe situations of hardship, along with a few epi-
sodes of “interracial” conflict, but where, at the same time, it is possible to re-
cord experiences of mobilization from below, as well as practices of neighbor-
liness and projects promoting the inclusion of newcomers and the construction 
of the common good. In many respects –and with a prophetic meaning– it is 
the “suburbs” (in a sociological rather than a geographical sense) that turn out 
to be authentic laboratories of interethnic coexistence in which the future of 
the Ambrosian Church is being written. As stated in one of the documents 
received,
(…) the most intense context where the dialogue takes place is the one 
involving the most socially disadvantaged Italians, as immigrants find 
themselves in their life contexts. The care-givers deal with the elderly; 
workers find jobs in the least qualified areas of work, such as construc-
tion or manual work; students attend schools on the outskirts of the city; 
and the buildings are public housing buildings. (sc: Deanship of 
Gallarate)
Contrary to the threat of a “war between the poor”, it is precisely in this context 
that the concern to not relegate foreigners to the margins of the community is 
manifested, along with the concern to not disregard their forms of popular pi-
ety. It is always in this context that, to quote the words of a priest, the focus is 
on overcoming formal “liturgical languages and styles, not limiting ourselves to 
proposing our traditions and celebratory forms, but being willing to be con-
taminated” (sc: Priests of the San Siro Deanship). It is not by chance, in fact, 
that it is more usual, here, for immigrant traditions to find space in the liturgy, 
for foreigners to sit in pastoral councils and among educators in the oratory, for 
catechesis to be “multi-ethnic”.
Very often, however, immigration is not perceived in its transformative qual-
ity, and not even as an opportunity for self-reflection, i.e. an encouragement to 
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reflect on both the present and the future of the local Church. In describing the 
evolution of interethnic relations, the assimilation solution is frequently used 
in order to indicate a non-problematic coexistence, where foreigners –who are 
not many and who are, at times, barely visible in the public space– are not 
considered as such anymore (as it used to happen during the internal migra-
tions of the past decades), except in some critical situations when people are 
looking for someone to blame. To cite just a few examples, the extraordinary 
linguistic richness that immigration creates –easily seen in the Milanese cul-
tural industry– cannot be found in the liturgy of the Ambrosian churches, 
which are basically still monolingual (and mono-cultural) –if we do not take 
into consideration the celebrations held specifically for foreign communities. 
In fact, Milanese Catholics are still not fully aware of the evangelization poten-
tial of immigration,10 and that is because they tend to focus more on issues 
such as the violation of human rights or religious persecutions. Also, many mi-
grant parents are not happy with the idea of raising their children in a society 
they perceive as “morally neutral” and, for this reason, different from what they 
had imagined when they were planning their journey to the cradle of Christi-
anity. Besides, we can see how “old” and “new” Milanese (especially those who 
have left fundamentalist and oppressive regimes behind) need to be educated 
in the values of secularism –conceived in its deepest form– and of religious 
pluralism (see in this regard Chapter 11). We finally have to note that the needs, 
the skills and the potential of the aforementioned hyper-bourgeois are only 
partially recognized by the structures of the local Church. And that the same 
can be stated for the contribution of dozens of priests and other religious peo-
ple coming from all over the world who are members of religious orders or 
work in diocesan institutions or in local parishes.
3 It Is Sowing Time: The Reasons behind the “Church from the 
People” Synod
To break the inertial mechanism with which the ecclesial body was responding 
to the many stimuli described above and, at the same time, to make the Chris-
tian communities, as well as the whole Diocese, become a reflection of their 
ongoing transformations, the new archbishop Mons. Mario Delpini decided to 
10 In this case, too, there are some significant exceptions. For example: “The evangelization of 
the poor through charity is one of the clearest signs of the Kingdom of God. When this is 
achieved, it creates a dimension of positive and joyful proclamation that generates hope” .
(sc: Community of Sant’Egidio, 30 March 2018)
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use an instrument that was typical of periods of major change (such as in St. 
Charles Borromeo’s times or, more recently, in Cardinal Schuster’s). That in-
strument was the Diocesan Synod.
The Archbishop’s declared aim for the “Church from the people” Diocesan 
Synod was to help the Diocese recognize the changes that are taking place in 
its corpus in order to remain faithful to the task that defines its identity – and 
that is serving as the instrument through which the Christian faith and God’s 
message of love for everyone is announced.
3.1 Inside a Tradition
The Synod has not been created out of the blue. It was in fact the result of a 
process of dialogue started in the immediate post-war period. The Ambrosian 
Church has always paid attention to any changes taking place in the world 
around it, and has always tried to understand them and adapt to them, or even 
criticize them in an attempt to correct them. Cardinals Montini, Colombo, 
Martini, Tettamanzi and Scola have always done everything they could to keep 
the Christian faith alive in the urban context of Milan, which has always been 
marked by profound transformations. With the help of many Christians, they 
used to listen to every question they were asked, they tried the best to respond 
to all the requests for help they would receive, and they would do anything in 
their power to fulfill the hope of those wishing for a happy life – starting from 
the poorest and the marginalized.
The “Church from the people” minor Synod is part of this tradition. The Am-
brosian Diocese participates in the synodal journey in order to remain faithful 
to a specific trait of the Church, which is the will to be there for those who look 
for help and for those who feel alone or struggle to decipher the meaning of 
every major change. The Ambrosian Church sets out on this synodal journey 
also to discover more about the Holy Spirit’s plans inside these changes, and to 
offer everyone the fruit of this comprehension exercise, as it strongly believes 
that a more mature and incarnated Christian faith will create a brighter future 
not only for the ecclesiastical institutions and its pastoral bodies, but also for 
the people living in Milan and the institutions contributing to the develop-
ment and the governance of the city.
3.2 An Intense and Quick Journey
The Synod was defined as “minor”, since it focused only on a chapter of the text 
to be updated. It was active for a relatively short period time, as it began in 
November 2017 and ended on St. Charles Borromeo’day, 4 November 2018 – the 
connection with this holy pastor is deliberate: he was in fact the one who gath-
ered the first synods to keep the ecclesial body up to date with what had been 
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introduced by the Council of Trent. It activated an articulated and well-planned 
process that focused on listening and on dialoguing, thus leading the ecclesial 
body to a better understanding of the changes it has been experiencing, as it 
knows that the destiny of grace that God has in store for us must be sought 
inside those changes.
Many thought that such a short time would be not enough to complete such 
an important task, i.e. understanding and interpreting all major changes. In 
truth, the appointed time frame is perfectly in line with the code of communi-
cation typical of our contemporary culture: a longer time frame would in fact 
let the synodal theme fall behind many other urgent issues characterizing the 
life of individuals and communities; on the contrary, a shorter time can help 
focus more on what is really at stake. The Synod is conceived as a moment of 
awareness based on the idea that the changes the Christian communities need 
to make are above all cultural. It will take years to really put into action the 
insights and the signs of openness that the minor Synod has been showing 
within the Diocese.11 With this in mind, everyone was welcomed to participate: 
women and men, lay people and clergy, individuals and families, people living 
a consecrated life and the new ecclesial realities, members of the Ambrosian 
Church for generations as well as newcomers, Christian believers and anyone 
else who is willing to take part in the construction of the Milan of tomorrow. 
The theme on which the Ambrosian Church has to express itself was well de-
fined: as the title “Church from the people” clearly suggests, we must observe 
how, in a time of social and cultural changes, the operation of gathering of 
people that has been carried out for centuries by the Holy Spirit here in Milan 
is undergoing significant transformations.
3.3 Milan, Church from the People
For this mission to be successful, a Synod was certainly necessary. As it had 
been necessary in 1995, at the time of the 47th Synod promulgated by Cardinal 
Martini – although it is fair to say that the evaluation of its results did not con-
cern such a wide scope as today. The Ambrosian Church was invited to go back 
to a particular chapter of that Synod, the one dedicated to Pastoral of Foreign 
People. As the reader can easily guess from the title, there was a clear need for 
this text to be adapted to the changes that have been taking place in the world 
around. The Ambrosian Church was asked to reinterpret this section of the 
Synod by focusing on a more specific dimension of its life and of its actions, i.e. 
the one that expresses its catholicity. This means understanding that, because 




of the arrival of new people, the Ambrosian Christian communities have not 
only activated reception services and integration paths, but have also tried to 
encourage a fraternity among different people.
The purpose of this synodal path is eminently pastoral. Every Christian 
community and every ecclesial reality was invited to react to the questions 
posed by the synodal path. As a result, the Church was expected to become 
more aware of its catholicity and to do its best to translate this awareness into 
pastoral choices that are agreed upon across the diocesan territory. A Church 
from the people that, day by day, will be able to spread more serenity and more 
hope for the future even to the rest of the social body. The Ambrosian Christian 
communities will in fact have tools to better comprehend the very complex 
social and cultural situation that many tend to define, in a quite simplistic way, 
as “the phenomenon of migration”. A Church from the people, a Church gath-
ered in a Synod with the aim of remaining faithful to its Ambrosian identity – 
that is, as in the days of Saint Ambrose, in continuity with its spirit.
4 “The Church is bigger than our fences”
Migration scholars are very fond of the “mirror” metaphor. Indeed, if many 
themes and problems raised by the multi-ethnic and multi-religious transfor-
mation of Milan had already been outlined during the 47th Synod, we need to 
point out that although the immigrant population, today, has dramatically 
grown (and, with it, its incidence on the demographic profile of a city with an 
aging population), there is an increased awareness –at least among the 
“ experts”– of the fact that the destinies of the city and of the Ambrosian Church 
are indelibly intertwined with that of immigration (if this is the word that we 
want to keep using when referring to it). Taking into consideration this mirror 
function is therefore a precious opportunity for a Church –and for a society– 
that wants to reflect on its own future.
To evoke one of the themes that has already emerged, but that we will not 
be able to discuss any further here, we will not be surprised to hear that the 
“good” integration (and the good coexistence) will not be built by migration 
policies (or, at least, not only by them), but rather by “good politics” itself, with 
both a government and a governance system truly oriented towards the com-
mon good. In this context, immigration helps lay bare the problems, bring a 
different perspective from which to look at things, and show the risk of “wars 
between the poor”, especially where the social protection systems are flawed 
and where a sense of insecurity is more widespread: “The presence of people 
who migrate creates issues that must be faced” (sc: Focus with students from 
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Università Cattolica, 22 March 2018). As some explicitly claim, and as seen in 
many other documents, a renewed spirit of evangelical testimony displayed by 
Christians will not however be enough to solve the many problems that are 
affecting all the communities. For this reason, it is necessary to develop the 
idea of a society that is able to meet the need for more sustainable processes, 
and it will be in this framework that the management of new arrivals and the 
enhancement of the contribution of migrants will be placed (sc: Focus with 
Movimento Terza Età, 16 March 2018). Catholics will have to do their part in 
order to achieve this goal.12
In this light, the consultation has produced, we believe, some significant 
results. We will refer to them in a necessarily brief form, without further dis-
cussing the richness of the contributions received, and we will try to clarify 
some crucial matters, which indicate the emergence of the awareness of how 
Milan is, and must learn to think of itself as, one of the focal points of a truly 
universal Church, a reflection of a globalized society and, at the same time, the 
expression of catholicity at its deepest. Such awareness cannot help but make 
the Church come to terms with some implications regarding the various di-
mensions of its identity: its everyday life, its organization, its pastoral care, and 
its theology.
4.1 The Dimension of the Everyday Life
From the everyday life point of view, it is above all the young people who are 
confronted with this reality. They naturally live their destiny as global citizens, 
growing side by side, in a city that has become cosmopolitan, with peers who 
are more and more distant from the myth of ethnic, cultural and religious ho-
mogeneity on which our state communities had been founded. This reality, 
however, sounds less familiar and less “natural” to the adults and to the older 
generations, although they are more prone to religious practice and to partici-
pation in Catholic associations, therefore being more exposed to the values of 
Christianity.
This generation gap clearly suggests that the need to keep the traditions 
alive, the reluctance to include the novelty brought by immigration, and the 
issue of cultural identity, end up hiding the Church’s effort to renew itself, to 
propose a liturgical and pastoral offer that is able to intercept the expressed 
and latent needs of the diversified population of the Diocese of Milan, with its 
variety of individual and family lifestyles. The decrease in the number of 
12 An indication that was first taken into account after the establishment of the Commis-




 faithful who regularly attend Mass (particularly true for younger age groups), 
and an even more dramatic reduction in the amount of people who receive the 
Sacraments (especially baptism) is the most eloquent sign of this problem 
that, if not addressed, can become a real risk.13 Nevertheless, this problem is 
also a providential warning:
In our pastoral condition of parishes built in suburban areas and full of 
different people and cultures, it is clear to all of us that if we (authors’ 
note: the Western Church) shut ourselves down we will surely disappear. 
The phenomenon of the drastic reduction in baptisms and marriages 
among Italians is well known. Further discussions on this interesting 
phenomenon could be carried out during the Eucharistic assemblies or 
while taking catechism classes. (sc: Priests of the San Siro Deanship)
The coincidence in time between the diocesan minor Synod and the world 
Synod dedicated to young people is perhaps a prophetic sign, which tells us of 
a Church –and of a society– called to renew itself, to “regenerate itself”, through 
the activation of channels of dialogue, exchange, mutual fertilization between 
different generations. On the one hand, we can see that young people, as “ex-
iles of the real meaning”, have at heart the desire to overcome every inadequate 
behavior or language, and feel inevitably close to foreign people for being on 
the margins of a Church that they would like to be able to
walk “with” them and to be more close to reality; a Church that is a “home” 
for everyone, and not just a club of friends; a Church that is open to the 
risk of encountering others. (sc: Focus group with students from Milan’s 
Università Cattolica, 22 March 2018)
On the other hand, we have the elderly who, in order to fully play their role as 
witnesses/educators and as guardians of the values of humanism and catholic-
ity, express the need to be the recipients of the “care” of the diocesan Church 
and of a project designed and created specifically for them (sc: Focus group 
with Movimento Terza Età, 16 March 2018).
13 “Our communities run the risk of becoming self-referential and closed in on themselves; 
their traditions could end up being excessively glorified to the detriment of a true Chris-
tian experience, continuously kept alive by the Holy Spirit; our habits, our order, our cer-
tainties could finally prevent us from “being fertilized and enriched””. (Pastoral Council of 
the Pastoral Community Paul vi, Paderno Dugnano)
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4.2 The Organizational Dimension
At the organizational level, the Church’s universal feature manifests itself in 
the numerous ethnic chaplaincies that welcome the faithful who come from 
other places, in the increasingly heterogeneous composition of the religious 
congregations present in the area, and in the presence of foreign priests who 
support the Diocese and the various parishes in their daily work. As stated in 
one of the contributions received, today the Church from the People is outside 
the door (sc: Presbyteral Assembly, Varese, 6 March 2018) and is linked, not 
only ideally, to the Ambrosian Church by a story of reciprocity.14 However, the 
potential of this transformation still remains largely unexpressed.
Certainly, the most attentive observers can understand the precious role 
that foreign religious people play in all those areas where the presence of for-
eign users is increasing and, in particular in places of suffering, such as hospi-
tals and prisons. They also make everyone more aware of the conditions of 
people living in other continents, showing us that we are actually “fortunate 
faithful”. Besides, we can observe that the testimony of foreign religious people 
can attenuate the frenetic activism of the Ambrosian Catholicism, asking for 
more meditative and internalized ways of living one’s faith:
The sisters who have come from the Asian continent, who are more in-
clined to meditation and prayer than to activities, remind the people of 
the Ambrosian God, who is active and frenetic, to the foster the values of 
interiority, of relations and of Christian creativity. (sc: usmi Council, 
Archdiocese of Milan integrated by two non-European sisters, 22 Febru-
ary 2018)
In this regard, the presence of the Eastern-rite Catholic believers, such as the 
wide presence of the Orthodox Church in its various national declinations (Ro-
manian, Russian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek, and also Coptic), make the West-
ern declination of the Christian faith –very intellectual and very simple from a 
liturgical point of view– wonder how the gift of a God who reveals himself and 
who makes himself present by entering into a relationship with all dimensions 
of the human person should be lived today, in the current culture.
14 sc: “It is with affection and gratitude that we want to remind you that some of pime (the 
pontifical institute for foreign missions) missionaries who came to us were from this par-
ish: since they helped us learn more about the Christian faith, today we, too, would like to 
give our contribution to the local Church”. (Sister Giustina Kalko, Shanti Rani Communi-
ty, Valmadrera, 25 March 2018)
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Once again at an organizational level, we can see that the missionary orders 
present in Milan, and their communities, carry in their imprinting a desire for 
openness that makes them inclined to collaboration as well as capable of “in-
habiting change”, as they reflect on the different ways that migrants have to live 
their religion. We can also observe that the Milanese missionaries scattered 
around the world can show the sensitivity of a Church that is a minority and 
that cannot impose itself, but that can still do little things that will not make it 
to the news, “but that will make a difference for those who live next to me” (sc: 
Father Paolo Ceruti, pime missionary of Hong Kong); a Church that can be-
come an intermediary between believers of different cultures and societies, as 
the Church really knows what it means to feel like a stranger (sc: Marcelline 
Nuns in Albania). Finally, the ethnic chaplaincies, often accused of contribut-
ing to the self-segregation of immigrant communities, start to be seen in a dif-
ferent light, thanks to the Synod, as they become important actors in the con-
struction of the new “Church from the People”, linking not only the immigrant 
communities and the Ambrosian Church, but also –and above all– the Ambro-
sian and the universal Church. Together with other religious orders, they “pose 
to the Ambrosian Church the challenge to achieve a universal opening” (sc: 
Community of Comboni Missionary Nuns).
However, as it is evident in this testimony, the universality of the Church is 
measured, first of all, by the ability to see in each person a Son of the only Fa-
ther. It is precisely in this context that much still needs to be done, even within 
the boundaries of the Church:
There is much to be improved even within the ecclesial community, 
which sometimes is not aware of the fact that acting on behalf of the 
Church means to act on behalf of the Spirit and not just by the rule of 
law; that being part of the Church means catholicity and openness to the 
world. Even though officially proclaimed, there is no real perception of 
the absolute equality of men as children of God in the Son – children 
who all carry, deep down, the image of the Father, who all wish to love 
and to be loved, who all have the same needs and the same feelings, and 
who are able to think and make decisions. (sc: Italian Conference of Sec-
ular Institutes)
4.3 The Pastoral Dimension
Moving on to the pastoral plan, as many have stressed, it is a matter of chang-
ing from “doing for” to “doing with” the migrants. Of course, we are not at year 
zero. The consultation was also an opportunity to measure the richness of the 
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initiatives “generated” by the territories (from intercultural theater workshops 
to Italian language courses – which became, over time, places of confrontation 
and mutual re-evangelization). The opportunity offered by the Synod to make 
these projects known to a larger audience was much appreciated and managed 
to trigger a process of mutual fertilization. However, as we mentioned above, it 
is not easy for many to make room for immigrants and for their ways of living 
the faith and the liturgy – thus preventing their potential for evangelization 
and regeneration from being exploited. “Doing for” is certainly an expression 
of altruism and generosity, but when it turns into paternalism “it hinders the 
achievement of an authentic human relationship” (sc: Lay volunteers of the 
Missionaries of Charity, Baggio, 3 March 2018).
In any case, we can list a number of specific suggestions. Some are quite 
“obvious” and recurrent, like the hope that during the liturgical celebrations 
more space could be granted to migrant believers, for example by choosing 
them as readers (even if their linguistic competences are not perfect); by say-
ing prayers in a foreign language; by introducing songs from their tradition; by 
presenting “their gifts” during the offertory; by sharing the celebration of the 
typical festivities of their countries of origin; by including some contributions 
in foreign languages in the parish bulletin; and by translating the leaflets for 
Mass and the various notices. Besides, it would also help if there could be a less 
ethnocentric approach during catechism classes; a mutual explanation of the 
meaning of the respective devotional practices; an effort to rethink the lan-
guage and cultural patterns of the basic pastoral care; a more punctual refer-
ence (for example in homilies) to the Christian values and their concrete dec-
lination in the relationship with others (which must always be inspired by the 
principles of respect and equity); a valorization of the Pentecost events as tools 
to understand the current Church in the paths of education to the faith; the 
inclusion of non-European Saints in the liturgical calendar; greater apprecia-
tion of the foreign priests of the Diocese; preaching by using narrative and ex-
periential dynamics; choosing prayers that are universally comprehensible 
and that actually give voice to what is happening in the world; implementing 
international mobility schemes (on the model of the Erasmus project) for new 
priests and religion teachers; promoting the study and the teaching of African 
and Latin American theology, as well as the Orthodox theology; offering cours-
es on the different religious and liturgical traditions, inside and outside the 
Christian world, to pastoral workers and to all the faithful; and finally rethink-
ing the ways in which
Catholicism has expressed itself: the Western modality, exported as the 
best one by the European missions of preservation during the colonial 
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expansion, should be open to the changes historically brought by the dif-
ferent cultures. (sc: Diocesan pastoral Council, 24–25 February 2018)
As summarized by another contribution,
we need to go from choosing to receive to choosing to meet; when receiv-
ing people, the relationship between those who welcome and those who 
are welcomed is not equal; on the contrary, when we meet people, our 
differences are recognized and valued as a gift and we all walk together 
carrying each other’s burdens. (sc: Deanship of Cagnola, March 2018)
4.4 The Theological Dimension
Finally, as for the theological dimension, the challenge is to learn to reread the 
experience of faith, at the personal and at the community level, in light of the 
presence of Christians coming from other places and of believers of other reli-
gions, as well as in view of the growing number of agnostics and other people 
seeking alternative ways to express their spirituality. The importance of this 
challenge is effectively summarized by this testimony:
The initiative of the Feast of the Christian Peoples helped us reinvigorate 
our faith; despite all the limitations encountered, it helped us understand 
that we are not superior, and that the Church is greater than what ex-
pected by its boundaries – which can be affirmed not directly for socio-
logical reasons, but because of the original plan of God who wants all 
peoples to participate equally in the communion with his Son, Jesus 
Christ. (sc: San Siro Deanship)
As we have already pointed out, it is first of all the “suburbs” that will grasp the 
regenerative scope of this challenge. Conversely, by virtue of their experience 
marked by precariousness, many immigrants represent the “existential periph-
eries”, namely the places where the Lord primarily manifests itself, according 
to the theology enunciated by Pope Francis.15 In this perspective, there are 
many reasons behind immigration’s potential for evangelization, especially if 
we consider that many of its protagonists have dramatic stories to tell, all 
marked by a lot of suffering and persecutions – thus encouraging us to seek a 
new socio-demographic, economic, political and democratic balance, as well 
15 To further read about Pope Francis’ theology, see: Cozzi, A., Repole, R., & Piana, G. (2016). 
Papa Francesco. Quale teologia?. Assisi: Cittadella.
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as to deal with the ethical aspects of political choices, of the relations between 
countries, and of our daily behavior. In broader terms, there is a strong need to 
promote an intercultural approach, which invites us to put people and their 
relationships with other people at the center of attention, with each person 
meant as the “flesh of Christ”. “We must not forget that the Church’s task is first 
and foremost that of taking care of human relationships” (sc: Lay volunteers 
of the Missionaries of Charity, Baggio, 3 March 2018). In its most authentic 
meaning, inter-culture should give us the chance to look beyond people’s 
countries of origin, on which we tend to focus too much, and
to simply favor human relationships: we are all different persons, and we 
know it, but we can try to get to know each other and get together as hu-
man beings in order to enrich ourselves. (sc: Families of different nation-
alities from the Migrant Pastoral, Baggio, 24 February 2018)
It is only at this point that the authenticity of the Christian message can be 
grasped:
We need to see people just as God sees them; therefore, the main focus 
should not be on immigrants, but on how we look at people, which 
should be in the same way as God does. (sc: Pastoral Council of the Dean-
ship of Vimercate, 19 February 2018)
A message that, by its very nature, does not involve any distinction between 
migrants and non-migrants:
Like the first Christian community in Ephesus, we have the opportunity 
to discover an even greater value to our faith, which is true when there is 
an authentic sharing and a felt reciprocity. This practice of a more atten-
tive catholicity starts from the awareness that speaking of “foreigners” 
and of “migrants” is deeply improper (as it emerges in the Old Testament, 
the whole Church was born from the Jewish-Christian announcement) 
and creates what can be defined as the population “of the people”, which 
is determined by God’s plan for all humanity. It is in fact the universal 
Church that will be able to seize the new opportunities for enrichment 
and for an authentic evangelization that will come along, and it will do so 
through the creation of new relationships, which will closely follow the 
Christian message and which will be strongly inspired by the commit-




5 “Seeing people as God sees them”: Implications for the Pastoral 
Care and the Future of the Ambrosian Church
A first fundamental declination of this perspective is the way in which the Am-
brosian Church should deal with migrants, in particular when it comes to the 
theme of spiritual accompaniment. The logic of interculturality, to which the 
Synod has further attributed the concept of “hybridization”, can help the single 
Christians and all the communities remember that at the heart of the Church’s 
birth and growth there is a true encounter between people. This allows them 
to see the presence of Christ in other people, as well as the gift that the Spirit 
offers to their faith, together with the need that they all have to support each 
other in the search for the only Father and in the understanding of God’s plan 
for everyone. Thanks to the Synod, several Christian communities found out 
they had not been offering what migrants need the most: a spiritual accompa-
niment and support, as well as the possibility for them to feel in communion 
with God and “at home” even here, where they often feel in a foreign land. Such 
discovery manages to solve many problems concerning the relationships be-
tween natives and newcomers, thus preventing the latter from being consid-
ered as simple users of the services provided by the Catholic parishes and 
communities:
Helping these brothers grow humanly and spiritually means to make 
them aware of their potential ability to offer a service to others. (sc: usmi 
Council, Archdiocese of Milan integrated by two non-European sisters, 
22 February 2018)
The Church can consider itself as open to the people not only if it man-
ages to make these people feel accepted, but also if it helps them keep in 
contact with their place of origin, their culture, their language, their tra-
ditions and their religions. (sc: Father Paolo Ceruti, pime missionary of 
Hong Kong)
A second, and even more important, declination of this perspective is the en-
couragement to recognize, and realize, the connection between unity and va-
riety, as well as the idea of the “body of Christ as a unity in diversity”, both in 
history and in the Church’s life.16 The Synod allows to decline the principle of 
“pluriformity in unity”, taught in recent years by the Magisterium of Cardinal 
Scola. It is a matter of interpreting the differences in celebrating, in praying, 
and in bearing witness to one’s faith as many different ways of expressing the 
16 1 Cor 12, 19–20, 27.
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same faith, the one that has been given to humanity, and that has been nour-
ished by the Holy Spirit. Out of all the contributions from the consultation, 
many of them go in this direction:
We could also mention other examples drawn from the same narrative: 
people who, despite belonging to different cultures, feel united by the 
common Catholic Faith and by the wish that this Faith will not remain 
closed in a tabernacle, but will instead inundate every aspect of our life. 
(sc: cl Varese)
However, it is in particular the field of consecrated life that leads the way in 
this experience:
The communities that live a consecrated life, made up of people of differ-
ent ages and of different social and cultural backgrounds, all throughout 
history have tried to embody the Father’s plan to let all human beings be 
part of one big family united in love, without erasing any of their differ-
ences. Moreover, it is in the care of the weakest that we can see the inclu-
sive and missionary nature of the Christian faith. (sc: Daughters of the 
presentation of Holy Mary in the Temple)
Our community life in itself is a sign of an inclusive and unconditional 
mutual acceptance that speaks of a single family with a single Father. 
Through community life, through a spirit of acceptance for all and by 
praying with everyone and for everyone, we can show people that we are 
the sons of the same Father (…). Our charisma brings the experience of 
other rites to the Ambrosian Church (…) and can help welcome other 
ways of praying and behaving, bearing in mind that, in the Church, there 
is room for everyone. (sc: Community of Comboni Missionary Nuns)
The daily “effort” of our communities to experience interculturality as an 
opportunity to grow in love and trust is one of the gifts that the conse-
crated life can offer to the Church, especially today. We feel the encour-
agement to build a communion in communities made up of sisters from 
different cultures, thus showing that a conviviality of differences is com-
pletely possible. (sc: Consecrated of the Forlanini Pastoral Unit, 22 March 
2018)
As we notice by another testimony, it is from the orders of consecrated (and 




The efforts that we make day by day –all together as a choir or in silence– 
when we have to blend our voices in one single song of praise, is what we 
believe to be our contribution to the journey that the Diocese is making 
in the search for a spirit of communion among any cultural, social and 
ecclesial differences. (sc: Observation by the Benedictine Nuns of the 
San Benedetto Monastery)
Finally, a third declination of this perspective is the encouragement to ques-
tion ourselves, to reflect on the profound meaning of being a Christian today in 
the city of Milan, which is a city that is constantly changing. At this point, we 
can really grasp the deep intention of the Synod, the fundamental reason be-
hind its proclamation: when confronted with the social and cultural changes 
around them, the only adequate response that Christians can give to them-
selves as Christians is that they, too, have to change; they have to change their 
institutional subject and they have to create (by asking the Holy Spirit) new 
ways to be part of the Church today. As cleverly observed by some from the 
world of education:
Living in a plural society, characterized by the coexistence of different 
faiths and cultures does not have to be a problem neither for Christianity 
nor for the Catholic Church. It used to be that way for the very first com-
munities of believers, and it still is in many nations of the world. At times, 
it may even be seen as a providential opportunity, as it encourages Chris-
tians to deepen their faith: this is what Peter used to suggest by warning 
about the importance of always being ready to give reason for one’s faith. 
(sc: Catholic religion teachers of the Besta Institute of Higher Education 
in Milan)
Significantly, one of the most recurring aspects is the awareness –either ac-
quired or strengthened when facing the “different”– of the need to regain “our” 
Christian identity through the attempt to deepen the faith and to define the 
personal and the collective identity of local believers. As stressed by many par-
ticipants, only through dialogue can the local culture survive and open up to 
change.
Many have observed, or at least perceived, that the re-appropriation of one’s 
own Christian identity is the first step towards an authentic dialogue with oth-
erness; conversely,
the difficulty of starting a dialogue is not necessarily due to the diversity 
of cultures; it rather depends on the weakening of our Christian values. In 
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our society we tend to hide any possible reference to our faith, and that 
starts being true ever since our children’s early education (…). Therefore, 
people should be braver when it comes to living and bearing witness to 
their faith in the world. (sc: Deanship of Carnago)
Finally, as a result of the encounter with other people, Ambrosian Catholics’ 
faith becomes stronger and more aware of its universality. Contrary to what is 
usually believed, a dialogue is possible not only when one tries to acquire or 
broaden his/her knowledge of other faiths:
I think that Catholics can really open up to others if they do become 
more aware of their own Catholic identity – which has nothing to lose 
(but much to gain) if compared with the other faiths, as they encourage 
us to further understand the reasons for our faith. (sc: Observation by a 
Religion teacher)
As it appears, the most tangible –and perhaps the most profound– result of the 
minor Synod is the acknowledgment of the need for a process of re- 
Christianization of the Ambrosian Diocese, namely the need for the Ambrosian 
Church to keep up with the present time in order to remain a friendly face of 
Christianity, close to the people’s hopes and needs, in line with the model of 
popular Catholicism inherited from the past. As some priests and some paro-
chial realities have pointed out, in order to achieve this goal, Catholics from 
other cultures and nations can be extremely helpful: from some communities of 
foreign Catholics, in fact, indigenous people could learn “a more authentic faith, 
a deeper devotion and a more lively liturgy” (sc: Deanship of Legnano, 14 Febru-
ary 2018), “the same careful attention to the liturgy and the Eucharistic celebra-
tions, as well as a true sense of fraternity” (sc: Cassina de’ Pecchi Pastoral 
 Councils). Ultimately, to quote the words of a group of priests, it is necessary to
focus more on that essential, on the Gospel and on the Eucharist, and 
therefore on the basics of our faith, in order to catch sight of the afore-
mentioned openness towards “the others”. (sc: Meeting of priests in San 
Pietro Cusico di Zibido San Giacomo, 15 March 2018)
We can finally observe that the Synod has strongly promoted the need for a re-
Christianization, that is a re-appropriation of the past through a path of self-
reflexivity, always with an eye towards the future and towards the new age that 
the current surge in migration flows is powerfully announcing. The Synod has 
in fact encouraged the adoption of a dialogical style, which –as the results of 
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the consultation phase clearly demonstrate– can help raise awareness of the 
multiple implications of the transformations taking place around us. Finally, 
by supporting the adoption of a participatory approach, the Synod has given 
the communities a chance to reflect on their plans for their future, as well as on 
the future of the next generations and of the Ambrosian Church –a Church 
made up of people where there is, indeed, “room for everyone”.
<UN>
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Transmission: Issues from International Literature
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1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of international literature 
about the importance of religion in family migration histories, with a special 
focus on how religious values are transmitted between generations.
The significant presence of migrant families having a clear religious identi-
ty, which they keep nurturing in their host country (usa, Canada, France and 
the Netherlands), for at least the last thirty years has brought about the need to 
explore the issue of religion, in order to understand its significance within the 
processes aimed at integrating migrant minorities. Today, we are facing one 
further issue, which has been investigated by research less extensively and 
which is the focus of this analysis, concerning the fact that the reason behind 
migration is a specific religious affiliation.
Giving consideration to the connection between religion and migrant fami-
lies seems quite arduous in our highly secularized society, where the topic of 
religion appears to be in the background and is often regarded as playing a 
barely active role in guiding choices and strategies to face the challenges and 
risks related to families’ and individuals’ migration.
The following critical issues tend to overlap in this topic:
a) The phenomenon of religious persecution of Christian minorities in 
their home countries, which affects several families migrating to Europe 
and to Italy in particular, shifts the focus back onto the debate about reli-
gious belonging, which has gradually been playing a secondary role with 
the advent of the secularization process. This process is now apparently 
suffering a setback, and religious belonging is once again playing a pri-
mary role (Rizzi, 2016; see also Chapter 3).
b) On the other hand, the secularization process (Eberstadt, 2013) –which 
has been present, at least so far, to some extent in Western Europe, as well 
as in the English-speaking world, since the second half of the 20th cen-
tury– has been documented by several studies in Europe (Pollini et al., 
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2012). These studies underline how religiousness has suffered a steady 
decline in its role as a pillar of the transmission of values, in general, and 
also of the importance of the family.
c) But what is the outcome of secularization? The advent of a post-secular 
society, which is the outcome of the morphogenetic process of the previ-
ous secularized society. This process implies “a further differentiation be-
tween the essential values (let us say religious, for the sake of simplicity) 
that inspire the variety of cultures appearing in it” (Belardinelli et al., 
2009: 110). In the Western world, where the phenomenon of migration is 
increasingly important, a process of differentiation from a cultural and 
religious point of view has been taking place over the last few decades. 
Today, the post-secular society is expressed by a multi-cultural society 
(Donati, 2008).
d) The post-secular society includes elements of paradoxicality as it incor-
porates both the unexpected effects of secularization (lack of meaning, 
deviant behaviors that can be classified as discomforts of modernity) and 
direct effects (need for transcendent meanings in irrational forms or 
forms of new rationality) (Donati, 2009). As for Europeans, on the one 
hand there is a progressive decrease in the importance of religious be-
longing, and, on the other hand, there is a sort of re-sacralization of social 
bonds (sometimes required by non-Christian religions) and of new forms 
of religious participation.
e) The behavior of migrant families having a clear religious identity can be 
explained in the same perspective of paradoxicality. Two different pro-
cesses emerge: a sort of theologizing experience (Connor, 2009; Massey, 
Higgins, 2011) –which is a sign of a higher level of personal awareness, but 
will not always affect the communal religious participation–, and the dis-
affiliation from religious practices and beliefs.
f) It is also necessary to avoid any generalization when referring to the word 
generation. What do we mean by it today? Generation is a group of peo-
ple sharing one relationship (Boccacin, 2005), that is the one linking their 
position within one’s progeny in the family-relatives sphere (i.e. child, 
parent, grandparent, etc.) with the well-defined position in the societal 
sphere depending on the social age (i.e. depending on the relevant age 
group: young, adult, elderly, etc.) (Attias-Donfut, 2000; Rossi, 2012).
g) Lastly, what do we mean by religion? Religion differs from culture (ritu-
als, myths, sacred, etc.) when “it becomes the relationship with the en-
tirely other than me (transcendence) that is within me and outside of me 
at the same time” (Donati, 2009: 304). However, differences between 
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 religions can be observed by considering the idea of transcendence. This 
produces social effects that can be very diverse; in particular, “the differ-
ence of Christianity lies in referring to a theological matrix that uses a 
relational semantics of difference” (Donati, 2010: 218) thus not limiting 
religion to a series of practices and/or ritual obligations (Pace, 2013).
2 Intergenerational Transmission of Religious Values: the Main Issues 
Emerging from Italian and International Studies
The transmission of values falls within the realm of socialization processes and 
–from a relational sociology perspective– can be seen as a process aimed at 
“transmitting the ethos of a culture, which expresses a normative, i.e. interpre-
tive, view on life and on the world that individuals have despite not being their 
own only makers” (Donati, 1989: 98). Values and norms are part of a story, a 
memory, and are constantly comprehended, endorsed and modified within re-
lationships, thus eventually becoming an interpretive project (Donati, 1991). 
Socialization is virtuously achieved when shifting from a unidirectional model 
to a transactional model implying reciprocity between individuals (in this 
case, adults-grandparents, parents-children, grandparents-grandchildren).
The intergenerational transmission of values, which plays a crucial role in 
the socialization process (Pontalti, Rossi, 1995; Cigoli, 1995; Barni, 2009), in-
cludes two logs, the first one recording what lies between generations and 
which can be defined as intergenerational transmission, and the second one 
concerning what goes beyond, what crosses and transcends generations, by 
exceeding them – which has been defined as transgenerational transmission 
in psychosocial literature (Cigoli, Scabini, 2006). The intergenerational trans-
mission of values refers to the system of moral principles that previous genera-
tions pass down to the following ones (whether they pass it down and how) 
and to what the latter, in turn, perceive, accept, or refuse to pass down (Scabini, 
2006). The transmission of religion has specific features that have long been 
underestimated and appear significant in relationships between generations.
One of the issues that several studies on migration, families and religion 
focus on is linked to the question whether religion is a bridge or a barrier to the 
inclusion of families (Foner, Alba, 2008). The findings of the study conducted 
on Coptic families and their children in the following chapters provide inter-
esting elements on this matter.
The act of thinking by generations involves a significant heuristic ability: this 
approach actually allows to observe relationships between generations and 
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the symbolic content that is generated through them and is transmitted within 
families and society. Thinking by generations implies bringing into focus a dif-
ferent, mutual responsibility: previous generations actually play a crucial role 
in favoring or hindering the chances that the following generations could be or 
not be generative. In our opinion, the meaning of the whole generation  concept 
lies in the bond, in the significance that such bond assumes on a personal level 
for those who engage in it in everyday life, and in the significance, within a 
social context, that the intergenerational bond, engaged both inside and out-
side the family, assumes in the surrounding context (meso level) as well as in a 
wider, or social, context (macro level). In this perspective, the concept of gen-
eration is based, on the one hand, on the historical-biological age, in terms of 
descendant/ancestor relationships (family axis), and, on the other hand, on 
the mediation that society, and welfare systems in particular, provides to these 
bonds (social axis).
The concept of generation, thus, appears as a synthesis between the family 
and social spheres, and allows to place generations within the complex dy-
namics of resource and general exchange allocation.
Through the relational approach, it is possible to go beyond the previously 
quoted and predominantly monosemic interpretations of the concept of gen-
eration, which, despite helping to clarify the various meanings of the word, 
prevent us from reaching a comprehensive and multi-dimensional under-
standing of it.
Focusing on relationships between generations also implies considering 
their ambivalence, which is generated by the considerable variety and frag-
mentary nature of the elements at stake in relationships, and is related to their 
elements of risk.
One way to deal with this ambivalence in family relationships between gen-
erations is favoring elements of obligation/subjection and keeping the marked 
cultural differences between generations in the background. The emancipa-
tion strategy stands at the other end of the spectrum; within this strategy, bal-
ance in family life and possible innovations are based on the convergence of all 
family members’ cultural patterns and values (Lüscher, 2011).
The elements of risk in intergenerational relationships do not seem to be 
considered in most postmodern analyses and reflections. However, we know 
that relationships between generations are not immune from ambivalence 
and can therefore be either generative or degenerative.
2.1 Is Religion a Dependent or Independent Variable in Generational 
Transmission?
Let us now explore the main issues emerging from the most recent studies on 
the transmission of values in immigrant families, with a special focus on 
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 religious values, which have been carried out in Italy and other European and 
non-European countries.
The relationship between religion and family has been extensively studied 
by sociologists, who have provided religion with a role of both a dependent 
and an independent variable in socialization processes within families.
The following are the areas explored by researchers who have embraced the 
first hypothesis (religion as a dependent variable):
a) the intentional religious education provided by parents;
b) the family atmosphere, i.e. relationships based on trust and mutual 
respect;
c) the family structure, with reference to the presence of the marital 
dyad;
d) the group of peers, i.e. the community.
A second line of research identifies religion as an independent variable. In this 
case, the main focus for researchers is to determine whether and when religion 
is a crucial factor in how families work.
Notably, researchers have analyzed the impact of parents’ religiousness on 
the strength of family bonds, especially couple relationships; religious prac-
tices as a strengthening element in the educational project; and the parents’ 
religiousness as a strong predictor of juvenile religiousness.
Both these perspectives provide very interesting clues to understanding the 
dynamics of the transmission of values between generations and allow to de-
velop a complex picture.
3 The Transmission of Religious Values in Immigrant Families: Some 
Empirical Evidence
The main empirical evidence emerging from research can be regarded as a re-
flection of two macro topics: the relationship between family and society and the 
dynamics within generations.
As for the relationship between family and society, a key issue is the place 
that religion holds in the transmission of a sense of ethnic belonging and iden-
tity (Chen, 2002; Min, Kim, 2002; Rumbaut, 2006). It is actually one of the most 
important indicators of group identity (Verkuyten et al., 2012). Moreover, reli-
gions provide certainty of belonging, but also the support for many beliefs and 
lifestyles, such as intergenerational obligations, or family rituals. One key issue 
concerns the contribution that religious values can offer in the transmission of 
the most salient features of a cultural heritage (Warner, 2000). In intergenera-
tional relationships, the issue of cultural reproduction arises when children 
start going to school.
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3.1 The Relationship between Family and Society
In general, the connection between family, cultural identities and religious in-
stitutions is a crucial element in the processes through which migrants seek to 
forge a system of meanings and to find a way of life for themselves and their 
children. Scholars (Ambrosini, 2007) have noted that, for Catholic families 
 during the first migration flows to North America, aggregation around religious 
institutions was a way to preserve their languages and cultural traditions, while 
trying to adapt to an obscure and often hostile environment.
Catholic schools often represented an ideal place to help children avoid 
discrimination. Besides, Churches represented more than just a place of wor-
ship: they were places where people could meet, socialize, and form associa-
tions or informal groups. These religious environments also provided the 
chance to take on leadership roles and experience civic participation, which 
otherwise would not have been accessible in the surrounding society. To quote 
a classic text on this matter: “Church was the first line of defense behind 
which immigrants could preserve their group identity” (Warner, Srole, 1945: 
160). In other words, for years Churches and religious associations have repre-
sented a clearinghouse that allowed immigrants to adapt to the new social 
context without losing their roots and social networks (support). This role has 
proven long lasting and capable of passing from one generation to another. 
Nowadays, this applies to a certain number of communities, not only to 
Catholics.
Sometimes, these forms of belonging lead individuals and families to 
strengthen their religious sentiment. The title of a study about religion and 
ethnicity among Indian immigrants in the United States (Kurien, 2002) is: We 
are better Hindus here. And actually most of the people who were interviewed 
reported that they had become more religious after arriving in the new coun-
try, as they started to ponder the meaning of their religious identity (see also 
Chapter 12), which they gave for granted in their home country, for the first 
time. Besides, while the traditional Hindu religious activity is not generally 
practiced in groups except for some celebrations, religious gatherings provide 
community support in a context of migration.
3.2 Social Integration
According to several scholars (Hirschman, 2004; Reitz et al., 2009), religion can 
act as a vehicle for a good level of integration into society, despite the fact that, 
after what happened on 9/11/2001, Islam is regarded as a barrier to the integra-
tion process, especially in Europe (Foner, Alba, 2008), because the values it 
fosters are considered in stark contrast with the values fostered by the society 
of the host country.
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The widespread phenomenon of conversion to Christian Churches among 
Asian immigrants in the United States is a sign of the importance of faith for 
families that are trying to redefine their identities in a new environment.
It is more difficult to detect this kind of experience in a secularized context 
like the European one, in which, conversely, the loss of religious practices by 
migrants (and especially by second generations) is seen as a positive event, an 
indication of a full and successful assimilation (Tribalat, 1995).
Religious belonging appears to be a rather important factor according to the 
chances of social integration and to the cultural differences with the host 
country (see also Chapter 13).
Foner and Alba (2008) addressed the issue of differences in the importance 
of religion in Western countries. The assumption is that, in the United States, 
studies tend to focus more on religion as a factor in integration, whereas in 
Europe religion (and Islam in particular) is regarded as a barrier to immigrants’ 
integration. These polarized perspectives reflect the different social dynamics 
that characterize the United States and Europe.
American literature highlights the role of religion in responding and cater-
ing to the immigrants’ social needs, which can be summarized, by borrowing 
Hirschman’s (2004) formula, by the three Rs: refuge, respectability, and 
resources.
Religion has been analyzed as a socially acceptable way for American im-
migrants to express, reformulate and convey their cultures and ethnic identi-
ties. Immigrants learn that Americans are more willing to accept religious di-
versity that ethnic diversity, and therefore use religion as a socially tolerated 
tool to build their culture and identity (Herberg, 1960; Karpathakis, 2001).
In churches and temples, immigrants “can (…) pass on their religious and 
cultural heritage to the following generation” (Ebaugh, Chafetz, 2000: 141). The 
act of going to church or a place of worship, which is often encouraged by fami-
lies, seems to have a positive effect on young generations, also limiting the risk 
of situations of social exclusion (Zhou, Bankston, 1994). Moreover, religious 
organizations can increase upward mobility in second generations (Zhou, 
Bankston, 1998).
In the United States, religion helps transform immigrants into Americans 
and gives them and their children a sense of belonging. In other words, reli-
gious institutions are places where immigrants can formulate their requests to 
be included in the American society (Portes, Rumbaut, 2006).
3.3 Religion as a Barrier to Integration
In Western Europe, religion is generally perceived as an issue associated with 
immigrant minorities. When analyzing immigrants’ religions, the focus of 
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 academic researchers is almost exclusively on Islam, which is regarded as a 
barrier or as a challenge to integration, and as a source of conflict with local 
customs and institutions. Some social scientists have more radical views sug-
gesting or explicitly stating that Islam is hindering the integration of immi-
grant  minorities and threatening the liberal values of European countries. An-
other topic in the social sciences literature concerns the discrimination against 
and restrictions on Muslims in Western Europe (religion as a vehicle for dis-
crimination and prejudice).
Islam can become a place where to build an opposing identity: a progressive 
growth of a religious conscience among members of the younger generation 
more and more often refers to a globalized Islam, rather than to their parents’ 
Islamic family. This process has been called re-islamization (Laurence, Vaisse, 
2006). Some scholars and researchers claim that loyalty to Islam has had posi-
tive effects, such as helping young people keep away from criminality and juve-
nile delinquency, but there is also growing concern about the role of Islam in 
second-generation cultural isolationism, which may lead to acts of violence 
and terrorism.
An interesting perspective is the one relating to the theory of segmented as-
similation (Portes, Zhou, 1993; Portes, Rumbaut, 2006): after migration, the 
various generations in the family pursue continuity with the culture of their 
home country in very different ways. Therefore, there are several possible out-
comes of this:
– Consonant acculturation: it occurs when the parents and children are ac-
culturated at the same time and speed, both in learning the culture of the 
host society, and in abandoning their native language and cultural tradi-
tions; in these situations there are few intergenerational conflicts;
– Dissonant acculturation: it occurs when children learn English and adopt 
habits and lifestyles of the host society faster than their parents do. Differ-
ences in the acculturation processes can lead to intergenerational 
conflicts;
– Selective acculturation: it may occur when parents and children, who have 
been acculturated together, preserve ties with their culture of origin. This 
can lead to socialization with the lifestyles of the host country without los-
ing the most important cultural values of one’s home country, in both the 
first and second generation.
There is another perspective in the analysis of intergenerational transmission 
that highlights the conflict between generations.
There is a conflict between generations when children are exposed to the 
new cultural inputs from the society of the country where they live and from 
global cultures (Caneva, 2011), while their parents want to teach them the 
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 values and behaviors from their homeland. Besides, sometimes parents have 
an embellished version of the values from their homeland, which might have 
changed since they left it (Foner, 2009).
Often, at the heart of this intergenerational conflict, there is some difficulty 
in accepting one’s paternal authority (Fass, 2005), or even the discomfort and 
shame caused by the customs and traditions typical of one’s home country 
(D’Alisera, 2009).
However, this conflict is not the only option in intergenerational relation-
ships: admitting the possibility of cultural hybridization (Gomarasca, 2009) is 
also possible. Moro et al. (2009) remind us that the real challenge of migration 
is indeed that of hybridization: “…integrating into the world here, with the 
support of one’s parents’ world of origin, leads to a dynamic mix of women and 
men, thoughts and their evolution. Saying hybridization means saying that all 
forms are possible … in an ever-changing configuration, which sometimes var-
ies according to internal needs and in the various stages in life” (Moro, Baubet 
et al., 2009: 14).
By adopting their first-generation immigrant parents’ point of view, chil-
dren, who are surrounded by new lifestyles, can also change some cultural pat-
terns and social customs. Adults can try and negotiate new family rules with 
their children, accept new norms and soften their parenting styles (Zhou, 
2009). This approach shows a sort of reciprocity between generations.
The big picture thus appears to be quite articulate and complex, and it is 
precisely within this marked differentiation, which sometimes can be ex-
tremely ambivalent, that the transmission of values takes place in families 
 experiencing migration.
3.4 The Dynamics within Immigrant Families
If, on the one hand, emigration is always an event involving the whole family, 
and in which the whole family changes (Gozzoli, Regalia, 2005; Valtolina, Co-
lombo, 2012), different generations will implement different strategies to 
preserve-while-changing.
In Vatz-Laaroussi’s study (2001) –whose suggestive title is Le familial au cœur 
de l’immigration–, family is once again at the center both in migration trajecto-
ries and in integration dynamics. In her book, the author duly relates that not 
only migration, but also social participation and exercising one’s citizenship 
are a family affair.
Sociologists studying the transmission of values claim that, in various fields 
such as religion, politics, or relationships between the sexes, family is what af-
fects the most young people’s socialization, whereas parents’ educational meth-
ods –be they authoritarian or permissive, autocratic or democratic– only have a 
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mild influence on the level of transmission of values within the family (Perche-
ron, 1991). Coherence, persistence, visibility and the social  acceptability of the 
message appear crucial; these are the essential dimensions for the transmission 
between generations, and family is the privileged place for transmission. For a 
long time, immigrant families have been described as a place of cultural contra-
dictions, in which the parents’ coherence and persistence is opposed to the so-
cial invisibility and unacceptability of the supported values. Observing real-life 
experiences in both Quebec and France, a dynamic transmission may be identi-
fied in migration trajectories. Although it does not transmit a fixed set of values 
and customs from one generation to another, this transmission transforms 
“containers, contents, transmitters and receivers” (Percheron, 1991: 94).
Migration favors a two-way (bidirectional) transmission between children 
and parents. Everybody must adapt to and increase knowledge and expertise. 
And therefore, the transmission of values involved in immigration is never lin-
ear, but is more often multi-faceted and can be understood by analyzing it at 
different levels.
3.5 Semantic Transmissions
Their aim is to transfer a meaning and an orientation within the family (such 
as, for instance, the importance of helping each other out). The vast majority 
of immigrant families describe this as a spiritual value, connected with religion 
or a form of cultural humanism, which is quite distant from the idea of obliga-
tion that we tend to associate it with.
3.6 Hybrid Transmissions
These transmissions are the strongest indicator of the family’s tendency to 
change.
It can be noted that, in hybrid transmissions, parents’, as well as children’s, 
customs are less and less formal and automatic, and more and more contextu-
alized and dynamic, justified on a spiritual or social level. Both the effort and 
the progressive re-orientation of younger generations range from the need to 
conform to one’s family to the ability to make personal decisions (e.g. Rama-
dan for Muslims), without the support of the surrounding social context.
Some relevant strategies seem quite significant: for example, Catholics from 
Latin America join specific religious groups (Adventists or Seventh-Day Chris-
tians) as there they find an environment that looks more appropriate to the 
transmission of their faith and beliefs.
3.7 Transmissions by Keywords
The semantic meaning given to values that can have multiple meanings de-
serves special attention. A key concept becomes the center of, and a catalyst to, 
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family transmission: it is often polysemous and multi-dimensional, and allows 
for several interpretations and multiple updates depending on the family 
members who use it –young or adults, men or women–, and on the context. An 
example of this is the value of respect. It is one of the key concepts of immigrant 
families’ transmission in both Quebec and France, precisely because of its pol-
ysemy. Through nuances and contextualization, respect allows each family 
member to find their place within the family, and to interact with other gen-
erations, sexes, as well as society and institutions.
The transformation of the contents of the transmission often leads to switch 
from values to skills, due to the need to survive in an unfamiliar setting (e.g. the 
value of patience of Arab Muslim women in the relationships with their hus-
bands can, in turn, become a skill for their husbands in their social relations 
with the Public Administration, in the labor market, or in neighborhoods).
In another survey (Helly et al., 2001) conducted by the same research team, 
the focus is on the transformation process of values and customs by Moroccan 
and Salvadoran immigrants who, in the 1990s, faced different stabilization con-
ditions than people from previous migration flows. Four are the reasons why 
such processes are observed within families: the importance of families in so-
cialization processes as well as in processes of production and reproduction of 
models and customs; their intermediate position among the macro- and 
 micro-sociological (individual) levels of analysis; their key role in emigration 
as a meeting and stabilization place for homeland cultures; and the promotion 
of family solidarity for most immigrants.
The research focuses on the project of transmission of values and customs 
and allows to identify three types of pivot (i.e. element that eases the transfer) 
in transmission: 1) grandparents, who are the symbolic and actual actors of this 
process; 2) the home country, which is sometimes idealized and unwelcoming, 
and towards which parents develop an ambiguous relationship, which they 
communicate to their children to justify their emigration and offer them a po-
tential identity; 3) networks, mainly informal ones, including members from 
one’s home country community and from the immigrant community, which 
allow to recreate value-based social relations and to speak one’s native 
language.
In a more recent article, Vatz-Laaroussi (2007) emphasizes how important 
family (us as a family) and social networks are. This us as a family –carrying a 
strong migration project, acting as a vehicle for integration into the new social 
life, and mediating participation in new social institutions– is also a catalyst to 
resilience and, at times, almost the only element of continuity in disruption 
and change trajectories for those who emigrate. The featured analysis follows 
the three dimensions that run through and make up the dynamics within 
 immigrant families: the processes of intergenerational transmission, family 
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memories and history, and resilience. This study is based on a number of sur-
veys conducted on foreign families with children in Quebec. Its results show 
that neither the home country nor the parents’ level of education were the 
single determining factors affecting the processes of intergenerational trans-
mission or children’s resilience. However, these factors lead to a range of modes 
of transmission of the family’s history, and of children’s school performances. 
The author’s analysis allows to redefine the axes that run through family issues 
and immigration: family transmission is here associated with the creation of 
new reference points and meanings, family memories refer to a contextualized 
construction of the family’s history within immigration, and resilience allows 
for each individual’s re-integration into transnational networks crossing space 
and time boundaries. If we observe intergenerational relationships from these 
complicated processes, they appear as a turning point in the family’s and soci-
ety’s transformation, which establishes a continuity that is essential to resil-
ience, social integration and the creation of a new Self, within a different and 
multiple Us, and possibly also to the birth of a new reality.
While immigration has altered the religious structures in French society, the 
opposite process, i.e. the transformation of immigrants’ religiousness in their 
new living environment (Simon, Tiberj, 2014), can also be observed. In this 
context, how does immigrants’ religiousness evolve and differ from that of the 
mainstream population? How does intrafamilial religious transmission occur? 
And to what extent does being raised in a family where religion was important 
determine people’s current religiousness? Is the religious sentiment more of-
ten maintained in religious minorities, particularly in the context of migra-
tion? The authors of the recent Survey on the Diversity of the French Popula-
tion (Beauchemin et al., 2016) have tried to answer these questions through 
data analysis.
Before being a matter of personal choice, religion is transmitted by parents 
through socialization or, more in general, religious belonging: in other words, 
children are regarded as the heirs to their parents’ religion. The survey reveals 
which religions the parents belong to, and emphasizes the importance of reli-
gion in the education people receive. Being raised in a family where religion is 
very important influences the formation of religious feelings: transmission 
happens in 85% of cases, even though with a marked decrease in the intensity 
of religiousness. Conversely, almost everyone who was raised in an agnostic or 
atheistic family claims to be equally agnostic or atheist, and less than 7% re-
ports some degree of religiousness. Religious-mixed families, i.e. where one of 
the two parents has no religion, represent 10% of cases and are even rarer 
among immigrant families. The decrease in religion intensity from one 
 generation to the following one is clearly expressed by this comparison: 24% of 
581Migrations and Intergenerational Religious Transmission
<UN>
people between 18 and 50 living in metropolitan France were raised in a self-
declared religion-less family, and today 44% of people claim to have no 
religion.
This disaffiliation trend varies according to the religion that the parents 
practice. Religious disaffiliation is apparently more frequent for people raised 
in a Buddhist (30% of disaffiliation), Christian and Jewish (26%) family than 
for those who have Muslim parents (11%). Intergenerational transmission can 
be divided into three categories:
– Secularization: religious disaffiliation from the religion of one’s parents, or 
lower level of religiousness compared to that of one’s family;
– Reproduction: same level of religiousness, including absence of religion;
– Reinforcement: higher level of religiousness than that of one’s parents (in-
cluding agnostics).
According to this categorization, slightly more than a quarter of people be-
tween 18 and 50 living in metropolitan France followed a secularization trajec-
tory and consider themselves less attached to religion than their parents, two 
thirds maintain continuity with their families’ religious feelings, and only 7% 
consider themselves more religious than the previous generation.
3.8 The Relationship between Parents and Children in Transmission
Observing the dynamics of intergenerational transmission of values in immi-
grant families from the mother-child relationship perspective is the aim of the 
research conducted in Italy by Caneva and Pozzi (2014). Through the design of 
qualitative interviews with immigrant mothers and children, the research 
analyses how mothers and children negotiate styles of transmission of values, 
as well as the importance of language and religion.1 The survey provides differ-
ent results for Muslim and Christian women. Muslim women perceive religion 
as a key factor in personal identity, whereas Eastern-European Christian wom-
en perceive religious belonging as a private matter and generally attach little 
importance to participation in religious celebrations and Holy Scripture read-
ing. For Muslim women, though, the little chance they have to take part in reli-
gious celebrations and their long stay in Italy lead them to distance themselves 
from religious practices, and this impacts their children’s socialization. This 
distancing from rules is especially present in the younger generations and 
 determines a sense of discomfort and shame in mothers, in so far as they have 
1 The interviewees were 23 children between 14 and 20 who came to Italy to be joined with 
their parents again (10 Pakistanis, 9 Romanians, 2 Ukrainians, and 2 Moldovans), and 58 
women (26 Bangladeshi, 7 Pakistanis, 21 Romanians, 3 Ukrainians, and 1 Moldovan) who had 
emigrated before, or had arrived in Lombardy through processes of family reunification.
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not been able to maintain interest in a religion. Children feign interest only 
when their parents are present.
For Eastern-European immigrant women, the importance of religion does 
not lie in regular attendance, but in its supporting and guiding role. This allows 
children to feel independent and autonomous, and mothers to not feel a sense 
of shame or defeat (the transmission of religion is regarded as a transmission 
of values rather than of customs).
For children, knowing and speaking their parents’ native language is essen-
tial to preserve their connection with their origins and define their identity. 
Language is a symbolic boundary through which children define themselves 
and differentiate themselves from others. As for the transmission of religion, 
some of the young interviewees state that they go to church or the mosque and 
perform religious rituals (e.g. they pray). In particular, Muslim children state 
that religion is part of everyday life in their families. For some, religion is a way 
of life, a set of rules that are useful in everyday life to provide a guide to solve 
problems. Children feel that faith and religious practices are part of their iden-
tity and want to transfer them to their children in the future.
Despite some differences with their mothers, conflicts do not occur over 
religion and religious practices. This behavior is common to a lot of young peo-
ple who claim to be religious, even though they go less often to church or the 
mosque and pray less than their parents. The decrease in religious practice is 
partly due to the duration of their stay in Italy. Young people who are born in 
Italy or who came when they were still babies are less devoted to beliefs and 
religious practices, whereas those who have been socialized in their home-
lands and have arrived in Italy in their teenage years are more devoted.
Children with Easter-European origins state that their families are not reli-
gious, and that religion is not a part of the education they receive from their 
parents. For these children, the transmission of values is related to other cul-
tural issues (like, for instance, the importance of showing adults respect, or the 
importance of the nuclear family), which are not closely related to religion.
In conclusion, Asian Muslim families show a stronger attachment to reli-
gion, whereas Easter-European families seem less interested in religious 
aspects.
For Muslim women and their children, religion is still a fundamental issue. 
Both parents and children see the transmission of religion as a way to preserve 
values and moral integrity, even though second-generation children attach less 
importance to customs, thus creating a conflict with their parents.
However, this sense of belonging to a religious community clashes with a 
lower attendance at the mosque. This could be a consequence of an absence or 
shortage of places of worship, but also of a change in habits in a context of 
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migration, or a strategy to avoid discrimination. For Eastern-European women 
and younger generations, religion is not closely related to identity issues and 
attachment to origins issues: it can be seen at most as a moral guide.
Also a recent study conducted in the Archdiocese of Milan on two genera-
tions of Muslims (Bramanti, Meda, 2016) highlights a different degree of adher-
ence to Islam related to gender and generation. As for gender, women get pre-
dominantly higher scores in the adherence to Islam index (Closeness–Distance 
between self and Islam (Graphical Display); Attendance at religious practices; 
Orientations–Values) (49% high modality versus 42.3% for men), whereas, in 
terms of difference between generations, older people show higher levels of 
identification with Islam. Those who were born in Italy (second generation) 
actually appear in definitely lower numbers within the higher level of adher-
ence to Islam (about 17% versus 49% of those who were born abroad or are 
first-generation), almost as if a secularization process is already underway for 
second generations.
In terms of willingness to get to know the host culture, the level of adher-
ence to Islam seems to be neither a hindering nor an enhancing factor: both 
those who appear to be relatively more distant from a strong identification 
with religious values and those who are conversely totally devoted are actually 
willing to dialogue, whereas bridging social capital availability proves crucial.
3.9 The Importance of One’s Native Language
Language, particularly one’s mother’s language (Medvedeva, 2012), is definitely 
a unique tool to transfer values within families. Language is closely related to 
the chance to express religious contents and preserve a sense of belonging to 
one’s original community, especially for Muslims. Using one’s native language, 
effectively combined with the new language, is crucial for a successful integra-
tion process (Esser, 2006; Jiménez, 2011; Ambrosini et al., 2013). However, par-
ents and children show different abilities in learning the language of the host 
country: children tend to learn it faster than their parents. And this can lead 
children to become their parents’ parents: the result is a dissonant accultura-
tion and, eventually, a weaker parental authority, or even conflict (Choi et al., 
2008).
3.10 Generational Differences
The author (Saint-Blancat, 2004) analyses the cultural and religious socializa-
tion of young Muslims who were born or socialized in Europe, through the 
generation category. The family’s religious socialization, the pluralism of Islam 
re-affiliation paths followed by young Muslims and their current attempts at 
re-orientation towards faith are then examined. Lastly, identifying changes in 
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the transmission process (contents and practices) highlights the queries new 
generations have: claiming a sort of gender identity for women through the 
prism of religion, a new need of citizenship, and the issue of “religious” author-
ity. All these progresses help Islam emerge and drift away from a social con-
struction of exception.
3.11 Gender Differences
This paper (Flor, Knapp, 2001) is interesting for the interpretive categories used 
and the final discussion highlighting the paradoxical effects related to the chil-
dren’s gender.2 The first introductory part proposes an open discussion about 
the unidirectional model (parents to children) versus a dialectical model 
(transactional). In these models, both parents and children are perceived as 
active agents in the internalization process.
Some of the parents’ transmission methods are unidirectional, such as, for 
instance, the parental desire for the child to be religious, but there are also 
more dialogical methods.
In this research, the child’s religiousness is regarded as a dependent variable 
of the parents’ religiousness. In short, parents appear to have a direct influence 
over children, but transactional elements can also be noted. There are some 
interesting paradoxical effects about gender. Despite the occurrence of dialogi-
cal discussions about faith between fathers and daughters, the latter see reli-
gion as decreasingly important; a similar paradoxical, although less marked, 
effect was evidenced in the mother-son dyads.
3.12 Memories
According to Amadini (2012), in reprocessing one’s obligations, heritage and 
sense of belonging, new generations can discover that there is a system of 
models, rules and values that convey the reassuring feeling of not having to 
start from scratch. This takes us back to memories, a topic included in the 
broader topic of transmission.
Among the records of the past, Assman distinguishes cultural memory from 
communicative memory, which includes memories from the recent past that 
human beings share with their peers: a typical case is generational memory. 
Assman underlines that this memory is built on the interaction in everyday life 
which is transmitted between generations by witnesses, and is less institution-
alized than cultural memory, which has fixed objectifications (Assman, 2002). 
In religious transmission, everyday life within the family and living in the 
2 Participants in this study were a subgroup of 171 Caucasians living in families with two par-
ents and one pre-adolescent child (84 women, 87 men).
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 family’s house help build an incorporated memory that can be described as 
communicative memory. Leccardi (2009) argues that, in family relationships, 
experience is incorporated as a natural behavior, which generations are a living 
memory of, a long memory that is present in families below the threshold of 
awareness.
According to Pace, the act of transmission indicates a constant movement 
in time: in the transfer from one generation to the other, not only do external 
conditions vary, but also different and somehow opposite ways of understand-
ing and interpreting the contents of the beliefs being transmitted alternate 
(Pace, 2008).
This structuring of beliefs has a social, cultural and political nature. It can be 
interpreted as a search for new meanings of everyday life in spite of diversity as 
a continuous negotiation process to extend the symbolic boundaries of faith, a 
constant symbolic (and generational) renovation to adapt to the surrounding 
environment.
According to Campiche (2010), religious transmission shows a personal his-
tory building up through a relationship between the evolution of personal 
freedom, management of one’s heritage and integration into a specific socio-
historical context.
Barrera Rivera (2001) argues that transmission is a religious language dy-
namics in the making, and describes it as being inseparable from the concept 
of group-approved memory, and here a connection between transmission and 
exercise of religious authority is inevitably established. According to the Bra-
zilian author, the aim of transmission is ensuring socialization to individuals 
and groups within this institutional framework, by also integrating, in a bal-
anced way, community, ethical, emotional end cultural records of identifica-
tion with the religious traditions. Thus, transmission continues to be a process 
on which religious identities, which are temporary and partial, are built and 
rebuilt, based on individual experiences.
3.13 The Role of Elderly People
Elderly people are the leading actors in the exercise of memory. Aggoun (2003) 
described their (the grandparents’) place in Algeria and France. Immigrant 
grandparents can combine their individual memory of the past –which in-
cludes a collective identity– with the present and future of the host society. 
They build their identity through a selective memory (a collage of elements 
from the homeland and host societies in a dialectical and non-dichotomous 
way) and by trying to find consistency and plausibility in their present and 
past. In doing so, the sense of belonging to their community, as an element in 
their personal identity, is lost in their transition from one society to the other. 
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However, religion is still an element that ensures a connection between the 
living and the dead.
This analysis allows to explore the continuity and discontinuity of roles and 
functions and the transmission of memory in migration situations.
As for references to the past, the concept of generation of post-memory 
refers to the transmission of family memories across generations, and spe-
cifically to second generations’ ties with their religious past in “an (…) oscil-
lation between continuity and rupture” (Hirsch, 2008: 106). This is a particu-
larly interesting concept for the generations of Jewish families’ children who 
have not experienced the Holocaust; of Armenian descendants who have not 
experienced the genocide; of Catholic younger people (e.g. Focolare Move-
ment) who have neither experienced World War ii, nor taken part in the 1970s 
youth revolution, nor known the pre-conciliar Church or the birth of ecclesial 
movements.
Hervieu-Léger (2003) argues that what matters the most is not continuity 
itself, but the fact that continuity is the visible expression of a filiation, which 
is explicitly claimed by the single or collective believers and makes them mem-
bers of a spiritual community including past, present and future believers.
4 And Finally … Breaking the Silence
Studies on the transmission of religious values among people who have suf-
fered religious persecutions in their home country are missing from this ana-
lytical presentation of the main studies on the transmission of religious values 
in immigrant families.
This absence highlights a significant gap and also a sort of collective 
removal.
The findings that we have presented are obviously of enormous value and 
importance. This is what guided us in designing the study of persecuted groups, 
as the following chapters in this part will illustrate. However, the almost total 
lack of this specific focus highlights that, in the Western scientific community, 
attention has only recently been turned to this issue, which has not been thor-
oughly examined yet.
For immigrants, the religious persecutions that they suffered in their home-
land and that have forced them to emigrate are, of course, an element of severe 
distress, and shed a sad light on their homeland, even though the sense of be-
longing to it is a major factor in the immigrants’ identity. Therefore, as the 
 interviews with the members of the Coptic community emphasize (see Chap-
ters 19 and 20), those who have suffered discrimination or violence in their 
home country struggle to talk about that.
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The religious freedom that immigrants experience in host countries is thus 
a key factor in supporting integration and re-socialization paths for both adults 
and youth, provided that it does not imply that religion is a totally irrelevant 
fact. On the one hand, removing all the pain suffered because of religion can 
make the role that religion has in Western countries incomprehensible to im-
migrants; on the other hand, it can reduce immigrants to a sort of forced si-
lence in order to live up to social expectations.
To this effect, the integrated model of transmission of values gains a special 
heuristic significance: it is a common thread running through several studies, 
and it combines the vertical axis (generations), horizontal axis (the group of 
peers) and diagonal axis of social transmission (Maliepaard, Lubbers, 2013). In 
particular, vertical transmission refers to the role that parents play in explicit 
socialization, cultural education, norms and values, and in the everyday prac-
tice of behaviors that children interiorize by observing and imitating their par-
ents’ actions. Horizontal transmission is fundamental during adolescence, 
when friends and peers have a growing influence on them. The diagonal axis 
refers to extra-familial socialization: individuals are also influenced by the so-
cial context in which they grow up, notably school (Berry et al., 1992), working 
environments and associations or non-profit organizations.
The present chapter hypothesizes that religious values and beliefs are a val-
id support in integration and cohesion processes for migrant families. The 
framework within which this hypothesis can be verified refers to the four key 
concepts presented in Chapter 2.
Based on the empirical evidence provided, it can be stated that the families’ 
commitment in the transmission of religious values is definitely aimed at 
building an individual and family identity in the contexts of origin. It can also 
be stated that this effort tends to persist at least in first-generation immigrants 
even in the host country.
If it is true that religious values are mainly conveyed within family relation-
ships, it is also true, as research has found, that they are challenged by the so-
cial background of the host country, which is new to immigrants.
In European host countries and in Italy in particular, migrants experience 
freedom of religion, as a formal right, which, however, plays a barely active role 
in defining a new right to citizenship and making places of public life accessible.
This condition poses a threat: leaving families alone in their efforts to pass 
down values. However, on the other hand, it adds value to ethnic communities, 
as well as to local Christian Churches and Parishes, by investing them with a 
supporting role to families in this task.
Unfortunately, in Italy, there is still no adequate empiric research about 
these dynamics, due to the complexity of the investigation (as the first findings 
presented in the chapters about the Coptic families and their children who 
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were targeted in this study will illustrate), and also to a sort of removal of the 
religious issue as a cause of migration.
This silence is dangerous and has to be purposefully tackled and studied, in 
order to prevent the courage and self-sacrifice of the many people who have 
risked or given up their lives from crashing into a wall of silence and denial.
<UN>
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Chapter 18
The Copts in Italy: Migration and Generosity
Beatrice Nicolini
1 The Coptic Church and Italy
The term copt, initially without any confessional connotations, derives from 
the Arab term qutb, quft, qift, and more precisely from the Arab translation 
of the Greek term aiguptios imported through the Latin term cophti, cophtitae. 
At the beginning of the Arab domination along the Mediterranean African re-
gions, this term indicated Egypt’s original inhabitants in order to distinguish 
them from rum, which was referred to those Egyptians of Greek-Byzantine ori-
gins.1 Copts were simply thought as Egyptians.
The Copts once formed a large Christian community, from the Nile to the 
Middle East to the Horn of Africa. They became a minority after the Muslim 
occupation of Egypt in the seventh century; they remained an integral part of 
the Egyptian world.
The relationship between Italy and the Coptic community in the Middle 
East is ancient and intense. Coptic recorded history ended around the four-
teenth century (Ayad, 2016). In the fifteenth century, the Council of Florence, 
held between 1438 and 1445, decided to invite the first official delegation to 
Europe. The first Coptic manuscripts were introduced in Italy and soon the 
Copts were persuaded to submit to the papacy. In 1630, there were Copts in It-
aly although, on the whole, they were very reluctant to travel to Europe or, in-
deed, to travel at all (Hamilton, 2006). Nevertheless, the Coptic Diaspora 
showed that upward mobility could be achieved without loss of heritage iden-
tity (Mahmood, 2012). Until the nineteenth century there have not been many 
sources. Occasional sources from Arab authors or from Western travelers or 
pilgrims were the only available information. Gian Battista Brocchi (who vis-
ited Egypt in 1822–26), Alessandro Ricci (1817–22) and Ippolito Rossellini 
(1828–19) visited Egypt and reported about the Copts. These explorers, through 
their adventures, described the Coptic Churches they visited and explained 
the main theological differences between the Coptic Orthodox, the Coptic 
1 A special thanks to L. Zanfrini, G. Valtolina, A. Melcangi, R. Bottoni and P. Schellenbaum for 
their precious comments. Transcriptions and transliterations are here simplified and as in 
consulted sources and texts.
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Catholic and the Roman Catholic Churches. It must be remembered that the 
three Italian explorers were driven by prejudice typical of their epoch and, in 
their reports, wrote about the Copts as “heretics”, “schismatics”, “ignorant”, “in-
tolerant”, “extremely poor”; besides, monks were believed to have permission 
to get married. In 1824, Vatican City opened a parochiality for the Catholic 
Copts, but it remained a theory and was never realized. On March 15, 1895 Pope 
Leo xiii (1810–1903) appointed vicar apostolic G. Makarios who took the name 
of bishop Cyril. Once elected, Cyril guided a delegation to Rome asking for the 
realization of the parochiality. Pope Leo xiii agreed to this request through the 
apostolic letter “Christi Domini” of 26 November 1895, which officially restored 
the Coptic patriarch of Alexandria of Egypt. Catholic Coptic priests can get 
married except for the bishops; the majority of them lives in Egypt and in Su-
dan; and, as stressed above, very few migrated to other countries.
2 Migrations and Presence
The migration fluxes in Italy were historically mainly from Egypt due to the 
persecutions and the violence against the Coptic community. Today, the pres-
ence of the Copts in Italy is supposed to be around 70,000 people scattered 
along the territory (International Congress of Coptic Studies, 2016; Ambrosia-
na Community Report, 2018). The majority is centered around the Milan area. 
The total number of the Copts in Italy remains quite obscure also because of 
the non-compulsory religious identity clarification in Italian censuses (Botto-
ni, 2019). In France, there are about 250,000 Copts, and in Great Britain 20,000. 
In total, Egyptian migrants in Italy are estimated to be around 119,000 (Istat, 
2018), with the Copts representing almost one third of this total. The role of 
this religious community is very important: the Copts not only give to their 
parishioners, but they offer shelter to local communities, thus valorizing the 
churches and the places where they pray and live. Violence hits but does not 
prevail. The religious structure facilitates positive assimilation. Copts Church-
es are present on the Italian territory as follows: in Tuscany, Florence, St. Mina 
Coptic Orthodox church in Scandicci; in Lazio, St. George, and St. Mark in 
Rome; in Lombardy, monastery Anba Shenouda in Lacchiarella, St. Mary & St. 
Antonius in Cinisello Balsamo, St. Mark in Milan; in Piedmont, St. Mary, 
Turin.
The recent presence of the Copts in Italy dates back to the 1970s; pastoral 
activities started in those years, too. In 1973, the historical meeting between 
Pope Paul vi (1897–1978) and Shenuda iii, Pope of the Copts, marked the con-
clusion of a route that lasted fourteen centuries. Since 1982, the Copts have not 
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increased their presence in the Milan area, where today there are two bishops, 
one monastery, the Episcopal seat in Lacchiarella, close to the city of Milan, 
and twenty parishes and other communities are growing quickly. Moreover, in 
1995, a second reality organized by the Coptic community in Italy, in collabora-
tion with the Patriarch Tawadros ii (Waqih Sobhi Bakky Suleiman, born in 
1952), 118th Pope of the Copt Orthodox Church, did appear in Turin, Rome, 
Florence and its surroundings. It was divided into some main areas: Rome, 
Florence, Perugia, Bologna and Reggio Emilia, Turin (plus the other centers of 
Genova, La Spezia and Bari), with the central seat in Rome under the guide of 
the bishop Barnaba El Soryany. The Coptic diocese of Rome has some 7,000 
worshippers. The Coptic Church found a welcoming environment in Italy, 
where it was possible to show all the vitality of a Christian reality that survived 
centuries of persecution, an intense liturgical life focused on the radical expe-
rience of the monasticism of the desert, and an active interest for the mutual 
support of the faithful in various aspects of social and family life. The Coptic 
Church is in favor of the theological dialogue between Christians and supports 
many initiatives for Christian realities in the Middle East. Cinisello Balsamo, 
Milan, is the Episcopal seat with Anba Kirolos, metropolitan bishop of Europe, 
who died in 2017 and strongly contributed to the construction and realization 
of ten churches in the Milan area. Today (2019), the new bishop is Anba Anto-
nius. Visiting the Episcopal seat is very instructive to try to understand the 
Coptic world. From outside, it looks like a former factory that remained as it 
used to be. Inside, it has been totally renovated: in the main corpus, today, 
there is a beautiful Coptic church that can seat up to 500 people. All around 
there are buildings for parishioners’ gatherings after the celebrations, for cate-
chism, priests’ residential houses, and the bishop residence. Joining a Coptic 
Mass is a fascinating experience; the whole community sings and dialogues 
with the priest in Coptic, in Greek and in Italian. The community is very young, 
with many families with more than three children; this is one of the main rea-
sons of the great attention to the religious education of the young Coptic gen-
erations. Furthermore, it is interesting to note the new positive experiences of 
the open oratories during summer. Here, the children join the priests, as the 
Coptic structures remain open during summertime, while others usually close. 
Among the nine Coptic churches in Milan, only one is Catholic in origin, which 
is the one in Senato Street, in the very center of Milan, dedicated to St. Mark. 
The other churches have been restored from abandoned buildings, such as the 
one in Gorla and in Saronno. In Gorla, a dismissed industrial area has been 
bought through a judicial action and two industrial sheds were united so that 
it could host all the parishioners. In Saronno, instead, a formerly abandoned 
gym became a place to deal drugs and created many problems to the local 
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 inhabitants. The Copt community helped Saronno through the acquisition of 
this degraded space. The proof of this positive initiative was that the Via Crucis 
celebrated by Cardinal Angelo Scola through the pastoral zone 4 during the 
route between the two stations saw the alternation in carrying the Cross of St. 
Charles containing the Saint Nail of a Coptic exponent, a Romanian, and a Rus-
sian: important signs of the multi-religious reality. The commitment to rede-
velop abandoned spaces is among the main tasks of the Coptic Church in Italy. 
This is the answer of a migrant community in touch with its identity, which 
never stops dialoguing with the surrounding communities and attempts to 
solve many troubled situations in order to set constructive examples to many 
people.
3 Terrorist Attacks and the Coptic Church in Italy
Since 2011, hundreds of Egyptian Copts have been killed in sectarian clashes, 
and many homes and businesses have been destroyed. In just one province 
(Minya in Egypt), 77 cases of sectarian attacks against Copts between 2011 and 
2018 have been documented. Copts migrated to Italy from Egypt between 1952 
and 1975 because they could not find jobs due to discrimination. Their wives 
could not go to a Coptic gynaecologist because Coptic gynaecologists could 
not practice – and this is just one of the examples of daily discrimination faced 
by Copts in Egypt. Equality did not exist at work or in the streets. If a woman 
was seen walking around wearing a cross, she would have to face harassment. 
It was forbidden to park cars outside of any church. Copts have been, and still 
are, strangers in their own country. In Egypt, rarely are documents released to 
Copts, and they prohibit people from converting to Christianity by putting 
them in jail. The terrorist attacks against Copts in Egypt during these recent 
years were all firmly condemned by the Italian governments and by the main 
religious communities. According to bishop al-Soryani, all Christians expressed 
their grief in the demonstration against the terroristic attacks in 2000 in 
 Kosheh, where 21 Copts died, and on 7 January 2010 in Naga Hammadi, where 
eight Copts were shot dead in the Upper Egyptian city of Naga Hammadi, right 
in front of the cathedral. On that occasion, Italy condemned violence against 
Coptic Christians in Egypt, with Foreign Minister F. Frattini during his second 
mandate (2008–11) saying he would personally take up the matter with his 
Egyptian counterpart on a visit to Cairo. The violence perpetrated against the 
Christian Copt community in Egypt was horrific and outrageous after six Copts 
and one Muslim police officer were killed, apparently by Muslims, in the south 
of the country. At least nine more Copts were wounded, two of them seriously, 
593The Copts in Italy: Migration and Generosity
<UN>
when drive-by attackers raked a crowd of shoppers in a southern Egypt town 
with gunfire, on the eve of their Christmas celebrations. Rome and Milan’s 
Coptic community organized demonstrations in various parts of the country 
to express support to Coptic Christians in Egypt after the New Year’s Eve bomb 
attack on a church in Alexandria in 2017 (Cucca, 2018). Milan saw a sit-in in 
front of the Egyptian embassy in Porpora Street, with some demonstrators 
blocking the road for a few hours. Tensions increased when Muslim citizens 
arrived, and police intervention was required. No demonstration received the 
support of the Coptic diocese of Milan, which consists of about 12,000 Copts 
guided by Anba Antonius. The bishop did not approve of the sit-in from a spiri-
tual point of view since he disagreed with the idea of priests leaving the church 
to demonstrate in the streets. There were two main reasons. First, it must be 
noted that the Coptic Church is not a political entity; second, the way to sup-
port the Copts in Egypt is through prayer and sending aid to the affected fami-
lies. This is why Coptic churches of the diocese of Milan held a mass prayer on 
8 January 2018 for the dead and the wounded of the Alexandria attack. The dio-
cese agreed to meet Egypt’s ambassador to Italy and the consul general in Mi-
lan at the monastery of Anba Shenouda in Lachiarella to express condolences 
and discuss the current situation of the Copts in Egypt. They stressed the ur-
gency of an education reform, the spread of the concept of citizenship regard-
less of religious affiliation, changing the rules for church construction, uphold-
ing the rights of non-Muslim families, and other measures aimed at eliminating 
inequality between Copts and Muslims. The Coptic Church asked them not to 
make any comments so as not to make the situation worse and endanger the 
lives of the Copts in Egypt. Fear pervaded in the Milan demonstration. All 
those interviewed were reluctant to give their names, afraid of endangering 
relatives in Egypt. They denounced the Egyptian government’s conspiracy of 
silence, which, they said, failed to put an end to the discriminations against the 
Copts, though it had been stipulated in the Constitution. Interviewees cited 
the need to obtain a presidential decree to build a church and pointed out the 
low number of Copts in parliament, as well as the fact that key positions re-
main inaccessible to Copts. Many of the Egyptians who joined the sit-in had 
emigrated because of religious discrimination, which had prevented them ei-
ther from finding a job or from advancing in their careers.
Rome was also ripe with Coptic reactions to the incident. Unlike Milan, the 
Rome diocese organized a January 2018 demonstration in support of Coptic 
Egyptians and against terrorism and religious discrimination. Criticism started 
before the event, when al-Soryani asked Muslims and Jews not to take part in 
the Repubblica Square sit-in, saying it was the wish of the Copts to mourn 
within their community. He invited them to organize a different  demonstration. 
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About 1,000 Copts from different areas, including Turin, Florence, and Reggio 
Emilia, gathered amid massive security measures. Prayers in Arabic and Italian 
were recited by bishop al-Soryan and priests from all over the Diocese. Another 
recent attack was in Minya, in Egypt, on 2 November 2018. A prayer in St. Peter’s 
Basilica preceded the Rome demonstration, and Catholics could show solidar-
ity with the global Christian community. Common requests to the Egyptian 
government by Copts from both Milan and Rome were cancelling the field of 
religion in identity cards, changing regulations on the construction and resto-
ration of churches, changing the school curriculum to include the pre-Islamic 
period, which used to be omitted, and other reforms aiming at eliminating re-
ligious discrimination. On 9 July 2018, the President Sergio Mattarella received 
at the Quirinale Tawadros ii, Pope of Alexandria and of San Mark. Pope Tawad-
ros ii, Pope of the Copts, came from Bari, and then he went in the Basilica of 
St. Paul Outside the Walls in Rome with Anba Barnaba, Anba Antonius and 
Anba Wisa. Ambassadors of Rome and of Vatican City, Hisham Badr and 
Mahmud Sami with a diplomatic delegation with Wael Selim. During the cel-
ebration, Anghelos Bisha became the new bishop of Florence, beloved by his 
parishioners when he was in Rome. Pope Tawadros ii appointed the new Cop-
tic bishop of Milan, Anba Antonius, as successor of Anba Kirolos. He graduat-
ed in medicine at Assiut University and at Ain Shams University in Cairo. He 
chose the monastic life and he lived in the Anba Shenouda monastery in Milan 
serving many churches of the Coptic community. Anba Antonius is the new 
bishop of Milan and its surroundings, with the Venice exemption.
4 Conclusions
While the Coptic tradition and presence constitutes an ancient and strong re-
ality in Italy, today the majority of Italians are substantially ignoring Copts’ 
lives and activities. The striking lack of recent sources and information, com-
pared to the richness of Middle Eastern sources of such a lively religious reality 
in Italy, is a symptom of the deep necessity for further research on this impor-
tant topic. The history of religious and political persecutions and violence is a 
tragedy that affected all Copts, most of all in Egypt. Throughout their Diaspora 
history, the principle of unity as a nation represented Copts’ only hope, and it 
was only within the context of the nation-state that the point of unity could be 
possible across all the religious and cultural differences. The creation and the 
necessity for the definition of religious minorities was a dramatic passage in 
Christian Copts’ history. They refused to be classified as a religious minority 
and claimed the recognition of their identity not on a religious basis but on a 
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national one. This topic is so vast that it could represent a further issue of re-
search alone. Moreover, the Coptic presence in Italy, as described above, can 
surely be seen as positive, since the Coptic Church not only takes care of its 
parishioners, but is also very generous with the whole environment and the 
surrounding communities. Coptic migration and generosity are positive and 
potential issues to a future communication and a future understanding 
 between religious as well as between social communities in Italy.
<UN>
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Chapter 19
Religious Belonging and (Forced) Migration:  
a Study on Migrant Coptic Families in Italy
Cristina Giuliani and Camillo Regalia
1 (Forced) Migrants and Post-migration Processes
Within the extant psychology scientific literature, the epidemiological and 
psychiatric perspectives for a long time have been predominant in research on 
(forced) migration processes. The latter approach aims at assessing the typol-
ogy and severity of pre-migration traumas (including war-related violence, ex-
posure to persecution for religious and/or political reasons, injustice and op-
pression) as well as their effects on the mental health of adult and under-age 
migrants (Hussain, Bhushan, 2009; Jović et al., 2005; McGregor et al., 2015; 
Reading, 2009; Wilson, Tang, 2007).
Recently, such theoretical models have become richer and more complex in 
two respects:
a) firstly, the focus has shifted from the pre-migration to the post-migration 
phase; this is characterized by numerous stressors related to resettlement 
and acculturative processes, which increase long-term risks of mental 
health issues (Betancourt et al., 2015; Laban et al., 2008);
b) secondly, the identification of risk factors and protective processes ca-
pable of moderating the link between cumulative trauma and psycho-
social wellbeing has become richer.
Overall, although psychological/psychiatric diagnoses and comparisons are at 
times difficult, research on (forced) migrants, refugees and asylum seekers 
confirms the groups’ high rates of psychological suffering, as well as increasing 
psychic pathologies in the post-migration phase. Indeed, this phase is likely 
characterized by a vicious cycle featuring the disruptive effects of traumas and 
difficulties prior to migration and of the multiple losses and stressors faced in 
the respective resettlement countries, ultimately leading to a shift from an “ac-
tual exile” condition to a “psychological exile condition” (Ellis et al., 2008; Jović 
et al., 2015; Salvatore et al., 2014).
As noted by a growing body of scientific literature featuring empirical stud-
ies mostly conducted in the United States, Canada and Israel on refugee groups 
that are relatively homogenous as for geographical provenance (Sudan,  Eritrea, 
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Iraq) as well as religious faith (Christian), several variables appear to be corre-
lated to migrants’ processes of psychological adjustment and mental health.
Although laden with expectations of safety and hope, (forced) migrants’ ar-
rival in their respective resettlement country engenders delusion and suffer-
ing. This sharpens the condition of psychological “exile”. Amongst the most 
frequently noted risk factors during the resettlement phase, there are the 
lengthiness of juridical asylum procedures, the uncertainty of living condi-
tions, prolonged stays in immigration detention centers (Kronick et al., 2015; 
Laban et al., 2008); the feeling of being discriminated in the resettlement coun-
try due to ethnicity or religion, aggravating the experience of migrants which 
have already suffered from oppression in their country of origin and injustice; 
the accumulation of stressful circumstances such as poverty, loss of social roles 
and status, unemployment, social isolation, identity and culture loss, precari-
ousness of dwelling, discrimination, separation from family members (Betan-
court et al., 2015; Ellis et al., 2008; Weine, 2008, 2011).
In addition to the aforementioned stressors, acculturation implicates fur-
ther difficulties, such as the encounter with a new society and being faced with 
other cultural models. These experiences cause acculturation stress, intra- and 
extra-familiar cultural clashes (i.e. couple conflicts, intergenerational accul-
turative gaps) (Betancourt et al., 2015; Nakash et al., 2015; Yako, Biswas, 2014).
Within the extant research, post-migration stressors and adversities faced 
by migrants have received considerable attention. However, few studies have 
considered the role of resilience and protective processes in influencing post-
migration adaptation among (forced) migrants and refugees from a salutogen-
ic point of view. According to the Conservation of Resources Theory (cor – 
Betancourt et al., 2015; Hooberman et al., 2010; Silove, 2013), migrant individuals 
and families face multiple traumatic losses during migration but they are also 
able to conserve, use and enhance many types of resources (individual, famil-
iar, and collective). According to this framework, the impact of (forced) migra-
tion transition is linked to a deeper understanding of the interplay between 
cumulative pre- and post- resettlement stressors and protective processes on 
the individual, family and community level (apa, 2010; Bottura, Mancini, 2016; 
Kramer, Bala, 2010).
Overall, the few quantitative studies conducted on refugee families high-
light the presence of positive resources capable of supporting families through 
this difficult life stage. Resources include family cohesion, community support 
and the support granted by formal institutions, the relationship with one’s 
country of origin, a parental investment and the stability of children’s upbring-
ing (parenting styles, school support, and parental investment), transnational 
relationships and spiritual beliefs. The stronger one’s cultural identity, the 
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 better such families seem to cope with the difficulties they encounter. On an 
individual level, religious faith and a strong sense of belonging to a religious 
community play an important protective role as migrants resettle in new soci-
eties. Religious identity is a strong feature of cultural identity and it acts as a 
spiritual resource as individuals accept and process events (Betancourt et al., 
2015; Bottura, Mancini, 2016; Laban et al., 2008; McGregor et al., 2015; Yako, 
Biswas, 2014).
The wellbeing of younger generations, which experienced (forced) migra-
tion, is also strongly linked to some relational resources within their family 
(cohesion, supportive relationship with parents, parental monitoring, mainte-
nance of cultural and collective identity, effective use of external resources and 
services) and school (e.g. positive feeling about school, sense of school belong-
ing) (McGregor et al., 2015; Trentacosta et al., 2016).
Within the scenario described above, religion and belonging to a religious 
community deeply affect migrant people’s lives. As previously noted in the 
present book (Part 1 and Chapter 17), the rebuilding of community and faith-
based organizations in their respective resettlement countries has a significant 
impact on integration processes for religious minorities that have suffered 
from marginalization and violence in their country of provenance. A body of 
historical-anthropological as well as sociological literature corroborates this, 
as it aims at exploring and understanding the experience and history of the 
so-called migrant Christian Churches, also named Diasporic Churches, well 
established in several Western countries.1
It is worth bearing in mind that within the psychology literature on (forced) 
migrations reviewed in the present book, for a long time, religion has been ex-
clusively considered as a category to identify pre-migration traumas linked to 
religion-related persecution. Indeed, few studies have explored the interplay 
between religion and ethnicity in post-migration identity redefinition process 
(Eid, 2003; Van Dijk, Botros, 2009). This seeming lack of research is remarkable, 
especially when considering that transnational religious groups and institu-
tions constitute a resilient resource in supporting members’ resettlement and 
1 As described in Chapter 18, two terms are used to indicate Egyptian Copt migration, namely 
“Coptic diaspora”, phrase promoted by secular activist Copt organizations in the West, and 
“Copts/Coptic Churches in the lands of immigration”, promoted by the Egyptian Church. The 
double terminology is symptom of two competing narratives and transnational strategies: 
the former focuses on human rights and Coptic persecution at the hands of Muslims, the 
latter focuses on religion and on efforts to persuade Copts to preserve their religious identity 
in their lands of immigration (Galal, 2012a, 2012b; Haddad, 2013). On the complexity of the 
concept of diaspora, see also Karoui, 2012.
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acculturation experiences (Bottura, Mancini, 2016; Connor, 2012; Gozdziak, 
2002).
As thoroughly illustrated in the first part of the present work, there are sev-
eral reasons for the limited research interest taken into the variety and diver-
sity of migrant groups’ religious experiences, especially regarding Christian 
(forced) migrants. Psychological research, too, has prevalently described mi-
grant people based on their ethnicity (country of origin). In turn, this has pri-
oritized the focus on ethnic identity whilst blurring other components of iden-
tity, thus neglecting the importance of further cultural, religious and language 
differences amongst migrant groups from the same country. On the contrary, 
in Western countries, scientific literature and research have looked at religion 
almost only when the latter is perceived as a problematic issue for how immi-
grant minorities and the local majority interact in resettlement countries 
(Sparre, Galal, 2018). As a consequence, in Europe and in other Western coun-
tries with a long-standing history of immigration (US, Canada, Australia), at-
tention has mostly been paid to Islam and to integration processes of first- and 
second-generation immigrant Muslims (Giuliani et al., 2018).
However, over the last decade, it is worth noting that scholars have indeed 
taken interest in the adjustment process of immigrant Eastern Christian 
Churches in North America (Canada, US) and in some North-European coun-
tries. Next to historical-political perspectives (Chapter 18), studies have been 
observing the complexity of Middle Eastern Christians’ migration experiences 
to the West, as well as the prominent role played by religious institutions in the 
lives of their members (Diez, 2017; Marzouki, 2016; Sparre, Galal, 2018).
A recent multi-site fieldwork project conducted in Sweden, Denmark and 
UK (dimecce, 2015; https://arts.st-andrews.ac.uk/dimecce) has explored 
identity formation processes of three Middle Eastern Christians groups (Iraqi, 
Assyrian/Syriac, Coptic Orthodox Christians) migrated to European countries 
and the distinctive traits of their post-migration resettlement experiences. 
Generally, marginalization and double minority status seem to characterize the 
experiences of immigrant Middle Eastern Christians in Europe. They are a re-
ligious minority in their Muslim-majority country of origin and in their new 
countries of residence, resulting in their frequently being an invisible minority 
within a mostly Muslim immigrant group. Galal et al. (2016) suggest that this 
double minority status is nevertheless displayed in different ways in the three 
case study countries and that such display is dependent on several factors 
(specific location, community size, diversity and minority position). In Lon-
don (UK), where Middle Eastern Christians are one group among others with-
out an apparent majority, they present themselves as a visible minority within 
a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic setting. In Taastrup (Denmark), Middle 
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 Eastern Christians are an invisible minority within a visible Arab Muslim im-
migrant minority. In Södertälje (Sweden), the high concentration of Assyrian/
Syriac Christians living around their churches makes them a visible majority (a 
“Little Assyria” or “Little Babylon”) within an immigrant minority. The diaspor-
ic identity of these communities requires careful apprehension of their spe-
cific resettlement experiences and relative cultural encounters (Sparre, Galal, 
2018).
A few recent studies –mostly carried out in North America– confirm mi-
grant Coptic Churches’ will to remain separate and distinct from mainstream 
society (Van Dijk, Botros, 2009). Said choice seems to be due to both the recent 
migration history of these communities and to their efforts to retain a strong 
and distinct ethnic-religious identity in the countries of immigration. Further-
more, these works highlight the prominent role played by migrant Churches 
and faith-based institutions in preserving a strong connection to the Mother 
Church and homeland Egypt, replicating religious rituals, negotiating an 
 ethno-religious identity within immigrant societies and supporting adaptation 
of their members (Botros, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2009, 2014, 2016; Galal, 2012b; 
Saad, 2010; Sparre, Galal, 2018; Van Dijk, Botros, 2009; Westbrook, Saad, 2017).
Lastly, a recent quantitative research carried out in United States (Brinker-
hoff, 2016) comparing different generations of Coptic immigrants shows that 
second and third generations are experiencing a selective acculturation pat-
tern, characterized both by a selective retention of their heritage culture and 
by efforts of positive socioeconomic assimilation in mainstream society. Thus, 
younger generations’ positive assimilation efforts do not seem to prevent the 
preservation of a strong heritage identity.
Given the extant literature outlined above, and considering the scarcity of 
psychological studies taking into account Middle Eastern Christian immigrant 
families’ narratives and subjective experiences of migration, the aim of the re-
search illustrated in this chapter has been to explore the post-migration expe-
rience of Coptic Orthodox families immigrated from Egypt to Northern Italy, 
comparing perception and narratives of two different family generations (first-
generation parents and their second-generation children).
2 The Present Study
The present study aims to explore post-migration experiences among Coptic 
Orthodox families immigrated from Egypt to Northern Italy. Specifically, 
we explored and compared parents and children’s narratives about family 
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 migration history and projects, negotiation processes of their identity within 
the Italian society, intergenerational transmission of values and practices, role 
played by religious communities and institutions in their lives, social and com-
munity support network.
As previously described (Chapter 18), the Egyptian immigrant community 
in Italy numbers 119,513 individuals (67.7% of them living in Lombardy, a re-
gion in Northern Italy) officially residing in Italy on January 1, 2018 (istat, 
2018) and it is amongst the largest Muslim minorities in the country. For this 
immigrant group, the first migration wave was male-dominated. Although this 
trend was gradually counterbalanced by the arrival of women and children 
within the scope of family reunification, even today, female Egyptian immi-
grants in Italy are fewer than male immigrants (33% versus 67%) (istat, 2018). 
Within the Egyptian immigrant community, it is estimated that the number of 
Orthodox Copts ranges between 18,000 and 40,000 (https://www.chiesadimi-
lano.it/news/chiesa-diocesi/vivacita-e-fermenti-dei-cristiani-copti-a-mila-
no-146112.html).
From April to June 2017, ten Coptic Orthodox families coming from Egypt 
participated in the study. Members of Coptic Churches located in Milan sub-
urban area were contacted to inform families about the possibility to take part 
in the research project and recruit them. For every recruited family, both par-
ents and a preadolescent/adolescent child were interviewed, for a total of 30 
interviewed participants: 10 first-generation fathers, 10 first-generation moth-
ers, and 10 second-generation children. Fathers were aged between 37 and 51 
years (M=44.9) and they had lived in Italy on average for 19.4 years (range: 
17–27 y.). Mothers had immigrated to Italy from Egypt through family reunifi-
cation, were aged between 34 and 43 years (M=38.4) and had lived in Italy on 
average for 15 years (range: 9–18 y.). Pre-adolescent and adolescent children 
(5 males, 5 females) were aged between 13 and 16 years (M= 13.5), mostly born 
in Italy (only 2 had been reunified with their families before they were two) 
and attending secondary school.
After being informed of the general aim and scope of the research, inter-
ested adult participants with their children were invited to sign a consent form 
and interviewed individually by a researcher with extensive experience in 
qualitative interviewing and (forced) migration-related topics (Pernice, 1994).
Upon having granted anonymity to participants, the in-depth interviews 
took place at the respondents’ Church. The interview aimed at gauging inter-
viewees’ perceptions of the changes occurred in their lives following migration 
(only for adult respondents), of the challenges and hardships faced in Italy, 
comparisons between homeland and resettlement country, personal and 
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 family immigration history, identity construction process, intergenerational 
communication of values, family relationship and community context (family, 
school, work, leisure), activities and role of the Coptic Church in their lives.
All interviews were conducted in Italian. Adult and young participants dif-
fered in their fluency in the Italian language, with some linguistic difficulties 
encountered whilst interviewing adult participants.
The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim in order to carry out 
a thematic analysis of the transcripts. Thematic analysis was conducted utiliz-
ing Atlas.ti 7.0 (Muhr, 2004); the transcripts were uploaded on the database 
and subsequently coded independently by two researchers. External team 
members who were not directly involved with the analysis reviewed the tran-
scripts, methodology and analytic strategy to increase the study’s credibility 
and validity.
3 Results
The thematic analysis carried out on the interview transcripts has allowed to 
identify several themes, revealing the complexity that characterizes Coptic 
families’ post-migration experience in Italy. The choice to interview first gen-
eration parents and children from the same family has allowed to highlight 
parallelisms and similarities emerging from their stories.
Firstly, the separation from the home country because of migration has been 
a recurring theme amongst interviews conducted with first-generation 
 parents – which have directly experienced the migration journey, unlike their 
children. Although they migrated many years ago, separation from the country 
of origin and the feeling of estrangement upon arriving in Italy is a strong, 
vivid memory especially for women.
(…) it’s that after you’ve come here with no job, no language (…) no iden-
tity (…) you are very very painful because one is not recognized like, like 
in Egypt (…) and maybe this is something we all suffer without distinc-
tions, without one taking the skin off … language … look, waving hello in 
the street, what can you say? All these … without … naked. (Mother 1)
In the long run, the disorientation experienced upon arrival is coupled with 
the difficulties and stressful conditions caused by the encounter with another 
culture and by the acculturation process. Interviewed parents mostly recall the 
challenging redefinition of gender roles. This has shown both forms of defen-
sive closure towards the new environment to preserve heritage culture (mostly 
for men) and bi-cultural approaches striving to combine heritage culture and 
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new culture (mostly from women). The starkest perceived difference with the 
new culture concerns the deeply cultural range of gender roles identity within 
family and society – strict and traditional gender roles can clash with Western, 
more egalitarian gender roles definition within families.
Most things I cannot, I don’t understand because the culture is differ-
ent (…) Let’s say, if before there was something they shouldn’t do be-
cause it is not possible for females to do this, that … like in Egyptian 
culture. (…) For me, all this I still cannot accept because it is an evil thing. 
(Mother 2)
I, like before, haven’t changed anything … Everything is the same … same, 
even though the society was new to me, the culture was new but I have 
stayed like I was born until now. (Father 1)
I like it as, as a way of living in general, let’s say … as I said earlier Egypti-
talian. I take the good from this and the good from that, too, I cannot be 
pure Italian and pure Egyptian, too (…) now, I am a bit stronger, I manage 
to do many things, let’s say because it’s a mum responsible of a house and 
children. I have to make decisions about many things. This has changed, 
it wasn’t like this before, I was not like this. But now I’ve become like this, 
I want to choose, to think things through. (Mother 3)
Memories of pre-migration experiences come to live in both parents and 
children’s stories – although they have never lived in Egypt, children speak 
about marginalization of and discrimination against their parents in several 
areas of Egyptian social life, especially the work environment (see also Chap-
ter 20). If, on the one hand, the choice to migrate is linked to a need and a 
desire for personal and professional emancipation, on the other hand mi-
grant people’s high-profile education background was seemingly not ade-
quately matched by the work environment upon arrival. Thus, comparison 
with the Muslim majority in Egypt is mostly explicitly recalled in terms of 
discrimination.
Well, my father was like a lawyer in Egypt, but he was Christian anyway, 
so when compared with Muslim lawyers … it was more likely that they 
would hire them instead of him and so … he came here essentially for 
work, then essentially from what I remember he started working at a res-
taurant first, then at a garage and in places like this, then he opened a 
cleaning company and now he goes, well he works with … he has a van 
with which he works with those who make advertisements. (Son 7)
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Look, there are many reasons in Egypt, for us even finding a job is too dif-
ficult, as us, as Christians, even in the middle of Egypt, too much effort. 
(Father 4)
About every aspect of life, even when you are to go to the hospital, when 
you are at the hospital, all folks are the same, no? No, instead, it’s not like 
that in Egypt for them. (Mother 9)
Episodes of violence against Christians remain in the background. Only two of 
the men interviewed address it very carefully and prudently; as they recall, epi-
sodes happened in the distant past, they mention the Christians’ centuries-
long martyrdom in Egypt. As far as discrimination is concerned, the compari-
son with the Muslim majority is explicit, whereas as far as religion-based 
persecution against Christians is concerned, the theme is treated with greater 
prudence and awareness of the situation in Egyptian society – mentioning vio-
lence suffered by Christians does not imply that Islam or Muslims are generally 
enemies, but it refers to extremists or jihadists.
The Churches of Egypt have paid with so much blood, since the early 
days up to now. (Father 2)
In the old generations, grandfathers of grandfathers of grandfathers, we 
come from a city, from a town where everybody was Christian and half of 
them were killed. And others fled and others have been killed because 
they were Christians … (…) This is something like they have killed more 
than 3,000 people just because they were Christians, and we’re talking 
about 350 years ago. (Father 1)
I have experienced them. From the beginning of the 1980s until 1986 – I 
have seen my brother jumping from the second floor, running away from 
jihadists who wanted to kill him because somehow at the time he had let 
his beard grow, and let his hair grow longer. They said: “You look like your 
Christ in movies”, so they had to kill him. Jumping off, he broke his leg, but 
other friends brought him to the station and managed to escape. (Father 1)
There have also been terrible moments, in 1997 here in Italy, I heard of my 
27 years old brother killed whilst he was praying in church with groups of 
young people, reciting the vespers, it was Wednesday 12th February, an ex-
tremist had gone to the church and made all these young people die as they 
were praying … my brother was the leader of the group and I went back to 
Egypt to be close to my family until this bad moment went away, but we 
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consider him as a martyr because we was dead only for this reason, nothing 
else, then my family mourned a little, but faith grows anyway. (Father 1)
More than religion-based persecution, the theme of martyrdom is recurring 
amongst interviewed adults, both mothers and fathers. Telling dramatic events 
about Christians’ persecution asserts one’s faith’s strength and courage and 
strengthens the feeling of belonging to the millenary history of the Coptic 
community, scattered with martyrdoms. As they speak of Christians who were 
killed in Egypt, interviewed mothers claim and repeat together that “No one is 
afraid to die” – martyrdom is “not a bad thing”; rather, it is a destiny, evidence 
and message of faith.
Interviewer: but maybe it is harder to be religious when ...
No, no, no, that is not the case because even when it happened on Palm 
Sunday … even after Holy Week there were even more people, for exam-
ple inside a church there were 3,000 people, there were even 5,000 people 
inside. They go more often, they go to church even if something happens, 
my brother. No, no, no, no one is afraid of that.
Interviewer: One needs to be strong, when these things happen
Eh, yes it is not a problem at all, on the contrary, they say next time we all 
go to church, we must be martyrs ourselves … even the Gospel that is al-
ways in church and this, no one, no one is afraid to die. (Mother 5)
No one is afraid to die, that also becomes martyr because it is not a bad 
thing. Because all these martyrs is not (…) prayer because … we are close 
to them … yes but, I’m saying that we are also happy, we are not that 
afraid … this never happens. (Mother 8)
Martyrdom conveys the same spiritual strength that animates Coptic migra-
tion (according to others, Diaspora) and thus the destiny of all migrants and 
immigrant Coptic Egyptian families. Migration and all its related suffering find 
a meaning in being testimony to faith, in serving Christ and in the mission for 
others. “That’s why they are scattered” claims a woman, valuing migration as a 
choice at once of sorrow and glory – “our pain is our glory”. Interviewees’ nar-
ratives confirm and make apparent that attributing spiritual meaning to one’s 
suffering is amongst the most effective and positive resilience strategies to 
cope with persecutions (Betancourt et al., 2015; Laban et al., 2008; McGregor et 
al., 2015; Yako, Biswas, 2014).
I had to leave family behind to go to a place where you don’t know where 
you’re going to stay, what to eat, but this is why there is faith within us, 
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that we serve Christ this is why there is not fear to go far away and serve 
like this, my family gave me the courage to serve like this … (Father 1)
(being Coptic) is the most beautiful thing in the world even if suffering 
is a part of our glory as a Church. This is our core teaching. The mar-
tyrs of the Coptic Church and the suffering in the Middle East, the whole 
Church, especially us because the Christian majority in the Middle East 
has taught me our bishop, he has always taught me that our pain is our 
glory … this is part of their cross also for us. If you are Christian in Egypt, 
you are not Muslim, this has been our identity and this to nurture oneself. 
(Mother 2)
Coptic means that the Coptic Church has always … been persecuted, it 
has … they have offered to their sons, as martyrs do, so I’m happy … uhm 
… I’m Coptic, uhm … and so our Church … let’s say …we were few in our 
country … (Father 5)
Like the presence of the Lord in Egypt and Christians in Egypt keep on 
until the last day on Earth and they proclaim his presence here, (…) They 
are scattered because of this, because it is a very honorable thing … not 
for us to be the only ones to keep his Kingdom, we need to give it for oth-
ers, too (…). None of us wanted to leave Egypt because it is the most 
beautiful country in the world for us, but with all these bombs, with all 
these martyrs he has urged of us to go and bring the mission to others. 
(Mother 1)
As far as identity is concerned, and especially when comparing themselves to 
Italians, the deep spirituality and the belonging to the Coptic Community are 
central elements. Comparison with Italian peers –and with the Italian society 
more generally– emerges from interviews conducted with second-generation 
children. Such a comparison is instrumental to claim the positive in-group’s 
distinctiveness related to spirituality and assiduous religious practice in a 
largely non-religious context.
(Being a member of an Egyptian Coptic family) is something that surely 
makes us different from the others … because everyone is used to one 
way of living, whilst I am used to a very different one. Nowadays, I see 
that the religious sphere shrinks in Italian families, whereas it grows a lot 
in Egyptian families where it is always increasing because of the 
 persecutions, the suffering, and the suffering of Christians worldwide 
and most of all in the Middle East and in the East and most of all in Egypt. 
(Son 1)
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Very few Italians go to church … some (of their Italian peers) are Chris-
tians and they have no faith at all, they are Christians, but they do not 
even believe in Jesus … (Daughter 6)
Those are not duties, because we love the Church … (…) yes, it is part of 
my identity, something specific of our life and Church, Mass, and prayer 
always! (Mother 6)
I wanted to say that the most important thing about Egypt is that people 
are more attached to the Church here than in Italy. (Father 1)
Interviews show the efforts of parents and religious institutions to pass 
down values, practices and religious beliefs to young generations. The aim of 
such an intergenerational communication of values is twofold: firstly, it aims at 
granting adults’ continuity of individual churchgoing experiences; secondly, it 
aims at ensuring obedience to what is preached by the Mother Church to dia-
sporic Churches. The relationship with homeland Egypt and Mother Church is 
very deeply-rooted – indeed, religious identity references and features an eth-
nic dimension acting as a strong bond with homeland Egypt.
No, faith hasn’t changed our Church, here it is the same as the one in 
Egypt, nothing changes. Even there, all my life I was like him (points at 
her son) always at church and always at Catechism with parents always 
for us. (Mother 1)
We are Christians, we have been used to it since we were born, we are al-
ways in church and do a lot of things we grew up like this and then I want 
that my children, too, grow up like we have lived, always growing up here 
in church and become children of God, not children of the world, that is 
what we want to be, children of God. (Mother 1)
Because most of all my dad and my mum are very devoted to the Church, 
to Christianity, they never let I go, my dad always prays for anything and 
most of all my dad, and my mum a bit less, she’s very Christian compared 
to me and my sister and even for the little things for example, the com-
puter breaks and instead of calling she prays and it’s all good, then she 
calls the technician who fixes it in no time then Mass everyday my dad 
my mum sometimes after she’s taken me to school then she goes, too, 
otherwise she stays home and is the housewife. (Son 1)
My parents even at catechism they always tell me, when you don’t man-
age to do something … let’s make an example, during a school test, you 
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know that you have studied a lot, say that you’ve been studying that book 
for three hours, to pass the History test and then you can’t remember any-
thing and then you recall the teaching of your parents at catechism and 
you make the sign of the cross and maybe then you calm down, you trust 
in Jesus and then maybe you can also hope that the school test goes well. 
(Son 2)
For both children and parents, praying, rites and activities at the Coptic Church 
in Italy are crucial.
Faith is fundamental in my life, everything I do is related to faith … during 
the day there is Mass, a specific prayer, and I attend it every day and every 
week I go to the Sunday Mass and on Saturday, too, on Saturday morning, 
then there are the afternoon prayers and the vespers at night which I al-
ways attend … (Son 1)
Religious structures and Coptic communities in Italy greatly support and 
strengthen religious identity. Regarding the post-migration experience, inter-
viewed families acknowledge the centrality of attachment and the role played 
by Churches in countries of immigration. Coptic Churches support believers 
in several ways, ranging from providing religious support, to social, affective, 
material support, too.
No one manages to live here in Milan without the Church, because the 
Church is just too important … important to live, to pray, to meet some-
one who is a priest and maybe confess, the chance also to be in church 
that is a quiet place, far away from life, from the stress of the outside 
world and so church is simply too beautiful a moment. (Mother 5)
No, I can’t see the difference. Here the Church does everything … all 
Masses, the Holy Week, Christmas, Easter, everything, everything … in 
summer they have camps, maybe, they do something that … the church 
is always open to everyone. (Mother 5)
The Churches and those who work for them (priests, bishops, and metropoli-
tans) are a guide and a fundamental point of reference for families coping with 
an outside world perceived as “threatening” and “negative”. Interestingly, inter-
viewed children born here acknowledge said role as guides to navigate a threat-
ening and dangerous world, thus showing a great degree of similarity between 
how parents and children perceive the world.
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I have learned a lot …sharing other things than games, experiences and 
fun. (…) I mean, they teach you a lot about how to behave outside, when 
somebody is unkind to you, I mean from the lives of Saints you learn how 
to react outside. (…) Well since I pray and since all the friends I have, I 
have been knowing them since I was a child, let’s say that it’s a second 
family. (Son 2)
The outside world is also ugly, boys outside, what happens in schools. I 
think I gave everything, the right path and the wrong path. So, the Church 
is always important (…) that children are born like my son, young, so 
young until they marry her inside the church (…) otherwise even chil-
dren outside get lost. I mean, the Church is our mum, a mother … which 
is also our very own mum. (Mother 5)
(...) so about friendships only at church, there is not friendship at school 
… girls have many friends they attend catechism together and afterwards 
they play together, there is quite a few friends, the churches for us I can-
not live without churches. (Father 3)
Priests, bishops and metropolitans participate in families’ daily and extraordi-
nary decision-making, striving to concretely help families but also, seemingly, 
to underline their distance from the external society and its institutions (school 
and young people’s gathering places).
For Coptic people, the priest is a very important figure, then always rely 
on this priest when they don’t know where to come, for me with my com-
munity there are always meet-ups, when they have problems they call 
me, always some … and …strength … joy to gather together. (Father 1)
We followed advice from metropolitan A. who even before becoming 
priest, for us he was always a father, a father for everything, and he tried to 
give the right advice, put people on the right path and, I mean, has always 
passed on that who does good, finds good, a right path is always right, so, 
I mean … we have, we have that he has pointed in the right direction, so 
let’s hope that we did very few mistakes, or almost none at all. (Father 5)
I have to answer all, all questions. I am not used to it and I find difficult. 
The Church has helped me with this. When I cannot answer certain 
 questions, fathers, the Church and the bishops … because we have a won-
derful bishop, really like a father. He lives with us the difficulties that I 
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find with my children … well … M., my daughter, in her 5th year of  primary 
school she wanted to go on a school trip for three days. It was the first 
time because her school usually doesn’t bring children to nature camps 
and I have said, worried: “No M.”. Mad, she said “How? Why? All my class-
mates go apart from me why?” Because I was not used to go on school 
trips. In Egypt, even at school, boys and girls were apart. Here not, boys 
sleep … and I have said no M., and she got mad. I’ve spoken with our 
bishop and he said: “Alright, I solve this problem”. He called M. and said: 
“M., we are spending three days in Venice, are you coming with us?” 
(laughter). (Mother 7)
4 Conclusions
The aim of this study was to explore migration experiences of Coptic Egyptian 
families migrated to Italy and living around Milan. More specifically, the study 
aimed at understanding the families’ efforts and resources in the context of 
both their pre-migration experience as a religious minority in their country of 
origin and of their encounter with a new culture. Adopting the family-based 
scope whilst designing the study has allowed to explore processes of adjust-
ment and identity redefinition by combining the voices of several members 
from the same family – namely, first-generation parents and second- generation 
children. The 10 families interviewed for the present study belong to and regu-
larly attend Coptic Churches located in Milan’s suburban area.
Since the earliest stages of research, including the reaching out phase and 
the recruitment phase, participants showed a strong ethnic-religious identity, 
corroborating previous studies (Van Dijk, Botros, 2009); the reaching out phase 
and the first point of contact was mediated and supervised by the local Coptic 
Church’s priest and all interviews took place at the church the families regu-
larly go to. Therefore, the results allowed us to deepen the understanding of 
the experience of a group of families that share a strong ecclesial belonging as 
well as a keen involvement in the activities promoted by their Church. Given 
the potential bias in our sampling processes, we cannot know the extent to 
which these findings may be generalized to other Egyptian Coptic immigrants 
living in Italy.
Parent and children’s narrations feature several common elements, and this 
seems to validate the joint efforts of first-generation parents and religious lead-
ers to pass heritage values and practices onto younger generations (Botros, 
2006; Saad, 2010; Saad, Westbrook, 2015).
611Migrant Coptic Families in Italy
<UN>
A strong sense of belonging to the religious community and a deep, rooted 
link with the Mother Church and country of origin characterize the experi-
ence  of interviewed Coptic families. Interviews have highlighted the all- 
encompassing reach of the decision to migrate for men and of family reunifi-
cation processes for women. The feeling of estrangement experienced upon 
arrival and the grieving loss of one’s homeland are extremely vivid. From the 
interviews, it emerges that religious identity is strongly connected to an ethnic 
nuance of the link with the country of origin and with the Mother Church in 
Egypt (see Chapter 18). The interviews also express the efforts and fatigues 
brought about by the acculturation process, by the perception of cultural dif-
ferences –unreconcilable, for some– and by feeling threatened and endan-
gered by the outside world.
The cultural encounter with the Other recurring across the interviews desig-
nates only the encounter with “Italians”. Interactions with Italian people often 
acquire negative connotations, because Italian society is essentially consid-
ered non-religious and distant from faith. Such difference with the Italian ma-
jority underscores the religious and spiritual distinctiveness of the group one 
belongs to. It also underlines the distinctive features of the Coptic Church 
since its formation and its mission for Christianity.
The focus on difference –both religious and ethnic– acts as an intergenera-
tional social glue and it is present in parents and children’s perceptions of real-
ity and worldviews. Said focus is also the target of great efforts on the part of 
the parents and the Church to pass on religious faith, to preserve practices and 
rituals, to maintain a strong link with the Mother Church, in Egypt.
All interviewees (both adolescents and adults) are very proud of the heri-
tage of which they bear witness to the world, as well as about the sorrow and 
“glory” awaiting Coptic Churches and their believers.
Interviewed individuals –including the second-generation children born in 
Italy– talk about the difficult situation of Christians in Egypt, where they are 
marginalized and widely discriminated against by the Muslim majority. Al-
though they do denounce discriminatory behaviors against Christians, inter-
viewees do not talk at length about the acts of violence against Christians in 
Egypt, nor about Egypt’s socio-political situation.
Overall, they do not seem willing to endorse narratives framing them as vic-
tims. There is no place for fear, be it fear of the Other, fear of suffering or fear of 
the disintegration of the community. Although one could see a shared psycho-
logical mechanism of denial of reality at work, but the latter should not be re-
garded as dysfunctional. Indeed, Terror Management Theory (Greenberg et al., 
1997) points at the stronger adhesion to one’s own cultural worldviews as one 
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of the most effective strategies –for individuals and groups– when facing 
death. Attachment to one’s cultural roots and history allows to develop and 
maintain feelings of symbolic immortality, which counter anxieties and sor-
rows derived from one’s mortality.
Furthermore, interviewees distance themselves from stereotypical repre-
sentations of Islam as an enemy and of Muslim people as terrorists. Thus, they 
appear –consciously or unconsciously– to reject the demonizing narratives 
that are so common in Western countries and illustrated in the introductory 
part (Chapter 2). For interviewees, the religious theme of martyrdom (in Egypt) 
and of the migration/diaspora (in Italy) characterize the millenary history of 
the Coptic Church and as the migration mandate much more decidedly than 
the theme of violence and persecution against Christians. By praying, inter-
viewees take part in dramatic events unfolding in Egypt, too.
Themes emerged from the interviews are in line with the collective memory 
and the ethnic-religious identity promoted by the Coptic Orthodox Church on 
the transnational level (Botros, 2006; Galal, 2012b). As previously noted, the 
aims and language of such narrative contrast with the narrative promoted by 
secular Coptic  Organizations in immigrant societies (Galal, 2012b; Van Dijk, 
Botros, 2009). Within the Coptic Churches’ narrative, immigrant communities 
are communities of memory which ensure continuity between the past and 
the present (Botros, 2006). As highlighted in Chapter 18, several elements from 
this Coptic narrative are meant to underline the uniqueness and distinctive-
ness of Coptic communities as regards the outside society; these include the 
Pharaonic heritage, the twenty centuries of Christianity, the apostolic founda-
tion in Egypt and the glorious early era, up to the latest 14 centuries, which 
show this Church’s resilience, its strength and spirituality, as well as the “mira-
cle of survival”. Interviews with parents and children seem to suggest that mi-
gration strengthens the celebration of the group’s distinctiveness. The theme 
of migration as a destiny and as a mission conveys the strong link between 
immigrant Churches and the Mother Church in Egypt, as well as the transna-
tional role of the Mother Church in supporting and guiding immigrant 
Churches.
In this regard, interviewees greatly value the role played by the community’s 
religious leaders, as they become very dependable in many respects. This ap-
plies to migrant parents as well as to young generations, which fulfil their spiri-
tual, material, friendship- and school-related needs within the religious 
community.
At the same time, interviewees treated the stories of violence against Chris-
tians and the issue of relationships between Muslims and Copts in Egypt with 
great caution. It seems to echo the Mother Church’s message and warning to 
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avoid issues that may have an impact on Egyptian society, on relationships 
 between Egyptian Muslims and Christians living in Egypt, as such issues run 
the risk of easing foreign influence into Egypt’s socio-political scenario.
Numerous psychology studies have widely emphasized how the intergen-
erational transmission of a strong ethnic-religious identity is a key protection 
factor for migrants who often experience distress and fatigue due to immigra-
tion (discrimination, status loss, social isolation). Thus, the focus on the his-
tory of the Egyptian Coptic Church and its distinctive traits meet the needs of 
immigrant communities living in Western countries where they face margin-
alization (Van Dijk, Botros, 2009). However, the emphasis on the distinctive-
ness of the Coptic identity raises doubts and questions the risks that could 
arise from such a stark juxtaposition to –and separation from– Italian people 
and the Italian society as stereotyped in the interviews. The Coptic minority is 
often an invisible minority within the resettlement country’s society (Galal et 
al., 2016); consequently, choosing to remain separate from it does not seem to 
promote cultural contacts with the local majority and its communities (Chris-
tians, other immigrant communities). In the long run, the gap may become 
challenging especially for younger generations born and raised in Italy, as they 
are expected to be loyal to a migration mandate requiring them to protect and 
preserve their cultural and religious heritage, prioritizing the latter over an 
opening towards the new culture. Indeed, a strong commitment to the values 
passed down from their parents and the Coptic community is a strong protec-
tion factor. It is nevertheless worth questioning whether this tendency leaves 
space for intergenerational negotiation, if the choices of the younger genera-
tions deviate from prescribed norms and rules. Furthermore, even if younger 
generations fully endorse the cultural and familial value system, the relation-
ship with the outside world based mainly on defensive or utilitarian behaviors 
would be problematic. It is a common bias across immigrant communities to 
underscore their distinctiveness and positive uniqueness compared to the new 
context they live in. The main issue concerns the extent to which the Cop-
tic Community intend to maintain this separated acculturative orientation or 
to pursue a more integrative perspective, enabling their members to be open 
to the new society and culture, while maintaining their cultural roots (Berry, 
1997; Phinney et al., 2001) On the long run, integration is widely recognized as 
the better solution for immigrants and host society in terms of personal and 
social wellbeing. However, in order to achieve this goal, both the Coptic com-
munity and the Italian society need to accept the challenge of trespassing the 
borders they live in and dare to start interacting with each other. The shared 




In line with the prospect of an ethics of hospitality presented in the first 
part of the present work (Chapter 2), the experiences of the Coptic families 
interviewed corroborates the crucial role of religion in the post-migration 
phase, as well as the complexity of (forced) migrants’ identity redefinition 
process.
The religious sphere is intrinsically connected to the history of this commu-
nity and to the collective memory passed down from one generation to the 
next. However, the religious sphere necessarily faces the challenges derived 
from the narratives and counter-narratives that inform the Western gaze on 
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. In our study, interviewed families’ dif-
ficulties with the encounter with the Other is conveyed through the perception 
of the outside world as threatening, a world one needs to be cautious of; yet, at 
the same time, it is a world in which it is possible to reaffirm the distinctiveness 
and strength of one’s Church. The risk of an introverted tendency and of dis-
playing reactive solutions and behaviors is apparent. As such behaviors risk 
creating an extreme gap between immigrant communities and the Italian so-
ciety, they make it more complicated to individuate the common good that hu-
man migration can promote.
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Religious Belonging and (Forced) Migration:  
a Study on Migrant Coptic Minors in Italy
Giovanni Giulio Valtolina and Paola Barachetti
1 The Effects of Forced Migration on Children
In recent years, a growing number of migrant children have been seeking psy-
chological assistance or mental health treatment in European Union coun-
tries. Many of these minors, of different origins and cultural backgrounds, are 
victims of persecution, ethnic conflict, war or political troubles, and come to 
Western Europe in search of a better future. However, the condition of migrant 
is often burdensome, especially in the case of forced migration, and the com-
bined effects of these experiences can lead to problematic consequences for 
the mental health of boys and girls, bringing additional complexity to their 
psychological wellbeing and having negative effects on parent-child interac-
tion (Wiese, Burhorst, 2007).
The literature on the consequences of forced migration for children’s health 
can be summarized in two groups: studies focusing on the immediate effects of 
forced migration and studies examining long-term effects (Avogo, Agadjanian, 
2010). As far as the very short term is concerned, the research significantly 
demonstrates the disadvantage of children of displaced populations compared 
to the host population. Thus, a study of mortality rates from 37 conflict zones 
(Guha-Sapir, Gijsbert, 2004) showed the increase in vulnerabilities among chil-
dren, especially under the age of five. In the longer term, the results of research 
on the effects of forced migration on children’s mental health are less conclu-
sive, but the high probability of a disadvantaged development seems evident. 
The results of the long-term impact of forced migration are also documented 
for their consequences on children’s health (Saarela, Elo, 2016; Pavli, Maltezou, 
2017; Santavirta, 2017).
Among the factors that induce stress in the persecution, there are some –
such as wounds and death threats– that directly affect the child, and others 
that are more indirect, such as the disintegration of the family and the separa-
tion or loss of the parents (Terr, 1988; Yurtbay et al., 2003). The enormous im-
pact of violence –seen or directly experienced– seriously deteriorates the child 
development. However, according to many child psychologists (i.e. Jensen, 
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Shaw, 1993; Garmezy, Rutter, 1985), the cognitive abilities of the children, who 
are still immature, and therefore very flexible and easily malleable, as well as 
their ability to develop adaptive strategies for self-protection, frequently cover 
the impact of violence to a certain extent. For example, research report that 
the children’s reactions to stress and behavioral changes were less severe than 
expected (Masten et al., 1990).
The degree of influence of terrorist attacks and similar violent events on 
children depends on many factors (Wiese, 2010). The level of expectation of 
such episodes in the society where the child lives in, the range and time of the 
violence, the preparation of the society for the attack expected (or not expect-
ed), the value of the judgments and of the attitudes of society towards terror-
ists are considered among these factors. Almost certainly, the personality of 
the children, their levels of cognitive development, the broad circumstances 
they live in, the changes that these events cause in their lives and their ages are 
decisive factors, too. Garmezy and Rutter (1985) highlight that the qualities of 
the accident that causes stress must be fussily examined: physical and emo-
tional deprivation, hunger, physical injury, loss of loved relatives and friends, 
as well as being taken away from the dangerous area.
Adolescents, whose physical integrity is very important, tend to perceive 
wars and terrorist attacks as threats against their bodies. It is generally accept-
ed that those who have previously suffered serious losses within their families 
or among their friends are much more harshly affected by violence and perse-
cution (Pynoos, Nader, 1990; Wiese 2010).
Furthermore, it has been suggested that not only people directly exposed to 
traumatic events are affected by long-term damage to mental well-being, but 
also their significant others, such as their offspring (Dekel, Goldblatt, 2008; 
Jelinek et al., 2013). The process by which the symptoms associated with trau-
ma are transferred from one person to another is named “secondary traumati-
zation” (Rosenheck, Nathan, 1985). Considering a meta-analysis by Bakermans-
Kranenburg et al. (2003), in non-clinical populations such a transgenerational 
transmission is unlikely, meanwhile an increased risk to develop mental disor-
ders, particularly ptsd, has been detected in the offspring of individuals with 
post-traumatic stress disorder (from now on ptsd) (Roberts et al., 2012; Yehu-
da, Bierer, 2008; Shrira et al., 2011). Furthermore, the processing of biased infor-
mation is implicated in the adult offspring of parents with ptsd (Suozzia, 
Motta, 2004; Wittekind et al., 2010).
Since World War ii, there has been a growing awareness of children’s psy-
chological vulnerability in persecution and in the discriminatory context. 
Studies on stress reactions related to war in children (Freud, Burlingham, 1973), 
which identified the mother-child relationship as a protective shield for the 
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psychological well-being of preschool children, and which found out that the 
separation between mother and child in preschool age has negative effects, 
have been of great importance.
More recent studies, however, have shown that intimacy to a responsible 
mother does not fully protect the preschool child from the traumatic effect of 
the persecution. Studies on children exposed to government persecution have 
highlighted an improved prevalence of behavioral disorders in the form of so-
cial withdrawal, sleep disorders, clinging and over-dependent behavior, chron-
ic fear, depressive moods (Allodi, 1980; Lustig et al., 2004), regressive symptoms, 
such as separation and stranger anxiety, repeated bed-wetting, tetchiness, loss 
of learned abilities (Arroyo, Eth, 1985; Thomas et al., 2004), psychic indifference 
(Dodge, Raundalen, 1987; Craig et al., 2009), and behavior problems such as 
struggling and insubordination (Baker, 1990; Fazel et al., 2012). Even refugee 
children, previously exposed to persecution, have been described as showing 
symptoms such as difficulty in concentrating, sleep disturbances, anxiety, ad-
diction, and depressed mood (Hjern et al., 1991; Schottelkorb et al., 2012).
Since 1980, when ptsd was included as a diagnosis in dsm-iii,1 knowledge 
of psychological reactions in children exposed to violence and in hazardous 
backgrounds has been growing significantly. There has been a number of stud-
ies on post-traumatic stress reactions in children following violent incidents 
and disasters, such as witnessed acts of personal violence in countries where 
minority groups are persecuted (Eth, Pynoos, 1985; Schwarz, Kowalski, 1991). 
A shared trait of most of these studies is the uniqueness of the traumatic event, 
whose circumstances are known to researchers by journalists, adult eyewit-
nesses or police reports. When families flee from war and persecution and 
move to another country, they are the only sources of information on the trau-
matic stress they suffered.
Most studies about the reactions of preschool children to danger and feroc-
ity are based on interviews with the parents of children, and sometimes with 
their teachers, and the results show that parents and teachers tend to underes-
timate the post-traumatic problems of the children (Almqvist, Brandell- 
Forsberg, 1995). Furthermore, children can try to protect their parents from 
knowing the full extent of the traumatic event (Yule, 1991). It is known that 
traumatized children do not tell what happened until they are asked the right 
question, and usually do not do it in front of their parents (Eth, Pynoos, 1994). 
However, there is evidence that even very young children are able to talk about 
1 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is the taxonomic and diagnostic 
tool, published by the American Psychiatric Association (apa), worldwide considered the 
primary authority for psychiatric diagnoses.
Valtolina and Barachetti618
<UN>
traumatic experiences or to dramatize “malignant memories” in the right con-
ditions, for example in play therapy (Eth, Pynoos, 1994; Terr, 1988).
Studies on refugee children were generally based on samples in which the 
age differences were wide, or on samples restricted to more mature kids, who 
are easier to talk to. This makes it difficult to compare different developmental 
ages, in particular in light of the results that post-traumatic stress reactions 
take different forms depending on the age of the child (Eth, 1990; Eth, Pynoos, 
1985).
2 Egyptian Christianity and Discrimination
As for our study, the background of the Coptic boys and girls we interviewed is 
Egypt, a country that has several ethnic and religious groups with a dominant 
Islamic religion and a majority of Sunni Muslims. Among the Christian popu-
lation, Coptic Orthodox Christians are the largest group, while other ethnic 
and religious groups include Iranian Jews, Buddhist and Bahais (Pew Research 
Center, 2010) (see also Chapters 5 and 6).
The history of Egyptian Christianity precedes that of Islam, as we saw earlier 
(Chapter 6). However, due to the seventh century Islamic conquest, Egypt be-
came Islamized and Arabized; many Coptic Christians converted to Islam to 
sidestep religious persecution and extra taxes under Islamic law, and Arabic 
gradually replaced Coptic language with the implementation of state norms at 
the beginning of the eighth century, which meant a ban on Coptic language 
(Swanson, 2010). After the long history of Islamization, the Egyptians who re-
mained Christians today proudly consider themselves “true” Egyptians of 
Pharaonic origin (Cragg, 1992). And religion is a fundamental social marker for 
Coptic Christians.
Christianity is deeply rooted in the history of the Coptic families; thus, reli-
gious conversion and interfaith marriages are infrequent in order to preserve 
the Coptic identity. While religious symbols are a means of identity expression 
for the Copts, the cultural development that distinguishes them from Egyptian 
Muslims has also built Coptic ethnic group (Rowe, 2017). For example, veils are 
associated with Muslim women and silver rings are associated with married 
Muslim men, while Christian women wear crucifix necklaces and married 
Christian men wear gold rings. Only Coptic Orthodox Christians often have 
cross tattoos on their right wrists. In addition to these visible indicators, the 
names mainly differentiate the Copts from the Muslims. Although there are 
some names for both Christians and Muslims, many Copts are likely to appoint 
their children with biblical figures, Coptic saints and martyrs. Furthermore, 
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although both Egyptian Christians and Muslims use the same language – 
Egyptian Arabic–, Coptic Christians have developed several specific expres-
sions for their religious faith.
Sometimes these religious signs become reasons for discrimination, per-
petuating a religious hierarchy that privileges Muslims over Christians in 
Egypt. For example, the Copts are not only significantly underrepresented in 
politics and the media –only a few Copts currently occupy positions of politi-
cal, military and educational leadership (Bayat, Herrera, 2010; timep, 2018)– 
but they have also limited employment opportunities and promotions, com-
pared to the Muslim majority. This underrepresentation of the Copts has 
gradually progressed through discriminatory policies and state-sponsored vio-
lence against them, led by radical Islamists in all areas of Egyptian society (Mc-
Callum, 2012; Bosmat, 2017) (see also Chapter 10).
Experiences like terrorist attacks, but also indirect violence, discrimination 
and micro-aggression generate collective emotions within an ethnic group. 
The collective emotions contribute to the “ethnic affinity”, while creating sym-
bolic boundaries along ethnic lines. Emotions are therefore not only social, but 
also political and collective, and further strengthen the sense of belonging to a 
minority group, such as the Coptic Christians (Ha, 2017).
Studies on religious minorities in Egypt have paid attention, so far, mainly to 
two topics with a clear focus on the Coptic Orthodox Church: State-Church 
relations and revival movements of the Church’s identity. This second issue 
concerns the politics of the revival of the identity of the Coptic Church. For 
example, McCallum (2007) explores the political function of the Patriarch (the 
Head of the Church) to reinforce the Coptic identity during national crisis and 
others focus on the Coptic formation of identity within the Egyptian political 
structures (Ibrahim, 2015; Rowe, 2007; Sedra, 19992). Current studies indicate 
more unlike issues such as the conceptualization of citizenship based on reli-
gious identity (Pizzo, 2015); the double-edged consequences of new media on 
the Coptic issues (Elsässer, 2010) and the importance of religious dialogue in 
the understanding of Muslim-Christian relations (Hansen, 2015).
While most studies on Coptic Christians have provided historical analysis 
and identity formation within the Coptic Orthodox Church, they have paid 
much less attention to common Coptic lay people and their daily lives. There-
fore, the focus on the Coptic laymen in place of the Coptic Orthodox Church as 
the main actor in the Coptic community is very important to fill the gap in the 
current literature.




3 The Present Study
The study aimed to investigate –using a qualitative methodology– factors and 
processes promoting or hindering the integration process of Coptic minors mi-
grated to Italy with their parents. The main aims were to identify the accultura-
tive challenges faced by these minors, the role played by Churches in sustain-
ing heritage identity and faith across generations, by paying special attention 
to the significance of the persecution of Christians and martyrdom.
We adopted a salutogenic perspective (Antonovsky, 1987) that focuses on 
the resources of individuals and families, as well as on the resources of the so-
cial context, rather than focusing on the unavoidable critical issues, typical of 
the migration process.
The main strategy to reach our goals was to encourage the young Copts of 
the sample to tell their stories and standpoints, and to ponder about their past 
experience and their lives in Italy. In order to do this, 4 focus groups have been 
carried out, with Coptic minors, living in Milan, some of them Orthodox and 
other Catholics. 18 minors have been involved, 12 females and 6 males, aged 12 
to 18. Almost all the Coptic teenagers who participated in the focus groups 
were born in Egypt and arrived in Italy as children, except one. Most of them 
attended primary schools in Milan, almost all of them –except one– the lower 
secondary schools. All the minors interviewed for the present study regularly 
attend Coptic churches located in the Milan area.
The focus groups have been audiotaped and entirely transcribed. After-
wards, using the methodology of the content analysis, the text has been seg-
mented into codes created by the researchers; thenceforth the codes have been 
reassembled, thus leading the researchers to work on the meaning attribution 
(the code-and-retrieval logic). The analysis was computer-aided, by means of 
the software atlas.ti (Muhr, 2004) and based on the principles based on the 
grounded theory: we started from the participants’ accounts and debates, and 
from the meanings they constructed during the interactions, trying to avoid 
selecting information and data on the basis of pre-existing categories.
The required criteria for the selection of participants were the following: 
a) being part of a family with Coptic belonging only (no bi-cultural families); b) 
living in Italy for at least two years; c) speaking fluently the Italian language.
Coptic minors have been contacted through multiple channels, such as lo-
cal Coptic associations, Coptic communities, and the Archdioceses of Milan 
and third-sector associations.
Coptic minors’ experience and adaptation to the Italian context have been 
investigated considering some main topics: the (forced) migration process, 
that is a reason why families leave their home country, with special attention 
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to the migratory mandate; the difficult phases of family separation and reuni-
fication; the efforts to keep ties and create new relationships; stereotypes and 
prejudices, which have a great influence on the relations between Italians and 
Egyptians, and which can negatively affect the contact between the two social 
groups and their cultures and traditions. For each topic, we tried to highlight 
critical issues and resources.
The research work focused on the (forced) migration caused by religious 
persecution, seen through the eyes of the offspring of migrant families: pread-
olescents and adolescents, mostly arrived in Italy very young, some born in It-
aly, children of Coptic Orthodox and Coptic Catholics Christians, forced to 
leave their country of origin due to harassment, persecution, and violence suf-
fered as Christians. The perspective of the minor sons and daughters was ad-
opted to gather what they know, what they lived, what they were told about the 
persecutions their families had suffered.
The set-up of the work, the methodology and the tools used have had the 
purpose of favoring the rise of memories, thoughts and issues, in a climate of 
protection and trust, and guaranteeing total respect for privacy. All the minors 
seemed to be very motivated in debating and showed very high involvement. 
The data and the elements detected allowed to collect stories, directly experi-
enced or “inherited” by their parents. We have chosen to deal with some issues, 
such as the persecution experienced and remembered, with the tools of verbal 
narration and without the use of mediums – such as writing– in front of which 
minors often show resistance. All the boys and the girls have freely brought 
memories, data, images, feelings and emotions, declaring themselves happy to 
participate in the research, and above all happy to have the chance to speak 
about their condition. In fact, they stated that no one had ever been interested 
in their history of religious persecution before, no one ever asked them what 
they had lived and seen.
4 The Results
After the content analysis of the transcriptions of the focus groups, five words 
came out as the most important for the participants: violence, fear, freedom, 
religious freedom, future. These words were the most frequent and the most 
meaningful among those used by the interviewees to describe themselves, to 
tell about the violence suffered by them or their parents, and to tell about the 
freedom found escaping from Egypt. The results are presented according to the 
outcomes of the content analysis and according to the elements already de-
scribed (§2). The words will be commented in three different groups: two word 
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pairs (violence-fear and freedom-religious freedom) and one single word (fu-
ture). The reason is that, in the narratives, the two pairs of words were strictly 
interconnected and very often verbalized together.
4.1 Violence and Fear
Violence and fear are two different words –and concepts– repeatedly encoun-
tered in the narrative that the Coptic boys and girls have proposed in a sort of 
link of meaning and experience. The first one –violence– is harsh and focused 
on contacting the outside environment; the second one –fear– is emotional 
and focused on the inside world. In the stories narrated by the Coptic minors, 
the two concepts are strictly connected, linked to each other, interdependent 
and consequential.
Violence is perceived as a form of abuse of power and control, which mani-
fests itself through physical and social dimensions. The use of the term in the 
collected narratives mainly concerns physical violence, understood as actions 
aimed at hurting or frightening. In this sense, the Coptic minors reported the 
episodes that characterized their brief life in the country of origin –Egypt– as 
experiences of great violence against Christians and women. A violence ex-
pressed through public and private aggressions, consumed at home, but also 
on the streets, in public places. A violence with the purpose of intimidating 
and frightening, and, for this reason, necessarily manifest, visible, and close to 
the everyday life.
My mom, dad and grandparents were going to church in Egypt and a few 
minutes before they arrived, the church exploded; they were waiting for 
a taxi that arrived 5 minutes late and those minutes saved their lives. It 
was 2012 and it was one of the many attacks against Christians.3 I also 
witnessed an act of extreme violence against Christian children. We were 
playing football in our parish center, in Cairo. Suddenly, some men on 
motorbikes came in, they were driving very fast; they shot randomly and 
killed three children; then they left. (…). I also remember Christian boys, 
at school, playing football. They broke a window and the teacher forced 
them to collect the glass with their bare hands, hurting their hands so 
badly … (M., 12 years old, Male)
(Whispering) When I was in Egypt, two little girls, twin sisters … they 
were my friends … one day they were sent to blow themselves up: one did 
3 He is describing the attack against the church of Holy Mary of Zeitoun, a place of worship 
and visit for the apparitions of Saint Mary.
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it, but the other one didn’t have the courage. I don’t know what happened 
to her after that …. (A., 13 years old, Female)
A quarrel between two people, in Egypt, ended in a firefight that struck 
two innocent men who were chatting in the street: the bullets entered 
our house and we witnessed the scene. The people of the house helped 
the man who had been shot to escape because the dead persons were 
Christian and the killer Muslim. The law imposes the death penalty if a 
Muslim kills another Muslim or if a Christian kills a Muslim, but not if a 
Muslim kills a Christian; nothing happens to him … (F., 14 years old, 
Female)
Besides, the violence they experienced has also a psychological dimension, 
which grows up in the continuous lack of respect, in the offenses that humble 
the dignity of Christians, in a relentless devaluation that aims to bend Chris-
tians by humiliating, disqualifying and intimidating them overtly.
The young Copts interviewed reported several episodes of adults chastened 
in public because of their Christian faith, hampered in their professional ca-
reer because they were identified by a Christian name. They also reported epi-
sodes of children humiliated and denigrated by peers –or older children– in 
school courtyards.
In Egypt, Christians cannot have a job in the police, in the army, as judges 
and often die during military service. The media call it “misfortune” –e.g. 
while cleaning a weapon, while doing something in very difficult 
 situations–, but these are not reliable stories! The truth is that they send 
Christians to carry out very dangerous actions, which put their lives at 
risk as if they had no value … (G., 16 years old, Female).
Religious violence and the following persecutions strike the spiritual life of 
Christians by not allowing them to practice their religious duties or by impos-
ing conversion to the Islam.
(...) In Egypt, when girls are 16, they take them away, they take them some-
where else –even with violence– and they try to convert them to Islam until 
they turn 18 (…). They do it with girls but also with women living in the 
country … and then they say they became Muslim … (D., 16 years old, Male)
I saw the same things! I come from Alexandria of Egypt. Over there, the 
girls were kidnapped in order to convert them. In other places in Egypt it 
is not so common. (…) Only girls, no women. At 16 and before they turn 
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18… because then they have an identity card and the religious choice is 
considered complete and official. It is scary, always … (S., 14 years old, 
Male)
All the Coptic teenagers reported strongly discriminatory acts and behaviors 
acted in public schools in Egypt by Muslim adults and pupils. Acts of physical 
violence of groups of Muslim children against single Christian child in the 
courtyards, but also assaults approved by adults and even by teachers, who 
very often “turned away”.
When I attended school in Egypt, at the age of 6, a classmate was asked 
–from the group of peers in the schoolyard– which religion he was prac-
ticing. As soon as he said “I am a Christian”, the other classmates began 
to throw stones against him with violence. The adults that were in the 
schoolyard intervened after a long time, but that delay was intentional 
and punitive … the Christian child suffered serious injuries. In Egypt, I 
had to suffer violence too, in primary school; violence perpetrated by the 
teacher, who put me in the middle of the class so that the other class-
mates could insult me because of my Christian faith … I remember the 
pain and the sense of powerlessness, the tears … (G., 16 years old, Female)
There was a ritual practiced at school. If you are a Christian in Egypt, at 
school, you have to say: “I am a bad person”… in front of everyone … You 
feel terrible … I felt offended and abashed … it’s not fair … (M., 18 years 
old, Male)
I remember that the bus driver often mistreated Christian girls by grab-
bing their hair, for no other reason but their Christian belief. (A., 12 years 
old, Female)
Many Coptic minors reported violent practices such as abduction, torture and 
murder in Egypt, in Cairo as well as in Alexandria: 16-year-old girls kidnapped 
by Islamic extremists and forced to convert to Islam before their 18th birthday; 
Christians killed by firearms while walking in the streets –with the murderer 
never being stopped–; children threatened, mocked and beaten in the class-
rooms and courtyards of Islamic public schools.
Nevertheless, if in the collective image of Islamic extremism, what attracts 
and seduces adults and children is a sort of “aesthetic of violence” and if the 
identity of the groups finds an effectual way of expression in violence, when it 
comes to the persecutions of the Coptic Christians, the Islamic violence aims 
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to generate distress and fear. This fear, however, instead of intimidating and 
questioning their faith, straightens the awareness that being a “true Christian” 
also means bearing discrimination and violence, without losing faith. Being a 
good Copt Christian is part of their identity, since it is what parents have passed 
on to them and it is a very important value that is considered as a priority. 
Many of the interviewed teenagers reported phrases stated by their parents 
throughout their lives (if they ask you if you are Christian, you answer “yes” 
and defend your faith until you die). The relationship between violent and dis-
criminatory acts and the fact of being Christian is grounded on real facts – 
 situations they memorized because they experienced them directly or because 
of the constant reminder from their parents: burnt churches, children killed 
with firearms while playing in the church square, cars and buses blown up.
The relationship between violence, death and faith and the practice of the 
Christian faith appears in its terrifying consequentiality: being Christians in 
Egypt, bearing a Christian name, and professing the Christian faith leads to the 
risk of death, to the certainty of being a target of denigration, persecution and 
violence.
The parents of Coptic children have transmitted religious values to their off-
spring, who have made them their own, as distinctive elements of their iden-
tity. Most parents have told and continue to tell their children about the perse-
cution of Christians by Muslims, often showing them photos and videos of the 
acts of violence that continue to be perpetrated in Egypt. Daughters and sons 
are very conscious of the reality of being Christian in Egypt: they talked about 
it as if it were part of their everyday life. They contrast the beauty of Christian 
faith to these narratives of violence: several times, they talk about Christianity 
as a tolerant and peaceful religion; they say that their behavior must always be 
respectful and tolerant because they are Christians and Christians do not dis-
criminate, do not misbehave, and do not lie. These are values that these minors 
re-propose with strength: tolerance, respect for others, acceptance, brother-
hood, sincerity and righteousness.
Fear is a second facade of the Janus-faced concept emerged by the analysis, 
directly linked to violence. We have considered fear in its psychological mean-
ing, as an emotional response of an adaptive system, an active defense mecha-
nism against the dangers to people’s survival. In this sense, the function of fear 
is both individual and social but, in the minors’ narratives, fear was mainly 
used in connection with personal experience, as the consequence of threats, 
persecutions and violence, and in situations of danger or in the case of possi-
ble interaction with people who were truly dangerous. They express a fear that 
comes from direct experiences –the narration of violence experienced directly 
by children and remembered with the same emotional intensity that has left 
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the inheritance of fear– and experiences frequently narrated by parents,  rooted 
through videos and photos and kept alive as they are continuous and condi-
tion stimuli.
Fear, for these minors, occurred at different times in their lives, triggered by 
the perception of a threatening and potentially harmful presence for their sur-
vival. A threat certainly aimed at the expression of religious freedom, but also 
at their own lives. For most of the interviewed teenagers, the response to fear 
is to claim a denied right, the right to live free from fear.
In the narratives of some Coptic minors who came to Milan around the age of 
4, fear takes on the anxious tones of an alarming conundrum: the memories of 
burned churches or of killed children are mixed with the stories told by parents, 
with what they see on television and with the images that come from Egypt.
I have never liked living in Egypt; when I was in Egypt, I wished to go 
away, to America or Europe. I was afraid. (…) In Egyptian public schools, 
Muslims have far more rights than Christians. I was lucky enough to go to 
a Franciscan school in Egypt, but when my parents started thinking about 
coming to Milan, they sent me to a public school to save money for travel 
and a new life in Europe. In Egypt, Muslims pupils did not want to be 
with their Christians peers, so Christian children were isolated, even by 
professors, treated badly, threatened. I have always lived with fear in 
Egypt … (S., 14 years old, Male)
For many Coptic teenagers, fear had the outlines of anxiety, with negative pre-
dictions about all the events that are perceived as dangerous or only poten-
tially dangerous. In the tones of the voice, in the modalities chosen to speak, 
and in the very words of the minors, it was clear that the feeling that the perse-
cutions suffered in Egypt by their parents and their relatives are shaping up 
their existence and their projects for the future. None of them, in fact, plans to 
go back to Egypt one day.
In Egypt, girls can never go out alone; they cannot leave their heads and 
arms uncovered. If they do, boys and adults males pull their hair violently 
or use a sort of electric baton to shake their arms. I was always afraid! (P., 
17 years old, Female)
The stories of the Coptic boys and girls expressed a fear that, in many mo-
ments, seemed tied to traumatic events, reactivated as the narration proceed-
ed. Because of the violence they witnessed, their accounts were emotionally 
intense: Christian children abused and killed in front of them, and people 
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beaten in the street before their eyes, only because they were Christians. In 
general, the fear is perceivable in almost all the interviewed teenagers, thus 
producing a negative image of the life in Egypt.
However, it must be noted that the fear brought by these minors is the result 
of a sort of “parental contagion”. That is anxiety and fears for the relatives still 
living in Egypt and in constant contact with these teenagers, along with the 
fears that those living in Italy pass on to their offspring, thus generating or am-
plifying their anxieties and fears both by imitation and by sharing the same 
environment, which is particularly demanding and distressing.
The arrival in Milan was difficult at the beginning, but now we are free 
and I’m fine. Now I know that I can trust people here in Milan. At the 
beginning, I couldn’t, because when in Egypt some called me: “Come here 
a second!”. I was scared that he could kidnap me … Even in kindergarten, 
Islamic children managed to beat Christian children. I was always afraid! 
(M., 12 years old, Male)
Yet, this intense fear does not stop them from acting as Christians, as newspa-
per documented over the years. In the aftermath of the double Islamic attack 
on 9 April 2017, for example, an article by a major national newspaper titled: 
“The Copts do not seem to know the fear. Armored churches between metal 
detectors and soldiers: this is how we live in the Coptic community after the 
long wave of fundamentalist attacks. But fear has not emptied the churches” 
(ansa Magazine, 2017).
The interviewed Coptic teenagers have reported stories of Coptic Chris-
tians, victims of terrorist attacks, who died invoking the name of Christ, in pre-
venting terrorists from accessing churches. They talked passionately about 
having learned from their parents and from their own faith that being a Chris-
tian is a value that goes beyond life, which must be defended from everything 
and everyone. They said they were ready to die for the faith and proud to be 
Christians.
We learned from an early age. Our parents have always told us: “If they 
kidnap you and try to convert you, you have to say no until death. Rather 
die”. We learn this from an early age. (G., 16 years old, Female)
4.2 Freedom and Religious Freedom
The questions that explored whether and how the religious factor represents a 
constraint or a resource for the interviewed minors revealed good levels of 
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 integration, openly declared by boys and girls that “feel Italian and Milanese”, 
while maintaining a constant and significant link with the country of origin. 
The profile that emerges –with a minimum variance– describes them as boys 
and girls who, above all, feel “free” in Italy, free to join peers, Italians or Egyp-
tians, classmates, but also friends from the parish. For the Coptic teenagers 
interviewed, the religious practice is also lived through the attendance of Cath-
olic youth centers and churches in Milan, where they have no difficulty in 
adapting to the Ambrosian rite (the rite of the Milan Archdioceses). In particu-
lar, almost all the Coptic minors interviewed attend the Coptic Church – 
Orthodox or Catholic– at least once a week (often even twice a week) and, in 
addition, the Catholic Churches in Milan.
A constant religious commitment brings together Coptic boys and girls, as it 
is considered a value transmitted by parents and internalized, reached by a 
careful and constant practice. The religious practice links and allows to know 
and meet peers of the same ethnic origin. If attending school opens up oppor-
tunities for integration and freedom, it is in religious practice that they all re-
discover the values of their own origins. The two things seem to fit perfectly 
into almost all the experiences reported in the focus groups.
(...) The others must know that you are a Christian, and you must prove it 
with facts. You must prove it in practice. You don’t have to ruin Christian-
ity’s reputation for what you do. On the contrary … you have to improve 
it. All of us must be like this. Our values have been passed on to us by our 
parents thanks to what they do and say. They are our guide and our free-
dom. (P., 17 years old, Female)
Our mother always tells us that if there is the possibility of going to 
church we must go there. My mother says I shouldn’t be afraid to talk 
about our religion. That we should let it be known, talk about it …. (A., 13 
years old, Female)
They are teenagers who recognize that they have more opportunities in Italy 
than in Egypt and recognize the sacrifices made by parents to offer them a fu-
ture of freedom, as well as the chance to practice their religion. Some of them, 
the majority, have managed to go along the difficult path of integration by 
sharing and living the two worlds that are part of their identity: Egypt and 
Italy.
Being in Milan is much better than being in the city where I was born, in 
my home country, because the school in Italy welcomes everyone, 
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 regardless of the religion they have … In Egypt, Christians are separated 
from others, ridiculed, abused. In Milan, there is space to play safe, free – 
which there was not in Egypt … (M., 12 years old, Male)
Being able to live in a State where you are free to practice your religion, to 
dress in many different ways, to be yourself … this is what freedom is to 
me. Like in Milan. In Egypt, we could not do anything. Anything … (F., 13 
years old, Female)
For all Coptic minors, the values transmitted by the family, and by the parents 
in particular, are very important as they have become a primary part of their 
identity and are also taken into consideration in relationships with adults and 
peers. In Italy, they feel “free”: free of being Christians and of being able to 
practice their religion, free to proclaim themselves to be Christians without 
any fear of discrimination or violence. They also feel they can be free to live 
their lives by connecting the present to the past, which means being Egyptian 
and Italian at the same time. Being able to say what they think, dress like their 
Italian peers, and have the same opportunities as Italians have without being 
discriminated is recognized as the result of a sacrifice made by their parents, 
who –in most cases– deprived themselves of that higher socio-economic sta-
tus they had in Egypt and which was not possible to achieve in Italy.
I know my parents made great sacrifices to take us to Italy, giving up their 
social position in Egypt and accepting to have jobs in Italy they didn’t 
like, just to make me and my brother feel comfortable and give us a better 
future. In Egypt, we were not free. I was trained to protect myself in case 
I was kidnapped and forced to convert to Islam. Our parents told us that 
we should oppose to that, that we should continue to say that we are 
Christians and that we want to remain Christian. We lived in a constant 
state of anxiety, with the fear of going out and being kidnapped. We 
learned from an early age that, if they kidnap you and try to convert you, 
you have to say no, until you die. You’d rather die … we learned this from 
an early age … (G., 16 years old, Female)
The issue of the persecutions suffered in Egypt is part of the chapter on reli-
gious freedom. The boys and girls who participated in the focus groups believe 
that values are fundamental and essential. And among these values, there 
 certainly are the religious values, transmitted by the family through the gen-
erations, along with the narration of the denied liberties in the home country. 
All the Coptic teenagers interviewed know their family history and the 
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 persecutions lived by their parents when they were in Egypt, and consider 
those persecutions as inhuman and unacceptable. They think that their par-
ents have made a choice for them, which is important, as much as it is painful, 
and tiring, in order to offer them a better future. They call themselves “lucky” 
for having had the opportunity to live in Italy, which they consider as a country 
in which they can really be free.
We Christians make no difference between Christians and Muslims: we 
make friends with everyone and our parents educate us in this. I had 
Muslim friends in Egypt. Not everyone is like that, but the majority are. 
They know that there is a difference between religions, but … people are 
people … We can be together, play and do things together, and then every-
one goes back to his/her religion. On the contrary, in public schools in 
Egypt, everyone is forced to study the Koran. Pupils must recite some 
parts by memory. If they do not know those parts and do not recite them, 
they do not pass the exam and they just flunk out … (D., 20 years old, 
Male)
The values our parents have taught us are to be honest, to respect others 
and to treat everyone well, to help without expecting compensation. Do 
everything possible. Try to stick to religion. When my mom has to teach 
me something, she tells me: you are Christian, you cannot tell lies …. (M., 
13 years old, Female)
Almost all the Coptic teenagers tell stories of discrimination, intimidation, ag-
gression and violence perpetrated by Muslim children, teenagers and adults 
against Christians. Some of them attended private Catholic schools in Egypt: 
very expensive institutions into which parents have enrolled them in order to 
protect them and allow them to exercise their religious freedom despite Is-
lamic pressures and violence. In private schools, the students actually felt pro-
tected and had the opportunity to study in a context that is described as posi-
tive and respectful. However, friends, neighbors, relatives and other children in 
their neighborhood, who could not afford the high cost of private schools, con-
tinued to go to public schools, in a climate of terror and overwhelmed by 
 constant humiliation and harassment.
In Egyptian public schools, Muslims had far more rights than Christians. 
I was lucky enough to go to a Franciscan school in Egypt. My parents 
made many sacrifices to find the money they needed to send me and my 
sisters to a private school. (S., 14 years old, male)
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The narratives about school describe institutions in which children and 
young people, instead of finding a room for growth and education, found 
teachers ready to taunt them, to ridicule them by isolating them publicly, hu-
miliating them precisely because of the Christian name they had or because 
they were defenders of their religion. Touching and delicate stories, which are 
surprising mainly because of the depth and the maturity showed in the opin-
ions and beliefs of these teenagers. Freedom for Coptic minors is made up of 
the possibility of having behaviors that are not admitted in Egypt, but which 
belong to the set of what “a good Christian should do”, in line with rigorous 
values. Freedom, for them, is the possibility to go to school and stay with class-
mates; to go out on Saturdays; to go shopping or to a football match; to go to 
Mass and to church whenever they feel like it.
In Egypt, we were used to spend a lot of time indoors. We couldn’t go out. 
In Italy, I feel free, I feel really free. It was painful, however, to abandon a 
piece of the family in Egypt. Because one of the most important values, 
for us, is family. (L., 17 years old, Male)
To me, it is very easy to live in Milan. People welcomed us, (…) and the 
language was not a problem: we learnt it in three months. We are very 
comfortable here and we only have to be good people and good Chris-
tians. We are free, now. (F., 14 years old, Female)
All teenagers go to Mass on Sundays either with family or with friends. They do 
not seem to perceive great discrepancies between the practice of the Orthodox 
rite and the Catholic one; certainly, they attend their own church and their 
own ritual, but they also attend other churches, even with a local rite, different 
from the Copt one.
I do not see any striking differences between the Ambrosian rite and 
ours. Few things are different: the language and Palm Sunday, which is 
much more beautiful here. The ritual is beautiful both in the Arabic and 
in the Italian language. (V., 15 years old, Male)
Some Coptic teenagers reported a problem they experienced in Italy: they said 
that their schoolmates in high school, but also some professors, label them as 
“Muslims” in a negative way, or even call them “Islamic extremists”, since they 
are Egyptians. The minors participating in the focus group interpreted this 
misjudgment as a lack of knowledge, as a consequence of the Italians’ igno-
rance about the very existence of Christians in Egypt. It is a not discussed  topic, 
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unlike Islamic extremism, and therefore it is not known. Narratives of  Muslim–
Coptic unity have played an important role in the collective imagination of the 
nations, and these narratives have effects that are distinct from that of formal 
legislation. Although these narratives are often advocated and supported by 
the State, they are not reducible to the actions of state officials. Rather, they 
rely on popular rhetoric, repeated and performed as part of the imaginary of a 
modern plural Egypt. The perpetuation of this national unity performance has 
led to the “invisibility” of the Copts in the contemporary political landscape, 
with minority rights being subjugated to national needs (Ibrahim, 2015) (see 
also Chapter 6).
4.3 Future
“Future” is a word emerged many times from the narratives of the Coptic teen-
agers and –in most cases– it is strictly connected with the idea of freedom, 
which is what pushed them and their families to migrate to Italy.
My parents came to Italy to live better together, to have a quieter life and 
to give us more opportunities for our future; also, to let us have a peaceful 
life in which we can do what we want to do. I am well aware of my par-
ents’ sacrifices and I know what they had to give up on for my future … 
(G., 16 years old, Female)
For Coptic minors, the future is a possibility determined by freedom and by the 
sacrifices made by their parents. The qualitative level of the narratives –for the 
breadth and richness of the vocabulary and for the wide use of a hypotactic 
syntax– expresses a maturity that is usually more present in young adults than 
in teenagers: the minors who participated in the focus groups are preadoles-
cents and adolescents who know very well the moods and the emotions that 
accompanied the choice of their parents, but also of their grandparents, their 
uncles, their cousins and the relatives they left behind in Egypt. Their future is 
the consequence of the freedom they have today to study in Milan, which to-
morrow will allow them to find the job they want, without any discriminations 
or abuse of power. Almost all the interviewed minors want their studying or 
working future to be in Milan, the city that welcomed them in Italy, or some-
where else in the world, but without forgetting to maintain solid roots in Mi-
lan. Milan seems to have become the “secure base” from which to start and to 
which go back in the journey of life.
My father wanted to find something better than what we had in Egypt 
and he was afraid for us. (….) He wanted to offer our lives a new 
 possibility. He saw the future in Egypt and understood that there was 
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nothing for us. He was afraid for us, who were alone in Egypt. (L., 17 years 
old, Male)
The Coptic boys and girls, who project their future mainly in Italy, as we saw 
before, are strongly focused on the “doing”, on achieving something that can 
lead them to a profession. The future is linked to freedom in a very decisive 
way, as if the experience of having been deprived of their own freedom and 
of the possibility to think of a future in their home country had led them to 
the idea that living in a nation allowing you to be free already means to have a 
future ahead of you. Most of them attend technical or professional institutes. 
They have concrete goals in the short term, such as passing school exams and 
gain a diploma. Their goals are so pragmatic that none of them even envisages 
attending university. Their aims seem to be a job, a home, and a future in Milan.
Being in Milan is much better than being in the city where I was born. (…) 
It is in a free country where you can imagine living your life. (C., 17 years 
old, Male)
The future can be built on today’s integration process, on the ability to keep 
together, and in balance, both the identity of the country of origin and the new 
one, acquired thanks to the migration to Milan. In fact, Coptic teenagers con-
tinue to maintain constant relationships with their community of belonging, 
which many visit continuously, going back to Egypt on a yearly basis. All the 
interviewed minors claim to have a constant relationship with the country of 
origin; most of them go there every year, others every two or three years. From 
their narratives, in fact, we can see that there is a “double bond”, one with the 
host country, Italy –to which they feel they belong and in which they dream to 
live their future– and one with the home country, to which they are still emo-
tionally tied and which they continue to visit, valuing family ties with relatives 
left behind (grandparents, uncles, cousins), to whom all the boys and girls 
claim a strong attachment.
As far as I’m concerned, it has been very useful to come to Milan: here I 
studied and I started working, but I miss family and friends and some-
times I have to visit them. I have to endure two more years, and then I 
want to go to Egypt to see them. But I wouldn’t go back to living there. No, 
I really wouldn’t … (M., 18 years old, Male)
They are clearly aware that freedom is fundamental to even think of a possible 
future. They have learned by their parents that the choice to go to Milan has 
involved many sacrifices, but at the same time, it has allowed them to live in a 
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country where they can be themselves, and where they can freely practice 
their religion, dress as they wish, and make the choices they think are best 
suited to them.
I felt good coming to Milan, I felt the peace, which was very different from 
Egypt; the cleaner air and a sense of security. (…) I was constantly being 
afraid, in Egypt. I would not go back to live in Egypt ever again; now, I feel 
very good here in Milan … (S., 14 years old, Male)
My father in Egypt had a shop and my mother was an accountant. They 
arrived in Italy separately: first, my father and then my mother and I 
reached him when I was 3 and a half years old. In Egypt, I attended a 
Christian private kindergarten. My father found it hard to recognize us, 
since he was seeing us after a very long time. My parents made massive 
efforts in Italy at the beginning. But they did it for us and today we are 
grateful to them, because in Egypt a Christian can only die. Here, on the 
contrary, we have a future. (F., 14 years old, Female)
While they really appreciate the variety of values and cultural proposals of Mi-
lan, they do not renounce the values and the distinctive elements of their cul-
ture: they listen to Egyptian music, along with the Italian ones; they all speak 
the Arabic and the Italian language with no difficulties; they have eating habits 
that mix food and traditions of both countries; they follow different habits and 
rituals linked to the Coptic tradition; they profess and practice the values of 
their home country. They have ways of dressing that are identical to those of all 
the adolescents in Milan and –an element of primary importance– they have a 
pigmentation and a physiognomy that does not make them particularly differ-
ent from their autochthonous peers.
A girl wanting to explain how important it was for her parents to pass on 
their native language to their children, in order to preserve it besides the Ital-
ian language, said:
When I came home from kindergarten and I spoke Italian, my parents 
pretended not to understand me: so I had to learn Arabic too … (smile)… 
but now I like it! (A., 12 years old, Female)
5 Final Remarks
The purpose of the present study was to investigate factors and processes pro-
moting or hindering the integration process of Coptic minors, migrated to Italy 
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along with their parents. More specifically, the main aims were to identify the 
acculturative challenges faced by these minors, the role played by religion in 
sustaining heritage identity and faith across generations, paying special atten-
tion to the significance of the persecution of Christians and martyrdom. By 
adopting a salutogenic perspective, which focuses on the resources of indi-
viduals and families, we wanted to help Copt boys and girls to report their 
opinions, and to reflect on their past experience and their lives in Italy.
As already highlighted in the previous paragraph, the focus group partici-
pants revealed a strong ethnic-religious identity, differently from their autoch-
thonous peers, as also highlighted by several studies on Copts (Brinkerhoff, 
2016; Henderson, 2015; Ibrahim, 2010; Smith, 2005).
The thoughts and the feelings expressed by the young Copts during the fo-
cus group seem to be an endorsement of the effectiveness of efforts made by 
their parents and by the religious leaders in order to pass heritage values and 
practices to second-generation Diaspora.
Even if they are still adolescents –and adolescence is notoriously a tumultu-
ous age– they clearly have a deep sense of belonging to their religious tradi-
tions and their community.
In the focus group, it became evident that religious identity is strongly con-
nected to the home country, even though they had left it when they were very 
young and have little memories of that time. Nevertheless, the teachings of 
their parents and the frequent visits to Egypt have managed to make the link 
become stronger and deep-rooted. Many migrant groups are worried that their 
cultural tradition will not survive in the following generations living in the 
 Diaspora – a feeling that has developed most intensely in faith-based or faith-
centered Diasporas, such as the Coptic Diaspora. An important member of the 
Coptic Diaspora in the usa, after having lived fifty years in the US, wrote: “One 
of the serious challenges has been the age-old tension facing immigrant com-
munities: maintaining a strong communal identity while dealing with the 
pressures of “compromise” associated with assimilating into a new society. An 
associated challenge is keeping most –if not all– second and third generations 
within the church” (Saad, 2010: 220). As for our sample, up to now this chal-
lenge has been faced successfully, through a wise strategy of narratives and 
personal relationships with the family left behind in Egypt. These Coptic teen-
agers were very proud of the legacy of their history and their culture, along 
with the awareness of the “hard time” that Christians in Egypt have to endure. 
They have a clear picture of what it means to be living in Egypt as a Christian, 
also because –besides the narratives of their parents–, most of them witnessed 
cruel terroristic actions and institutional discriminatory behaviors in the home 
country. During the focus group, they spent a lot of time describing the acts of 
violence against them as Christian children in Egypt, the pressure of the 
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 discriminatory laws on their parents, and the fear characterizing the everyday 
life at school and in the streets. It is surprising to see as these young Copts talk 
about violence and terroristic actions with equilibrium, not showing evident 
signs of ptsd or of the traumatic background due to having witnessed people 
being stubbed or dying. Further research should focus on a follow-up study, 
maybe in 10 years, to see what would happen to these second-generation off-
spring entering the adult life.
According to the remarks on the ethics of hospitality presented in Chapter 
2, the experiences of the Coptic minors we met in the focus groups uphold the 
key role of religion in the host country, as well as the importance of a “cross-
cultural institutional folder” in order to maintain strong roots and develop new 
sprouts.
As far as one of our main aims is concerned –the role played by religion and 
the Church in sustaining heritage identity and faith across generations– we 
can observe, from the narratives of the participants in our focus groups, that 
the Coptic Church turns out to be, as Brinkerhoff writes, “a transnational are-
na, linking the single Christian to churches and to the Mother Church in Egypt” 
(p. 483). In this way, the link across generations is assured. The Coptic Church 
tries to provide facilitative mechanisms to keep in touch with the home coun-
try, for example through philanthropy, helping Christian families in Egypt 
(Ebaugh, Chafetz, 2002). The Church’s fostering of philanthropy betokens a 
positive link between the later generations in Diaspora –not willing to go back 
to their home country, as clearly stated by the interviewed teenagers– and the 
Egyptian society. Early studies about such phenomenon showed that this ex-
perience likely lead to such participation in adulthood (Perks, Haan, 2011). An-
other observation that can be made out of the analysis of our focus group is 
that the role of the Coptic Church implies a dimension of cross-culturalism, 
because it stresses the Coptic identity and its legacy and –at the same time– it 
promotes the adaptation to the way of living in Diaspora, outside of Egypt, in-
cluding the fact of being proud of one’s non-Egyptian citizenship. According to 
some scholars, this attitude of the Coptic Church shows that selective accul-
turation processes do not automatically hinder ascendant mobility, and that 
acculturation itself does not have to imply a loss of the heritage culture and of 
the religious values and practices associated with it.
The Coptic Diaspora is probably one of the few that supports selective ac-
culturation. The Coptic Church gives the impression of underlining the great 
importance of keeping Egyptian and Coptic identity alive in Diaspora and 
that –to do so– suppleness and adaptation is fundamental to many host societ-
ies, which are very different in terms of values, practices and customs.
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Given the potential bias in our sample, we cannot know the extent to which 
these strategies for transnationalism and selective acculturation influence Di-
aspora members who are not active in the Coptic Church, but it is possible to 
say that very few Coptic Egyptians living abroad have no link to the Church, 
being the Copt identity so in-deep rooted, as we saw in our focus groups. Ac-
culturation with upward mobility does not require substitution of one culture 
for another. This study highlights some issues and, at the same time, raises 
several questions. The human capital legacy of the Coptic second generation is 
noteworthy and liable not only to help its upward mobility but also to support 
an insight in exploring and enacting the Coptic identity. Sharp and fuzzy bor-
ders may change according to life events and to subjective dynamics. In a faith-
based migrant community, does religion play a mediating role in the network 
mechanisms that can facilitate acculturation? More generally, how important 
are institutional structures, such as those provided by the Coptic Church, in 
facilitating transnationalism and selective acculturation? What other types of 
structure might proffer similar advantages?
Certainly, these remarks would need to be re-examined after a long period 
of time, through third and fourth generations, to evaluate whether or not this 
cross-cultural approach, adopted by the Coptic Church, works.
Further research can begin to answer some of these questions. Keeping cul-
tural legacy –while reaching upward mobility– is possible, and this process can 
be eagerly supported. Preserving roots and not “selling off” one’s legacy are 
aims that are as crucial as socio-economic achievements. The issue is how to 
pull all of them together.
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Chapter �1
The Religious Dimension in Plural Schools: 
Institutional, Relational and Strategic Issues
Maddalena Colombo
1 Introduction: Cultural Change and the Role of Religion in Public 
Schooling
This chapter is focused on religion as an element of the schooling process and 
aims at enlightening the main changes occurring in public schools as a conse-
quence of the increasing pluralism and multi-ethnicity (Colombo, 2013), over-
all among students and their families, and the “new” consideration of religion 
(and religion education) within the school environment (Hobson, Edwards, 
1999). The change is mainly due to a two-fold pushing factor:
– A demographic change, in all Europe the second-generation immigrant pop-
ulation brings into the school environment the reality of a multitude of 
faiths and worships, with more or less attachment in comparisons to their 
parents or to peers with a native background;
– A cultural change, the organization of public education in many countries 
lies on the secularization principle – which means that, when it comes to 
student’s religion, it tends to be as neutral as possible. This goes along with 
an increasing “indifference” of young people to the family religious tradi-
tions and belonging, and the growth in the number of youngsters who are 
not believers, agnostic or religious recusants (Garelli, 2016). It is widely ac-
knowledged that secularization brings about a privatization of the religious 
choice and observance, and an increase in religious illiteracy (Melloni, 2014; 
Cadeddu, Melloni, 2018).
Here, we want to discuss two consequences of this on public schooling. At an 
institutional level, pluralization through migration –especially after the last 
decade, with its threatening issues about religious fundamentalism and radi-
calization among people with an immigrant background– may have led many 
educators to change the focus of their discussions on religion at school; i.e. 
from a form of single faith religious teaching to a “non-confessional”, inclusive, 
multi-faith approach, including learning about the religions of relatively newly 
established minorities such as Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, as well as about 
Christianity and Judaism. Or, from a casual and mostly improvised reference to 
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faith into the Human Studies curriculum, to a more structured inclusion of 
learning objects concerning religions as historic expressions of mankind, mod-
ern institutions and set of lively rituals that feature different people and States, 
etc. (Jackson, 2014 and 2016).
At a relational level, instead, the resurgence of religion (as “identity specif-
ic”) among immigrant students and parents may have generated various kinds 
of reactions, both by majority and minority school agents, from discomfort to 
curiosity, from intolerance to intercultural solidarity. As sociologists of educa-
tion, we have been interrogating about how this mixed educational landscape 
is going to be designed, as regards the main issues at stake when students’ reli-
gion is visible: equity, integration, diversity management, citizenship and val-
ues education. Questions, such as “Are we in an equal, not discriminating, and 
peaceful environment because of the disappearance (or neutralization) of 
religion(s)?” and “Are we in a conflict arena, where religious worships, com-
munitarian belonging and perception of social discrimination generate dis-
cussion, tensions and fight among students, teachers and parents?” become 
urgent. As well as the question about the strategy that schools with multi-eth-
nic groups of learners may adopt to reach their purposes better: “Must the pub-
lic school teach more about religions, with the aim of making students aware 
of their own cultural roots and religious belongings? Or must it practice more 
laicism, avoiding to pervade teaching about religious contents and pursue the 
objective to give students tools for choice and identity building, across a neu-
tral, non-religious, universalistic, curriculum?”. In evidence, the response to 
such questions shows if a school can represent a “neutral space” for students, 
where diversities can respect one another independently of their roots or, in-
stead, if it becomes a “common house”, where students background is recipro-
cally questioned and recognized as a tool for growth.
Recently, Benadusi et al. (2017) stated that teaching religions in public insti-
tutions is still an open issue, because of the main associated risks of ideologi-
zation and “functionalization” of religion in mixed schools – facing interfaith 
conflicts, misunderstandings and negative stereotypes that are likely to rise 
where religious speech and practices take place. Although the majority of state 
school principals (elsewhere in Europe) seem to recommend to keep out from 
religious disputes and show the “secular self”, many school professionals feel 
distress facing the negative externalities of the neutral school, and claim for 
better preparation to cope with cultural and religious clashes among students 
or with immigrant parents (Laborde, Silhol, 2018).
Taking religions as a fundamental part (among others) of the public debate 
on education is thus unavoidable today for plural schools, even if this will lead 
to take over the traditional reluctance to engage schools in “private issues”. 
In  fact, if religion is a “pending question” for young people, education must 
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provide some replies. As Meuret (2015) argued, in order to contrast young peo-
ple’s fascination for ideological and religious radicalism, democratic educa-
tion, as well as the republican one, have the specific task to teach students 
tolerance and civicness facing multi-religiosity. Youngsters can profit mainly 
from the school experience, if they want to learn how to gain (and not to lose) 
from religious diversity and how (and why) to avoid the main inconvenient of 
xenophobia, religious phobia and intolerance. Education in multi-religious 
settings can really open students towards a “non-relativistic view” and create 
in them a “value-sensitive attitude” (Pace, 2004: 279).
In the next paragraphs, after a brief overview on the secularized school en-
vironment in Europe, we will emphasize the role of religious education in the 
institutional frame (§2).  Then, we will mention the state of religious education 
(re) in Italy, both in socio-demographic (what kind and how many students 
ask for re) and in normative terms (how the access to re in public schools is 
regulated) (§3). Afterwards, we will discuss the different approaches to inter-
ethnic dialogue in the Italian mixed schools (§4). We will close the chapter by 
presenting the main theoretical and methodological assumptions of an em-
pirical study focusing on the religious dimension of interethnic relationships 
in public education system, which was carried out during s.y. 2016/17 in lower 
secondary state schools in Northern Italy (§5).
2 The Secularized School Environment in Europe: What Is Religious 
Education Expected To Do?
The transformation of school environment in an increasing secularized setting 
(see Chapter 3)  has to do with the reciprocal implications between state, edu-
cation and religion, three fundamental institutions of the European civil soci-
ety. Although with diverse nuances, at the turn of the millennium the process 
of de-institutionalization affected every organizations: the consequence has 
been a widespread suspicion and mistrust by people towards all kinds of for-
mal guarantee –in the domain of social, economic and cultural or religious 
right’s protection, the strongest opposition being against the political institu-
tions. Since religion and education have a political side (although it may be 
non-visible to users), they could not avoid to be affected by this “institutional 
crisis”.
Secularization began to be a feature of the modern education system long 
before the creation of a European space for education, as it is rooted in the 
Enlightening period. Anyway, it was during the 20th century that the rational-
istic school systems were established, and they regulated the spaces devoted 
to  religious education, according to every national history and religious or 
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 cultural tradition.1 As Schreiner argues (2009; 2013), there are different reli-
gious landscapes in Europe. The South tends to be dominated by Catholicism 
(Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Malta and to some extent France, as well as Po-
land, Ireland and Lithuania), whereas the North is more Lutheran-Protestant 
(Scandinavia). Central European countries tend to have mixed religious land-
scapes (Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, etc.), while Orthodoxy dominates 
most countries in Eastern Europe, including Greece and Cipro. Finally, Islam is 
the major religion in countries like Turkey, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Of course, the way in which the majority religion is followed, and taught in 
public schools, depends on the relation between state and religious authori-
ties, state and education system and, finally, on the characteristics of educa-
tion offer. It is not the case to compare all these elements. It is worth remem-
bering, however, that multi-religiosity has had, and still has, different impacts 
on Member States, with direct implications on the cultural phenomena that I 
will analyze: secularization and resurgence of religions (de-secularization or 
post-secularization).2
According to many, secularization has different ways to be embodied and 
expressed by both institutions and lay people. On the institutional side, keep-
ing the public school system as an example, secularization implies not only 
adopting a non-religious (or secular) curriculum, but also having looser rela-
tions with religious authorities (at a local and larger scale) and avoiding to let 
students practicing worships or celebrating religious ceremonies in the school 
space (including to forbid to wear religious symbols and clothes). On the per-
sonal side, secularization goes hand in hand with the decline of religious ser-
vice attendance among youngsters (a sort of disaffiliation from religion) (Ber-
trand, 2015) and, more generally, the tolerance towards who is non-believer, or 
the idea that the condition of a believer is not necessarily superior to that of a 
non-believer. Both stand at the same level of importance and have the capacity 
to cope with the fundamentals in life (Garelli, 2016), provided that they are free 
to choose their beliefs.
1 As Casanova wrote: “Internal differences notwithstanding, Western European societies are 
deeply secular societies, shaped by the hegemonic knowledge regime of secularism” (Casa-
nova, 2007: 62).
2 In the Humanities and Social Sciences field, many scholars advocate that religion has gained 
a new role in the globalized and plural society; after the “dogmatic secularism” imposed by 
the Enlightening, and after refusing the State religion, contemporary men still need a system 
of beliefs to follow, which justifies all the efforts to progress. Thus, for many, faith and reli-
gious observance become the response to this post-secular need, if chosen in a free and pri-
vate regime (Berger, 1999; Habermas, 2006; Rosati, Stoeckl, 2012; De Kesel, 2017).
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Without doubt, in all Western countries the separation between state and 
church authorities, along with the affirmation of universalism of rights as a 
basic principle for the nation, have reduced the public role of religion in many 
spheres, i.e. in public education. This had some consequences, as religion may 
be a neglected and controversial topic, and laicism or neutrality may affect the 
way in which students, teachers and parents construct the discourse about re-
ligion in education. At the same time, in a liberal society public education does 
not derogate from its civic mission: promoting religious literacy and tolerance, 
and protecting individual and minority religious liberty, which are among the 
greatest challenges facing pluralism. How do public schools afford this dilem-
ma on the ground?
In usa and Canada (two good examples of secularized and multi-cultural 
nation), schools typically adopt two different and extreme solutions: (1) mak-
ing schools hyper-secular and potentially hostile to religion and religious be-
lievers, or (2) promoting either flagrantly or subtly the dominant religion of 
the local community, by adopting curricula that give the impression that any 
religion is inherently good (Bindewald et al., 2017). Nevertheless, none of the 
solutions have been successful: although they act within “a solid legal frame-
work to protect the rights of students, the reality on the ground is that many 
schools are failing to live up to their obligations to students” (Ibidem: 18). The 
middle-path between the two extremes would be what the provinces of On-
tario and Quebec, for example, carried out: “Enhancing students’ religious lit-
eracy and engagement with the religious/cultural other – paying heed to 
warnings about not allowing majority groups to take advantage of religious 
education programs (…) or discriminating against minorities in the public 
schools” (Ibidem: 28).
In Europe the effects of secularization are deep and differ according to each 
country. A range of approaches to provide religion education have been ad-
opted thanks to the initiative of different providers (religious communities, or 
the state or both). According to Schreiner (2009) and Ferrari S. (2013), the main 
distinction must be drawn among the following formula:
1) Learning from religion: countries where no teaching of one or more spe-
cific religions is offered, because references to religion are part of the cor-
pus of other disciplines; this secular teaching is organized by state au-
thorities exclusively (like in France, Czech Republic, Sweden, Belarus and 
Hungary);
2) Learning religion (or into religion): in many countries there is a confes-
sional/catechetical approach, where re is provided by religious 
 communities that have the exclusive responsibility for teachers, text-
books and curricula: this is called “denominational” teaching of religion, 
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(as in Austria, Poland, Spain and Italy); it is compulsory but in some cases 
students can opt out;
3) Learning about religion: re is taught as a voluntary and/or mandatory 
subject in state schools and provides knowledge and information about a 
number of different religions from a point of view that is external to each 
of them; activities are fully in charge of the State, which pays for teachers, 
organizes curricula and checks for textbooks (i.e. in Slovenia: Kodeljia, 
2012). re is called “non-denominational” education and sometimes is 
taught collaboration with religious authorities (for instance, in the UK 
and Denmark).
Beyond the single pedagogical strategy, all kinds of re find their legitimation 
in the attempt to respond to the new needs of young generations by facing 
multi-culturalism and secularization. This becomes more urgent in the coun-
tries where re is denominational. In a “Europeanized” curriculum (Bekemans, 
2013), Religion Education (even the denominational one) must be rooted not 
only in an academic and theological justification, but also in the search for a 
common understanding of religion as a social fact, mixing historical and philo-
sophical elements of knowledge. This is the only “antidote against the threats 
of fundamentalism, on the one hand, or the ‘big blank’ of the laicism, on the 
other” (Pajer, 2009). The same purpose has been expressed by the Council of 
Europe in the Recommendation no. 1720 (Religion & Education, 2005): “By 
teaching children the history and philosophy of the main religions with re-
straint and objectivity, and with respect for the values of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, it will effectively combat fanaticism. Understanding 
the history of political conflicts in the name of religion is essential”. This docu-
ment addresses some issues previously emphasized by the Parliamentary As-
sembly in 1999 (see Religion & Democracy),3 which recommended that all State 
members provided in public schools any sort of religion education, both de-
nominational and non-denominational, on a mandatory basis.
Strong support to this approach comes even from odihr-osce, whose Ex-
pert Group on Freedom of religion set up an important list of recommenda-
tions in 2007, the Toledo Guiding Principles (odihr-osce, 2007). They stated 
that: a) there is a positive value in teaching religion that must emphasize re-
spect for every religion and belief; b) teaching about religions and beliefs can 
reduce misunderstandings and simplifications in facing the beliefs of others.
The traditional way to teach religion subjects, as doctrine transmission and 
preparation to worships, has been hardly discussed and reformed in many 
3 Resolution adopted by the Assembly on 27 January 1999 (5th Sitting). See: http://assembly 
.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=16672&lang=en.
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countries. What is urgent now is to give people of the globalized 21st century 
not only reasons to reinforce one’s identity and choice, but also the widest cog-
nitive and ethic potential to “get” a religious culture with freedom and aware-
ness. The perspective to assume is thus interdisciplinary and intercultural: re-
ligious education embodies both religious and moral convictions; these are 
gradually taken from the subject along the life course, and are based more on 
real social and personal experiences than on the family heritage; the school 
approach must integrate spiritual, moral, ethical and civic values (Council of 
Europe, 2006).
In conclusion, the role that re is expected to play in the European secular-
ized and multi-cultural landscape is multiple: a) to give pupils a religious lit-
eracy in their own and others’ religion; b) to instill the rational and critical 
thinking facing religious issues; c) to reinforce social cohesion by recognizing 
that belonging to a religion is a fundamental “identity marker” among others; 
d) to offer exemplary patterns of social coexistence among diverse people.
As a matter of fact, these are very challenging objectives in many countries. 
re still remains a “slippery arena of education” (Benadusi et al., 2017: 476) be-
cause of the implicitness of many issues that it raises up: equality and right of 
difference; visibility and invisibility of one’s religious belonging; school auton-
omy and need of extra-school partnerships with confessional representatives, 
only to mention some of the main dilemmas.
3 The State of Religious Education (re) in Italy
Italy has greatly been affected by cultural diversity and plural religiosity as 
well, especially since the turn of Millennium. The country has a long tradition 
in re, for the teaching of one religion, i.e. Roman Catholicism, which is the 
majority religion. The teaching of the Catholic religion is called irc (Insegna-
mento della religione cattolica). Despite the nation has strong Catholic roots, 
education is by 90% provided by the State; in addition, 7.5% of private schools 
are coordinated by the Catholic Church with the support of the State.4
According to the agreement signed in 1922 by Italy and the Holy Church and 
renewed in 1984 (Chapter 9), in all state schools, irc is guaranteed from the 
4 Law n. 62 of 2000 establishes that private schools can be recognized on an equal basis with 
State schools, in accordance with Article 33.4 of the Italian Constitution, if they comply with 
some requisites (about programs, teachers, etc.). In this case, they are called scuole paritarie. 
They are publicly subsidized; they also have the authority to issue certificates with the same 




infant school to upper secondary education for one hour per week (two hours 
only in kindergarten and pre-school services) and it is funded by the State. The 
irc is taught by class teachers, if they are available and considered appropriate 
by the Catholic Church authority (cei – Conferenza Episcopale Italiana – Ital-
ian Episcopal Conference), or by special teachers, selected and prepared by the 
cei itself.
Until the 1980s, irc was a “compulsory discipline, from which parents were 
allowed to withdraw their children” (Giorda, 2015: 80) in case they disagreed 
with a confessional education or they were non-believers. In other words, as 
Coglievina says (2017: 2): “As Catholicism shaped Italian national identity, the 
presence of Catholic religion lessons in the state-school system has been re-
garded as something ‘normal’”. Nonetheless, in 1984, after a strong and con-
frontational debate developed in many political and cultural environments, 
the renewal of the Concordate introduced a new type of student’s engagement: 
parents were requested to subscribe irc at the beginning of school cycle. For 
those who do not opt for irc, the regulation offers several options: an “alterna-
tive activity” (aa) established by the school itself, which should address topics 
concerning ethics, values, tolerance and peace.5 This activity should be im-
parted by any teacher who is, at the time, available. Another option is tutoring 
(revision, in-depth studying) or, for high school, a study activity without the 
presence of any teacher, within the school premises; lastly, an often selected 
option is the early exit from school (or delayed entry).
Due to the history of the country as mono-confessional, the opening of an 
alternative education to teaching of one religion represents an official ac-
knowledgment of religious pluralism: in public and state schools, there is an 
amount of children coming from families with different views or practices 
concerning religion. Thus, re is asked to meet the challenge of secularization 
and religious plurality and the multiple needs of a secularized and multi-faith 
student body.
As a consequence of the new choice regime, the number of students who 
followed irc during the ordinary school time has decreased, even if the vast 
majority still opt for it (the provision of irc is guaranteed in every school no 
matter of how many students subscribe). The Catholic Church office for irc 
(Servizio Nazionale cei per l’irc, 2016; 2015) shows this trend: in s.y. 2015/16, 
the subscribers to irc in the state school system (all degrees) were 87.9% out 
of the total (81.5% in upper secondary education). Since s.y. 1993/94, this 
 proportion has decreased by -5.6%. In the private school system, the participa-
tion to irc is much higher than in the public one, being most of private schools 
5 See the Ministry of Education Circular Letters, No. 128, 129, 131 (1986).
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run by Catholic organizations: 97% of the private school population opt for 
irc and only 3% for alternative activity (aa).
As a matter of fact, aa have been little and badly organized so far, even be-
cause they have been optioned by a minority of students (12.1%); someone ar-
gues it is still an “invisible education” because, by ministerial rules, it is not re-
quested to be planned and included in the ptof (the 3-year general education 
plan of one school). This explains its inferior status in comparison with the rest 
of school subjects and, consequently, it reduces the legitimation of the stu-
dent’s choice between re or aa (Bossi, 2017). If a non-choice could be a little 
problem for natives (whose majority opt for irc), it can be considered as a 
falsification or a lack of freedom of choice by immigrant students (amongst 
whom, almost 20% are Catholic). As shown by the Istat research on Religious 
belonging and practice among foreign citizens (2011–12), 60.4% of immigrants 
in Italy between 6 and 17 years old attending Italian schools do not belong to 
the Catholic religion (Istat, 2015). The majority are Muslim (30%), followed by 
Catholic (23.2%), Orthodox (19.6%) and, at a distance, Buddhist (3.6%) and 
Protestant (2.4%) and others.6
Therefore, the multi-ethnic composition of the classrooms (especially in 
the North of country) radically changes the “religious profile” of a school or 
group of students: not all are believers; not all believers are observant; not all 
believers have a mono-religion family background, etc. In a past study on low 
secondary multi-ethnic schools in Lombardy (Colombo, Santagati, 2017; Santa-
gati et al., 2019), with 39% average rate of non-Italian students), the sample was 
distributed as follows: 11% were not believers; 89% believers; within believers, 
¾ were Catholic and ¼ minority religions; ¾ were observant but ¼ (both 
Catholic and non-Catholic) were non-observant.
Thus, in the last decade, a fundamental reforming process of the irc teach-
ing has been activated, both by the cei and the whole body of irc teachers. 
They have become aware of the multi-faith change of school population, which 
affects the attendance of irc both quantitatively and qualitatively. The chal-
lenge of secularism is also becoming day by day more acute.
From the one side, students of foreign origin bear a religious belonging and 
a family tradition (according to which religion must be respected as a belief, a 
worship, and a concrete authority performed by parents or community repre-
sentatives) and emphasize the identity meaning of religion. If non-Catholic, 
6 For distribution of non-Italians according to their religion, see also Idos, 2018: 196, and Ismu 
Foundation, 2018. Idos estimates that among foreigners 33% is Muslim; 30% Orthodox; 18% 
Catholic; 4.5% Protestants; 3% Induist: 2.5% Induist, 0.1% Hebrew; 1.6% Sikh and other East-
ern faiths; and 5% atheist or agnostic.
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they do not attend irc, because it is considered as “an hour of other people’s 
religion” (Frisina, 2011: 275). In this way, they reinforce the religious and cul-
tural divide between believers of different origins: seen as a narrow confes-
sional education, irc ends up going far from the article 9 of the Concordat, 
which states that the teaching of Catholic religion in state schools (according 
to the secular nature of the State) must be “part of the aims of the education 
system” and consequently cannot coincide with catechism, but it must be 
open to pluralism and take a cultural-historical perspective.
From the other side, native students attend irc for a range of motivations, 
not always spiritual or authentically religious, but often practical, opportunis-
tic, and superficial – which tends to diminish the importance and seriousness 
of irc itself.7 This is due to the increasing secularism, or laicism, or “flexible 
Catholicism” among Italian population, as Garelli (2011, 2012) pointed out, that 
is a widespread affiliation to Christianity associated to a secular behavior and 
discontinuous presence in ecclesial settings. Among Italian young people, a 
“cold” attitude towards religion and personal engagement in worship is very 
common, and it is called “occasional Catholicism” (Grassi, 2006: 60).
To remark the weakness of the irc (Canta, 1999), it is also worth mentioning 
that irc teachers are considered by students and parents as less authoritative 
than other professors; moreover, their professional status is more precarious in 
comparison with the rest of the teaching staff (Silhol, 2017).
To sum it up, as of today, irc must meet a double-face challenge:
a) to reinforce and legitimate its status, balancing believer and non-believer 
students’ needs in the light of a “national way to secularism” (Garelli, 2011; 
Canta et al., 2011), and
b) to help any religion to take voice in public spaces according to ecumen-
ism and post-secular societal needs (which requires that a discourse on 
God must be carried out and not bypassed, even in affluent and fully 
secularized societies8).
In particular, re is a sensitive and “heated” matter in the everyday life of school. 
The initiatives introduced by irc teachers outside the classroom (i.e. celebra-
tions, projects, campaigns etc.) meet the disagreement of atheist representa-
tives, who claim for a secular education according to the Constitutional right 
of freedom of belief and nurture a long-standing debate with many political 
repercussions on the status of re in public schools (Giorda, 2015). How-
ever, the presence of religions other than Catholicism among the student 
7 Mentasti and Ottaviano (2009: 243) spoke about a “lukewarm” participation to irc in a sam-
ple of upper secondary students surveyed in 2006.
8 On the post-secular societal needs, see: Rizzi, 2016.
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 population is not easy to manage and, often, it is up to irc professors to deal 
with it. Generally speaking, multi-religiosity is not emphasized or stigmatized 
in Italian public schools: rather it’s ignored and minimized.9 There is very lim-
ited room for minority religions (Ferrari A., 2013b), so that sometimes non-
Catholic migrant pupils do attend irc (especially those coming from an Or-
thodox, Protestant, and sometimes even Islamic family), when parents agree if 
their children get some information about religion instead of no religious in-
formation at all (or they attend classes against their parent’s wishes) (Frisina, 
2011: 276). In these cases, irc becomes a “space of presentation and mediation” 
between diverse habits, beliefs and traditions.
Because of these facts, the need to renew re in public schools has become 
urgent in order, firstly, to cultivate a type of education, which renews the sense 
of re for dubitative or superficial Catholic offspring. Secondly, to give room to 
other narratives of God (and spiritual positions) coming from minority believ-
ers, whose sense of belonging to their own religion is often stronger than the 
one Catholics have. re addresses both minority and majority followers (and 
atheists too) in order to raise awareness of the risks of fundamentalism and to 
educated in the practicing of dialogue. Consequently both irc and secular 
curricula, in the last few decades have begun to focus on active citizenship, 
communication about religion and interreligious dialogue (Vacchiano, 2013), 
as new fields of engagement for re scholars and teachers (Bradford Local Au-
thority, 2016; Salvarani, 2006).
4 Different Approaches to Interreligious Dialogue in the Italian 
Mixed Schools
On the future of re in Italy within the frame of intercultural education, an in-
tensive cultural debate has been developed in the last decades, involving poli-
ticians, Church representatives, academic experts, etc. An even higher number 
of Italians ask for a change in denominational re in public schools, despite 
they do not want to delete irc (Garelli, 2011: 171–4). Giorda (2015: 91) states that 
“This country offers a special and original focus to consider the ambiguity of 
unsolved tensions between the authority and the Constitutional privilege of 
one Church, the secularism of the juridical frame and the plural and super- 
diverse reality”. It is not surprising, then, if at a national and  institutional level, 
9 For example, non-Catholic students can opt out from irc, but they cannot have a parallel 
confessional education during the school time.
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the public debate brought about only few concrete  consequences.10 However, 
in many local realities affected by this debate and moved by a spirit of renewal, 
new pluralistic strategies have been adopted in re provision – some temporary 
and experimental, some more structured.
Many providers agree on two fundamental principles, useful to bypass prej-
udices and discriminations among students of different beliefs: a) knowledge 
about religion is necessary for anyone, believers and non-believers; b) confron-
tation among different beliefs must occur in a free and democratic educational 
setting (Pinto Minerva, 2012). By consequence re, no matter if denominational 
or non-denominational, must be rooted on the universal values of men and 
women, drawn from the European Union Chart of Values, and must train the 
basic citizenship competences in every (future) citizen (Halász, Michel, 2011).
In fact, re helps to reach a European integration, and must refuse any meth-
od or content that could end up separating, isolating, or segregating individu-
als on the basis of their religion, or that creates intergroup conflicts. Knowing 
one’s own religion, or others’ religion, is considered to be fundamental for a full 
maturation of the person and for a peaceful coexistence between diverse peo-
ple. On the contrary, ignorance and illiteracy, neglecting and neutrality facing 
religion issues are considered as factors of social disorder (Council of Europe, 
2008;11 Wierzbicki, 2016). This kind of preparation to diversity must occur in a 
secular environment, based on freedom of thought, conscience and religion, in 
which diverse religious beliefs are welcome, but none should have the promi-
nence on others. This is the necessary premise facing the risk that –among 
immigrant people– Islam would become the first minority religion by  number 
of followers and take advantage of other faiths, limiting the freedom of expres-
sion of other beliefs.12
10 For example, from about 2000 to now, a heated debate has been developed on the laicity 
in Italian schools, that is, the correctness of exposing religious signs in state schools (i.e. 
Crucifix), or imposing food regimes or religious celebrations to minority students (this 
echoed the laicism adopted in France with the “no-veil legislation” in 2003). See the men-
tion to “Ofena case” in Ottaviano, 2010. The issues at stake were: a) the way in which the 
secular nature of public institutions would be guaranteed, and b) the safeguarding of the 
right of free expression for every religion. At the end of a large debate, legislative changes 
have taken place.
11 Intercultural and interreligious dialogue, as a means to foster democracy and prevent so-
cial conflicts, is an idea emphasized by the White paper on Intercultural dialogue in Europe 
(Council of Europe, 2008: 4): “It contributes to strengthening democratic stability and to 
the fight against prejudice and stereotypes in public life and political discourse and to 
facilitating coalition-building across diverse cultural and religious communities, and can 
thereby help to prevent or de-escalate conflicts – including in situations of post conflict 
and “frozen conflicts””.
12 Although Islam is the majority faith followed by foreign citizens, in Italy the risk of “Islam-
ization” is far from the truth. Nevertheless, many authors report that native parents 
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Several authors and studies report experimental activities of interreligious 
dialogue, carried out both within and outside irc in Italian multi-cultural 
schools. All attempts are embodied in one of the three landscapes, designed by 
Canta (2006, 2013b).
1) Religious Pluralism: beyond irc (which remains unaltered, addressed to 
Catholics), other denominational teaching of religions could be offered 
to non-Catholic students as a curricular activity, according to specific 
agreements signed by the State and the single Churches. An alternative 
activity (aa) for atheist and agnostic students must be provided as well, 
to guarantee equity in the school offer, teaching “religious issues”, such as 
ethics, history of religions, religious culture.
2) Interreligious curriculum: with the compliance of ecclesial authority, irc 
could addresses all learners (who opt for irc and who do not), teaching 
the basic elements not only of Christianism but also of other faiths; i.e. 
the three monotheisms (Christianism, Hebraism and Islam) or some of 
Mediterranean faiths, or those religions that are represented in the school 
population.
3) “Understanding Islam” Laboratory: within irc curriculum, Catholic reli-
gion teachers can be prepared to teach some learning modules devoted 
to understanding Islam (of course, this module cannot be confessional). 
The aim of this proposal is multiple: to make Catholics aware of the his-
torical and cultural contribution given by the Islamic religion to Europe; 
to prevent the diffusion of religious prejudices towards Muslims (islamo-
phobia) among native students; to prevent the formation of radicalized 
visions of Islam among children of Muslim immigrants; to involve Mus-
lim students in participating at irc as witnesses of their own religion; 
and to implement a “laboratory” of interreligious dialogue, although this 
cannot universalistic (and participation of irc remains optional).
To mention only a few exemplary experiences, the first scenario is under-
pinned by what Giorda (2013) reports: in a Waldesian Lyceum (Torre Pellice, 
Piedmont), since 1984, a 5-year mandatory course of History of Religions, 
 associated to that of Local History,13 has been carried out. Both have been con-
sidered as complementary subjects to general history, and attended by both 
Waldensian and non-Waldensian pupils, believers and non-believers. “The 
 express an increasing islamophobia (especially after the 11th of September 2001), associat-
ing Islam to fanaticism, fundamentalism, intolerance and ethnocentrism, and this preju-
dice look higher towards Muslim Middle-Eastern people (Santerini, 2008; Branca, Cucini-
ello, 2014).
13 This course was activated in collaboration with the local archive and library of Walden-
sian Society of Studies.
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course, which features a historical approach and integrates the normal course 
of history, aims to teach the principal founding elements of the ancient reli-
gions of the Mediterranean (…) and of the religions of the present-day world; 
there are presentations of the Bible and the Koran (Giorda, 2013: 185). Learners 
are expected to understand “the main differences between religions, and to 
learn about the relationship between religion and culture of people through-
out history” (Ibidem).
Within the second landscape, a number of experimental curricula of re 
based on historical and comparative approach has been put in place in many 
Italian high schools (i.e. in Bari, Turin, Verona and Rome), often in collabora-
tion with Departments of Religious studies and academic staff of the local uni-
versities, local ministerial offices, ngos and municipalities. Salvarani (2008) 
reports the experience named Bible Educational, aimed at widening the knowl-
edge of the Bible beyond the Catholic students; it is a project carried out in 
many secondary schools (in 2006–2008) with the aid of the Ministry of Educa-
tion and several private foundations.14
However, before introducing an interreligious curriculum, there is the need 
to compensate the low preparation of ordinary teachers with external compe-
tences (which must come from both university and confessional agencies) 
(Rispoli, Giorda, 2016; Naso, 2013). When teachers are not prepared enough, or 
they have no textbooks and bibliography updated with the extracts from the 
Sacred texts of all religions, the experiment ends up being too specific and the 
school as a whole does not change, does not learn from the didactic innovation 
(Mentasti, Ottaviano, 2008). The main tendency, monitored in Italy, is the min-
imization of religious plurality: the majority of teachers underestimate the in-
fluence of religions in the classroom (Daher et al., 2016), and the potential of 
conflict underpinning the tacit non-consideration of other religions. In this 
way, the interreligious dialogue cannot proceed and teachers have to cope with 
the interfaith or intrafaith conflicts without appropriate tools (Daher et al., 
2017).
One other interesting innovation in irc provisions is the activity aiming at 
understanding Islam (third landscape). Since 2005, several ngos and experts 
in Islam-Christianity Dialogue have been committed to preparing didactic 
 materials in order to provide teachers with correct information about Islam, 
even in collaboration with the Faculties and Departments of Islamology (Bar-
gellini, Frascoli, 2005; Bargellini, Cicciarelli, 2007; Canta, 2013b; Cuciniello, 
14 See: www.bibbiaeducational.org. Other projects are reported in: Clementi, 2008.
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2017a). The first purpose is to lead Catholic students not to perceive Islam as an 
“archaeological” and uninvolved civility (according to a “synchronic approach”) 
and to transmit a more adequate representation of Islamic culture and societ-
ies, as: a) connected with the European history, and b) embraced by a multi-
segmented, non-monolithic population. A wider and modern view of Islam 
should include not only historical and territorial conquests, but also scientific 
and cultural innovations. Thus after a deconstructive analysis of traditional 
textbooks a re-construction of what is said and written about Islam in regular 
lessons has become a fundamental part of the new way to “understand Islam”.
5 The Study: Theoretical and Methodological Assumptions
In the previous paragraphs we described how re, multi-religiosity and secular-
ism set up in Italian public schools. To sum it up there is a contradiction be-
tween the institutional and the “relational” school life:
– At institutional and formal level, almost all religious issues are attributed and 
regulated within the irc frame (that is, teaching of one religion), as the rest 
of the subjects taught are “secular” or “neutral”;
– Instead, at relational and informal level, religious issues are lived and ques-
tioned by pupils, teachers and parents in the ordinary school life, being the 
majority of school staff almost uniformed and non-prepared to manage 
them.
When religious bullying arises or even happens, the high level of tension 
among peers reveals the difficult management of multi-ethnic classes (Berga-
maschi, 2016; Colombo, Santagati, 2017). Even the recent violence and radical-
ism within the second generation of immigrants tells us the same (Gambetta, 
Hertog, 2016), although this violence does not always occur within the school, 
as much as outside the school (Santagati et al., 2017). The persistence of the 
juvenile need to be identified (and distinguished) not only by name, family 
background, local and cultural roots, but also by the religious community the 
children/youngsters belong to, is a push for deep reflection for sociologists of 
education (Cipriani, Costa, 2015). It requires exploring:
a) the student’s point of view,
b) that of parents/teachers, and
c) the public/institutional perspective (Rowe, 2016).
Because of this, an empirical study has been carried out with the aim of explor-
ing the religious dimension of interethnic relationships in public schools. The 
analysis of religions in public schooling is associated to both the presence of 
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second-generation immigrants (who can get citizenship by law only at 18,  unless 
their parents have naturalized thus transmitted Italian citizenship to their mi-
nor-aged children) and the perspective of interreligious dialogue, that is, reli-
gious pluralism is seen as a push factor for re renewal (Halafoff et al., 2015).
The major aim of the field enquiry is analyzing how (and in which forms) 
religion is a relevant dimension within the interethnic dynamics in the school con-
text, both in vertical relationships (teacher-students) and horizontal relation-
ships (among peers).
The theoretical frame of research embeds religion in a system of interde-
pendency between four key dimensions: Identity (I), Freedom (F), Citizenship 
(C) and Common good (cg) (see Chapter 2). For native and immigrant popula-
tion, the religious belief has an impact on each of these dimensions, affecting 
both the individual and the collective life. Thus it is worth wondering: does the 
religious faith influence the process of Self-shaping? (I); how much can people 
practice a given religion freely within an institution or a social group? (F); how 
does a given religion affect the access to legal citizenship for the group of fol-
lowers? (C); what is the contribution of religiosity to the civic consciousness 
(religion as a cultural heritage)? (cg), and so on.
In the school environment, the four key dimensions lead to more specific 
questions, such as:
– How does pupil’s and adult’s religion become an element for self-identifica-
tion, self-expression and affirmation in intergroup exchanges? What kind of 
frictions or conflicts do the different cultural and religious identities bring 
about in the school environment?
– (F) Are teachers and students feeling free to express their own religious be-
liefs at school? How much is the attendance of irc classes freely chosen or, 
instead, imposed by parents among both majority and minority students? 
Are the religious prohibitions of school activities (among immigrant stu-
dents) an expression of their freedom of choice or a parent imposition? Is 
the freedom of expression about one’s own religion limited or negatively 
affected by prejudices, jokes, teasing or bullying among peers?
– (C) Is religion conceived by both young people and adults as a private or 
public matter? Are the non-Italian nationals affected by minority status, 
also due to their religious faith, as far as their sense of belonging and their 
school integration are concerned?
– (cg) Are the minority religions represented enough in the school curricu-
lum? Can the whole school population correctly understand the contribu-
tion of a single religion to the current national and European common 
identity?
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Our general hypothesis says that, despite religion is often considered as a rea-
son for social conflicts and xenophobia in secularized society, in the school 
environment students’ religious beliefs and values (if expressed in a regulated, 
welcoming and accommodating institutional setting) could be positive factors 
for the social integration process as a whole. In fact, religious socialization pro-
vided by family, school and confessional community might reinforce one’s 
own sense of identity and the will of integration by enlarging the social capital 
necessary for the growing process of pupils (Coleman, 1988). This applies both 
to native and immigrant children.
Through the medium of self-reports, collected by pupils, teachers and par-
ents, we can observe, firstly (Chapter 22), how (and in which forms) the reli-
gious belonging of the different social actors is visible and expressed in the 
school environment, rather than hidden and neglected. In particular, we want 
to verify if the “freedom of choice and expression” (as a Constitutional princi-
ple) applies to the religious needs and sensitivity of people who attend public 
education in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural situation. We expect to draw 
findings about:
a) Existence (or non-existence) of an open debate around the minority pu-
pils’ rights in schooling according to their religious convictions;
b) Different ways by which religion (or atheism) affects students’ behavior 
and attitudes;
c) Different patterns in the school-family link about religious matters, pos-
sible impediments or discriminatory behavior towards minorities (put in 
place by either teachers or peers), chances and opportunities generated 
by interreligious dialogue;
d) Different ways in which the school curriculum, and particularly the irc 
curriculum, deal with multi-religiosity the classroom.
Secondly (Chapter 23), we want to analyze religion as a triggering factor of in-
terethnic exchanges in schools, by wondering:
– Does religion play the role of “precipitating factor” of conflicts, being a 
source of problems and tensions, generally seen as the marker of diversity 
and social divide (Foner, Alba, 2008)?
– Or, on the contrary, is it a bridge for inclusion, a “facilitating factor” of the 
adaptation process of immigrant offspring?
Previous European studies on the same topic came to different conclu-
sions: someone found out that educational integration is facilitated by the 
disappearance of religious identity (Esser, 2010); someone else stated that, 
in some cases, religiosity is compatible with integration, if the receiving 
school contexts are welcoming enough and try to accommodate religious 
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 diversity (Flieschmann, Phalet, 2012). In our study, we expect to draw find-
ings about:
a) Different kinds of conflict (on the basis of religion) among peers and be-
tween teachers and students, or teachers and parents, in multi-cultural 
classrooms and how they generate, develop, spread with specific atten-
tion paid to words, attitudes and behavior adopted by social actors;
b) Different narratives on religious tensions, made by teachers, native and 
foreign students, native and foreign parents;
c) Ways to manage religious conflicts from the perspective of school institu-
tion and professors;
d) Explanations of religious-based conflicts from the different point of 
views of adults and preadolescents.
Of course, we will consider the backdrop of the possible conflicts in multi-
cultural classroom, that is, the wider social disadvantage of immigrant chil-
dren, due to the economic and cultural divide with native population, in which 
the religious difference covers only a part of the problem (Santagati, 2015; Ri-
cucci, 2017). Several studies highlight the combination between multiple con-
straints and factors of disadvantage (the so-called intersectionality) (Cren-
shaw, 1989), such as age, race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, class, cultural capital, 
living place, etc. According to the intersectionality framework, the interplay 
between structural and cultural factors brings about boundaries and hierar-
chies in social life, mostly beyond the individual efforts. Thus an empirical 
study on disadvantage categories and subjects should have the sensitivity for 
the issue of power and it should locate the social practice within given spatial 
and temporal contexts (Anthias, 2013).
As far as the methodology is concerned, the field enquiry was carried out 
in spring-summer 2017 in lower secondary state schools (compulsory educa-
tion) located in Lombardy (Italy): Milan, Brescia, and Bergamo.15 The target 
 population was made up of a sample of low secondary students (11 to 14 
years old), some of their parents, and a selected group of secondary school 
teachers and principals. 14 focus groups have been carried out (7 groups with 
students and 7 with adults) for a total of 74 students and 69 adults. Groups 
15 The schools participating in the research are: ic Calcio (Province of Bergamo – bg); ic 
Ovest 2 Tridentina Brescia; ic Pralboino (Province of Brescia – bs); ic Polo est Lumez-
zane (bs); ic Terzani Abbiategrasso (Province of Milan – mi); ic Palestro Abbiategrasso 
(mi); ic Aldo Moro Abbiategrasso (Mi); ic Borsi-Ojetti Milano; ic Primo Levi Baggio Mi-
lano. We are grateful to all participants and their school representatives for the serious 
and precious engagement in the study.
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were composed of believers of different religions and non-believer persons 
(atheist or sceptical): see Tables 21.1–21.2 for the participants’ composition.
A semi-structured grid of questions has been administered to each group of 
discussion (lasting 1.30 to 2.30 hours), based on similar inputs. All questions 
addressed to students and adults referred to the four key dimensions of the 
study (see above) and they tried to be as “two-fold” as possible: the same item 
was administered to both targets (youngsters and adults), with the necessary 
adjustments due to different languages and status. In Table 21.3, one can read 
the comparative list of questions.
All focus groups have been conducted and recorded by the same research 
staff. All transcripts have been processed by N-Vivo 11.0. Chapters 22 and 23 
will present some of the research findings about the main objectives of 
enquiry.
After these, two concluding chapters will host the analysis of the multi-reli-
giosity schooling link respectively in France (Chapter 24)  and Spain (Chapter 
25), two European countries whose history of migrations and public education 
systems are of interesting comparison with Italy. From a cross-national com-
parison, the reader will learn how much Italy differs on:
a) the implementation of secularization (which in France is part of the na-
tional identity) in public education;
b) the cultural diversity management within the earlier stages of public ed-
ucation, included the re curriculum which in Spain is under revision, 
due to the multi-religious composition of the classrooms in many places 
of immigration.
Source:  Author’s personal elaboration. 
Table �1.1  Focus groups with students – participants’ composition
fg N. Females Males Italian Non-
Italian






1 bs 14 8 6 7 7 7 6 1 0 0 0
2 bs 7 4 3 2 5 2 1 0 2 2 0
3 bs 12 4 8 6 6 6 3 1 0 1 1
4 bg 11 7 4 6 5 6 3 0 1 1 0
5 mi 10 4 6 5 5 8 0 1 0 0 1
6 mi 10 5 5 6 4 7 2 0 0 0 1
7 mi 10 5 5 4 6 4 4 0 0 0 2
tot 74 37 37 36 38 40 19 3 3 4 5
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Table �1.�  Focus groups with adults – participants’ composition
fg N. Females Males Parents Teachers Principals Italian Non-
Italian
Catholics
1 bs 13 13 0 7 5 1 9 4 10
2 bs 8 6 2 3 4 1 8 0 8
3 bg 13 6 7 5 7 1 11 2 11
4 mi 9 7 2 3 5 1 9 0 9
5 mi 9 6 3 4 4 1 7 2 8
6 mi 8 8 0 2 4 2 8 0 6
7 mi 9 7 2 0 6 3 9 0 9
tot 69 53 16 24 35 10 61 8 61





Identity What is their religious consciousness  
and “literacy”? What do they do to make 
their religion visible/invisible?
Agreement on “religion as 
identity factor” (collection of 
opinions)
Freedom Which feelings are associated to the 
expression of the minority or majority’s 
religion in the school context (I-F): 
Muslim veil, Catholic crucifixes …? 
(collection of episodes)
How/how much are religions 
expressed (or not) in the 
school context?In which 
forms? (collection of 
episodes)
How do they feel when coping with 
religious pluralism in the school?
How do they feel when 
coping with religious 
pluralism in the school?
Citizenship What religion-based conflicts do they 
cope with and how do they manage  
them (pro and against who?)?  
(collection of episodes)
How does pupils’ religion 
take part or intervene in their 
educational relationships 
(collection of episodes)?
Source:  Author’s personal elaboration. 
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In conclusion, we are convinced that the sociological look at the religion-im-
migration relationship in the school environment should develop a sensitivity 
about the main patterns of religious-based behavior in multi-cultural schools 
(including symbols usages). If school professionals would become competent 
to detect religious frictions and “religious bullying” among peers (along with a 
specific preparation in conflict management), they could recognize the multi-
ple nuances of religious pluralism and the ways it can increase or hinder inte-
gration of minority pupils. In this way, there would be room to enhance the 





What kind of religion-based 
conflicts do they cope with (if 
rights and duties are at 
stake)?
How do they manage them?
Common 
good
Do they think religion must be more or 
less considered in the curriculum?
Do they think religion must 
be more or less considered in 
the curriculum?
How do they practice dialogue with  
other religion observants?
How do they practice 
dialogue with other religion 
observants?
Source:  Author’s personal elaboration.
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Chapter 22
Religious Belongings in Multi-Cultural Schools: 
Freedom of Expression and Citizenship Values
Rosangela Lodigiani
1 Introduction
This chapter is aimed at presenting and discussing the main findings of the 
qualitative research illustrated in Chapter 21. Deepening the research findings 
by focusing on the basic concepts of religious freedom and citizenship rights, 
the chapter explores youth religious beliefs, spirituality and atheism in a con-
text of “weak secularization” (Chapter 3) and illustrates how the school can be 
deemed as a public space to test religious pluralism. Religious diversity deeply 
and increasingly challenges the school intended as a secular and open place, 
by producing different, when not fully opposite, reactions: from neutralization 
of religion to the promotion of its cultural dimensions. However, the interreli-
gious and intercultural dialogue developed within the school turns out to be a 
training ground for democratic citizenship, at least when aimed at fostering 
mutual knowledge, respect, acceptance of differences, and at sheltering from 
the temptation to reject different memberships because of a certain idea of 
secularism.
The chapter is organized as follows: §2 briefly draws the theoretical frame-
work and the research’s aim and hypothesis. The subsequent paragraphs ar-
range the research findings around four main themes, by deepening:
a) the freedom of expression of religious belonging (that is, religious free-
dom and the worship of one God, of another God or of no God at all) 
in the school context –through the use of religious symbols too–, where 
there may be either ease, caution, indifference or lack of awareness 
(§3);
b) the relation between religious plurality and the development of different 
“world visions”, which calls into question the citizenship values and the 
differentiation of public and private spheres (§4); 
c) educational students’ and families’ choices affected by religious beliefs, 
which show that issues that were thought to have been secularized – 
finding a peaceful solution in the differentiation of private, civil and reli-
gious spheres– are coming back in the school debate (e.g. how to protect 
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the right to freedom of expression, and what the boundaries of parental 
authority over children’s education are) (§5); 
d) the space for religious issues through and beyond the curriculum and in 
the daily school life: by enhancing different religious cultural heritage 
(§6, 7), the school becomes a “laboratory for dialogue”, in which different 
voices co-operate for finding ways of living peacefully together (§8).
2 Scenario Outlines, Theoretical Framework, and Study’s Aims
As described in the previous chapter, multi-ethnicity is becoming a struc-
tural and fundamental feature of Italian public schools. Actually, schools 
experience –and reflect– in a specific way what happens in society.
2.1 A Brief Outlook on the Italian Context
Since the beginning of the Seventies, Italy has started to record a positive net 
migration, reversing its traditional role and turning from an emigration to an 
immigration country. However, the increase of the foreign population, speed-
ed up especially since the Nineties, began to be felt in the school system, due to 
the growing of migrants’ offspring born in Italy to foreign parents or re-joined 
with members of their own family already settled in Italy. Some figures are use-
ful for drawing the trend.
In the last two decades, the increase of students with an immigrant back-
ground has been exponential, and Italy reported immigration rates of foreign 
student, calculated on the total amount of students, close to the ones recorded 
in the European traditional immigration countries (Santagati et al., 2019): from 
0.7 % in the 1996/1997 school year, the rate has been rapidly increased to 7.9% 
in the 2010/2011 school year and to 9.4% in the 2016/2017 school year. Particu-
larly in the last five years, there has been a surge of new migrant students, 
which can be partly explained by the significant rise in the arrival of unaccom-
panied minors, asylum seekers and refugees (Azzolini et al., 2019). Therefore, 
in the 2017/2018 school year, about 826,000 foreign students have been enrolled 
in the different educational levels of the Italian school system, which is charac-
terized by an inclusive approach. The rate reaches 10.7% in pre-school, 10.8% 
in primary school, 9.7% in lower secondary school, 7.1% in high school, re-
spectively (MIUR, 2018). Moreover, alongside the second generations of foreign 
immigrants, a second generation of “Italians with migratory background” is 
growing, born to –or re-joined with– foreign parents who have completed the 
naturalization process, and who, together with the children of mixed  couples, 
are legally indistinguishable from Italians students, except for some specific 
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points of view –e.g. language, religious confession or other features– which 
make them fully belong to the second-generation “universe” (Molina, 2014). As 
the latter is a plural and diversified universe, we should speak about “second 
generations of immigration” instead of “second generations of immigrants”1 
for a better understanding of the phenomenon.
The national outlook does not allow to appreciate the territorial differences 
that are relevant at the regional and, especially, at the local level: among cities 
of the same region or districts, or single schools of the same urban area. For-
eign population is distributed unevenly along the peninsula and the highest 
number of students with non-Italian citizenship does not necessary result in 
the highest rates. Lombardy is the region with the highest number of foreign 
students (207,979), equal to about a quarter of the total foreign students in Ita-
ly, while Emilia Romagna has the highest percentage of students’ regional pop-
ulations. Milan leads the cities ranking considering the absolute numbers, but 
it is not even among the top 10 in relative terms; however, in some districts and 
in some institutes, the percentage of students with non-Italian citizenship ex-
ceeds the majority, so as to have triggered –in some cases– the so-called “white 
flight” phenomenon (Pacchi, Ranci, 2017).
Beyond the statistics, Lombardy and the main urban centers of the region 
are interesting contexts to observe with regard to intercultural (and interreli-
gious) dynamics in multi-cultural schools because of the long-lasting attention 
to this issue witnessed by the large number of studies carried out on education 
and on social inclusion of foreign students, ethnic inequalities in education 
etc. (Santagati, 2015). In line with this type of studies, as explained in Chapter 
21, the research here presented focuses on 7 lower secondary schools (isced 2) 
in the Lombardy Region: 3 in Milan, 3 in Brescia and 1 Bergamo.2 These 
three cities gather about 37%, 17% and 12%, respectively, that is almost 
two-thirds of the total amount of foreign student enrolled in the Lombardy 
schools; and Brescia is the fourth largest city in Italy as for the foreign stu-
dents’ rate.
1 As claimed by the youngsters with a migratory background. See, for example, “Rete G2” (G2 
Network), a non-party national organization, founded –in connection with the International 
G2 Network– by children of immigrants and refugees born or arrived in Italy as children 
(http://www.secondegenerazioni.it/).
2 For more details about the schools and the persons included in the research, see Chapter 21 
Focus groups’ quotations reported throughout this chapter have been codified as follows: 
participants’ gender, nationality, religious affiliation (if any), fg number, school province 
and typology of participants (students or adults, that is: teachers/school manager/school as-
sistant or parents-mother/father).
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Due to the growth and expansion in the number of students with a foreign 
and migratory background, multiple cultural roots and religious belonging 
meet with each other in everyday school life, as in the whole society. The struc-
tural and stable changing in the ethnic composition of the classrooms under-
lines (in Lombardy as in Italy) the need to deal with the multi-cultural educa-
tion issues and takes back to the very center of the educational debate the 
question of how to treat the students’ different cultural and religious belong-
ings in order to promote school integration (Colombo, Santagati, 2017).
2.2 Beyond the School as a Secular Space
As deeply discussed in Chapter 21, the revival of the role of religion inside and 
outside the school environment contrasts with the idea that religion belonging 
must be shut in the private sphere and should not interfere with the under-
standing of the public schooling as a secular, “neutral” space, with respect to 
different religions.
The core idea of a secular education in public schooling took shape in a 
scenario of increasing secularization, pluralization and “disenchantment” of 
the world (in Weberian words) of Western countries, Italy included. In this sce-
nario, according to secularization theory, at the collective (political and insti-
tutional) level, the separation between State and Church authorities/religious 
communities became a central pillar of the “modern State”, intended as “a non-
denominational State”, and of liberal democracies grounded on the fundamen-
tal rights of universal human dignity and equality and freedom of expression. 
That is, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as affirmed by the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (1950, art. 9), but firstly stated by the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights of the Unite Nations (1948, art. 18). As for 
religion, this means: freedom to choose among different religions and between 
believing or not in any religion. It is worthy to add that, although the freedom 
of conscience, religion and worship is an inviolable right of the person, to be 
guaranteed to all citizens, the freedom to manifest and practice one’s religion 
is not absolute whereas it is subject to the political legitimation within the 
framework of democratic laws and citizenship, as we can read –for example– 
in the above-mentioned European Convention (art. 9). All these statements, 
principles and liberties are clearly expressed and guaranteed by the Italian 
Constitution (particularly at art. 8 and 19) too, and are today acquired and rec-
ognized as fundamental part of the European legal and legislative culture 
(Chapter 4).
In this wake, in accordance with the process of functional “differentiation 
and specialization” of modern society –which represents the basic assumption 
of the secularization theory (Luhmann, 1982) –, Churches and religious 
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 communities increasingly confined their function to pastoral care by renounc-
ing their competencies in other areas of society, schooling education included, 
while the State protects and promotes the rights and the general welfare of its 
citizens, without interfering in matters of faith. Simultaneously, at the indi-
vidual level, religious believing and behaviors have undergone a process of 
privatization as there is a link between the functional differentiation of the 
religious system within the whole society and the individualization of religious 
practice (Habermas, 2014).
In other words, as argued by Ferrara (2009; 2014), secularism refers both to: 
(i) a political dimension, since the Churches and the State are clearly separated; 
all citizens can freely exercise their religious freedom and worship (or athe-
ism), and the Church religious faiths are protected by the State, which main-
tains its “neutrality”; and (ii) a social dimension, since religious communities 
cease to influence law, politics, education and public life in general and be-
come functionally specialized sub-groups, while religious rituals, symbols and 
boundaries of faith diminish their role in marking significant moments of 
people’s lives, in shaping their thoughts, commitments, loyalties and their 
main concerns. As the author affirms, this distinction “allows us to pinpoint 
asymmetries and unbalances in complex processes of secularization. In some 
countries, at a certain time, political secularization may proceed at a faster 
pace than societal secularization” (Ferrara 2014: 68).
Within this framework, the implications of public schooling are supposed 
to be clear: the school has to focus mainly on its role of public and secular in-
stitution, by teaching civic and democratic citizenship values and competenc-
es, thus giving all students the same opportunity to access education regard-
less of their religious belief. Religion neutrality is assured through a curriculum 
that tends to expel “religion education” (re) (whatever the solution adopted by 
the organization, in order to ensure religion literacy alongside the curriculum 
itself): religion should not interfere with people behavior outside their very 
private sphere, in school life as well in public. From this point of view, the 
French case represents a meaningful example, since it theorized and then ap-
plied the so-called “Republican model of integration”, which turned into the 
“Republican model of indifference (to ethnic, but also cultural and religious) 
differences” (Ichou, van Zanten, 2019: 519–520; see also Chapter 24). 
However, in the last few years, the scenario has dramatically changed, and 
the complexity and misalignment evoked by Ferrara has come to the fore.
As Habermas –among others– argued, not only “the loss of function and the 
trend towards individualization (did) not necessarily imply that religion (has 
lost) influence and relevance either in the political arena and in the culture of 
a society or in the personal conduct of life”, and “quite apart from their 
 numerical weight, religious communities can still claim a “seat” in the life of 
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societies that are largely secularized”, but even the awareness about the persis-
tence of religion in the public arena is becoming “common sense” to the point 
that the awareness of living in a “post-secular society” is widely spreading (Ibi-
dem: 63–64). In the author’s thinking, three overlapping phenomena are mov-
ing in this direction: (i) the rise of international and local conflicts connected 
to religious issues (terrorism and fundamentalism); (ii) the revival of the pub-
lic role of religions in pluralist national contexts (as the Western ones), where 
a growing number of ethical dilemmas (i.e. abortion, voluntary euthanasia, 
bioethical new frontiers) needs a political regulation, which is hardly attained 
by ignoring Churches and religious organizations voices that push to enter and 
influence the public arena; (iii) the intensification of global migration flows 
that obliges to face the pluralism of religions, cultures and ways of life and the 
consequent challenges for social integration. As a result, not only people’s 
awareness of the relevant role still played by religion in the public space rises 
but, more radically, the secularization theory itself ends up going under pro-
found scrutiny (Rizzi, 2016; Chapter 3). 
Public school –as the whole society– is put to the test of religious plurality, 
expected to be a secular and, at the same time multi-religious, context (Fab-
retti, 2013), and is called to reach two different aims: because of its status of 
public institution, being a secular place, not conditioned by norms and values 
of a specific religion; and because of its status of education institution, pro-
moting religious education within a framework of mutual respect and toler-
ance about different religions. As highlighted in Chapter 21, due to the increas-
ingly multi-cultural and multi-religious character of contemporary societies 
and schools, this twofold purpose becomes more challenging, turning into a 
“dilemma”:
(i) being anchored to the “modern” idea of secularism (e.g. renouncing to 
delve into religious contents, ensuring that the school is recognized as a 
neutral space, a “free-zone” in which personal convictions and religious 
belongings are substantially ignored);
(ii) opening the door to the dialogue between different cultural roots and 
religious belongings, by teaching about different religions in a climate of 
mutual respect and reciprocal understanding.
2.3 Study’s Aims, Hypotheses and Questions
Against this backdrop, this chapter seeks to explore how the Italian pub-
lic school deals with these challenges; more in detail, the chapter aims at 
 investigating what place is given to religion in school life and in the curricula, 
assuming that the capacity of enhancing (respecting, knowing) the (religious) 
differences as an essential part of personal identity can be a lever promoting 
school (and social) integration. In fact, through the research outcomes here 
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discussed, we will shed a light on interethnic and interreligious dynamics in 
the school context, considering both vertical (between teachers/parents and 
students) and horizontal (among peers, and between teachers and parents) 
relationships, by scrutinizing if and how (in which forms and circumstances) 
religion affects them.
In our hypothesis, students’ religious belongings (beliefs and values) –if dia-
logue is encouraged and adequately accompanied– promote social integration 
in the multi-cultural school context. Although it cannot be excluded that con-
flicts and xenophobic attitudes may arise inside and outside the classroom, we 
assume that when conflicts are properly managed, they may represent an op-
portunity to foster social cohesion and build bridges between cultures.
Following the whole project’s theoretical framework, we can maintain that 
for both migrant and native students, personal belonging to a religion faces at 
least four cultural and social, individual and collective spheres of experience, 
here identified through the four keywords/lines of research outlined in Chap-
ter 2: Identity, (Religious) Freedom, Citizenship, and Common good. These 
four spheres of experience are mirrored by the school context in a specific way.
The first term, identity, focuses the attention on the individual and collec-
tive processes of (re)shaping self-definition, based on religious beliefs and val-
ues, in the school environment. More precisely, it pushes for considering reli-
gion belonging as a fundamental “identity marker” (among others) in school 
relationships: among students, between students and teachers, between teach-
ers and parents.
The second term, religious freedom, draws the attention to the legitimiza-
tion of the pluralistic involvement of religious identities and affiliation in the 
school life, by guaranteeing the right to freedom of religious choice and expres-
sion. Many questions arise around the actual exposure of one’s religion belong-
ing through symbols and/or decisions and behavior, which clearly depend on 
it.
The third term, citizenship, concentrates not only on the normative (regula-
tive and legislative) framework of religious freedom –in the Italian school pro-
tected by the Constitution and regulated through specific agreements between 
the State and different Churches, denominations and religious communities 
(Chapter 9)– but also on the contrasts that may arise among the multiple iden-
tities and loyalties deriving from the affiliation to a certain religion and con-
nected to the specific place where one has grown up (in our case, Italy).
The fourth term, common good, directs the attention to the school (students, 
teachers, parents) strategies (if there are any) to enhance re as a cultural heri-
tage for the curriculum enrichment, to consider interreligious dialogue as a 
laboratory of “civicness” and participation.
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Within this framework, the field research aimed at:
(i) analyzing school life and school curriculum to see if, and to what extent, 
religion is “at stake”, and which role it plays towards school integration;
(ii) describing the main patterns of religious-based behavior in multi- cultural 
schools (including symbols’ usages);
(iii) gathering empirical evidences about the role of religion diversity in 
school integration;
(iv) deepening the issue of interreligiouss conflict in the classroom (see 
Chapter 23, specifically focused on interreligious conflicts and integra-
tion processes in multi-cultural schools).
The focus groups and the chances for a progressive deepening that this meth-
od entails allowed us to delve into three main themes: spontaneous outpour-
ing of religious belonging; when and why (in which circumstance) the pres-
ence of different religious affiliations arises; how schools cope with religious 
plurality.
3 Religious Identity and Freedom: Lights and Shadows from an 
“opaque prism”
The issue of religious identity, explored through the spontaneous declarations 
of belonging at the very beginning of each focus group, shows, along with some 
elements of convergence, interesting differences between what students and 
adults think.
At first, consistently with other research carried out in the Italian multi-
cultural school (Ottaviano, 2010), the presence of different religions in the 
classroom is perceived as something that tends to remain in the shadow and 
that is generally a-problematic, since it is considered neither a relevant matter 
of interpersonal relationships nor a lever for conflicts. By examining the issue 
more in depth, however, the picture becomes more complex.
Thanks to the preliminary content analysis carried out with Nvivo software, 
it is worth noting the sizable difference in the most frequently-mentioned 
words recoded during the students’ and adults’ focus groups. Selecting the only 
words with a minimum length of four letters and excluding religion(s)/ 
religious, school(s), student(s), teacher(s) –which, due to the guideline pro-
vided for discussion, are necessarily continuously utilized in every focus 
group– we find that students largely utilize the terms freedom and friend/
friendship, while the adults’ narratives revolve around the concepts of 




The uneven distribution of the most recurrent words reveals students’ and 
adults’ different concerns regarding the presence of religion plurality at 
school: as we will examine below, the former certainly have been influenced 
by the students’ age (11–14 years) and the transition into adolescence that 
they are experiencing; the latter have been influenced, on the one hand, by 
their specific role –as teachers or parents–, and, on the other hand, by the 
composition of the adults’ sample, in which female teachers and people be-
longing to the national and religious majority were over-represented. Beyond 
the frequency, however, it is more interesting to understand the semantic 
context in which the most recurrent words have been used and the meaning 
given to them. To understand these aspects, we need to go in-depth into the 
analysis.
3.1 The Students’ Point of View
In the students’ opinion, religious belonging remains in the backdrop of their 
identity until something happens and brings it back to the surface. They de-
clare that religion is not influential neither in their interpersonal relationships 
nor, in more in general, in their daily life, both inside and outside the school. 
According to them, religion pertains to the individual, to the “private and emo-
tional sphere”, and certainly, it is not relevant in forging the bonds of friend-
ship. It is therefore not important to talk about it, to address the issue openly.
On the one hand, there is a strong (idealistic) recall to the shared values of 
friendship and “common humanity”: religion belonging is not important –they 
say– since friendship goes further, as all people are equal. “Friendship has no 
religion. Friendships are always friendships without religion. Friendship is not 
based on religion or nationality” are the most used phrases at the beginning of 
every focus group.
I don’t care about religion or nationality because, actually, even if we be-
long to different religions, we are all brothers and sisters … hence, we are 
all bonded together, nothing and nobody can divide us. (Female, Moldo-
va, Orthodox Christian, fg 1 bs, students)
On the other hand, the issue –as the students assert– simply does not concern 
them as young people, more precisely as adolescents with many interests but 
with no interest for religion.
Religion … it’s more for adults. Indeed, it’s just for adults! As teenagers, we 
don’t care so much about religion, because then it depends on what you 
like … I like football and when we talk, we talk about hobbies and not 
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about religion, which is a bit more of an adult thing. (Female, Egyptian, 
Muslim, fg 7 mi, students)
It is not by chance that friendship is positioned at the top of students’ concerns 
and thoughts. During the adolescence transitional phase, finding one’s own 
place in the world and the process of identity formation require peer confron-
tation, from which depends one’s own self-esteem (Jounisse, Hanye, 1992).
Beneath the surface, however, students’ points of view differ. Once called to 
reflect on concrete experiences, on their actual relationships at school with 
peers of other religions, they reveal to be aware of their own (and other stu-
dents’) religious affiliation and the role that it actually plays in different situa-
tions. Religion may facilitate friendships among students affiliated to the same 
religion or hinder friendships with students that “are perceived” as belonging 
to a different religion. In other words, religion may connect students to each 
other or may bring differences to light.
In the first part of the discussion, however, religion is seen by students as 
any other personal feature that they may, or may not, have in common. As 
studies on adolescents have long been demonstrating, friendship is nourished 
by reciprocal and consensual validation: “reciprocity” lies at the root of 
 friendship, thus giving to this bond a symmetric feature (in contrast with the 
asymmetry that characterizes parents-children relations). Moreover, adoles-
cent friendship is based on a process of “co-construction of reality” that 
Table 22.1  Most frequently mentioned words during the focus groups
Students’ fg Adults’ fg
Words Frequency Words Frequency
Friend/Friendship 227 Woman/girl 350
Person 234 Differences 332
Family/Parents 225 Family/Parents 291
Christians/Christianity 180 Culture/cultural 165
Differences 158 Conflict 156
Conflict 149 Italy/Italian 143
Muslim 148 Catholic 143
Freedom 125 Male 136
Nationality 109 Children 132
Italian 93 Muslim 125
Source: Author’s personal elaboration
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 emerges through debates, discussions, compromises and negotiations, and 
that permits to participate in the “construction of each friend’s life story” (Ibi-
dem, 1992: 60). In this perspective, religion may affect friendships firstly be-
cause “you do the same things, you go to the same places, you have the same 
school hours, you schedule the same activities…”, and secondly because you 
share the same values and ideas, as many students concurred.
Going in-depth into the analysis, students admit that religion is a “sensitive” 
issue, which should be handled with care. It is something one can talk about 
freely, but with caution, as one can fear to be misunderstood or even teased 
about; something that makes you think of the other as an “unknown world”, 
even when looking at the choices he/she makes at school, which are not always 
transparent.
Although students unanimously declare they feel free to show their reli-
gious beliefs, and part of them clearly recognize that religion freedom is one of 
their rights which are protected by the Italian law in public schools (see also 
Chapter 9), various participants show they worry about being teased and mis-
understood because of religion and report that similar circumstances occurred 
to some of their classmates. This kind of worries could be an unavoidable im-
plication of the typical adolescent’s overriding concern –the inner personal 
need of being accepted/included as a boy/girl by the peer group– rather than 
an effective anxiety relating to religion diversity. However, many students’ nar-
ratives converge on it within the majority (Catholic students) and the minority 
groups (with different religious belonging and/or ethnic origin): both recall 
circumstances in which they (or some friends of theirs) have endured sarcastic 
jokes or even religious bullying.
This should be a public school; hence we should take the fact of being 
free for granted! If one is a Muslim or a Buddhist, there is no problem! For 
example, I’m a Christian, thanks to my parents, even if I do not profess 
very much … I do not really mind about it. It might be a problem for 
someone else, but that’s the society’s feature today, so … (Female, Italian, 
Christian, fg 6 mi, students)
I feel free to express my religion, it’s my right. That is all. The others could be 
against me, but I don’t care. The only thing is that sometimes I have a prob-
lem in sharing my opinion with my classmates: they keep on bullying me 
most of the time. (Female, Egyptian, Coptic Christians, fg 6 mi, students)
I am Christian, I believe and I like religion. However, my classmates often 
say unpleasant things about my religion: I feel free to profess it, but some-
times they hurt me. (Female, Italian, Christian, fg 7 mi, students)
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Actually, freedom of expression seems to be an acknowledged and proclaimed 
right more than a fact experienced at first hand. However, the scarce ability to 
identify moments and contexts in which they benefited from religious free-
dom hides the fact that it is generally taken for granted. This is true especially 
for the Italian students who claim to be Catholics: there is little awareness that 
religious belonging may represent a means for their self-affirmation or self-
definition, while the awareness arises among minority students and those who 
proclaim themselves to be atheists. Among the minority groups, however, 
there could be the habit to keep religion belonging to the foreground, as any 
other diversity markers, in order to reduce contrasts and possible stigmatiza-
tions. The fear of being excluded tends to prevail.
The classmates’ religious affiliation is generally deduced from external 
behavior and personal choices: in this perspective, what they eat at the caf-
eteria, their behavior during gym time, their participation (or not) in edu-
cational trips, and –particularly– their use of some religious symbols (such 
as the Islamic veil and headscarf, the Sikh uncut-hair, or the Christian 
cross) are considered as relevant markers that bear witness more than any 
spoken word. Furthermore, consistently with some research carried out in 
other countries (Jackson, 2014), the students interviewed firmly support the 
right to wear religious symbols as an expression of their own faith. It is 
perceived as something compatible with the school (and society) 
multi-culturalism.
However, in mixed classrooms, religious symbols sometimes are misunder-
stood and thus inappropriately used to label classmates. They are even worn 
and utilized without being fully aware of their meaning, just as ethnic fashion 
accessories mirroring a style of clothing, hence it is not always possible to pre-
sume the religion belonging of a classmate by only observing the external sym-
bols he/she wears. “There are girls with veils: thus, one understands that they 
are Muslim, but then there are also Muslims without a veil” is the laconic gloss 
of a Muslim male student from Pakistan (fg 1 bs). Another student echoes: “…
it depends because … maybe you can understand if a person is Indian from the 
traditional clothes he/she wears, but … you don’t recognize it … that is, you 
cannot say yes, he/she belongs to that religion because … one can be Moroccan 
or Indian … and wear western clothes … so it’s difficult to understand” (Male, 
Indian, Sikh, fg 2 bs, students).
From the students’ narratives, the idea that the veil (or other symbols) may 
be in profound relation with one’s identity, as an external signal for 
 self-affirmation and subjectivation – or even, as some research pointed out 
(Fassari, Pompili, 2017) for combating the stereotype that wearing the veil is an 
imposition suffered by girls and women, due to unavoidable family or commu-
nity traditions – does not emerge. Few students try to understand whether the 
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veil is a symbol of fundamentalism or just of cultural diversity: the curiosity to 
grasp their deepest meaning, or to wonder about it, remains latent.
Actually, students tend to simplify and stereotype classmates’ affiliations, 
often confusing religious affiliation with physical appearance or ethnic origin 
with nationality. In their mind, Italian corresponds to Christian, or white-
skinned, by default, likewise dark-skinned corresponds to Muslim, to the point 
that discovering that there are Italian Muslims or white-skinned Muslims has 
been reported as something still astonishing.
The students’ low familiarity with religion within the educational settings 
does not mean that the religious matter is expelled from school lessons, rather 
it is both a proper object of the re lessons and an occasional object in other 
disciplines of study (we will further examine this issue below: §5). However, 
students complain that teachers rarely give room to a deeper reflection and 
that teachers’ religious belonging (if there is any) remains generally hidden 
from their eyes.
As wondered by a Catholic, Italian male student (fg 1 bs): “We never speak 
about religion at school. Maybe this matter is something that teachers want 
keeping as private”.
In a nutshell, religious identity and freedom of expression through symbols 
and daily actions emerge among students with different nuances: ease for 
someone; caution and distress for others; and indifference or lack of awareness 
for others. In any case, the sensitivity of teachers and school managers, togeth-
er with a cooperative family-school relationship, can be decisive to let religious 
plurality enter the school as an issue to treat openly. To delve into the point, it 
is worth highlighting how adults deal with religious belonging at school.
3.2 The Adults’ Point of View
In the same way as students/children, the largest part of teachers and parents 
involved in the focus groups (excluding the answers of the teachers of re) ini-
tially declared that religion belonging should remain confined to the private 
sphere: teachers do not want to create barriers that hinder an open dialogue 
with students, and parents do not want to be misunderstood and prejudicially 
labelled.
According to some teachers, keeping religious identity into the private 
sphere is necessary to properly exercise their role in compliance with their own 
commitment to a secular education in the public school, for being super partes, 
tolerant and respectful towards the different beliefs of students (and their fami-
lies), and avoiding to construct “walls” and barriers. Disclosing it –someone 
adds– could be counter-productive since exposing or talking about one’s own 
religion and beliefs, or simply showing one’s belonging through religious sym-
bols, can produce frictions with students and their families.
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(Our own religion) is something personal … so it isn’t something to show 
off and it doesn’t really concern school. It can, by the way, come out and 
you can talk about it and make the most of it in a specific context, in con-
nection with a topic or something happening, otherwise it can’t be  useful. 
(Female, Italian, School assistant, Catholic, fg 2 bs, adults)
At school it is not relevant. Maybe because religion is something spiritual 
(…) something very personal, which we have inside. (Mother, Tunisian, 
fg 1 bs, adults)
Being Catholic, Muslim, Evangelical, it’s a form of choice to be the 
unique human being one can be, who lives as a Catholic, as a Protestant 
and so on (…) people can’t be categorized, because the truth, for me, has 
got lots of different sides, it can’t be kept within bounds, only in one 
field. In this world, (…) we can’t categorize, because if we do that, we 
withdraw; instead, opening to the others as individuals means to be uni-
versal, to be open towards anybody, towards differences, towards meet-
ing and dealing with others. (Male, Italian, School manager, fg 5 mi, 
adults)
I’m an Evangelical, but I don’ like labels, because behind a label there are 
a lot of prejudices and a lot of judgment, which prevents any dialogue. I 
don’t do that, even if I’m deeply convinced, I’m observant and everything, 
but I prefer when people notice, thanks to my actions, my way of living 
and dealing with others and being an open-minded person. (Mother, Ital-
ian, fg 5 mi, adults)
Not surprisingly, unlike the students, teachers are more aware of the impor-
tance of religious belonging in the process of identity formation. According to 
some of them, religious beliefs and affiliations represent a habit that concerns 
a person’s daily actions and relationships, and since they –the habit and the 
person– are one, the former does not need to be explained.
First of all, we all have something in common with the others, as human 
beings. (Father, Albanian, fg 3 bs, adults)
Generosity, for instance, is an aspect of the religion I belong to and that I 
usually practice (…), generosity is something I have been taught for all my 
life, by the people who witness it, or anyway indirectly by the  meeting I 
have had with God, so I bear it as my main characteristic … In this way, I 
think I witness my religious belonging without saying it openly; even if I 
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openly say I’m a Catholic to my students. (Female, Italian, Teacher, Cath-
olic, fg 3 bs adults)
It is an identity element which is part of our way of being, if I am like that 
it is also thanks to my religious faith, my education and so on. (Mother, 
Italian, Catholic, fg 3 bg, adults)
Well, I’m a church-going Catholic (…) I don’t see that as something I wear 
on the surface, but it must be your way of being; well, I’m a Catholic, but I 
don’t play the Catholic, I believe, but I don’t play that role. And my way of 
being a Christian Catholic has to be visible through my daily actions, 
through my way of acting and speaking, thanks to the choices I make. 
Besides, I’m convinced that every religion, the Catholic one, the Jewish 
one and the Muslim one must focus on the idea of meeting and on a con-
structive debate. (Male, Italian, School manager, Catholic, fg 5 mi, adults)
Called to reflect upon their actual freedom to express religious belonging, 
teachers and parents feel that they are completely free and are convinced that 
their students do feel the same.
I express my religious affiliation in an extremely free manner (…). For me, 
there is no such thing as not being able to freely express one’s religious 
affiliation. (Mother, Italian, fg 4 bs, adults)
When it happens during my lessons, I express my idea, my religious creed, 
without any problems. We often face the subject during our school activi-
ties, so, since I talk about it, even my students do the same (….) In prac-
tice, we often face subjects which lead to the religious aspect and to a 
constructive debate. (Male, Italian, Teacher, Catholic, fg 3 bs adults)
We don’t have to put up barriers, I am (…) free, free, because I’m open-
minded, I’m Muslim, I pray, but I’m even open to talk about my religion … 
(Mother, Macedonian-Albanian, Muslim, fg 3 bs, adults)
However, two caveats are worth noting:
– On the one hand, adults, and particularly teachers, are fully aware that 
speaking about their own religion may create difficulties to students which 
are sometimes afraid of being teased or simply are less self-aware or their 
own convictions and beliefs, given their young age.
– On the other hand, teachers and parents agree that students have little 
knowledge about religion. In this regard, our research seems to confirm 
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what mentioned above (§2.2): religion privatization and  individualization 
tend to produce religious illiteracy and trigger religious indifference, espe-
cially among young people, among which those who declare themselves 
to be atheist and agnostic are growing in number. This phenomenon is in-
creasingly visible in Italy too (Cadeddu, Melloni, 2018; Garelli, 2016; Melloni, 
2014). Although the religious affiliation remains higher among the Italian 
population, compared with the average of the Western European countries, 
and Catholicism is still the first religion of the Country, a “flexible Catholi-
cism” is emerging, making room for personal interpretations of religious 
precepts and for critical positions towards the Church (Garelli, 2012).
Maybe, there are more people who don’t feel like sharing their religious 
experiences with Italian students, sometimes they feel ashamed or sim-
ply a bit afraid … they are discrete … sometimes it is hard to let their 
characteristics come out … well, we need to follow some paths … where 
they can feel welcomed and free to talk about it, to bring out their pecu-
liarities. (Female, Italian, Teacher, fg 2 bs, adults)
The general trend is that students don’t get to know other people’s reli-
gion, because it is not an aspect that comes out at first. (….) I’m thinking 
about my classes, there are a lot of religions and students … who find it 
difficult to get the right time to talk about their faith, their religion, and to 
express it through their way of being, so sometimes, they are, maybe, I 
beg your pardon for my words, “crashed by that aspect” (…). It is not 
something that comes out positively, it only … comes out in a very super-
ficial way … I tease you because you wear a veil or because you don’t eat 
this and that, so, well, I really don’t think that what concerns the religious 
sphere is a bed of roses, I really don’t think so; on the contrary, in my 
opinion, at school, they don’t show their religious belief so much. (Fe-
male, Italian, Teacher, fg 3 bs, adults)
I feel that they don’t give great importance to their religion (Catholic). 
What I notice, on the contrary, is that they have a great curiosity towards 
the Muslim religion. I notice that when we face the subject from a histori-
cal point of view, they keep asking questions to their schoolmates. Yes, 
they have a sort of curiosity but, in my opinion, it is not connected to the 
religious belief itself, but to their habits, which are so different from theirs, 
and they want to know why. (Female, Italian, Teacher fg 4 mi, adults)
We have freedom of worship, but it’s superficial, young people don’t think 
about religion; as I see it, teenagers and children, since we are talking 
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about lower secondary school, don’t talk about religion when they are 
together, even Catholic teenagers don’t do that, common topics are: the 
way you dress, what music you listen to, what sort of mobile you have, so 
I underline it, well … I don’t even see it as a form of division. Just when 
they start to observe “the way they dress” then they wonder about it. 
(Mother, Italian, fg 3 bg, adults)
What is more, teachers are persuaded that parents generally acknowledge that 
the school can be a favorable place for their children to fully express them-
selves and their religious affiliation. At the same time, they seem deeply aware 
that a reciprocal trust can be reached only step by step. It’s a long way to, a sort 
of learning path featured by open dialogue, commitment, willingness to listen 
to each other without prejudice.
I believe we have basic confidence in our school: families know their chil-
dren are safe here at school and the message is, or at least I believe it is (a 
lot of mothers come to our school, well the general opinion is that, at 
school, children are at ease and teachers look after them). (Female, Ital-
ian, School manager, fg 2 bs, adults)
I sometimes have perceived that foreign parents –as long as you respect 
their children and they understand you are there to do the right thing for 
their children, and you devote to that– accept your decisions and are 
aware that all that you do is for their children’s good education, they re-
spect you. So, the basic choice is: I respect you and when I understand this, 
I accept any action or decision you make. (Mother, Italian, fg 2 bs, adults)
Besides a deep confidence in the school’s ability to be a “common place for 
everyone”, the awareness that conflicts and frictions may arise is widespread as 
well. When solicited to push forward their analysis, going beyond the abstract 
principles to describe what happens during and between the lessons in the 
school environment, the picture outlined by the adults becomes multi-faceted 
and some criticalities –concerning the school-family/teachers-parents’ rela-
tionships, especially– are pinpointed. It is not by chance that, at this level, the 
parents’ voice emerges more clearly.
4 Religious Beliefs and Citizenship Values: the Blurring Boundaries 
between the Public and the Private Spheres
Generally speaking, public school is perceived as an open and inclusive space, 
capable of assuring freedom of religious expression to all its members and 
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stakeholders. However, even the huge complexity of the issue emerges, togeth-
er with the need to be better scrutinized within the daily school life practice, 
where ideal precepts and concrete actions intertwine, and where the secular 
feature of the school demands to be preserved.
Religious belonging, in many ways, concerns citizenship rights and religious 
freedom, as defined above, that is: (i) freedom to believe, as an inviolable right 
for the human person; and (i) freedom to express one’s faith within the given 
framework of rules and norms for a democratic coexistence (Bychawska-Sin-
iarska, 2017). In other words, the full enjoyment of the right goes hand in hand 
with the fulfilment of the corresponding duties. Indeed, the multi-faceted fea-
ture of this relationship clearly emerges when we also consider the right to 
practice one’s own faith.
The many dilemmas that may arise from the struggle due to the coexis-
tence in the same public arena of different religious values and prescrip-
tions, possibly contrasting some democratic values, have found a solution 
across the ages in the separation between the public and the private sphere. 
As mentioned above (§2.2), while it seems relatively easy to outline the rela-
tionship between the State and the Church (Churches) –which are two insti-
tutions– as the paradigm of secularization theorizes, it is much harder to 
trace the relationship between citizenship (human) rights and religious 
rights. The latter, in the name of a religious belonging, recall the need for 
religious practices to comply with the rules (and limits) of the democratic, 
liberal society.
According to Max Weber’s lesson in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, for some aspects still unsurpassed (Rossi, 2002), any religion em-
beds ethical and moral principles as well as (what any religion considers) “civic 
virtues”, values and norms, that is, an idea of what constitutes a good citizen, of 
how it should be the “right order” of society (together with the affirmation of 
the truth and of the universality of their assumptions). This occurs even if the 
relationship between the religious doctrine and a moral code does not follow a 
unique model, since it is defined in a specific (and differentiated) way for each 
religion. Therefore, religious affiliation affects individual and collective life-
conduct and coexistence. Consequently, human rights (and the relating uni-
versal and internationally protected legal code) and “God’s rights” (specific re-
ligious law of the diverse religious communities and Churches) may collide 
with each other (Ferrari, 2017). Following the author, we may mention three 
main areas of possible ethical conflicts:
– The first area concerns religious practices expressing the right of parents to 
transmit their religious faith to their children, but potentially crashing with 
individual rights. A meaningful example is neonatal male circumcision, a 
fundamental practice both for Judaism and Islam. Practiced in the first few 
weeks after birth, therefore necessarily disregarding the individual consent, 
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it leaves an indelible physical mark, which may be considered as a violation 
of the individual integrity of one’s own body;
– A second area relates to the juridical status of women: human rights conven-
tions prohibit any discrimination based on sex, whereas many religions pro-
hibit ordaining women to the priesthood, prevent them from accessing 
other leadership positions in the religious community or gaining access to 
certain functions or jobs;
– A third area concerns the right to convert, that is to replace one’s current re-
ligion or belief with another (on none), protected by the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights, but strictly banned (and even punished) from some religion 
systems (Ibidem).
Without further exploring these extremely controversial debates, these few 
hints offer a suitable framework to understand to what extent, in the con-
temporary plural society, it is difficult to establish, once and for all, the 
boundaries between different orders of law, and between beliefs and 
practices.
These arguments are breaching the wall among the scholars who reflect on 
the “post-secular turn”, questioning the supposed religions irrelevance in poli-
tics and in public life. As argued by May et al., religion “is not simply concerned 
with supernatural entities and the nature and existence of a transcendental 
realm. It is also, crucially, a framework through which interpreting and re-
sponding to immanent contexts, events and experiences. Through symbolism, 
rhetoric, images, narratives, histories, myths, values and experiences, religious 
ideas and influences continue to intervene in, and unsettle, the supposedly 
ordered rational nature of secular politics” (2014: 339).
Clearly, the aforementioned controversies do not directly pertain to the 
school domain, but to the awareness that the relevance of these issues should 
be reminded in the school debate. As stated by Benadusi et al. (2017: 478), the 
debates concerning the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural schools tend to switch 
“from the religions (viewed as spiritual and pragmatic systems for “ordering” 
the world) to religious beliefs (seen as systems of values and moral guidance 
for conforming to institutions and adhering to established religious practices)”. 
The relationship between religious beliefs and power is particularly “circum-
vented or suppressed in the public discourse on religious teaching in schools 
and in educational curricula” (Ibidem), but its relevance deserves much 
 attention. In fact, the school mirrors similar sets of problems and, in a way, al-
lows us to focus on them better, as the separation between the public and the 
private spheres is daily challenged by the students’, families’ and teachers’ be-
haviors and choices. The legal protections of religious freedom, while provid-
ing a crucial leverage for social integration, triggers claims for the recognition 
of the legitimacy of each religious belief and practice within the school life, by 
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asking for a definition of borders between religious and civic loyalties – bor-
ders that no longer seem easy to identify.
As highlighted above, the different ethnic, cultural, and religion affiliations, 
burst into the school daily life mainly through external symbols and customs, 
like some peculiar eating habits observed in the school cafeteria (e.g. not eat-
ing pork meat, fasting, eating halal food) or some religious symbols worn by 
students (e.g. the Islamic veil). However, both students and adults agree that it 
is when these external symbols and customs start to influence people’s behav-
ior that they need to be handled in some way. The cases reported by focus 
groups’ participants concern some “typical” circumstances, such as:
− The request –from some students (and their families)– not to be enrolled in 
the Catholic religion lessons or to be enrolled in them despite admittedly 
adhering to another religion or despite being atheist/agnostic;
− The request –from some female Muslim students (and their families)– not 
to attend two-days (or more) long school trips, and not to have male class-
mates seated next to them;
− The request –once again from some female Muslim students (and their 
 families)– for a derogation to the dressing code, e.g. the request to wear only 
long pants during gym class or other special clothes for attending sports 
activities (e.g. swimming) or to skip swimming lessons.
Evidently, these are very different examples. However –although with different 
intensity– they all prove how much the distinction between the private and 
the public spheres at school is blurred. Furthermore, these examples prove the 
inner “power dimension” of school relationships and the religion’s role in 
shaping people’s (in this case, students’) “world vision”. Consequently, they re-
veal how thorny the recognition of religious rights at school is, not only from a 
cultural and religious point of view (pertaining values and beliefs) but also 
from a political one, lato sensu. Ethical and moral principles, as well as “civic 
virtues” (as intended above), are –more or less implicitly– fundamental mat-
ters of the religious socialization that students undergo within their families, 
and surface in some of the family’s choices, preferences and prohibitions im-
posed to them in the school contexts, as well as in some students’ behaviors, 
challenging the school’s ability to properly answer as a public, secular, and 
plural space, and bringing the school-family relationship to the foreground.
5 The School–Family Interface as a Keystone for Religious 
Socialization
In a certain sense, the aforementioned requests brought to the fore what 
Charles Taylor theorized about the effects of secularism on religion, in his 
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highly-influential book A Secular Age: “Believing in God is no longer axiomatic. 
There are alternatives. And this will also likely mean that at least in certain 
milieu, it may be hard to sustain one’s faith. There will be people who feel 
bound to give it up, even though they mourn its loss” (Taylor, 2007: 3). Religious 
belief has become a “social contingency”. This assertion does not imply that 
believers experience their own faith with the sense of contingency or value-
relativity, but that our social world is now sufficiently pluralistic regarding 
faith-commitments, to the point that we no longer consider religion as what 
provides us with the default normative foundations for collective action (Gor-
don, 2008: 665).
Religion interpretation of the world cannot be longer taken for granted, 
since it is a possibility among others. The gradual loss of a fully shared com-
mon sense –that is, the “social imaginary” (…), the “common understanding, 
which makes common practices possible, and a widely shared sense of legiti-
macy” pushes forward for a “radical reflexivity” (Taylor, 2007: 171–2). In other 
words, in post secular society, religion turns into a system of beliefs that is both 
self-reflexive and aware of the pluralistic scenario in which it is definitively 
inserted. As underscored by Ferrara (2014: 70), Taylor’s argumentation allows 
us to pinpoint a third dimension of secularism (together with the political and 
social ones, mentioned above), a phenomenological and “experience-near” di-
mension: “from the standpoint of this third variety of secularism, belief and 
non-belief, theism and atheism are not to be seen as rival theories, in cognitive 
terms, but rather as different ways of being in the world, of living one’s life”. As 
a consequence, the experience of believing has undergone a deep transforma-
tion: from being the unquestioned framework shared by everybody in a natu-
ral, unreflective way, to being one among other options available, and which 
can no longer be lived in an unreflective and naïve way.
Keeping this background, it is worth noticing that this self-awareness seems 
to be shared by all focus groups’ participants. The major part of the narratives 
underlines the importance of reciprocal exchange of views on religious issues 
and related practices, even if this exchange may lead to some disagreement.
In this regard, two macro-issues deserve our attention: the process of reli-
gious socialization and school-family dialogue.
Not surprisingly, family is acknowledged as the main agent of students’ reli-
gious socialization, even if the school and the peer group certainly contribute 
to it, considering that school is the place where the youngsters spend most of 
their time and build friendships. The opinions of students, teachers and par-
ents converge in it: family plays a fundamental role in the transmission of val-
ues and religious heritage. Not by chance, family, mother, father, parents were 
among the most-frequency words counted by the Nvivo Word Frequency 
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 Query. The socialization role of the family is considered as pivotal, especially 
for families with a migratory background and their offspring. As some research 
has proved, it is an ambivalent role since it may favor or hinder the children’s 
integration process inside and outside the school (Bichi et al., 2018; Ricucci, 
2017).
Parents are seen as the legitimate custodians of the religious knowledge 
transmitted to children. Hence, they are also responsible for the quality of the 
religious education offered to them. The educational and socialization role of 
the family is considered to be so influential that, according to many narratives, 
students’ behavior should be interpreted as a “direct consequence” of the 
teaching received at home, consistently with a “over-socialized” vision of the 
children that does not recognize neither the dynamic and relational nature of 
socialization process nor the active involvement of children themselves (Klin-
genberg, Sjö, 2019). What is more, this vision does not take into account that 
religious socialization is a process occurring in several different settings simul-
taneously, since there are many different ways in which young people encoun-
ter religion (Ibidem).
By the way, recognizing the family as a fundamental agent of religion social-
ization leads to highlight the responsibility that falls on parents’ shoulders, and 
the controversial aspects that may arise from the clash between, on the one 
hand, their influential role in children’s identity formation and, on the other 
hand, the peers’ and school’s (and media’s) influence that increases during the 
adolescence, thus eroding parents’ authority.
Approaching the issue, both youngsters and adults participating in the fo-
cus groups somehow “theorize” that all the families shape children choices, 
behavior, and beliefs regarding, for instance:
− Which religion to follow (and whether or not to follow one);
− Which choices and behavior to adopt at school: attending religion lessons or 
opting for alternative activities;
− Asking to skip some school activities (gym, journey, etc.) or to receive a “dif-
ferent treatments” (e.g. to dress differently, to choose who can be sitting by 
one’s side),
− How to judge other religions and cultures, (power) relationships between 
people, teachers’ and families’ respective roles and boundaries of authority, 
currents events, etc.
However, moving on from this common “theoretical” vision, when narratives 
refer to personal experiences, both students’ and adults’ attention focus on two 
main issues:
– Freedom of religious choice;
– Role of women according to religion beliefs.
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Notwithstanding these similarities, their opinions diverge for some aspects 
that we need to mention, considering: a) students’ and b) adults’ voice 
separately.
5.1 The Students’ Point of View
On the students’ part, attention is paid to the freedom of religious choice, that is 
as a matter of possible controversy within the family relationships.
Students belonging to the majority (Italians and Catholics) generally con-
sider their experience of freedom of religious choice as something just ac-
quired and a-problematic. Being aware that religion affiliation is a relevant 
family’s heritage, they feel free to change religion if they want to. They gener-
ally express gratitude for family education, for the values passed on to them 
and for their religion’s legacy, as well as for the freedom of choice, thought and 
act that they admit to benefit from. At the same time, they firmly criticize what 
happens to some of their classmates belonging to other religions, who –in their 
eyes– are conditioned and limited by family impositions that they cannot by-
pass and that can hinder their personal freedom and their transition to adult-
hood. Indeed, some students with a migratory background –mainly girls pro-
fessing Islam, but also a couple of Catholic non-Italian native students– reported 
to having to endure family impositions. However, this is a controversial issue 
and no generalization can be applied to the relating narratives, as the follow-
ing few ones show.
I would like to live on my own … I want to have two dogs, not just one. 
I don’t know … I feel under the control of my parents. (Female, Italian, 
Catholic, fg 1 bs, students)
I’m Muslim too, but I’m not like her, they don’t oblige me to stay at home, 
I go wherever, whenever I want! (Male, Senegalese, Muslim, fg 1 bs, 
students)
We are free, but we are on probation, because our freedom is also limited 
by some factors. For instance, I would like to be Buddhist, but I’m influ-
enced by the others, what my friends and relatives think about me. (Fe-
male, Italian, Coptic Christian, fg 6 MI, students)
We are oriented since our birth: our parents influence us a lot. When you 
have Christian relatives, it is difficult (to change), because you are used to 
specific habits. (Male, Italian, Atheist, fg 6 MI, students)
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I agree, there are religions and religions … Maybe there are stricter par-
ents who, according to their beliefs, tell their children they must do what 
their religion says, that’s it; on the other hand, other parents may say that 
… their children can dress as they like and believe in what they want … 
they are free. (Male, Moldavian, Coptic Christian, fg 3 BS, students)
In religion they cannot oblige you, because if you don’t wear a veil you are 
not doing anything wrong. (Female, Kosovara, Muslim, fg 3 bs, students)
In her religion there is no law which states: you must wear a veil, it’s a 
tradition which has been passed down. She says: “I wish I could take it off, 
but … my dad actually obliges me to keep it on”. According to her, that’s 
wrong, because nowhere it is mentioned that we must wear a veil and she 
told me that, actually, it just happens because men oblige women to do 
that. (Male, Italian, Catholic, fg 5 mi, students)
What is more, students debate on the role of women in the family, at school and 
in society, as an issue considered to be strictly connected to some religion be-
liefs and visions of the world. Here, the narratives become even more contro-
versial, enriched by both personal experiences and (above all) stereotypes, 
prejudgments and hearsay, particularly dealing with:
− Restrictions that (in the Catholics’ opinion) some female classmates suffer 
because of their family’s religious beliefs concerning especially the duty to 
wear the Islamic veil, the prohibition to participate in school journeys or to 
attend some sports lessons, etc.
− The idea that girls/women have to play a subordinate role in some “tradi-
tional” families and are subjected to specific restrictions at school due to 
religion prescriptions.
The example provided by the above-reported students mainly revolve around 
Islamic religion, but narratives often overlap and confuse religion affiliation 
and nationality, without being capable of distinguishing between migrant, cul-
tural and national backgrounds. A meaningful example is represented by the 
narratives focused on some Pakistani or Egyptian girls and families, whose re-
ligious belonging to the Islamic religion is presumed, but not really known by 
participants. Although the students consider this issue as a potential source of 
conflict, their discussions tend to remain on the surface, simplified and polar-
ized upon few circumstances in which they assume the passive role of the girls 
as an unavoidable outcome of parents’ impositions on daughters. The “asym-
metric vision” in the participants’ narratives (between what, generally 
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 positively, happens to oneself and what, negatively, may happen to the others) 
can be due to the composition of the focus groups (too many majority stu-
dents). However, it can also reflect the students’ difficulty in revealing situa-
tions personally experienced as problematic: it is easier to talk about yourself 
in the third person than being exposed to collective judgment. To “break the 
circle”, there is the testimony of a young Pakistani and Islamic girl, who tells 
her experience in first person.
For instance, Muslim people treat women in a peculiar way, while the 
Christians or people from other religions treat them in a different way. In 
my family, we only have one woman: my mother; we are all males be-
cause I have two brothers and a father and, obviously, we treat her well, 
but our Muslim neighbors, I don’t want to say, they treat women badly, 
but they don’t have the same rights as men … I hear them (…) Well, it hap-
pened once that the Muslim family had to go somewhere, but the woman 
couldn’t do that … so she had to stay at home for two days, because, as I 
figured out, the family was on a 2-day trip; on the contrary, we always take 
my mother with us … I mean, there are some differences. To tell the truth, 
there are some Muslim families that are more open-minded and others 
that are stricter, my neighbors are open in comparison with others I 
know, some other friends of mine … (Male, Romanian, Orthodox Chris-
tian, fg 4 mi, students)
When we go to school we don’t care about our different religions, we are 
all together and we are used to living together, even if we have different 
religions … we know everything about each other. However, when we 
are with our parents, Muslim people have more problems –at least this 
is what I have noticed– while Christian students don’t have this many 
problems, if they want to talk with their parents about what they want 
to do. It’s harder for Muslim students because we live in a prison … be-
lieve me, my house is a prison! Up to a few months ago, I could not even 
get out of my house, except for going to school or to the mosque, no-
where else (….). Over the last few months, I only have been to the library 
twice, nowhere else. They don’t let me go out so much. On Saturday they 
take me to the supermarket, otherwise they leave me at home … I feel 
like living in a prison and I want to go out more often, I want to run 
away from home because I don’t like it, I don’t like to live there … I want 
to live like the other students, but if I say so, they get angry, the only 
thing they can do is to force me … (Female, Pakistani, Muslim, fg 1 bs, 
students)
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5.2 The Adults’ Point of View
On the adults’ part, the role of family in children’s religious socialization is ac-
knowledged as particularly influential as it is the first agent that instils cus-
toms, values, social norms, social roles, etc. For better or for worse, hence, 
 family is considered to be responsible for students’ behavior at school, behav-
ior that “certainly reflects” –as it is said– “what they ‘breath’ at home”.
I think that teenagers and pre-teens, in general, at a religious level have 
more freedom of expression. I think that one of the limits is given both by 
their parents’ culture and by the culture in the school educational orien-
tation, which may have been more or less evident according to their dif-
ferent religions. (Father, Italian, fg 4 BS, adults)
The question is that in dogmatic families (not necessarily Arabian fami-
lies, there may even be some very integralist Catholics, who despite the 
very inclusive message of the Gospel, show suspicion) there may be an 
impact on teenagers, thus, their behavior reflects what they hear at home 
(…). In my opinion, students are inclusive with other young people, but 
the influence from their families may cause a sort of cultural resistance, 
which leads them to be more suspicious. (Female, Italian, School man-
ager, fg 4 BS, adults)
I sometimes see mothers wearing a veil and daughters without it and the 
other way around. I even met two sisters, one was wearing a veil the other 
one was not; their mother wasn’t wearing it either … I see, you under-
stand, they perceive in their families a sort of approach that, according to 
their personality and growing-up process, leads them to choose to wear it 
or not, despite their mothers. Well, you can really feel the difference … 
I’ve noticed that change over the past few years. (Female, Italian, Teacher, 
fg 1 bs, adults)
For the two Muslim girls who wear the veil, who are attending their last 
year here and are about to move on to the secondary school, the choice 
has been conditioned (…). (It would be necessary) to free them from a 
situation of “closure”, in that case, really, because of the father … They do 
the school that the father decided for them. (Female, Italian, School man-
ager, fg 4 mi, adults)
Teachers and parents agree that the issue of freedom of religious choice is gener-
ally easy to be addressed at school. Besides being quite sure that their children 
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can freely express their religious belonging at school, parents declare that they 
can make their choices about their children’s participation in religion lessons, 
or in other activities, peacefully and, even if not Catholic, they are often open 
to a better understanding of the Catholic religion teaching, which is provided 
by every Italian public school within the curriculum (see Chapter 21 and §7). In 
some cases, irc teachers reported to have had (and still have) Muslim (or 
 belonging to other religions) students attending their lessons with the consent 
of their parents, or to argue with parents about the desire of their children to 
attend irc against their opinion. All the reported controversies, however, came 
to a positive solution. Similarly, some parents say they have had to discuss with 
their children the choice of attending irc because their children wanted to 
attend it against their will; even in this case, their experiences have been gener-
ally positive. On the other hand, it is interesting to notice that teachers stress 
its importance to let students and families know more about the “non confes-
sional” aim of irc, so that these classes can be shared by students from differ-
ent religions and different cultures in a better way.
Compared with the students’ focus groups, the adults’ ones revolve more on 
the gender relations, differences, inequalities and even conflicts. To the adults’ 
eyes, these are very critical issues to address. Teachers’ comments are largely 
negative on this, by reporting examples of parents (especially the fathers) im-
peding daughters from participating in some school activities, obliging them to 
wear the veil, and prevent mothers to talk with teachers. In this regard, however, 
we must remember that the adults’ focus groups are mainly composed by wom-
en, Italian teachers who turned out to be particularly sensitive to these issues.
Although adults are generally more able to think critically than youngsters, 
their narratives are sometimes affected by stereotypes and simplifications (e.g. 
by considering people/students with the same ethnic/religion/cultural back-
ground as a homogeneous group) as well. Unlike the students, the adults con-
sciously try (and hardly succeed in) distinguishing the reasons of gender dis-
putes. For someone, these are rooted in a specific religion background and for 
someone else they are connected to the personal mentality or to a system of 
cultural beliefs rather than to a religion. Indeed, they think that prohibitions to 
girls and women are a “radical” and “betraying” way of interpreting religious 
precepts or a heritage of a patriarchal mindset and household.
It is a cultural problem and it relates to a religious vision … it is useless to 
bury our heads in the sand, well … beyond some sorts of integralism relat-
ing to religion, there is also a vision connected with (women’s role). May 
be inside the family the woman has some freedom, but outside she is not 
allowed to do much … It is especially true with Pakistani people: they 
have a more restricted vision of religion. I’m talking about the Muslim 
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one, which creates troubles for us, even as teachers, because starting 
from the swimming pool for girls and other stuff there is a prohibition 
and that’s it (…). We can even talk about Jehovah’s Witnesses and other 
situations … I mean, when the cultural and religious vision is very re-
stricted, or anyway when religion becomes an alibi even for some cultural 
choices, it is clear that it is hard for us with our students, but also for 
students too … (Mother & teacher, Italian, fg bs 1, adults)
I would like to focus on the gender difference, because, according to my 
own experience, not only as a school manager in a school for one year 
and a half, but also as a teacher, I have faced some episodes which made 
me wonder about it. Once, it happened with a Senegalese student … let’s 
say a very “lively” student … I told him “Well, I want to talk to your father» 
and he answered “My father is not interested at all in what you say be-
cause you are a woman”. As a matter of fact, his father was only in contact 
with the School manager who was a man, at that time, and the ict teach-
er who was a man as well. Anyway, I think this relates to some people, 
rather than to their religion (…). I think it’s a cultural question, rather 
than a religious one. (Female, Italian, School manager, fg 7 mi, adults)
They say they are subjugated, but … religion has nothing to do with it. I’m 
a Muslim, I know the Quran and I know what I’m saying … really, it has 
nothing to do with it, it is not mentioned anywhere that you have to be 
subjugated to men and that they are supposed to decide for you … (Moth-
er, Tunisian, Muslim, fg 1 bs, adults)
6 School–Family Dialogue: Boundaries of Responsibilities and 
Religious Reflexivity
On the whole, the teachers’ efforts are aimed at addressing the demand for 
recognition of different cultural and religious backgrounds through a “family-
friendly approach” that needs to be “child-centered”, geared towards the full 
respect of each child’s identity. By asking for the recognition of religious 
 identity at school –and, hence, asking for different ways to handle some as-
pects of school life in order to meet the values, the customs, and the practices 
relating to religion affiliation– families request that teachers (and school man-
agers) opt for an intense dialogue, negotiations, argumentations.
Apart from an overall positive appraisal of school-family relations, teachers 
neither diminish the difficulties met to carry on a constructive debate nor hide 
the failures suffered. At the same time, they also point out the crucial relevance 
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of such an effort, since it proved to be a profitable way to overcome barriers 
and to build reciprocal trust in the long run, even creating new chances for 
emancipation for some foreign mothers, once asked to be involved in their 
children’s school life.
(it is difficult) especially with young girls, for instance when we have to go 
away for a couple of days … Two years ago, for the first time, a girl was al-
lowed to come with us (on a school trip). Her family had accepted, be-
cause they trusted us, it’s just a question of trust, we had built that trust, 
otherwise they would have said “no” for sure … (Mother & Teacher, Ital-
ian, fg 1 BS, adults)
(...) On another occasion, a young girl wished her mother could come to 
talk to her teachers at the general school meetings, she really wished she 
could, so this lady in a burka came and told the teacher: “If my husband 
finds out I’m here I may have consequences”. So, we got worried and said: 
“Madam, go home right now to avoid any kind of consequences”. That 
lady was a newcomer, she had just arrived. Now, let’s say, we still have 
contacts with this family and things have changed a lot, as they have been 
living here for a while … (Female, Italian, School manager, fg 3 bg, 
adults)
The Pakistani experience is very strong here, in my opinion … It is the 
result of the typical narrow-mindedness of this nation, with its habits 
and customs, which are strictly controlled and tied to religion. We have 
had boys in our school institute who went home and “tipped off”, if I may 
say so, that the girls in their neighborhood or the daughters of some 
friends were not wearing a veil or just wore it on their shoulders rather 
than on their heads … A young girl had been badly told off by her family 
because of that … but some other things have improved a lot. I have seen 
Pakistani women who were very proud because they had come to school 
meetings and could sign documents: then, sometimes, they asked “Could 
you write down the things you are telling me? So, my son will not tell my 
husband that what I’m saying is not true…” Can you understand that? 
(Female, Italian, Teacher, fg 1 bs, adults)
Together with the local intercultural contact, we have been organizing 
meetings with parents, actually Indian mothers … We had a meeting last 
year and one at the beginning of this year and we noticed some confi-
dence in our school. A lot of mothers come to our school, and the  message 
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we get is (or at least I believe so) that at school (their children) are at ease 
and their teachers look after them. (Female, Teacher, Italian, fg 2 bs, 
adults)
Foreign mothers come to the general school meetings and apparently 
this is, let’s say, a way to get their revenge … my impression is that some 
foreign mothers take a sort of revenge because they come to school as if 
they were “fathers” who want to know about their children’s school life, 
and this is something typical here … Well, it is not that widespread be-
cause it is usually the fathers’ task to come to the school meetings, isn’t it? 
But actually, a lot of mothers have come to our school meetings (Female, 
Teacher, Italian, fg 2 bs, adults)
What is more, the teachers recognize the need to consider carefully the ethical 
dilemma concerning the “boundaries of responsibilities” between school and 
family: to what extent can teachers discuss families’ decisions? Which are the 
limits of parental authority over children’s education? How to protect the free-
dom of expression with regards to religious plurality, in compliance with the 
school’s “laïcité”? As a matter of fact, issues that were thought to have been 
overtaken by the secularization process –finding a peaceful solution in the 
separation of private, civil and religious spheres– can be found again in the 
school debate.
In addition, teachers underline that generalizing may lead to wrong conclu-
sions. Circumstances are complex and implications relate to the personal atti-
tude of people who experience them: the religious belonging is not at all “pre-
dictive” of a specific kind of behavior.
On the one hand, there are minorities, with a culture different from the Ital-
ian one and a religion different from the Catholic one, in which there may be 
frictions and reasons for disagreements – never easy to handle effectively. As 
this story emblematically witnesses:
We had the case of a Muslim student, a girl who lived her religion as an 
imposition, she wanted to integrate, but could not because of his extrem-
ist father. She was always accompanied to school, walking a step behind, 
she could not walk side by side, she could not attend the gym, she could 
not remove her veil in the classroom, she could not play music, watch 
movies … The nice thing was that she had found solidarity among the 
classmates. Whenever she entered the school, she took of her veil asking 
them not to tell outside … At a certain point, we fought because her fa-
ther no longer sent her to school … and had arranged a marriage: she had 
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to go to her country of origin to get married. She used to say “I don’t want 
to get married and with a man older than me”. We managed in some way, 
involving the Social Services, to let her conclude lower secondary school 
with the final exam. But, unfortunately, after that she disappeared. (Male, 
Teacher, fg 5 mi, adults)
On the other hand, some minority families are actually eager to encourage 
their children to deepen their cultural and religious roots, and to open up 
to a constructive debate with others. This behavior, which is characterized 
by “willingness to know”, appears even at school: the students with a migra-
tion background, from another culture and religion, are often more “experi-
enced” when it comes to religion and more curious about other people’s 
religions.
The foreign student is always called to reflect on …, so he/she has a great-
er awareness. (Male, Teacher, fg 5 mi, adults)
We sometimes feel embarrassed, it has happened several times, even 
with a colleague of mine and her pupil, when the teacher of the alterna-
tive subject to the study of Catholic Religion was absent, the pupil had 
stayed in class and before the following lesson he said: “I want to stay 
because I’m interested in what the teacher says … and I want to attend 
this class as well”. (Female, Teacher, fg 1 bs, adults)
The parents participating in focus groups do not reveal much about the mat-
ters of these subjects, but some of them say that their children’s school experi-
ence, their willingness to follow (or not) religion classes and other school ac-
tivities, encourage them to get utterly informed, to explain the deep-rooted 
reasons behind their choices to their children.
In any case, the coexistence of different religious belongings (including the 
non-believers) both at school and in society, may lead adults and young people 
to develop reflection, self-awareness and reciprocal dialogue. Indeed, these 
forms of understanding can favor integration, due to the capability of trans-
forming such attitudes into an effective, constructive debate.
7 Religion as a Transversal Content of the School’s Curriculum and 
Cultural Heritage
Within the given theoretical framework, the last issue that is worth being 
considered concerns the strategies enacted by schools to cope with  students’ 
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religious diversities through and beyond the curriculum and the corre-
sponding consequences. Besides re (whose teaching is guaranteed in Ital-
ian public schools for those who select that option; see Chapter 21), the 
different subjects offer several opportunities to speak about the religious 
diversity.
Students and adults agree with the idea that the school –as far as it is de-
scribed as an inclusive space, where everyone feels free to express his/her reli-
gious belonging– is not always capable of meeting students’ need to delve into 
the religion knowledge and to discuss it. A number of narratives underline that 
there are many chances to speak about religion offered within the several dis-
ciplines –e.g. literature, history, art and music– but few are the circumstances 
that allow teachers to develop an in-depth debate. Despite this, teachers try to 
take advantage of the school curriculum, of the religious festivities and of the 
daily news that in some way regard religion, to solicit the attention of students 
for religion issues.
I don’t talk about my religious beliefs at school, but as a Geography, His-
tory and Italian teacher, I really like to explore the historical root of some-
one who practices one religion or another. And I should say I have always 
had positive experiences, even with religion teachers who aimed to avoid 
catechesis at school, and rather focused on the history and culture of the 
country we live in. For instance, we can reinforce that with the “Divina 
Commedia” or with art history … (Male, Teacher, fg 3 bg, adults)
Consequently, by grasping only the anthropological and cultural dimension of 
religion, the subject focuses more on habits, customs, folkways, and religious 
traditions rather than, strictly speaking, on religious faith. It does not tackle 
the main issues that each religion deals with, such as the “ultimate questions” 
and the corresponding answers, nor does it explore the transcendent dimen-
sion and the claims to truth, which are at the basis of every religion. The con-
nection between faith and culture is dialectic and unavoidable, and even mu-
tually beneficial (we may say that religion is a “cultural fact”). However, the 
distinction between the two fades out in the perception of the interviewed 
people. Furthermore, some of them see the risk of reducing religion to a mere 
type of culture, losing the connection with the transcendent dimension, which 
instead represents the distinctive contribution that religions may give in the 
contemporary society (Magatti, 2018).
Culture and religion are not separated, because culture develops together 
with religion and religion turns into culture, they are strictly connected. 
(Male, Religion Teacher, fg 3 bg, adults)
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This is, maybe, something inevitably related to the above-mentioned third di-
mension of secularization (phenomenological and “experience-near” dimen-
sion), which reduces the experience of faith to one of the possible points of 
view coexisting in the common life.
Actually, thanks to the teachers’ narratives, we can grasp that re is not fully 
exploited for adequate insight because of the lack of suitable didactic means. 
Moreover, even though re does not follow a dogmatic approach and cannot be 
identified with a confessional teaching (catechism), students, who do not at-
tend it, have a limited knowledge of the contents they deal with.
Religion teachers especially want to emphasize that in their lessons they 
focus on the dialogue, by carefully taking into consideration different religions; 
moreover, they concentrate on developing ethical and universal issues.
Actually, they say it is a Catholic religion class, but we teach the history of 
religions, it depends on the (school) program we have. During the third 
year, we teach all the values … Life as a gift, from the beginning to the end, 
so we consider all the issues regarding procreation, abortion, euthanasia, 
all those things, which do not concern Catholic religion only. (Female, 
Religion Teacher, fg 3 bg, adults)
For years, I have been encouraging foreign parents to be curious and to 
come and talk to a Religion teacher because we don’t teach catechism, we 
don’t teach any doctrine. (Female, Teacher, fg 1 bs, adults)
At school, we experience humanity. (Male, Teacher, fg 3 bg, adults)
There is a Muslim boy who always wants to stay in the classroom and 
have religion lessons with me, I sometimes let him stay with me and he 
doesn’t leave for the alterative activity … but his parents told me not to do 
so, at present … but he told me that next year he will come. (…) In my 
opinion, it is also a question of information, maybe they don’t know what 
we do during Religion classes … teaching Catholic religion is not teaching 
catechism, catechism teaches you to believe in one God, but the irc is 
not only that … I teach you some values and it’s up to you to stick to them 
or not. (Female, Religion Teacher, fg 3 bg, adults)
Although some scholars critically assert that the Italian public school still re-
mains Catholic-centric3 (e.g. it affects the annual school calendar), over time, 
3 So that, Pace (2005) spoke about a “Catholic model of secularism” to underline the persis-
tence of Catholic Church’s influence in the public school and, more widely, in the public 
sphere.
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the changes introduced have been huge, due both to the acknowledging of 
public schools as secular and plural spaces, and to the growing number of stu-
dents with different cultural and religious background. As a matter of fact, 
within the secular setting of the Italian State, the acknowledgement that the 
Catholic religion is no longer the only religion of the country, and that the lat-
ter is increasingly becoming a pluralistic (multi-cultural, multi-religious and 
multi-ethnic) society, have pushed to renew both the historically privileged 
and exclusive relationship set between the Italian State and the Catholic 
Church and the regulation and content of re (Giorda, 2015; see Chapter 21). 
Regarding to the irc, these changes –reinforced by the increasing numbers of 
foreign students (Catholic or not) attending the lessons– have pushed to re-
think its content, opening it to the religious pluralism and adopting a “cultural 
perspective” (Frisina, 2011).
Despite this, the research shows that some contrast may persist between 
two opposite ways of understanding irc: one more pluralistic, the other more 
conservative and confessional. Indeed, the translation in practice of this “new 
deal” appears to be uneven across the education system, “depending partly on 
the training and sensitivity of the re teachers and partly on the local (social, 
scholastic, ecclesiastic) context”, also resulting from the school autonomy (Ibi-
dem: 267). Likewise, the right to freedom of choice –formally proclaimed– is 
hardly guaranteed as equally on the substantive level, since it may happen that 
no alternative activities (or only low-quality ones) are arranged for students 
who would attend them (Giorda, 2015). However, these criticalities remain in 
the background of the narratives collected though the focus groups.
Students seem to appreciate the “new deal” of irc, underlining that it is an 
opportunity to understand the differences (not only the religious ones) they 
find at school. Simply considering the fact that there are students who do not 
attend irc, in fact, encourages reflection. Those who attend Religion classes 
assess them positively and more than once suggest that everybody should at-
tend them (whatever religion they belong to, including non-believers), since it 
is a precious opportunity for debate. Because of this, students agree that a 
Religion class should be called, in a more explicit way, “the class for 
religions”.
Something that disturbs me relates to the students who abandon the Re-
ligion classes because they belong to another religion … In our school 
program, next year we will deal with Buddhism and all the other reli-
gions, so, as we learn about other religions, the other students from dif-
ferent religions can attend our Religion classes; because, by the way, it’s 




Religion classes are not only important for one religion, but for all of 
them because students can learn a lot in any case. (Male, Romanian, Or-
thodox Christian, fg 4 mi, students)
Indeed, religious pluralism at school may be restrained by two facts: firstly, 
there are almost only Catholic students attend irc, and secondly there are only 
Catholic teachers who have the task to speak about other religions – hence, 
from a point of view which is (more or less implicitly) mono-confessional.
We lack places and time for discussion, because even when I teach my 
subject, that is to say the irc, well, very often the group is only made up 
of few Christian Catholics. So, starting a dialogue with different religions 
is really complicated. Even if we should deepen the study of other reli-
gions, we would do it exactly as we do with all the other school subjects 
… There is no close relationship with the students who live and belong to 
a different religion … So, well, according to me, that class, that is to say the 
Religion one, would be a “good” one, in order to talk and go deeper and 
deeper into details about different festivals, ways of dressing, eating hab-
its and so on, but in my opinion we hardly ever use Religion classes for 
that purpose. (Male, Religion Teacher, fg 3 bg, adults)
In the first year, according to the school program, I always deal with the 
Jewish roots, so we study the Torah, the Jewish Bible and then Islam, the 
structure of the Quran, we read something … Then in the third year, we 
go on with Buddhism, Confucianism … to show that … the man who is 
behind that can express himself in different contexts … As a Catholic re-
ligion teacher, I am not worried about talking about my religion, so … 
When you teach a subject, you cannot separate it from its essence. (Male, 
Religion Teacher, fg 5 mi, adults)
Maybe, in order to open up to a more constructive debate, we might de-
cide to make Religion classes compulsory, on a State level, not as Catholic 
Religion classes but as the classes about the history of religions based on 
constructive debate. That might be interesting. (Male, School manager, 
fg 4 mi, adults)
Recalling the seminal Eisner’s work (1985) on the different levels and types of 
school curriculum, which weave together in the school4 – we may conclude 
4 The explicit curriculum is the formal one, intentionally communicated; it refers to what is 
designed to teach, to the contents, goals, resources, documents etc. that are included in a 
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that no teaching and no curriculum can be considered as “neutral” choices. 
Teachers’ narratives confirm that teaching is intertwined with socialization 
processes and that, especially through the hidden and implicit curriculum, so-
cialization’s formal and informal dimensions penetrate each other (Besozzi, 
2017). As a consequence –with reference to the Religion teaching –as to any 
other subject– teachers implicitly convey their expectations and preferences 
to students. Moreover, when you teach something, you deliberately choose not 
to teach something else (actually, by giving shape to a null curriculum): you 
cannot teach everything, obviously, but what you choose to teach does not re-
flect only a specific vision of the discipline and of the “state of the art”, but also 
what the school (on the teacher) believes should be taught/neglected in light 
of its own vision of the world.
8 Giving Citizenship to Religions at School: a Training Ground for 
Democracy
Although public education has totally taken over its role as a secular and free 
context, we still have to consider the issue about religious differences. How 
does the “laïcité” of its mandate can be observed, together with a correct con-
sideration of pupils’ religious identity? The adults involved in the focus groups 
complain that this mandate might be misinterpreted, often resulting in a total 
denial of the different religious belongings and, thus, limiting opportunities 
for dialogue and critical thinking.
For instance, I’m against professing a sort of laicism as anti-religion, that 
is to say “State school: let’s stay without symbols and crosses”. On the con-
trary, I believe in people’s spontaneity, which can be expressed without 
showing it off, anyway having something that refers to our religious be-
longing cannot be considered as bad if this is used to launch a sort of 
crusade. I find the attempt to cut off differences to be negative, because it 
(written, official and public) lesson plan and teaching programme. The implicit or hidden 
curriculum consists of all the messages that are conveyed indirectly, without being stated 
explicitly, which regards teachers’ attitudes, preferences, values, and expectations not includ-
ed in the formal curriculum (e.g. meta-messages and “implicit theories” embedded in every 
teaching style), as well as the school setting (organization structure, physical characteristic 
etc.). The null curriculum is what schools do not teach, which may be as important as what 
they teach, since schools teach much more –and much less– than they intend to teach; it 
regards “the options students are not offered, the perspectives they may never know 
about –much less be able to use–, the concepts and skills that are not part of their intellec-
tual repertoire” (Ibidem: 107).
Lodigiani712
<UN>
forces human beings to suppress one of their inmost parts, which – 
because of culture or nature– may on the contrary be important. (Male, 
School manager, fg 4 mi, adults)
There is a misleading idea that laicism does not favor a constructive debate 
or the presence of the Catholic religion at school. We should remind every-
body that the 1984 Concordat recognizes the presence of the Catholic reli-
gion because it is part of the Italian cultural heritage. By the way, at present, 
the discussion (even online and on social media) aims to limit this aspect as 
if it was a threat to people’s freedom. On the contrary, I would say that, from 
this point of view, we need to protect the sense of belonging, because if 
people cannot express their innermost essence, well, in that case there will 
be no debate at all. (Male, School manager, fg 5 mi, adults)
This is what actually happens in some European societies: the trend is to 
remove and ban any religious symbol. But this doesn’t mean more free-
dom, it means less freedom for everybody. The question then is not to 
remove religious symbols and signs of religious belonging. The question 
is to accept differences (…). We should focus on the way we use the word 
“different”. If we use it as a synonym of “other than/unlike”, as the Latin 
“divertere”, it means something characteristic, but also something which 
takes us far from the others. On the contrary, if we use “different” with the 
same meaning as the Latin “differo”, that is to say that is typical of me, of 
you, personal and peculiar, this means I can transfer something which is 
personal in my relationships with others and the others can do the same. 
In this case, “differences” become something valuable, and of course, 
they can only be valuable if we consider them as peculiar and unique 
aspects that we have and that we want to share with the others. If we 
consider the word “different” as a synonym for other than/unlike, this vi-
sion, because of its meaning, will tear us apart and lead to conflict. (Fe-
male, Teacher, fg 5 mi, adults)
Other teachers state that the school’s laïcité is not problem-free, and the risk 
that a secular education can pose is not considering differences at all, and then 
denying them together with one’s own identity. The fear of triggering conflicts 
or not having the suitable means to cope with religious contrasts, or establish-
ing which differential treatments can be accepted or not, leads many teachers 
to remove the problem, reframing it as non-pertinent. The consequence is that 
“neutrality” turns into “neutralization”, with two consequences.
On the one hand, the concerns about extremism, and the strategies to face 
it, could put an end to classroom debates. On the other hand, managing 
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 classroom discussions requires specific skills, taking into consideration what is 
appropriate to discuss in the classroom within the legal and educational sys-
tems and cultural context of reference, and with due regard to the age, matu-
rity and aptitudes of students (Jackson, 2019). Teachers feel not prepared to it.
Instead, as seen above, also in the national and the European public debate, 
in the school public debate carried out by teachers, students and their families, 
issues that were considered to have been sorted out peacefully (such as tracing 
the boundaries of freedom of expression, of parental authority, and of religion 
authority) are regaining the center of attention.
The laïcité implies, besides the duality between private and public spheres, 
the distinction between the civil and religious spheres. The latter implies the 
existence of a “religious authority”, which succeeds in transforming its abso-
lute truth into dialogue (Rizzi, 2016). This is properly what matters. Then, for 
schools, the challenge is not to implement cultural divisions, but to encourage 
the knowledge of all religions, so that each student can learn how to use criti-
cal reflection upon one’s own religious identity and tradition. Otherwise, no 
dualism is either applicable or believable (Ibidem: 89).
If we assume that “reflexivity” is a typical feature of Christianity –a religion 
historically open to reflexivity and to the hermeneutic exercise (Ibidem; Magat-
ti, 2018)–, the re and mainly the irc have an extraordinary learning potential. 
In other words, the cultural heritage of Christianity may be a lever for curricu-
lum enrichment and for promoting constructive dialogue skills among pupils.
In the wake of the European Recommendations, particularly the Recom-
mendation on the Dimension of Religions and Nonreligious Convictions within 
Intercultural Education (Council of Europe, 2008a), both adults’ and students’ 
narratives suggest that the school may represent a privileged space for learning 
what it means to live in a multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-ethnic soci-
ety, that is, learning to become a citizen who peacefully and actively partici-
pates in such society. To accomplish this mandate, at least, two more steps 
need to be taken.
First, the recognition of diversity –and, eventually, agreeing to different 
treatments– needs to be linked to the fight against the disadvantages related to 
it. The studies on educational inequalities still give evidence to this phenome-
non, with particularly reference to migrants’ offspring and pupils’ lower educa-
tion attainment (Ambrosini, Pozzi, 2018; Colombo, Santagati, 2017). In this re-
gard, the school mirrors what happens in the wider society. In Italy, as well as 
in the rest of Europe, migrants’ offspring is affected by the intergenerational 
transmission of disadvantages in the labor market outcomes, with a higher 
concentration in low-skilled and “ethnicized” jobs, and in the social mobility 
process, with little capacity to benefit from the opportunity structure because 
of both the inequalities constrains and the families’ legacies (Zanfrini, 2019). 
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All of this, as Zanfrini clearly pointed out, calls into question the prevailing 
(and “ambivalent”) model of integration. The latter is featured by the persis-
tent tension between two opposite aims –on the one hand, recognizing (and 
managing) the diversity “embedded” in the population with a migrant back-
ground, on the other hand, accomplishing the request for equality and unifor-
mity; moreover, it still appears to be incapable of “exploiting” the migration-
related diversity, despite many attempts (Ibidem).
Secondly, under the same tension, the school needs to find its way for giving 
value to diversity. This is a priority, as it is for the whole society. Indeed, for so-
ciety, the enhancement of (migrant-related) diversity may represent a lever to 
“renew the integration model”, thus linking economic competitiveness to so-
cial cohesion, viewing migrants as active citizens able to mobilize distinctive 
potentialities and resources and contributing to the common good (Zanfrini, 
2015). For the school itself the intercultural approach that characterizes the 
Italian educational system represents the best choice to move forward, provid-
ing that theoretical principles are translated in classroom practices. Although 
the Italian intercultural education policies are seen as quite advanced in 
 Europe, the literature underlines the weak correlation between policies, orga-
nizational and institutional practices, teaching strategies and educational ex-
periences (Santagati, 2016). As our research suggests, the need to recognize, 
manage and value religious diversity represents a “test bed” for the intercul-
tural approach and an opportunity to overcome those weaknesses. Acknowl-
edging religion beliefs (as well as atheism) as a fundamental part of one’s per-
sonal identity, gives to religions “citizenship in the school” and paves the way 
for an effective interreligious and intercultural dialogue.
When it calls to reflect on the freedom of expression, on the boundaries of 
responsibilities and limits of claims for different treatments, school becomes a 
training ground for democratic citizenship and active membership. Beyond 
the contradiction and difficulties highlighted by focus groups, the participants 
outline the profile of a public school that is “on the way” to cope with this chal-
lenge. The final goal is still far to reach, but it is clearly defined: instead of being 
a “neutral space”, the school will ensure a “safe space” for dialogue (Jackson, 
2014). As European Recommendations demand, this is a space where –with 
appropriate ground rules for constructive discussions in a given normative 
framework– inclusion and mutual respect are promoted. It is a space in which 
positive relations with students and parents are daily cultivated, in which stu-
dents are helped to deal with a plurality of visions, ideas, cultures and reli-
gions, to develop critical thinking, to learn how to debate in an atmosphere of 
mutual tolerance, when they confront each other, and so on (Ibidem). Surely, 
renewed learning tools, teachers’ competences and environmental conditions 
need to be developed, but first steps have already been taken.
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Chapter 23
Religious Conflicts in Multi-Cultural Schools: a 
Generational Divide between Students and Adults
Mariagrazia Santagati
1 Introduction: the Ambivalence of Conflict within the Integration 
Process of the Immigrants
For several decades, European countries have been undergoing a transforma-
tion towards greater cultural and religious pluralization: in the public debate, 
religious diversity –deriving from the growing presence of immigrants– has 
generated concern, misunderstanding, and has been perceived as a threat to 
the cultural identity of host societies (Foner, Alba, 2008; Wieviorka, 2001).
One of the most consolidated approaches to explain the diffusion of these 
negative attitudes toward immigrants and their diversities, in the field of social 
sciences, is the Group Conflict Theory, that predicts that increased ethnic di-
versities exacerbate in-group/out-group distinction and foster a state of per-
petual conflict and competition for limited resources (Blumer, 1958; Blalock, 
1967). Hostility toward immigration is considered a defensive and collective 
reaction to perceived inter-group competition for scarce goods: from the one 
hand, in a realistic perspective the immigrants are considered competitors in 
the labor market and in the Welfare system (Zanfrini, 2019). From the other 
hand, in a symbolic perspective the most violent conflicts arise in the cultural 
sphere and assume the shape of an identity fear, since the increase of cultural 
diversity weakens the national identity and could cause a growing clash be-
tween civilizations (Huntington, 1996; Bergamaschi, Santagati, 2019).
From a sociological point of view, however, we have to point out that con-
flict is not necessary negative per se, but is a fundamental element of social life, 
corresponding to the coexistence of contradictory orientations about motiva-
tions, goals, representations, world view, etc. Conflicts include existential, per-
sonal, relational, political controversies (Hirschberger et al., 2016), and repre-
sent the constitutive dynamics of the individual and collective, material and 
symbolic dimensions of societies. Undoubtedly, conflict has an ambivalent 
function, it could be disruptive and violent, but at the same time fruitful and 
transformative (Simmel, 1968; Dahrendorf, 1959). Within multi-cultural societ-
ies, conflict has not a univocal meaning; it does not necessarily coincide with 
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violence, but it can play different roles in the relationship between the host 
society and immigrants, affected by the different political visions and integra-
tion models.
Research findings confirm this interpretation of the ambivalence of con-
flict, remarking that cooperation and conflict are not alternative outcomes of 
intergroup relations, as they are constitutive and inextricably linked dimen-
sions of the integration process (Pastore, Ponzo, 2012). In this perspective, the 
literature has also dealt with the role of intergroup contacts in reducing the 
prejudices towards immigrants. Hostility will be supplanted by positive and 
supportive attitudes if contacts and relations between the majority and the 
minority groups develop under specific situational and structural conditions 
that facilitate mutual respect (Allport, 1954; cf. Zanfrini, 2016). Hereafter, in its 
evolution, Contact Theory has focused more on interethnic relationships of 
friendly nature that will reduce prejudices and xenophobic manifestations and 
will improve empathy toward members of minority groups (Pettigrew, 1997; cf. 
Valtolina, 2015). More recently, interculturalism, recalling the Contact Theory 
and its developments, has proved to be the main pragmatic strategy to pro-
mote positive and friendly relationships, thanks to the social proximity be-
tween natives and immigrants and considering diversity as an individual and 
public resource (Zapata-Barrero, 2015).
What happens, however, in the educational field? This chapter deals with 
the appearance, the development, and the management of religious-based 
conflicts in multi-cultural schools: this is an interesting sub-topic of our re-
search on educational integration in Northern Italy, already presented in 
Chapters 21 and 22. After a review of the international and Italian research on 
this topic in the sociological field, we will present some research results con-
cerning the emerging conflicts in Italian multi-cultural schools, in order to de-
scribe, analyze, and interpret the role played by religious affiliations. We will 
do so through a comparison between the points of view of the adults and of 
the students involved in the focus groups.
2 From Religious Bullying to Interreligious Friendships in  
Education: the Contribution of the International Literature
The Palgrave Handbook of Race and Ethnic Inequalities in Education (Stevens, 
Dworkin, 2014) identifies a key tradition on interethnic relationships including 
an analysis focused on the religious issues. Within this research tradition, since 
the Nineties the issue of school violence in multi-cultural schools has received 
an enormous attention, especially in French studies. According to Debarbieux 
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(1998), the growing concern for violence at school coincides with the collapse 
of the ideology of progress, and with the crisis of both educational institutions 
and liberal democracies. In this scenario, the process of “ethnicization of 
school violence” occurs: ethnic minority groups begin to be considered as nat-
urally aggressive, violent, and dangerous for school environments. Other schol-
ars, however, consider school violence as a type of urban violence, since 
schools with large proportions of children of immigrants are often located in 
poor areas, where delinquency and violence are part of everyday life (Dubet, 
1987). Research emphasizes the impact of social and ethnic segregation as well 
as the effect of disorganization of these schools on an emerging culture of 
drift, deviance, and delinquency (Blaya, 2006). These interethnic tensions risk 
penalizing the school career of students with minority religious background, 
thus exacerbating a situation of school distress and causing bad performance, 
educational failures and early school leaving (Bergamaschi, 2013a, 2016).
Recently, in European and North American literature, the new topic of bul-
lying has emerged, although research has focused more on general forms of 
bullying than on ethnic and religious bullying. This phenomenon refers to bul-
lying that targets another person’s ethnic background or another person’s cul-
tural or religious identity (Peguero, Williams, 2011). Ethnic bullying (and eth-
nic/peer victimization) involves a wide range of aggressive behavior, such as 
verbal (i.e. taunts and slurs) and indirect (i.e. exclusion from a peer group). 
A definition of religious bullying was introduced by the Beatbullying’s Inter-
faith Project and created by young people participating in the project (2008: 
3):1 “being taunted, excluded, or abused physically, emotionally or verbally on 
the grounds of one’s own religious beliefs, affiliation to a given religion, per-
ceived religious identity, or sectarian view by others, including those of other 
religious groups or belief systems”. The survey findings indicate that one in 
four young people of the uk sample are being bullied, often violently, because 
of their religious affiliation or because they are perceived by peers as members 
of a specific faith community. Almost half of the young people involved do not 
talk about religious or faith issues: they have in fact little support, if they want 
to talk about their faith. The fact of being bullied, moreover, made many ado-
lescents feel ashamed of their religion, made them question their faith and 
made them stop talking about their beliefs. Many bullied youngsters could not 
concentrate in class, would lose confidence and would become scared or an-
gry. Those who have a faith experience denounce verbal abuse, harassment 
1 The project was promoted by the UK’s leading bullying prevention charity in different waves, 
reaching in the last editions (2008) a sample of nearly 1,000 students aged 11–16.
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and stereotyping. They are also physically attacked, made feel isolated, and 
beaten because of their faith.
Other potential tensions are highlighted in the remc study (Religious Edu-
cation in Multicultural Europe: Children, Parents and Schools), a European com-
parative research on the way school and family face religious and moral educa-
tion of new generations (Smyth et al., 2013). The study shows that some parents 
are critical toward schools that do not provide religious education for minority 
faith children, claiming an overemphasis on majority faith culture. Minority 
faith parents are also more likely to criticize the faith educational approach 
adopted by schools. A common theme among some minority faith/secular par-
ents is the fear that teachers would isolate or differentiate their children from 
their peers: some interviewed parents report specific incidents where teachers 
display lack of sensitivity to minority religious beliefs. Schools tend to avoid 
the use of explicit religious symbols, but some explicit tensions emerge be-
tween Muslim and other faith/belief groups, in relation to the use of religious 
symbols and to participation in specific festivities.
There has not been, until recent times, an explicit reference to religious di-
versities in the education research traditions, with exception for school vio-
lence and religious bullying. redco Religion in Education. A Contribution to 
Dialogue or a Factor of Conflict in transforming societies of European countries? 
(Weisse, 2010; Jackson, 2019) can be considered the first comparative research 
project on religion and education.2 The project concerns young people’s views 
about religion, religious diversity and possibilities for dialogue; it involves 
classroom interactions and conflicts, and it shows teachers’ strategies to deal 
with religious conflict in educational settings. Many surveyed students appre-
ciate the religious heterogeneity in their classrooms, although some prejudices 
are expressed, too. Students are generally open towards peers with different 
religious background. However, they tend to socialize with peers from the 
same background, even when they live in areas characterized by religious plu-
ralism. Moreover, students often express a tolerant attitude more abstractly 
than practically. The tolerance expressed in classroom discussions is not al-
ways replicated in their daily life. Students generally wish to avoid conflict on 
religious issues, and some of the religiously committed students feel especially 
vulnerable. Dialogue is the favored strategy for teachers to cope with diversity 
2 The project was funded by the European Commission (2006–2009), promoted by the War-
wick Religions and Education Research Unit (wreru). It has carried out a qualitative and 
quantitative research in eight countries (Germany, England, France, The Netherlands, Nor-
way, Estonia, Russia, and Spain), focusing on religion in the lives and schooling of students 
aged 14–16.
719Religious Conflicts in Multi-cultural Schools
<UN>
in the classroom, but students are more ambivalent about the importance of it 
since, in practice, not all students are comfortable with the way diversity is 
managed in schools.
In the studies mentioned above, interreligious relationships in multi- 
cultural schools appear two-fold: interreligious dialogue is not always possible 
in a highly diverse school environment in which different groups of students 
inevitably have conflicting interests and worldviews. Interethnic and interreli-
gious friendships and conflicts coexist. Conflict does not exclude the mutual 
recognition of and respect for the other’s legitimate presence in a shared social 
space. Schools are obviously not the only social site for cross-cultural engage-
ment, but they are a perfect illustration of how this respect for others’ presence 
can work in practice (Ho, 2011). In the already quoted Beatbullying’s Interfaith 
Project (2008), many young people interviewed have friends from all religions. 
Many young people are tolerant and interested in each other’s religion. The 
majority of them have never been bullied because of their faith; their families 
encourage them to mix with young people from all religions and they feel com-
fortable discussing about religion with their peers in schools.
3 Religious Diversity in Italian Educational Studies: an Emerging 
Tradition
In Italian studies, a recent research tradition on interethnic relationships can 
be identified, including studies aiming at analyzing relationships, contacts and 
conflicts among peers by focusing on immigrant children’s relational experi-
ences as an important asset of immigrants’ well-being and a crucial dimension 
of school integration (Azzolini et al., 2019). Within this research line, the focus 
on religious diversity and school integration is quite underdeveloped and less 
consolidated in comparison with the other topics.
On the one hand, these studies highlight a condition of relational disadvan-
tage for immigrant students, without clarifying the role of religious back-
ground. The loss of social capital due to recent migration may produce distress 
and tension among peers, and interethnic conflicts (Colombo, Santagati, 2010). 
These phenomena, however, are ascribed to variables such as social class or 
gender, but are rarely explained in ethnic, cultural, or religious terms. Pioneer-
ing research on this topic affirms that the religious issue is not explicit and is 
not dealt with in multi-cultural schools (Ottaviano, 2010).
On the other hand, research shows that students with an immigrant back-
ground also experience good-quality relationships with classmates and teach-
ers, and they often do not declare relational difficulties within the classroom 
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(Besozzi et al., 2009): in general, immigrant students place greater importance 
on the cognitive dimension of educational integration, whereas they are less 
concerned with schools as an arena for socialization.
The issue of discrimination and interethnic violence emerges in a couple of 
studies conducted in schools in Northern Italy (Delli Zotti, 2014). Although 
peer violence is a common problem, pupils see schools as safe places, since 
violence mostly happens outside school grounds. The comparison between 
teachers and students’ perceptions of violence reveals the underestimation, on 
the adults’ part, of the ethnic-racial motivations for bullying and other acts of 
prevarication, as well as the role of gender (males) and (low) social class as 
catalysts for episodes of school violence. Other studies confirm the diffusion of 
relational closure towards immigrants among natives, young males, disadvan-
taged or isolated students, students who have relational difficulties or are un-
satisfied with their school environment (Barberis, 2016).
As in French studies, also in Northern Italy tensions among peers are more 
frequent in classes with a strong multi-culturality and many social problems, 
where there are low levels of peer exchange and reciprocal support. Specific 
measures against highly conflictual climates have been created by observing 
the offensive language used during instances of peer conflict, the development 
of negative attitudes towards diversity, and the presence of aggressive and vio-
lent behavior (Colombo, Santagati, 2014). The same studies also identify “the 
best school experiences”, in which positive classroom climates seem to be 
characterized by the development of intergroup friendships. In this perspec-
tive, the highly multi-cultural institutes can also be interpreted as social con-
tamination labs, multipliers of interethnic social capital, and spaces defining a 
mixed model of coexistence, in an atmosphere based on openness to diversity 
(Santagati, 2016).
Schools often offer spaces of (implicit or explicit) exchange in which identi-
ties, worldviews, similarities and diversities – also based on religious traits – 
play a crucial role, depending on the institutional, organizational, historical-
cultural conditions (Benadusi et al., 2017): the contradictory Italian frame is 
featured by the lack of awareness among teachers in managing controversies 
and dilemmas related to different religious traditions (Daher et al., 2017). More-
over, religion and migration represent an ambivalent mix within the educa-
tional pathways of immigrant students (and not only for Muslims), and, at the 
same time, a stigma and a capital independently of the specific religious back-
ground (Ricucci, 2017).
A positive experience emerges from a research on the role of students’ 
religiosity in school integration (Santagati et al., 2019): this study shows 
that religiosity does play an important role as an integration factor, mainly 
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because it fosters students’ well-being, thus improving their relationships 
with peers and teachers and promoting their openness to interethnic ex-
changes. Religiosity appears as a lever to improve tolerance, respect, and 
intercultural sensitivity. These intercultural competences are experienced 
through everyday religious practices and lifestyles and are shared by pupils 
with different origins in schools with a high percentage of immigrants. In 
addition, religiosity positively affects school integration both for Italian and 
non-Italian students.
Other analyses reveal that young believers from different faiths appear quite 
open to religious diversities and are able to interweave interreligious relation-
ships featured by pragmatism, reciprocity and respect between majority and 
minority groups: this attitude seems to be more difficult for non-Catholic stu-
dents than it appears to be for Catholic ones, but it is not impossible (Bichi 
et al., 2018).
4 The Religious Nature of Conflicts at School: Research Questions
An overview of the international and Italian studies highlights that religion is 
still neglected in educational and migration studies, and its role is scarcely 
considered to analyze the integration process of students with an immigrant 
background. Especially in Italy, school failure and interethnic conflicts are 
phenomena that are rarely explained or interpreted by religious factors. How-
ever, as pointed out before, religion is often considered a black box of phenom-
ena that are socially and culturally constructed, and it is important to avoid 
any simplification of the religious issues, considering the effects of the inter-
section of class, gender, ethnicity, religion, and other factors on educational 
trajectories (Farris, de Jong, 2014).
The lack of studies invites scholars to examine the role of religion in multi-
cultural schools, especially in producing conflicts or fostering dialogue, affect-
ing relational well-being of students, influencing or preventing violence in the 
school environment. Our study, based on 14 focus groups involving adults 
(teachers, school leaders, and parents) and students attending lower second-
ary schools (as presented before in Chapter 21), try to deepen these issues, in 
order to describe, analyze and interpret the effect of religious backgrounds on 
classroom interactions in terms of intergroup tensions and friendships charac-
terizing the school climate.
The research aims at deepening the issue of religious conflict in the class-
rooms and gathering empirical evidence about the role of religion diversity in 
educational integration in multi-cultural Italian schools:
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a) exploring the relevance of religion within interethnic relationships in 
public schools;
b) mapping the religious conflicts within multi-cultural schools, through 
students’ and adults’ narratives;
c) facilitating the punctual narration of conflictual events and episodes in 
order to distinguish motivations, actors, evolving dynamics, and iden-
tify words, attitudes, behaviors emerging in conflictual situations, ana-
lyzing more in-depth elements which define conflictual and contrast-
ing situation;
d) examining if religion is a triggering factor of interethnic conflicts; observ-
ing the religious differences in classrooms and the reactions of adults and 
students to conflicts;
e) collecting explanations of religious-based conflicts from the different 
points of view of students and adults.
In the following paragraphs, we are concentrating on the third part of the focus 
group grid dedicated to religious conflict at school, regarding the discussion on 
narratives, feelings, and opinions about religious-based disagreements or ten-
sions. The items used in the focus group are three. From the point of view of 
pupils, the discussion takes in consideration:
a) the reconstruction of a list of religion-based conflict involving them-
selves or classmates;
b) how they react and cope with conflicts, how they manage such conflicts 
or how they would like to;
c) the collection of narratives about religion fights, remembering and shar-
ing words, attitudes, gestures.
From the point of view of adults, the focus group includes:
a) the (in)direct observation or the knowledge of religion-based conflicts at 
school;
b) the way they react and behave facing conflictual situations, what duties 
they have and what choices they make or would make;
c) the collection of negative school memories and stories of fights for reli-
gious affiliations, considering teasing, bullying, and mentioning verbal 
and physical fights and their evolution.
Finally, the dimensions of the theoretical scheme used in this book (cf. Part 1 
and Chapter 21) help us to reconnect the analysis to some key questions:
– How the claim for the expression of the religious minorities’ identities be-
come a matter for religious school conflict?
– Are religious frictions and tensions among students with different religious 
backgrounds connected to different degrees of freedom and autonomy of 
students from adults’ control?
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– Could religion-based conflict and religious discrimination be linked to ma-
jority-minority group contrasts, to power disparity, and unequal opportuni-
ties in terms of rights of citizenship?
– Are conflictual dynamics compatible with tolerant and civil coexistence in 
multi-religious school environments? How schools become a common space 
in which diversities are combined, shared and transformed in the integra-
tion process?
These important questions lead us through the presentation of the results of 
the research, pointing out the differences and the similarities in the narratives 
of people from different generations with different cultural and religious 
backgrounds.
5 Research Results: the Point of View of Students, Teachers, School 
Leaders, and Parents on Religious-Based Conflicts
In the following paragraphs, we are going to present some results deriving from 
the content analysis realized by the software Nvivo. We have carried out an 
initial coding of the discussions deriving from the 14 focus groups (§5.1), basi-
cally by looking for the description of the school conflicts and the main char-
acteristics of these events narrated by students and adults (map/list of men-
tioned conflicts; actors involved and their role; kind of conflicts, such as among 
peers, teacher-student conflict, parents-teacher conflict, etc.; space-time coor-
dinates; religious identities emerging during school conflicts).
Then, we will summarize this analysis through a process of focused coding, 
more precisely by identifying the kind of narratives developed to describe con-
flicts (§5.2), the variability of conflicts (escalation from verbal to physical ha-
rassment, gradation, duration, etc.), the level of importance attributed to reli-
gion, the three components of conflicts (words, attitudes, behaviors), the 
reaction to and the management of conflict.
Finally, we arrive at an interpretative coding, elaborating the idea of religion 
as one of the core variables (mean or end) of school conflicts, identifying ma-
terial/realistic and cultural/symbolic explanations (cf. Stephan, Stephan, 
2000) that underpins the previous in-depth analysis of religious tensions 
(§5.3).3 
3 For the different types of coding in qualitative research, cf. Charmaz (2006).
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5.1 The Description of Conflict
Thanks to the open coding realized through Nvivo, we can observe that each 
focus group (hereafter fg4) involving students or adults has a 15–16% coverage 
of the total discussion regarding school conflicts. The attention dedicated to 
exploring conflicts is not similar, in terms of time and mentioned examples, 
among fgs with adults or students. Moreover, there is not a correspondence 
between fgs conducted in the same schools with adults or students with re-
spect to the importance given to the issue of religious conflicts. For example, 
the part about conflict is quite developed in FG4-BG-st, and it is particularly 
important in FG2-BS-ad, 4-MI-ad, and 5-MI-ad.
Students mentioned a list of 23 examples of conflicts, while adults referred 
to 15 cases. FG1-BS-st is featured by a very high number of episodes of conflicts, 
with respect to the other fgs with students and adults: we have to take in con-
sideration that it is the most participated fg (with 14 students) and that it has 
the highest number of Muslim participants (6 students) among all fgs. We 
have to remember that fgs with students are multi-religious and multi- cultural 
in the participants’ composition, while adults’ fgs are more homogenous with 
a majority of Italian, Catholic (and females) participants.
Most conflicts mentioned by students are peer conflicts (19), while few 
other actors seem to be involved in religious-based tensions in the narratives 
of students: there are only some cases of a discussion between a Muslim stu-
dent and a teacher; a friction between a Muslim father and the teacher of his 
4 Focus groups have been codified in the following quotes by number (i.e. FG1), school prov-
ince (i.e. FG1-BS), kind of participants (i.e. FG1-BS-st for students, FG1-BS-1-ad for adults).
Source: Author’s personal elaboration
Table 23.1  Number of conflicts mentioned in focus groups by students or adults
fg students No. conflicts mentioned fg adults No. conflicts 
mentioned
1 bs 10 1 bs 2
2 bs 3 2 bs 3
3 bs 3 3 bg 2
4 bg 3 4 mi 4
5 mi 3 5 mi 1
6 mi 1 6 mi 2
7 mi 0 7 mi 1
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 daughter; two cases of religious conflicts are reported from news on  television 
and concern the opposition parents-sons or conflicts among adults. In fg 
7-MI-st no conflicts are mentioned.
Almost all the religious conflicts narrated by the students are conflicts that 
they have witnessed directly (21): in 5 cases, Muslim students reported cases in 
which they have been victims of religious bullying. Even if these mentioned 
episodes occurred mainly within school environment and classrooms, in 6 
cases students referred to extra-scholastic contexts (oratory, neighborhood 
streets, television). In 14 cases of the 21 mentioned episodes, students deal with 
events that take place in the present, while past conflicts are narrated espe-
cially by Muslim students, victims of negative religious-based events occurred 
at school: referring to the past represents a way to make a narrative distance 
from painful situations.
Students provide a differentiated description of religious identities emerging 
during school conflicts: although, in most cases, conflicts are developing be-
tween Muslim students and the other classmates with no specified religious 
identity (12 cases), there are individual identities and affiliations that appear, 
indicating: interreligious conflicts (Muslims-Catholics; a case of Muslim Paki-
stani versus Indian Sikh) as intra-religious conflicts (among Catholics, Muslims, 
Protestants), majority-minority conflicts (Catholic students –majority faith 
group– versus a classmate with a different religious-minority identity); conflicts 
between atheists and believers; integralist and soft believers (among Catholic, 
Protestant, Muslim students); practicing and non-practicing students.
Although the religious majority identity of the classroom is not always ex-
plicit, there are different cases in which classmates identify a single student 
representing the religious alterity in the classroom as a victim of teasing and 
joking: i.e. the case of a Hindu student or a Jehovah’s Witnesses student. In 
some episodes, this hetero-attribution of a religious identity does not corre-
spond to truth and is used only to hurt a weak classmate: a student, son of a 
Muslim father and a Catholic mother, which is defined Muslim although he is 
Catholic; a Thai girl teased as Buddhist, even she is Catholic.
The list of conflicts mentioned by adults during the focus groups is more 
differentiated, if we consider the actors involved: 6 cases consist in peer con-
flicts involving students; 5 are conflicts between female teachers and Muslim 
students (only in one case we have a disagreement between a teacher and a 
Jehovah’s Witnesses student); 3 frictions in the school-family relationship con-
cern the fact that teacher perceive Islam as an impediment to gender equality, 
reporting experiences with Muslim fathers that prevent girls from participat-
ing in school activities or impose the veil. It is also mentioned a case of a 
 mediatized contrast among school leaders of the same territorial area about 
religious symbols and ceremonies (Crib, Christmas party, Crucifix, etc.).
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Table 23.2 Religious-based conflicts emerging from fgs with students
N. Quotes from students’ fgsa
1 When I arrived in Italy, my Italian classmates did not say anything. After a 
while they started making fun of me. First, I didn’t say anything, but they 
continued … One day, there were four, but I was bigger than them: I beat them 
up. (Male, Senegalese, Muslim, FG1-BS-st)
2 I don’t remember when it happened, I remember that two classmates and 
friends were involved, a Muslim and a Christian. They wanted to go out, but 
the Muslim said “No, I have to go to the mosque” and then the quarrel started. 
“Come on, you don’t care about it”, said the Christian, and the Muslim reacted. 
(Female, Italian, Catholic, FG1-BS-st)
3 One day I went out with my cousin and a friend, they didn’t know each 
other. My cousin wants to become a priest and my friend is an atheist.  
I don’t remember what happened, but my friend cursed, and my cousin got 
angry. They started fighting, almost slapping each other. (Male, Italian, 
Catholic, fg1-BS-st)
4 Two Christian classmates started arguing and fighting: one usually does not go 
to church, while the other goes. The non-practicing student told the other not 
to go to church anymore. (Female, Italian, Catholic, FG1-BS)
5 Last year there was a student who was half Thai and half Italian, she was 
Christian. Three or four classmates made fun of her, they told her she was 
Buddhist. (Male, Italian, Catholic, FG1-BS-st)
6 There was a boy who has a Muslim father and a Spanish mother. One 
 classmate told him “You are a mix” and has continued naming him so. Maybe 
he teased him because he has parents of different origins, but he is baptized. 
(Female, Italian, Catholic, FG1-BS-st)
7 Often my classmate makes signs with his hands … he also used to swear (Male, 
Senegalese, Muslim). I saw some of my classmates who made the sign like isis, 
dressed like isis, they put here (points at the face) a kind of band and started 
doing so: trrr (machine-gun noise). trrr (laughter). Against the whole class 
usually, to tease students from different religions. One of my friends is 
Pakistani, they point towards her. (Female, Moldovan, Orthodox, FG1-BS-st)
8 That atheist friend of mine, when he sees my cousin or other very Christian 
people, does this to them (simulates a gesture of prayer). If he sees Muslims, he 
lies down. He looks at them with contempt. (Male, Italian, Catholic, FG1-BS-st)
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N. Quotes from students’ fgsa
9 In our classroom, there was a boy who teased a girl because she was a Muslim. 
He continued for a long time, so the teacher made him feel like the girl, she 
teased him about his Christian faith. He said a swearword and the teacher 
repeated it, saying “how would you feel if I told you this bad word?” (Male, 
Italian, Catholic, FG1-BS-st)
10 Last year there was a Muslim girl in our classroom. She was always silent, a 
good girl, but everything would happen in the classroom, like stolen things or 
disappeared, the classmates accused her that it was her religion that told her to 
do those bad things. She was shy, closed, she didn’t know how to defend 
herself, sometimes she cried. (Male, Italian, Catholic, FG1-BS-st)
11 In primary school, a girl got angry with me, maybe for something I hadn’t even 
done. She said to the others: “You don’t have to talk to her, because if you talk 
to her, I will not be your friend anymore”. I said nothing and I continued 
staying with the ones who loved me. Slowly they understood that I had done 
nothing wrong and they forgot everything. (Female, Indian, Hindu, FG2-BS-st)
12 Some guys are bullies. I wanted to play with them, but they stayed away from 
me because I was a Muslim. Once, one of them shoved me and I punched him. 
There were problems, he got hurt: however, he was weaker than me and I 
couldn’t resist. (Male, Senegalese, Muslim, FG2-BS-st)
13 Once I heard in the tv that someone had hurt a person because they were 
Muslim (Female, Italian, Catholic). Yes … Moroccans who kill people, just 
because they are of another religion and not Muslim.
Q: But where happens? Among Moroccans, isis … they say they are Muslims. 
(Male, Senegalese, Muslim, FG2-BS-st)
14 In the oratory, a friend spoke in a negative way of my religion and I got angry. 
Q: And what was he telling you? I won’t tell you, bad things. (Male, Senegalese, 
Muslim, FG3-BS-st)
15 In the classroom, when we talk about religions, there is a Muslim classmate 
who says that Muslim women must wear a veil by force. The teacher always 
expresses her disagreement. (Female, Italian, Catholic, FG3-BS-st)
16 In primary school, there was a Muslim boy who beat another who was a Sikh. 
Someone told me about them, but I knew they used to beat each other 
frequently, because one was from one religion and the other from another.
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Table 23.2 Religious-based conflicts emerging from FGs with students (cont.)
N. Quotes from students’ fgsa
Q: Were they of the same nationality? No, one was Pakistani, one Indian. There 
were always religious hostilities between them. (Female, Italian, Catholic, 
FG3-BS-st)
17 In my case, we argued about religion. A classmate told me “Moroccan with this 
veil made of sh…”. She teased me because I put the veil and because I am 
Moroccan. I was in primary school; it was not such a happy past. This class-
mate and others made fun of me, but I pretended not to hear, and I ignored 
them, waiting for them to stop. (Female, Moroccan, Muslim, FG4-BG-st)
18 My dad wanted me to put the veil, but my teacher in primary school was 
against this idea and then there was a quarrel between her and my dad. When I 
was six years old, I was not able to choose, but after I had understood … my 
dad didn’t insist. (Female, Moroccan, Muslim) Perhaps the teacher wanted to 
take her defenses … about the veil, on the tv news sometimes we heard about 
girls who don’t want to put the veil on and their parents hurt them. (Male, 
Italian, Catholic) I also agree with him: the choice of religion is a personal 
choice and it should not be imposed by parents. (Female, Italian, Catholic) But 
my parents didn’t impose me anything. It was my choice, my mom explained 
to me it was a choice I had to make … certainly it is not a decision of my 
parents. (Female, Moroccan, Muslim, FG4-BG-st)
19 I have never seen a dispute between parents and sons about religion, maybe on 
tv I heard something about this … On the tv news, you hear about Muslims 
more than Christians … I never hear about Christian parents that order their 
son to go to Mass, and if he does not go, they beat him up. (Male, Italian, 
Catholic, FG4-BG-st)
20 My friends tease me because I must go to Mass, because it is important for me 
as it is for my parents. I have to go to Mass; I have to go to catechism class and 
my friends insult me: “What are you going to do? It is a waste of time”. My 
friends come to the oratory, but mostly for fun and to be troublemakers. (Male, 
Italian, Catholic, FG5-MI-st)
21 First, that guy came, and I pushed him away. Later he came back, with their 
friends. He threatened my friend, telling him not to talk about his religion 
anymore. When my friend wasn’t there, I told him that he didn’t have to 
discriminate other people for their ideas because sometimes the religion we 
profess comes from our parents. (Male, Romanian, Orthodox, FG5-MI-st)
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N. Quotes from students’ fgsa
22 We have discriminated a girl, a Jehovah’s Witnesses. I have a classmate: he is a 
hacker … he took videos where she sang and put them on YouTube … and then 
we removed her from our WhatsApp group. Many of our classroom laughed. 
When the fact came out, we were in trouble. We discussed it at school even 
with our teacher and she and we were uncomfortable. (Male, Italian, Catholic) 
Q: Before, you said that we excluded her because she is the only one of another 
religion. Right? Yes … she is Italian. She is not a very nice girl, her behavior is 
not so good, moreover she belongs to another religion. (Male, Italian, Catholic, 
FG5-MI-st)
23 There is a classmate who is a bit stupid, he teased and made fun of our Muslim 
classmate … I don’t know what he said to him. (Female, Italian, Catholic) He 
made jokes playing with the word Muhammad. (Male, Italian, Atheist)
And obviously our Muslim friend got offended … (Female, Italian, Catholic)
We were going back to the classroom and we saw the Muslim classmate 
holding the other by the neck and dragging him for the whole class. (Male, 
Italian, Atheist). Because he is an impulsive boy. (Female, Italian, Catholic, 
FG6-MI-st)
a Each quote from fg is ended referring to the main characteristics of the speaking partici-
pant: for students gender, nationality, religious belonging, fg code; for adults, gender, role 
(Parent, Teacher, School Leader), religious belonging and nationality in the case of foreign 
parents, fg code. In the fg quotes, sometimes we used the letter Q that stands for Question 
posed by the fg moderator.
Source: Author’s personal elaboration
The religious conflicts are narrated mainly by teachers and by some school 
leaders; only in one case a mother reported an experience lived by her daugh-
ter. Adults referred only to recent school conflicts, in which they are not di-
rectly involved (except for few cases): they told about fights among students, 
episodes narrated to them by students, negative experiences of colleagues, dis-
agreement with Muslim parents. In general, they are not the main actors of 
these conflicts.
Adults do not give, as students do, a differentiated Religious identities emerg-
ing during school conflicts: in many cases (10 out of 15), conflicts are developing 
between Muslim students (or parents) and the other classmates, students, 
teachers with a not-declared Catholic identity. Often, the division is  between 
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“we” (probably Catholics, the majority, autochthonous, non- immigrants, etc.) 
and “they” (mainly Muslims, the minority, foreign-born, immigrants, etc.). Only 
in few cases do adults refer to other religious identities (Orthodox, Sikh, Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses): no reference to intra-religious conflicts between practicing 
and non-practicing believers, no reference to spread atheism appear (see 
Garelli, 2016). The adults’ view seems a simplified and dichotomist vision of 
religious diversities at school: majority and minority faith groups, religion of 
autochthonous and religion of immigrants.
The results of the “Word Frequency Query” carried out by Nvivo have pro-
vided a first description of conflicts and have shown that students have a wide 
vocabulary to discuss conflict: in their fgs, they use words that refer to the 
form of the conflict (bad words, curses, discussion, insult, etc.) and words con-
cerning feelings and emotions experienced at the beginning and during the 
controversies (anger, fear, antipathy, etc.). Students also mention some distinc-
tive elements that appear relevant in the context of conflict (i.e. veil, skin color, 
etc.) and explicit some phenomena that influence negatively the interreligious 
relationships (prejudice, racism, terrorism and violent radicalism). We can also 
underline that “freedom” and “woman” are words that are used very often and 
that turn out to be significant for describing the conflict dynamics from the 
students’ point of view.
As far as adults are concerned, they use words that refer more generally to 
the form of the conflict (such as problems, difficulties, discussion, etc.); for 
them, the issues of “woman” (and “veil”) and “freedom” are particularly con-
nected to conflict mechanisms; they also introduce a special attention to “inte-
gration”, while negative attitudes and behaviors are used very few times (i.e. 
annoyance, mistrust, violence, contempt).
The difference between students’ and adults’ narratives about conflict can 
be seen in a relevant gap in the frequency of the use of the words: “freedom” 
(125 times among students versus 59 among adults) and “woman” (227 among 
adults versus 33 among students). In the in-depth analysis that will be devel-
oped in the following paragraphs, we will see that these are two different inter-
pretative perspectives of the conflict adopted by two different generations:
– The youngest, whose discussions are focused on the issue of freedom to 
choose one’s religion, central in the construction of their own identity, of 
their educational projects, and of their life plans. In the students’ narratives 
about conflict, the crucial question is the possibility of a free choice of one’s 
religious belonging, independent of the control, the constraints and the im-
position of adults;
– The adults’ perspective, on the other hand, is mainly focused on the “wom-
en” issues, namely gender gap, gender inequality, gender violence (we know 
that among the adults participating in the fg, as already mentioned, 
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Table 23.3 Religious-based conflicts emerging from fgs with adults
N. Quotes from adults’ fgs
1 Her classmates started to make fun of my daughter, because they heard of 
Muslims, of Isis … a boy said to her “Hey, shut up, you Orthodox!” My daughter 
replied: “Look, my religion and yours are the same, Christian religions. The boy 
fell silent. When she came back home, I asked her why the discourse about 
Orthodox came out. She said that this boy said: “I send Isis to your home” and 
she answered. (Mother, Moldovan, Orthodox, FG1-BS-ad)
2 Once I scolded a boy for his indiscipline. He told me: “You say that words to me 
because you are Italian and Catholic”. I fell silent, but a girl of Moroccan origin 
rose up. He also said: “I swear by the Koran”, she said to him: “First of all, you 
don’t have to swear because right now you don’t deserve to approach to the 
Koran. In this classroom, do not address in that way to the teacher, who has 
never given proof of treating us as foreigners or of having anything against us 
because we are foreigners. In this moment she scolds you because you are rude 
and that’s it. (Female, Italian Teacher, FG1-BS-ad)
3 There was a Muslim boy who always wanted to stay in the classroom during 
the Religion hour with me. Sometimes I accepted him, but the parents told me 
they did not want him to be there … Now he told me that they decided that he 
could stay, next year. (Female, irc Teacher, FG2-BS-ad)
4 It is annoying to hear teachers who say “we and them”, talking about their 
students. It means that there are still barriers, they are not all your students, 
but there are Italian students and the others. I repeat, there are isolated cases, I 
am not generalizing, but it happens. In the case I remember, the religious 
identity of the teachers was very strong, so it was precisely “we Christians and 
Catholics and they who are not”. These are not serious things, but I perceive a 
mental closure. (Female, Teacher, in charge of intercultural activities, 
FG2-BS-ad)
5 Last year I had a perfectly integrated Muslim pupil born in Italy, without 
linguistic problems, with a good family. But he was very problematic in terms 
of behavior, heavy to bear even for his classmates. One day he said to me: “My 
classmates don’t want to play with me because I’m Muslim!”. All his classmates 
turned towards him and one reacted: “What are you saying? I don’t remember 
if you are a Muslim … you are a nuisance, for this reason we don’t want you!” 
(Female, Teacher, in charge of intercultural activitsies, FG2-BS-ad)
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Table 23.3 Religious-based conflicts emerging from FGs with adults (cont.)
N. Quotes from adults’ fgs
6 I had two Indian pupils belonging to different castes in the same classroom. 
They could not talk together. It was very difficult to  distinguish the religious 
factor from the cultural factor, but this was the situation. (Mother/Teacher, 
Italian, Catholic, FG3-BG-ad)
7 This year I witnessed some quarrels but, in my opinion, these were not 
religious-based conflicts. Some students told me: “But this girl has offended my 
God, she has insulted Him”. But it was a quarrel born out of other reasons and, 
after that, the religious factor intervenes. (Female, Italian Teacher, FG3-BG-ad)
8 In this case, we can talk about a generational conflict. For the two Muslim girls 
who wear the veil, the choice was conditioned by the parents. From my point 
of view, there was also a conflict between the father and the teaching staff, that 
pointed out the potential of these girls in the educational field … Regarding the 
veil, the two girls accepted it. Instead, the youngest sister, also attending our 
school and with a strong character, said to a colleague that the veil bothered 
her. (Female, irc Teacher) She does not bear it. Every five minutes she goes to 
the bathroom, I think she wants to take it off. (Female, Italian teacher, 
FG4-MI-ad)
9 I would give you an example of my experience, when I was a teacher myself. It 
was not a problem linked to immigration, but to religious differences. I 
remember a girl who was a Jehovah’s Witness, I was explaining the Greek 
mythology and she wrote me a note asking if I could exonerate her because 
she was against polytheism. I obviously explained to her the difference 
between a mythological tale and a religious indoctrination … Her classmates 
made fun of her, because they considered it a bit naïve. (Female, School 
Leader, FG4-MI-ad)
10 A Catholic boy says: If they are here, we should remove the crucifix from the 
classrooms; but if we go there, they do not do so. They have freedom here, if we 
go there, we don’t have the same freedom. We must adapt to their life style and 
therefore they too must adapt … if we go there, we must follow their rules, 
while we leave them free not to follow them. (Male, Italian Teachesr, 
FG4-MI-ad)
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N. Quotes from adults’ fgs
11 Last year there was a controversy because a school principal in this area had 
decided to boycott the Christmas party. The fact was reported in the newspa-
per and I remember that a journalist had interviewed me. I think it is not a 
question of making a crusade for the maintenance of religion, but there are 
simply symbols of the tradition that have to be respected and preserved. It is 
sad also to see those who make the crusades to remove all the symbols that 
distinguish us, as if neutrality was the solution. Instead neutrality per se does 
not exist … I am also amazed by those who, facing this wide immigration 
especially from Muslim lands, want to make a crusade for their own religion. 
(Female, School Leader) … In my opinion whoever removes the symbols, does 
this choice to provoke. We do not make the crib, we do not do the Christmas 
party, this is a provocation. (Male, Italian Teacher, FG4-MI-ad)
12 We had the case of an Islamic student, who lived her religion as an imposition, 
she wanted to integrate but could not, because she had an extremist father. He 
accompanied her to school, she took a step behind him, she could not be 
equal, she could not do physical education, she could not remove the veil in 
the classroom, she could not play music, she could not watch movies. The nice 
thing was that he had found solidarity because she took off her veil in her 
classroom. She couldn’t do homework because she had to study the Koran two 
or three hours, then she had to do housework. We fought because her father 
decided to fix the marriage of his daughter. She had to go to her country of 
origin to get married. She said “I don’t want to get married and with a man 
older than me”. We managed in some way, in collaboration with the social 
services, to conclude lower secondary school with the exam, but unfortunately 
after she disappeared. (Male, irc Teacher, FG5-MI-ad)
13 An Italian-Brazilian student, who lives alone with his father, abandoned by his 
mother asks a Maghreb girl of Islamic origin for her vote. There is a certain 
frustration with respect to school results and, perhaps, mutual competition. 
The girl does not answer to him, so the boy begins to insult her heavily: “you 
are a terrorist”, “you have it black because you give it to everyone”, “you Muslim, 
have to stay in your country”. The girl replies: “you tell me so, you who are son 
of a Brazilian woman?” (Male, School Leadesr, fg6-MI-ad)
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 women are overrepresented). Religion, by the adults’ groups, is  represented, 
in the gender conflict, as an instrument of domination by men over women 
and as a justification of women’s submission to men’s power and control.
5.2 The Analysis of Different Kind of School Conflicts
From the point of view of adults, religious-based conflicts are collocated in 
continuum, from “light conflicts” (verbal conflicts, as joking, teasing), often 
corresponding to problematic attitudes (intolerance, contempt, etc.), to even 
more “serious conflicts” (bullying, physical violence, etc.). Considering the dif-
ferent kinds of conflict, peer conflicts through adults’ words are an escalation 
of teasing, provoking, offending, silencing, not bearing, insulting, getting an-
gry, exasperating. The violence is mainly a verbal violence and harassment, 
expressed through shouted words, strong and intolerant language. Among the 
narrated episodes, only one includes a violent behavior (tearing off the veil of 
a Muslim classmate, cf. Table 23.3 n. 15).
Between students and teachers, we can observe some disagreements con-
cerning the influence of religious belief on the lifestyle and study choices of 
Muslim girls (as we have previously commented in the analysis of word fre-
quency query results (§5.2). (Female) teachers report stories of reciprocal ac-
cusation, insinuation, rudeness, delegitimization, and lack of respect by stu-
dents and parents of different religious background (mainly Muslim) towards 
them. In one case, there is a distinction between “we Catholics” – teachers 
Table 23.3 Religious-based conflicts emerging from FGs with adults (cont.)
N. Quotes from adults’ fgs
14 In my school there was a conflict between a teacher and a Muslim girl, with 
mutual recriminations about religious practices, way of dressing, reciprocal 
intolerance. The teacher declared to be openly intolerant towards other ethnic 
groups and acted to defend her idea. The behavior of the teacher and the 
student seemed inappropriate. The student, though insulted, reacted with the 
same violence. The group class has taken the defense of the girl, seen as a 
victim and discredited the teacher who was a substitute teacher. (Female, 
School Leader, FG-6-MI-ad)
15 An Italian student has targeted a Muslim classmate, until the point of tear off 
her veil with contempt. (Female, Italian Teacher, FG-7-MI-ad)
Source: Author’s personal elaboration 
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with closed religious identities –and “them”– students of other religions. In 
school-family conflicts, dilemmas on religious symbols appear (whether to 
hang crucifixes or not; whether to put up Nativity scenes at Christmas or 
not; whether to celebrate Christmas with a party or not, etc.). In these cases, 
the discussions often concern religion as an imposition by Muslim fathers to 
daughters, with negative implications for school and life choices: female 
teachers remark their negative opinion and aversion toward these behaviors. 
At stake there are different world views, different ideas about the role of 
women in school and society, sometimes a different treatment at school of 
students with a different migrant or religious background (Dronkers, Ko-
rnder, 2015).
From the analysis of the three main components of religious-based  conflicts 
narrated by adults (Table 23.5), we can point out that there is a  correspondence 
between words and attitudes emerging in conflictual situation (Santagati, 
2014: 197). Conflicts appear mainly as verbal quarrel or dispute (see conflict 
Table 23.4 Word frequency query concerning conflict and problems in relationships
Word – fg students Word count Word – fg adults Count
Conflict 149 Woman 227
Freedom 125 Conflict 156
Word, Swearword, Curse 59 Problems 122
Veil 46 Difficulties 79
Problems 39 Veil 67
Anger 39 Freedom 59
Woman 33 Integration 48
Discussion 27 Discussion 39
Color 23 Words 35
Prejudice 23 Color 9
Racism 23 Annoyance 9
isis / Terrorism 22 Mistrust 8
Antipathy 20 Violence 8
Fear 18 Insult 7
Insult 15 Contempt 6
Source: Author’s personal elaboration 
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nn. 1, 4, 7, 9, 11), including teasing, naming, insults (and sometimes curses), 
controversies, linked to  specific ways and attitudes towards religious diversity. 
In these quarrels, adults discuss:
Table 23.5  Words, attitudes, behaviors emerging in religious-based conflicts from fgs with 
adults
N. Conflict Words Attitudes Behaviors
1 Teasing, insults, quarrel Simplification, 
stereotyping







11 Discussion, quarrel, 
dispute
Provocation Boycott Christmas party
7 Quarrel, curse Aggressiveness Look for teacher support





2 Scolding, complaint, 
blame
Playing the victim Discriminatory 
treatment
5 Complaint, quarrel Playing the victim Unbearable,  problematic 
behavior
8 Complaint,  
disagreement
Resistance, patience Wear or not the veil
10 Complaint, dispute Provocation, lack of 
reciprocity
Repeated discussion
3 Refusal Closure of parents Attend or not irc
12 Refusal Extremism, control Support to conclude Sec 
School
6 Not talking together Prohibition, 
traditionalism
Remain astonished





14 Recrimination, dispute Intolerance Students against 
substitute teacher
15 Verbal violence Arrogance, 
prevarication
Tear off her veil
Source: Author’s personal elaboration
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– Dynamics of simplification and stereotype use concerning religious belong-
ing and identity;
– Provocations triggered by the (ab)use or the refusal of religious symbols and 
signs;
– Misunderstandings/misinterpretation, confusion between cultural con-
tents of subjects of study and religious indoctrination;
– Presence of close-minded adults that behave differently towards people and 
pupils depending on other religious background;
– Mental, discursive and physical barriers created to foster insiders-outsiders 
distinction also in the educational field, as in the access to relevant social 
knowledge (Merton, 1972).
The analysis of “words” expressing conflict in the narrative of adults, reveal 
various cases of complaint, disagreement, recrimination and disputes (con-
flicts no. 2, 5, 8, 10, 14), especially in wide dynamics involving students, class-
mates, teachers (and sometimes other adults). Some students, in these situa-
tions, decide to “play the victim” in order to look for justifications and 
legitimization of their bad behavior, accusing classmates and teachers of dis-
criminating and treating them unjustly and unequally because of their differ-
ent religious background. Other verbal disputes refer both to attitudes of resis-
tance to family control and religious impositions on daughters, and of 
acceptance of conditioned choices concerning school, life, social participation 
of women; and to challenging attitudes of provocation concerning reciprocity, 
reciprocal adaptation, religious freedom in Italy and in the countries of origin 
of students with an immigrant background.
In the last group of conflicts mentioned by adults (no. 3, 6, 12–15), we have 
listened to and read the description of episodes of verbal violence including 
offenses, recrimination, verbal attacks, sexist language, ethnic and religious 
prohibitions and refusals. Insults often intersect and mix multiple offenses 
concerning religion, color, nationality, gender, etc. (recalling the interpretative 
intersectionality approach: Anthias, 2013). These are cases in which words are 
used as “guns” to hurt someone for his/her intolerable religious diversity. This 
violent language could be interpreted as a consequence of mental closure, vio-
lent extremism and radicalism linked to a traditionalist and conservative vi-
sion (Santagati et al., 2017), which justifies unequal treatment of diversities, 
intolerance, frustration and competition among disadvantaged and low- 
performer students, arrogance and prevarication corresponding to forms of 
religious bullying (Beatbullying, 2008).
Adults briefly refer to the (real, imagined, wanted) reactions to face conflic-
tual situations. Although they desire to demonstrate that school conflicts are 
under their control, in different cases teachers stay in silence, watching the 
reactions of peers in order to stop the conflicts in the classroom. In most cases, 
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teachers intervene by starting open discussions during their lessons, by trying 
to facilitate dialogue among classmates, by proposing an exchange of views 
about religious diversity, clarifications in controversies and disputes, and by 
looking for cooperation with other educational agencies to prevent early 
school leaving of students discriminated or conditioned from their religious 
belonging (Bergamaschi, 2016).
In their aspirations, adults think it could be important to intervene to 
 promote and defend respect for everything (people, culture, religion, etc. 
 FG2- BS-ad), since the parents perceive this respect, and consequently can trust 
schools and teachers more. However, religion is not always considered crucial 
by teachers in the fgs: the idea they have of conflict prevention is to educate 
students from all the points of view, including the religious dimension (Cucini-
ello, 2017), stimulating the expression of specific religious identities, especially 
during their construction and definition (FG3-BG-ad), working on tolerance, 
openness to diversity, non-violent communication and emotional intelligence 
(fg 7-MI-adults). The ideal for teachers is to face conflict with adequate author-
ity and punishment (bad conduct notes on their permanent record, suspension 
in more serious cases, etc.), restore order, listen to everyone’s reasons, teach les-
sons on the conflictual matter (Sclavi, Giornelli, 2014): teachers will be conflict 
mediators working at school (Santagati, 2004) and this will give the two sides of 
the conflict the opportunity to listen to each other and listen to the reasons that 
led to a certain behavior, in order not to repeat it (fg-7-MI-ad).
From the students’ point of view, the different type of conflicts depends on 
the insult gradation – “if they insult me a little, I don’t react, but if they insult 
me a lot, I get angry” (Male, Pakistani, Muslim, FG-1-BS-st) or/and on the time 
duration – “if someone is teasing me, at the beginning I’m not angry, but if he 
continues for a long time I get angry” (Male, Senegal, Muslim, FG-1-BS-st). Stu-
dents are very good at describing the escalation of conflicts, giving detailed 
tales of words, attitudes, behaviors emerging in conflictual situations.
Analyzing the three main components of religious-based conflicts narrated 
by students (Table 23.6), we can find several pronounced (and not pronounced) 
words that mark and characterize the conflictual climate among peers or the 
student-teacher interaction. Most conflicts are based on teasing a student with 
a different religious background (no. 1-5-6-8-9-22): teasing becomes more irri-
tating when it includes verbal insults, attribution of false names and religious 
identities, laughs. The “perpetrators” do not seem to know that they are dealing 
with a delicate subject that can hurt the classmate designated as the “victim” 
very much. In fact, these verbal strategies refer to superficiality, antipathy, but 
also to  contempt and harassing attitudes: practicing students or students from 
a minority faith group are victims of derision of their religious practice. Their 
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Table 23.6  Words, attitudes, behaviors emerging in religious-based conflicts from fgs with 
students
N. Conflict Words Attitudes Behaviors




5 Teasing, false naming Superficiality Emphasis on 
diversity aspects
6 Continuous teasing, false 
naming
Superficiality Emphasis on 
diversity aspects
8 Teasing, offense Contempt Simulation of gesture 
of prayer
22 Teasing, laughs, discussion Harassing attitude Exclusion, 
cyberbullying




Scold of the teacher
3 Curse, offense Provocation, 
aggressiveness
Fight, slaps




10 Blame, false accusations Provocation Cry, inability to 
defend herself
17 Quarrel, swearwords Provocation Negative reaction to 
veiled girl
23 Quarrel, curse, offense Group-centrism Fight
20 Quarrel, insults Group-centrism (Criticized) religious 
practice
4 Quarrel Group-centrism (Criticized) religious 
practice, fight
2 Quarrel, dispute Group-centrism Aggressive reaction
15 Quarrel, dispute Control, resistance Wear or not the veil
18 Quarrel, dispute Control, resistance Restriction of women 
autonomy




Exclusion from the 
classroom
21 Threat, refused 
communication
Arrogance, sense of 
injustice
Move and get away
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religious diversity is stressed, diminished and criticized; phenomena of reli-
gious bullying (also in the version of cyberbullying occurring over digital de-
vices like cell phones, computers, and tablets, in social media or in chats, etc.) 
take place (cf. Agirdag et al., 2011; Llorent et al., 2016). The exclusion of some 
students from the classroom because they are excessively different from the 
other classmates, as well as physical contrasts and fights, also happen as com-
plements to quarrels, arguments, and negative attitudes. In this conflict, unfor-
tunately, “some teachers do not even try to listen, and some others pretend to 
understand, even if they haven’t understood and end up punishing who is in 
the right” (Female, Italian, Catholic, FG1-BS-st).
Sometimes, in conflicts described by students, teasing is associated to 
swearwords, curses and blasphemies, verbal offenses, insults, bad words, false 
accusations (no. 3-7-10-17-20): dynamics of provocation, aggressive and harass-
ing attitudes, absence of empathy towards the teased victims, as well as pro-
vocative inclinations aimed at sparking conflicts appear. These negative orien-
tations, on the one hand, often turn into fights, physical violence, worrying 
simulations of weapons’ use (and terroristic attacks), as well as disrespect and 
disobedience to the teacher’s authority. On the other hand, they also create the 
feeling of being defenseless, sad, isolated and lonely in the classroom.
Quarrels and disputes narrated by students (conflicts no. 2-4-15-18-20-23) in-
troduce the interesting topic of group-centrism (Kent, Burnight, 1951), that is 
the idea that one’s own culture is better than any other culture. This  inclination, 
emerging from students’ fgs, consists of evaluating other religious beliefs, 
practices, and affiliations from of one’s own personal perspective, on which is 
Source: Author’s personal elaboration 
Table 23.6 Words, attitudes, behaviors emerging in religious-based conflicts from FGs with 
students (cont.)
N. Conflict Words Attitudes Behaviors






19 tv news: parent-children 
dispute
Control, resistance (Possible) religious-
based violence




14 Unrepeatable words Arrogance Aggressive reaction
16 No words Hostility Fight
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based both the belief in the superiority of one’s own group and the contempt 
for outsiders.
We call this attitude group-centrism, since it is exercised not only on an 
ethnic, religious, cultural (etc.) basis, but also by some groups towards other 
groups (Catholics versus Muslims; Atheists versus Catholics or Muslims; prac-
ticing versus not-practicing believers; etc.). Group-centrism is a crucial atti-
tude to interpret continuous controversies in which at stake there is the inclu-
sion of “one student” in the majority group of classmates (who are seen as 
similar, united, and strong). Such inclusion can be attained by avoiding caus-
ing the student to feel isolated, weak, or different because of his/her religious, 
ethnic and cultural belonging, identified as “strange” because of his/her behav-
ior or their way of dressing.
By observing from the point of view of the younger generation, among the 
various disputes we can see some discussions about the controversial issue of 
autonomy and control on girls and women exercised by fathers and men 
through religious traditions and practices. This discourse adds further ele-
ments about how adolescents perceive themselves as a group (experimenting 
youth-centrism) in front of the group of adults (Maassen et al., 1992). Students 
agree on the fact that the religious choice should be made freely and underline 
the importance of accepting and recognizing other religions. Accordingly, they 
are against adults who want to impose (sometimes in violent ways) choices 
concerning religion and highlight the need of being independent of adults and 
parents and of resisting to their impositions, with consequences on the physi-
cal and mental restriction of women’s autonomy.
In conflicts no. 11 and 21, we can find verbal threats and accusations deriv-
ing from aggressive, provocative and arrogant attitudes. These episodes are 
characterized by an explicit refusal of the interaction with the “others” by 
members of the majority group, driven by the adoption of self-centered atti-
tudes during the construction of a social act, which leads to conflict (in the 
constructionist view of Mead (Athens, 2012)). These classmates, sometimes, 
also refuse to communicate with a “super-diverse” victim, often fragile, and 
seen as not able to defend him/herself, or even not able to participate in the 
classroom relational dynamics because of his/her religious belonging. Among 
these last students, we can observe an increase in their perception of being 
treated unjustly by their classmates, of being discriminated for their religious 
ideas (without having done anything wrong). Sometimes they are beaten from 
the majority group, they suffer physical violence and harassment (almost ab-
sent in the stories of conflicts as told by adults), other times they experiment 




In the last group of conflicts (no. 12-13-14-16-19), finally, the violence of 
religious -based conflicts increases even more in the narratives of students. In 
fact, because of the seriousness of those conflicts, they discuss the news broad-
cast on television (religious-based murders, parent-children violent disputes 
about religion choices) and they consider the verbal dynamics of conflict in 
which they are involved as controversies made of “unrepeatable bad words”, hos-
tile words, offenses to God or to the prophets (cf. Lipperini, 2018, about the proj-
ect “Parole ostili” (hostile words)). We would like to point out that, in this kind of 
conflicts, a sort of religious-based violence is described. A violence motivated 
by or in reaction to religious belonging, practice or belief, a violence involving 
adults and young people caused by some religious aspects, a violence triggered 
by some religious features of the victims or of the attackers (Hall, 2013).
What are the reactions and the strategies used by students to face a conflic-
tual situation? As in some other studies (Van Praag et al., 2016), students tend 
to withdraw from classroom discussions and conflicts about religion where 
they feel that their values are different from those commonly expressed. As 
these young people from minority groups do not appear to receive a great sup-
port from peers or adults, they tend develop their own strategies of coping and 
survival, through silence, indifference and immobility, trying to hide their reli-
gious identity to stop the conflict, through passive waiting. In several cases, 
students show different emotional reactions: anger, sadness, annoyance, fear, 
irritability, displeasure, violence. Rarely do they talk about the mediation or 
the intervention of peers or teachers. In general, students think that some-
times it is necessary to involve teachers in the conflict management, while par-
ents have to stay out of the conflict not to complicate the situation. Teachers 
have to talk to students trying to mediate and to explain the importance of the 
respect of others and the injustice of religious offense. Then, sometimes, to 
punish physical violence, they have to use the appropriate measures, such as 
school suspension, and most of all they have to give comfort to the victim.
Teachers have to intervene without scolding those who made the insult 
and by giving comfort to the victim … Maybe the student feels under 
pressure and does not want to profess his religion any longer … Maybe 
the teacher’s intervention can lead him fight the anxiety he has inside. 
(Male, Italian, Catholic, FG1-BS-st)
5.3 Realistic or Symbolic? The Conflict Interpreted by the Focus Group 
Participants
The last part of our analysis of school conflicts concerns the explanation and 
the interpretation that fg participants directly attribute to the role of religion 
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in conflicts, and it takes in consideration different interpretative perspectives 
emerging from each fg.
For students, religious-based conflicts and disagreements are an important 
and personal matter, since it is linked to the construction and the definition of 
their cultural identity, in relation to their familiar history and to the migration 
experience. In this perspective, religion represents an important cultural dimen-
sion per se, since it deeply affects the development of the students’ identity.
The importance of one’s religion belonging appears from the fact that reli-
gious issues are used during conflicts to hurt students with a different religious 
background. In FG1-BS-st, we can clearly observe a vision of religion as a way of 
life or lifestyle (Berzano, 2011), a way to identify oneself. For this reason, religious- 
based threats and violence deeply hurt the personal identity: these offenses hit 
students in their most fragile and intimate dimension, targeting a (super)diver-
sity sometimes considered as socially inassimilable or unacceptable. Religious 
belonging seems to represent, for students, the weakest point in their inclusion 
pathways: curses or insults, and other negative attack strategies on religious top-
ics, mark a real distance and create a dramatic rupture in peer relationships. Re-
ligion is considered as a weapon that increases the chance of harassment and of 
suffering for vulnerable victims, implying the feeling of a perceived exclusion, 
especially when an attitude of contempt towards the other’s religion emerges.
My classmate makes fun of her because she belongs to a different reli-
gion. (Female, Moldovan, Orthodox)
He was pointing at me, saying to the teacher that it was my fault, surely 
because I belong to another religion, they hit more those who are not Ital-
ian and who are not Catholics. (Female, Moldovan, Orthodox)
I think the people who tease about religion don’t really want to make fun 
of religion, they don’t care. Religion is seen as a weapon to tease you even 
more with contempt. (Male, Italian, Catholic, FG 1-BS-st).
The description of the conflict dynamics provided by the adolescents, in fact, 
reflects the functioning mechanism of an apparently homogeneous group 
(in terms of religion, culture, language, clothing style, skin color, etc.:  cf. 
 FG-6-MI-st) that exercises its cruelty against a single student because of his/
her difference in religious terms. The majority group attacks students who 
appear distant and different from the group, expressing either indifference or 
ability to deny, exclude and reject this religious diversity. Classmates end up 
turning into “a pack of wolves that attack a vulnerable pray”: this opposition 
between a group of students apparently similar in the religious background 
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and one  single student with a clear religious (Muslim) identity, gives evi-
dence of the imbalance in relations crossing a multi-religious classroom, in 
which power disparity and majority supremacy is expressed and confirmed, 
identifying a target excluded by the group.
Q: But what is the origin of this quarrel?
This quarrel was born from the stupidity of people. (Female, Italian, 
Catholic)
No, I think the cause of the quarrel was the religion, because they were 
friends. Given that religion is a way of identifying oneself, being teased 
about that topic can be annoying and I know well me too. I am an atheist 
and, in the classroom, they make all the stupid jokes and I can say that it 
is very irritating. I have never reacted to these things because I am not an 
impulsive boy. I must say, however, that there is a lot of aggregation of my 
classmates to the group of those who made fun of. They are like wolves 
that run in a pack, if you come off the pack then you are the target too. 
(Male, Italian, Atheist, FG6-MI-st)
Religion in some cases (FG-2-BS-st) is considered the primary cause of differ-
ence, difficulty (and deficit) of immigrant students, therefore provoking con-
flicts and religious bullying, given the spread of negative prejudice according 
to which immigrant pupils of other religions (especially Muslims) are natu-
rally incapable and sometimes also intolerant, violent, extremist and terrorist.
Q: What were these arguments about?
They depend on my religion, sometimes on my color … teachers di-
vided us into groups to do something and if I wasn’t able to do that, they 
would start telling me “she’s not able to because she’s Indian”.
Q: But to what did they refer?
More to religion than nationality. Before, I couldn’t really understand, 
now I understand. (Female, Indian, Hindu, FG2-BS-st)
Sometimes (i.e. FG-4-BG-st), religious and immigrant backgrounds are con-
fused and mixed, thus representing together the usual issues used to create di-
vision and peer conflicts. The positive rhetoric of classrooms as united and co-
hesive groups, in which religious differences are not taken into account, seems 
to apply mainly to the majority faith group (of Catholics), while the students 
belonging to minority groups are discriminated do not have many friends.
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The quarrel started not because of religion, I do not talk about religion, I do 
not tease, I do not insult the religion of one of my classmates. It happened 
to me more because of the nationality issue. (Male, Italian, Catholic)
In my opinion, as he said, there is no quarrel over religion or nationality, 
but afterwards there are people who always bring up those topics together 
and use religion, origin, nationality. (Male, Italian, Catholic, FG4-BG-st)
The discussion developed in the same FG-4-BG-st, however, points out the se-
riousness of religious-based conflicts, as they concern family identity, includ-
ing religious, social, ethnic, cultural belonging. Religion, in fact, appears as a 
crucial and substantial element linked to familiar and collective identity. Reli-
gious conflicts are, for students, mainly identity conflicts, based on an identity 
divide involving the position of families towards religion. As we have previ-
ously discussed (§5.2), religious belonging is important because it concerns a 
central question in the growth of new generations: autonomy/ independence 
from parents through a free acceptance or a refusal of religious identity of the 
family, on the one hand; religious impositions and control from parents in re-
ligious beliefs or practices, on the other. Indeed, the dichotomies continuity-
discontinuity, tradition-innovation, conservation-change are constitutive of 
the social dynamics of socialization and education of new generations, of in-
tergenerational relationships, of cultural and religious transmission, dilem-
mas which continue to accompany the evolution of social life (Arendt, 1972).
Her parents made the right choice because it is her decision, in my opin-
ion the religion must not be imposed. (Male, Italian, Catholic)
As far as religion is concern, they must not force you because if you do 
not wear the veil, you do not do anything wrong. (Female, Kosovar 
Muslim)
I also agree, the choice of religion is one’s own choice and it should not be 
imposed by parents. (Female, Italian, Catholic, FG4-BG-st)
The link between religion and family is clarified even more in fg5-MI-st: 
 students reiterate that discriminating for religious ideas is considered to be 
particularly unfair by new generations, because it is seen as a choice made by 
parents, just like the choice to immigrate. In general, we can state that students 
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want to represent themselves as active and free in the transmission process of 
religious belief.
Do not discriminate other people for their religious ideas, because some-
times the religion we profess comes from our parents. For example, I am 
an Orthodox, but I would like to become a Catholic as soon as possible. I 
like being Orthodox, but I like more Catholic ideas … do not discriminate 
against people for their ideas and their religion because many times it is 
not because they choose this religious, but their parents did. (Male, Ro-
manian, Orthodox, fg5-MI-students)
As seen before, adults tend to minimize school conflicts, which are latent, not 
very dangerous, temporary and not problematic: they affirm that the religious 
issue does not seem to be very important and relevant at school; conflicts are 
mainly a personal, intimate, relational, extra scholastic or eventually ethnic 
matter that is connected to the adolescent dynamics of like-dislike or inclu-
sion-exclusion from a friends’ group. From the point of view of adults, unim-
portant conflicts happen because it is all under adults’ control.
For adults, moreover, religion is mainly a pretext and a justification for con-
flicts. Conflicts that are more dangerous are especially linked to immigration, 
to a negative view of the immigrant and the problem they bring, to a non- 
acceptance of migrant people, and to the fear of the Otherness. Diversity is 
perceived as more static, strong, divisive and excluding, where it is based on 
religious dogma (fg4-MI-adults).
In my opinion, there are conflicts linked to non-acceptance of the immi-
grant. So, in this frame, there have been and there are conflicts. Not in the 
sense of non-acceptance because you are Muslim. Because if you are a 
Muslim, I accept you, but if you are an immigrant, I begin to make a dis-
tinction. The strong conflict is that of immigration because of what stu-
dents hear in their families. The climate is totally contrary to immigration 
and therefore these guys, here, have these attitudes of difficulty … the 
immigrants come here to Italy and take something away from us. This is 
a conflictual perspective, but I’ll say more. Because of a personal experi-
ence, I had fights with colleagues since their idea was: “Couldn’t they stay 
at home instead of coming here to create a lot of problems?”. (Male, Ital-
ian Literature Teacher, Italian, Catholic)
Q: But … what about the religious factor?
In general, I believe the problem is the fear of difference and diversity 
is probably perceived as more static where it has a religious dogma be-
hind it. Perhaps it is this. (Female, Italian, School leader, Catholic)
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Going back to the religious discourse, it depends on how much a boy feels 
or doesn’t feel to be religious, and, consequently, he defends his idea 
based on this feeling … I have not seen among boys any conflicts for reli-
gious reasons because I think that religion is a bit personal, there could 
be a discussion linked to the need of knowing the religion of the other; 
but this does not lead to a conflict. The religious difference does not gen-
erate a conflict … The cultural diversity generates conflict. When I stop 
doing what I’m doing with you and I start praying somewhere else, ex-
cluding the others in the world. He is strong in other religions; he is much 
less strong in the Catholic religion, because I have never seen a Catholic 
say: “I will not go to school tomorrow morning because I must confess … 
I have to go to Mass … etc”. (Father, President of parents’ association, Ital-
ian, Catholic)
As we have seen before, conflicts from adults are mainly between individuals, 
but some collective identities are mentioned (Muslim identity or majority 
faith identity): conflicts arise especially when it is possible to identify visible 
aspects and religious symbols of the others (veil, traditional clothes, hat, etc.). 
A dilemma appears when extreme attitudes are shown: someone decides to 
make “a crusade” for the maintenance of the traditional/majority religion and 
its symbols; someone else tries to remove all the symbols that distinguish the 
national religious identity (FG-4-MI-ad). In both cases, religious neutrality 
seems impossible to reach, as a neutral attitude seems unreal, because reli-
gious differences need space to express themselves.
In general, for adults, cultural diversity generates more conflicts than reli-
gious diversity (FG-5-MI-ad): undoubtedly, a religious practice can affect rela-
tionships, having social/relational implications, namely excluding someone 
who does not share the same religious practices and create links with similar 
believers. However, when the religious belief is extreme and radical, it causes 
violent rejection of people with other religious background, and then it be-
comes a source of conflict. Religions lived as totalizing and closed ideologies 
create a social and cultural divide: in this perspective, more religion corre-
sponds to less social integration.
When a religious belief becomes extreme, then it is a source of conflict. 
(Mother, Switzerland/African origin, Protestant)
More religion, less integration, because religion prevails over the main 
goal of creating a human community with shared human values. If reli-
gion presents a partial point of view, then there is the clash of civiliza-
tions, closure, religions become theocracies, become a modus vivendi 
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and operandi, an obstacle for the formation of a true human and educa-
tional community. (Male, School leader)
Where there is extremism and radicalism there is no integration. (Male, 
irc Teacher)
It’s true. If religion is lived as a religion with all the symbols, with a brand, 
as a way of thinking, there is no dialogue. (Mother, Switzerland/African 
origin, Protestant, FG5-MI-ad)
In FG2-BS and 3-BG-ad, adults confirm a cultural explanation of school con-
flicts, which depend on the attitude of each student or teacher or parent. Of-
ten, the ethnic diversity in intergroup interactions led to the explosion of the 
conflict; later, religious diversity intervenes to increase the conflictual climate. 
Religion is an instrument (and not the cause) for school conflict, but the ideo-
logical manipulation and exploitation of religion make the conflict worse. 
Adults repeat that conflicts are generated mainly by group dynamics of sympa-
thy or antipathy, majority-minority interactions, family habits, ethnic factors, 
etc. At the end of this list, teachers put the religious topic as a conflict genera-
tor in adult dynamics.
It is not the religion that creates barriers; in my opinion, religion is often 
exploited. This year, I have witnessed some quarrels that were not religious 
based. Students sometimes tell me: “My classmates have offended my God 
or have insulted him”, but it was a quarrel born for other reasons, and only 
after that the religious factor intervensses. (Female, Italian Teacher)
The ethnic factor certainly intervenes in the conflict first; often, the reli-
gious factor intervenes only later, to make it even harsher. The students 
give that explanation, but the theme is not that. (Mother, Italian, 
Catholic)
If students ask not to be close to each other, the reasons are very different, 
it is not for religious reasons; it is more for sympathy or antipathy. (Male, 
Italian Teacher)
Perhaps, it is more for ethnicity than for religion. (Female, School 
leader)
Perhaps, this happens more among adults than among adolescents. 
(Male, Italian Teacher, FG3-BG-ad)
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Finally, we give evidence to some considerations emerging in the discus-
sion of FG6-MI-ad and FG1-BS-ad: non-religious causes are considered by the 
fg participants as the most important explanation of school conflicts. Con-
flicts are generated by competition for scarce resources, non-acceptance and 
 recognition of the others, incommunicability and intolerance. This interpre-
tation confirms that religion is only a pretext, a spark that makes the conflict 
explode. Religion diversity represents the most visible aspect of the conflict, 
but the triggering causes are based on the socio-economic divide between 
rich and poor people.
From the point of view of adults, the conflict is mainly a material and power 
conflict; teachers also recall the idea of a political and cultural colonization, 
based on the use of religions to justify oppression and abuses. The majority-
minority contraposition, the native-immigrant divide, the gender gap, all the 
disparities can be explained in terms of unequal distributions of economic, 
social and power resources among the population, from the views of adult par-
ticipants to fgs. Therefore, religion is seen as a cultural instrument to exacer-
bate the conflict in contexts marked by inequality and disparity.
Religion is only the tool of insult and abuse. Religious difference could be 
a pretext. We have seen an ideological conflict that has developed in a 
verbal crescendo that becomes increasingly heavy. The cause is the non-
acceptance of the other and his/her difference. Religious affiliation 
makes everything explode. It is a pretext, but the cause is another. (Male, 
School leader, FG6-MI-adults)
During History and Geography classes, especially during the last year of 
lower secondary schools, when we face exploitation problems and con-
flictual perspectives, it is important to look for historical causes and to 
help students understand how religion has been exploited for political 
ends. It is also important to reconstruct the history of the Christian reli-
gion and other religions, to analyze the attempts of abuses and to carry 
forward the discourse of imperialism. (Female, Teacher, Italian, Catholic, 
FG 1- BS-adults)
6 Open Conclusions: Overcoming the Generational Cleavage, 
Recognizing Material and Identity Claims
Although students and adults agree with the opinion that religious identity is 
not very important in the school environment (Chapter 22), religious diversity 
is normally experienced, expressed, taken for granted, or hidden in  multicultural 
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schools, and affects the educational process. Religion seems to become an edu-
cational and public matter, especially when conflicts appear. In this conclu-
sion, it is interesting to synthesize briefly the different point of view of stu-
dents and adults, in the description, analysis and interpretation of the 
religious-based conflict in classrooms. We try to summarize this analysis pro-
posal in the following table.
Table 23.7  Religious divide among generations
Students’ narratives Adults’ narratives
Protagonists of conflict Spectators in front of conflicts
Peer conflicts Peer, teacher-student, teacher-parent 
conflicts
Verbal and physical violence Verbal violence
Teasing, superficiality, derision Dispute, controversies
Variety of bad words, offense,  
curses, provocation
Quarrel, verbal disagreement
Expression of feeling and emotions Complaint and playing the victim
Religious-based bullying Words as weapons
Group-centrism Closure, insider/outsider distinction
Focus on degree of religious freedom  
from parents
Focus on the control of men on women 
through religion
Reference to prejudice, racism,  
extremism
Reference to integration
Strategy of ignoring conflict and hiding 
religious diversity
Representation of conflict under adults’ 
control
Rare intervention and mediation of 
conflicts by adults
Silence or dedicated lessons as main 
strategies
Religious issue, important identity 
component
Religious issue as unimportant question at 
school
Cultural, religious and identity divide Socio-economic and gender divide
Religion as independent dimension to 
express personal and collective identity
Religion as an instrument to exacerbate 
the conflict in contexts marked by 
inequality and disparity
Source: Author’s personal elaboration
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First, the fgs’ analysis highlights that the role of students is mainly that of 
protagonists of their narratives. They tell concrete and detailed stories, quite 
adherent to reality, offering a description of differentiated kind of conflicts in 
which they are directly involved. Moreover, students identify more cases of 
religious-based conflict than adults do. Adults give a simplified version of con-
flicts, referring to single episodes, to experiences told by colleagues or students, 
and to isolated and non-generalizable cases: they are mainly spectators in 
these events, while observing something considered to be not very dangerous 
or important.
The students’ list of school conflicts includes a broader and a more differen-
tiated series of conflicting experiences, above all referring to experiences be-
tween peers (intra and interreligious). They report detailed stories, highlight-
ing verbal and physical violence, a religious-based violence motivated by 
religious belonging and belief of victim and/or perpetrators, violence that is 
almost absent from the stories of adults, who mostly talk about the use of 
“words as weapons”. Conflicts are interpreted by students as a result of superfi-
cial attitudes and habits to make fun of classmates with a different religious 
background, using a large variety of provocative expression, curses, and blas-
phemies. The victims, often, refer to negative feelings and emotions, experi-
enced during the conflict, shown a total and direct involvement.
Adults refer mainly to conflicts among students, but consider also teacher-
student, teacher-parents’ conflicts. They highlight, above of all, examples of 
verbal violence and lack of respect for their role. They describe a lot of dis-
putes, controversies, quarrel and verbal disagreement, for example between 
Catholic teachers and Muslim students, female teachers and Muslim fathers, 
etc. In the conflictual situation, moreover, adults discuss cases of complaints 
and (false) accusation made by students, which are often “playing the victim”: 
for adults, in fact, students cannot always be considered as victims of religious 
bullying or excluded or discriminated basing on their religious belonging. Per-
haps, students use this issue looking for justification and excuses for their neg-
ative or problematic behaviors.
The conflictual situations are interpreted by students as group dynamics 
and attitudes that looks at the religion of others from the perspective (and 
the superiority) of their religion of belonging, while adults point out the clo-
sure of the majority (Catholic) group, making a clear distinction between 
insiders-outsiders.
It must be added that the main issue of the arguments, from the students’ 
point of view, concerns freedom (and autonomy) in religious choice from their 
parents (as confirmed by the Word Frequency Query (see §5.1)), while for the 
adult participants in the fgs, mainly women, teachers belonging to the 
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 national and religious majority, the object of the dispute often concerns 
 women’s role in school and society. In the Word Frequency Query, moreover, 
 students make several references to negative phenomena that affect intereth-
nic and  interreligious conflicts at school (such as prejudices, racism, extrem-
ism, radicalism, etc.); at the same time, teachers among adults refer mainly to 
the positive goal of integration in multi-cultural schools, which is a word that 
does not appear in any students’ discussion.
Last but not least, to young people, religion represents an important cul-
tural dimension per se, since it deeply affects the construction of students’ 
identity. The religious component of the personal, social, and cultural identity 
is fundamental since it is connected to the story of the immigrant families and 
to the collective experience of transmission and socialization of culture and 
values from one generation to another. Instead, adults think that the religious 
issue is not so important and relevant, especially in the school environment.
Young people tend to distance themselves from an excessive and painful 
involvement in conflicts, using the strategy of ignoring religious attacks or 
fighting when they are stronger than classmates, but the main strategy is to 
stay (im)mobile and resist, waiting for the conflict to end, in a scene where 
adults are not very present or active. On the other hand, adults tend to mini-
mize school conflicts, conflicts that are always represented under the control 
of teachers, adults, and educational institutions, with the illusion of playing an 
important educational role in preventing conflictual situations.
Finally, a sort of generational divide emerges from the different ways to read 
and interpret religious-based conflicts at school. For adults, the socio- economic 
issue (inequalities) relating to immigration (and to women’s condition) pro-
vides the main reason: religion is a pretext for the conflict, as well as the most 
visible and manifest aspect, legitimized and culturally accepted, to justify the 
division between groups. Religion is the fuse that bursts the conflict, trans-
forming an already incandescent situation marked by disparities and scarce 
resources. In fact, these adults grew in a political era in which the main refer-
ence was the class or gender conflict and, for that reason, it is quite normal for 
them to refer mainly to the material socio-economic nature of the conflicts.
For students, instead, the question of identity and belonging to the group is 
the most important, in a contemporary era in which conflict is interpreted 
mainly by cultural, ethnic and religious categories (Santagati et al., 2017): they 
emphasize the cultural nature of conflicts, thus suggesting not only the ethni-
cization, but also the culturalization and religiouzation of politics. The reli-
gious dimension is the bullet that deeply hurts identity dimensions linked to 
personal, family, communitarian elements.
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On the one hand, adults underestimate the question of the religious identi-
ty, considering it as a controversial and public issue; on the other, students 
underestimate the socio-economic issue, which will probably become more 
important in the transition to adulthood. Although they give different inter-
pretation to the conflicts, adults and students use a similar strategy: they refuse 
to address topics that are considered to be very contradictory and problematic, 
i.e. religious and spiritual questions in a material and consumerist era (Kriste-
va, 2016), work socialization and career opportunities in the jobless society 
(Lodigiani, Santagati, 2016), etc. Overcoming this generational divide in the 
interpretation of conflict, and nurturing the possibility of a good life together 
in schools and inside the society, means that religion is an important element 
per se for individuals and groups, an independent aim and sphere of life. At the 
same time, it is important to deconstruct the role played by religion, as a de-
pendent dimension and an instrument affected by other dimensions of social 
life (such as politics, economics, etc.).
Our study, therefore, re-draws the attention to the challenge of working on 
disparities, not forgetting cultural identities and preserving religious identity, 
without the fear of being excluded in terms of relationships and educational 
pathways when this identity is expressed. The challenge –clearly underlined 
by Zanfrini (2019)– consists in facing socioeconomic inequalities, accepting 
and recognizing religious identities, promoting cultural exchange and contam-
inations among peers – a combination of different dimensions that has long 
been characterizing the Italian vision of educational/social integration in 
multi -cultural environments (Colombo, Santagati, 2017). Once again, it is time 
to better combine the cognitive learning with the relational inclusion, by ex-
perimenting in schools (and not only there) a space for a “normal experience” 
of expression of religious minority identities; by promoting the freedom to 
(not) continue with the familiar tradition in terms of religious belonging, with-
out any imposition or violence, but rather with the family’s guidance and sup-
port. Other efforts have to be done, in terms of research, in order to recognize 
the overlap of the disparity deriving from religious belonging with other social, 
economic and cultural divides, analyzing the intersection of these disadvan-
tage factors and tracing routes to combine equal opportunity in education 
with guarantee of rights and solidarity (Zanfrini, 2019). It is time to inhabit, 
accept, and manage the conflict within the democratic frame of the 
 interculturalism (Santagati, Zanzottera, 2018) basing on the idea of dealing 
with controversies (Cavalli, 2016), transmitting the capability to listen, discuss 
and face the controversial issues that divide public opinion, and find in de-
mocracy a way to make decisions in this controversial world.
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Chapter 24
Religions and Laïcité in the French Republican 
School
Alessandro Bergamaschi and Catherine Blaya
1 Introduction
The status of religion in Western societies is an issue that constantly comes to 
the fore in European public debates, especially when the issue is to “go beyond 
the ordinary, or that regarding social dysfunctions and incidents”1 (Campiche, 
2010: 27). Despite the current relevance of these debates, whenever the ques-
tion of the capacity of religion to impact daily life is raised, “the hidden as-
sumptions are often found in a narrative of loss – loss of privilege, loss of au-
thority, perhaps loss of vitality and influence” (Ammerman, 2010: 155). This loss 
of influence appears to be confirmed by various European surveys, especially 
concerning young people (Lambert, 2000; Galland, 2008, 2009). In any case, a 
counterweight to the steadily declining influence of religion on individual 
lives can be observed in the widespread popularity of certain social issues 
which, either directly or indirectly, question the institutions of religion. In 
France, the most vivid debate is about wearing visible religious symbols in 
public spaces or about school lunch specific menus, mainly within schools. 
This apparent paradox is likely based on the assumption that modernity 
doesn’t allow enough space for religion to act as a means for interpreting real-
ity. Yet closer examination backs up the idea to deal the thesis about the loss of 
influence cautiously. Even Berger (1999) didn’t seem particularly convinced 
that the impact of religion on daily life was likely to decline inexorably, though 
he did uphold the hypothesis of its relegation to protected enclaves in order to 
ensure that it would overcome the effects of the continuing process of 
rationalization.
The present chapter questions the status of religion in contemporary French 
society. Throughout the chapter, religion is conceived as a transversal dimen-
sion of the constitution of French society. We will see that although it is strong-
ly characterized by the opposite phenomenon, namely secularism, religion 
1 All the translations are made by the authors.
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“exerts its impact both actively and passively, explicitly or implicitly, in every 
corner of social, cultural and psychological reality” (Hervieu-Leger, 1999: 19).
First, we focus on the relationship between religion and French society. We 
lay out that the foundation of the principle of secularism is the cornerstone of 
the French social and political philosophy and its ambition is to be a key ele-
ment of social cohesion. Then, as this ideological architecture needs a specific 
actor to be implemented, the following paragraph is devoted to the role played 
by the school system. We highlight the role of the education system as an actor 
in charge of the socialization to the Republican creed, widely based on the 
principle of secularism. The second part of this chapter presents findings from 
a survey completed in several secondary schools in the South of France. This 
survey about the factors of social cohesion among teenagers, shows that reli-
gious belonging is related to the school experiences and the feeling to belong 
to the French national community.
2 The Separation of Church and State and the Implementation of 
Secularism in France
Secularism is a key element of the institutional and political dimensions of 
French society and has been used as a model for public space management 
since the French Revolution. This was later strengthened under the Third Re-
public (1875–1940). At that time, religion was considered as some kind of ene-
my for two different reasons. First, it claimed to have the monopoly of social 
knowledge throughout the entire nation or even at a universal level. This was 
unbearable for the spirits from the Age of Enlightenment (18th century) since 
France is a nation of which culture was built upon a strong contribution from 
the intellectual class –namely Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim– who have 
worked long and hard to design the core values of the nation that would be 
freed from the legacies of religion and that should be transmitted and dissemi-
nated through the education system. As characterized by the French sociolo-
gist, Durkheim (1858–1917) schools are to fulfil a socialization role and teach 
the children, future of the nation, the way they should behave as citizens in 
accordance with the rules and norms of the society as a whole. As a conse-
quence, education was a key element of the ideological state apparatus. On the 
other hand, fears regarding religion were fed by religious authorities who at-
tempted to set up constituencies of local authorities through their diocese and 
parishes. Aristocrats and revolutionaries were at the roots of suspicion towards 
any form of local association that were considered as potentially plotting 
against the project of one dominant national culture at that time. As such, 
Church and its leadership and convening capacities at the local level could be 
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perceived as a potential counter-power and as the bastion of reaction. This 
historical background leads to the designing of secularism over three aspects:
a) the fight against the monopoly of Church over knowledge;
b) the setting up of a dominant collective culture of which ethics would not 
be informed by religion;
c) the strong will for the country to be ruled and the decision power to be 
held by one actor, the government, and to not be shared with religious au-
thorities, simultaneously neutralizing any local specificity (Duru- Bellat, 
van Zanten, 2012).
The 1905 law performed a complete separation of Church and State but also set 
up the principles of freedom of conscience and freedom to exercise any faith. 
Church was to remain outside any political activity at the national level. This 
law officialized that schools were to become free from any religious influence 
and education was about the inculcation of Enlightenment principles and 
dominated by the collective culture of the French nation in search of unity.
There was a return to religion after the establishment of the July Monarchy 
in 1830 and a controversy over the freedom of education in 1843 rooting in the 
1830 Charte that opened up the possibility of the creation of “public instruc-
tion and freedom of education”. In 1833, Guizot designed a law including the 
possibility to create publicly funded elementary schools that could be run by 
the Church and the creation of Church primary and secondary schools. At that 
time, secondary schools were not under the supervision of the State. Ten years 
later, the Church claimed the right for “freedom of education” in secondary 
education, that is the right of parents to choose the school of their children 
(private, religious or state schools) and to offer national qualifications. They 
lost their claim and it was not until 1848 that the Falloux law restored some of 
the power that the Church had over secondary education and exempted reli-
gious schools from delivering state certifications.
The Third Republic was paramount in the creation of modern French soci-
ety and the strengthening of the Republican ideals, among which the transfer 
of religious issues into the private sphere. If Church had been marginalized, 
the education system did not fully manage to offer education to masses and it 
was not until the end of the nineteenth century that there was a genuine impe-
tus on popular education when primary schooling became compulsory for all. 
Tensions between the supporters of state education –the new Republican 
elite– and those of private education, that is anti-Republicans, started to 
emerge over the content of textbooks. These tensions lasted until after the sec-
ond world war, when the State became the one actor of the democratization of 
education and secularism entered the French constitution in 1946. Since the 
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year 1959, the two systems (state education and private religious education) 
have co-existed, and there has been an increase in state-subsidized private 
Catholic schools. The private and state system tend to be seen as complemen-
tary, since the State has recognized the private education sector as a “private 
service for public utility”, as stressed by Tanguy (1972), considering that private 
schools are often used as “second chance” schools by parents of students at risk 
of dropping out (Ballion, 1986).
Although secular education remains dominant, the partisans of secularism 
have grown less inflexible since the 1970s and some new developments were 
based on scientific research (Duru-Bellat, van Zanten, 2012). For instance, the 
sociological analyses of Bourdieu and Passeron (1964, 1970) were influential in 
highlighting that although education was transmitting knowledge based on 
rationality versus ideology, it was reproducing social inequality and contribut-
ing to inequalities in educational attainment. On the other hand, the emer-
gence of claims for the assertion of identity from ethnic minorities and reli-
gious groups in the sake of individual identity and authenticity (Honneth, 
1996) have jeopardized the transmission of a national cultural unicity. Private 
education and more specifically Catholic education have been attracting in-
takes from more and more various cultural backgrounds and the Savary law 
project that intended to merge the state and the private system failed under 
the pressure of public opinion that considered that having the possibility to 
choose between different systems was a guarantee for quality and even 
freedom.
In the 1980s there was a turn in the use and understanding of secularism. 
Until then, secularism was opposed to religious power. Things changed with the 
long-term immigration of Muslims in France. The issue of diversity and the way 
to manage it in a society growing more and more plural became vivid. The con-
frontation of populations with different cultural and religious backgrounds 
raised new challenges. The growing presence of Muslim background students 
in schools destabilized the partisans of a homogeneous nation fearing a loss of 
cultural identity. These fears have been the cause of tensions and originated 
new laws that were meant to protect national identity and to preserve school 
from specific identity and religious influences. The ban on wearing conspicu-
ous religious symbols in schools by the law of 2004 is part of these new mea-
sures. Since the early 2000s, the issue of secularism has taken a new turn in 
French society. In 1999, the political project to promote the public recognition 
of the Muslim faith emerged. The French Council for the Muslim Faith was cre-
ated in 2003. It is a national elected body under the impulsion of Muslim stu-
dents who claimed for better representation in the political life of the country 
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and it serves as an official interlocutor with the French State in the regulation of 
Muslim religious activities. Created by Nicolas Sarkozy, it was at the time criti-
cized as being the tool for social control reinforcement by part of the State. The 
very same year, President Chirac created the Stasi commission to reflect upon 
the principle of secularism and the way it was implemented. One of the issues 
under discussion was the wearing of the Hijab (Muslim scarf) in state schools 
(Bergamaschi, 2013) and that originated the ban on wearing conspicuous reli-
gious symbols in schools. Cherifi (2005) argues that this measure was counter-
productive in the sense that it concerned a small number of individuals and 
that it contributed to revive the faith of millions of people who were initially 
moderate but who felt insulted in an important aspect of their religious identi-
ty. In 2009–2010, the Ministry for immigration and national identity promoted 
and organized a huge debate on national identity. This debate took the form of 
a survey completed throughout France including overseas territories and served 
two major objectives. The first one was to identify the constitutive elements 
that make up national identity. The second was to question immigration and 
more precisely the conditions of residence and the conditions for access to na-
tionality. The purpose was to identify ideas that would help to strengthen the 
sense of pride for being French (Portail du Gouvernement, 2009). In 2010, the 
prohibition of face-veiling in public spaces was ratified (French Concealment 
Act of 11 October 2010) and the debate on alternatives to pork in canteen meals 
for Muslim children emerged again in the public debate.
All of these measures were widely covered by media and monopolized pub-
lic debates. The relations between secularism and cultural or religious plural-
ism are still to be explored. Decision-makers rely on the notion of “positive 
secularism” to argue that one of the missions of the State is to manage religious 
pluralism (Campiche, 2015). This is considered as potentially facilitating com-
patibility between secularism and cultural diversity. Secularism serving to as-
sure neutrality in the public sphere where all individuals could cohabitate hap-
pily, provided they do not expose their religious specificities or claim some 
kind of acknowledgement of their difference. The question “who am I?” then 
becomes a recurrent refrain among the so-called ethnic minorities for which 
the concept of “diversity”, which results from peaceful and respectful cohabita-
tion of the Other, becomes “difference” and creates a situation where alterity is 
the target of resistance and identity-related oppositions and even leads to hos-
tility between groups.
To understand how the principle of secularism has become one of the key 
elements of republican life, it is necessary to look at the role played by the 
school in perpetuating the political philosophy of the République.
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3 The French School: a Passionate Link with the République
As we have seen in the first part of this chapter, school in France is willing to 
neutralize differences and to convey the idea that all people are equal, regard-
less of their particular characteristics. This is the quintessence of the Republi-
can identity. Conversely, it must fundamentally disseminate the idea that if 
one wishes to benefit from the protection of the State, including a relatively 
flexible procedure for acquiring nationality that, still today, is inspired by jus 
soli, one must abandon one’s peculiarities upon crossing the threshold of its 
institutions – in this case, school. This seemingly perfect sociological architec-
ture leaves no space for cultural particularisms, because such attachments 
would deeply contradict the universal interpretation of egalitarianism. This 
recognition would be to the detriment of a national community that sought to 
be highly integrated. For example, De Gaulle’s cultural levelling policies (Nar-
bonne, 1994) aimed to prohibit the use of dialects in institutional spaces and 
have been broadly implemented, particularly in the educational system. Thus, 
at the beginning of the 20th century, for a student to speak one’s one dialect 
during classes or break times could mean very strict sanctions. In French soci-
ety there is therefore no room for identity manifestations other than the Re-
publican identity and school is the institution that has been tasked with instill-
ing this idea. It is a very special role that has led some education specialists 
such as Eric Debarbieux (2008) to suggest that school and the Republic “have a 
passionate relationship”.
It goes without saying that the French society and its educational system 
have always had a controversial relationship in relation with the issues of 
“ ethnicity” – namely the result of an identity dialectic between groups en-
dowed with unequal economic and cultural resources and whose consequenc-
es are variable in contexts (Poutignat, Streiff-Fenart, 2008; Bertheleu, 2007). 
However, since the foundation of its modern nation, the French society has 
experienced a major migration influx, which has led to an exponential growth 
of cultural diversity. France’s challenges are, on the one hand, the fact that it 
has adopted a political philosophy that leaves no space for multi-culturalism 
and, on the other hand, the fact that it is one of the main European destina-
tions for waves of international migration. Indeed, France was the first country 
in Europe to use foreign labor, mainly from its (former) colonies, to meet eco-
nomic and even military requirements (Noiriel, 1988). How can one expect the 
millions of foreigners who have settled on French soil, and their descendants, 
to so easily forget their cultural background? How can one believe that the 
French society is really “indifferent to differences” (Bourdieu, 1966), such as 
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those that are generated by such migratory flows? How can all its members 
thrive in the education system, the labor market and in the urban space? The 
latest pisa data (2015) are rather stark: among industrialized countries, France 
is the country where the social origin of individuals has the greatest influence 
on the educational careers of its students. It is obvious that social origin and 
migratory origins are two variables that are often closely linked. Despite grow-
ing social tensions, where the principles of the Republic are confronted by in-
tegration deficits, growing social inequalities and urban segregations lead soci-
ologists to talk about “urban ghettos” (Lapeyronnie, 2009), French institutions 
continue nevertheless to behave in accordance with the Republican philoso-
phy. Instead of opening up to minimal forms of recognition of cultural diver-
sity and its social implications, measures such as the prohibition of wearing 
religious symbols in the primary and secondary levels of the school system 
(Law of 15 March 2004) are designed. In 1989 a student was excluded from high 
school for the first time due to the wear of Muslim veil. The Minister of Na-
tional Education at the time, not wishing to face the issue directly, had recourse 
to the Council of State which reaffirmed the principle of secularism in schools 
without extending this principle to students. In 1994, wearing ostentatious re-
ligious symbols was banned from schools by a ministerial decision. From 2004, 
school principals have had the right to exclude students wearing headscarves. 
The dominant position of the politicians and intellectuals were in favor of this 
measure for three main reasons:
a) to defend the neutrality of the education system;
b) to protect Muslim women from male’s domination and patriarchalism;
c) to fight against any religious fanaticism.
Although exclusions from schools were scarce, following this measure, the side 
effect was to encourage families to lodge complains with the High Authority 
for Discrimination and Equality (Ichou, van Zantent, 2014).2
However, the school system oscillates between taking diversity into account 
and attempting to neutralize any differences. Some intercultural pedagogy in-
terventions aimed at bringing value to cultural diversity have been implement-
ed since the early 1980s. There has been a movement that was sporadically 
diffused under the impetus of teams of very active teachers who strongly be-
lieve in the value of diversity. However, this logic of valorization is not without 
ambiguities since, in the same period of time, there used to be an appointment 
of non-teaching staff (supervisors, educators, leadership personnel, etc.) ac-
cording to ethnic criteria (Rinaudo, 1998; Rayou, van Zanten, 2004; Doytcheva, 
2 The High Authority for Discrimination and Equality was an independent authority created in 
2005 that was dissolved in 2011.
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2007). Thus, an institution that has a high concentration of Maghreb or Black 
African students would recruit staff who belonged to the same cultural/ethnic 
groups. The basic idea was that similarity should have helped to manage situa-
tions perceived as difficult by the school staffs. However, the problem was that 
the results obtained were often contrary to expectations and tensions and mis-
trust between minority students and school staffs increased (Zefir, 2010).
This issue of ethnic diversity is one of the problems that grips the Republi-
can education system, which, like the society that it serves, prefers to adopt the 
“politics of the ostrich” (De Rudder et al., 2000) rather than rethink its funda-
mental principles in light of the social changes. However, since the 2000s we 
have been witnessing a timid dialogue, starting with the inclusion of secular 
issues in the training of teachers and principals, and particularly the approach 
of the inclusive school with the establishment of a Charte de la Laïcité in 2012, 
followed by a mobilization around the values of the Republic following the ter-
rorist attacks in January 2015 and July 2016. The problem is this idea of secular-
ism is not interpreted in the same way by everybody, and its implementation is 
oscillating between social hypercontrol of any form of religious expression in 
the school and a position of dialogue and tolerance. As emphasized by Dubet 
(2016), secularism is not a disembodied concept that is inculcated. If we pro-
mote the idea of shared values, these values  must be put into practice by those 
who contribute to their spreading and therefore be part of their convictions. To 
think that this is a value shared by all the representatives of the education sys-
tem remains a utopia and the children who attend the school of the Republic 
are not socio-cultural idiots.
4 The Complex Relation between Religion, Schools and Secularism
As we have just seen, the relationship between religion, secularism and school 
is particularly complex. The French nation was built in opposition to religion 
and education is the actor in charge of transmitting and perpetuating a shared 
and unique national identity. As Schnapper states (2008: 133), given the na-
tion’s need to adapt to Republican principles, cultural and religious particular-
isms are not to be taken into consideration in the public sphere. The French 
model of integration therefore only recognizes free and equal individuals and 
“it is in this sense that it can be called universalist and every individual is to 
acquire their self-worth, independently of the community they belong to” 
(Hervieu-Léger, 1999: 258).
The high number of people from different ethnic backgrounds in French 
society and in the educational system questions the relevance of a political 
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philosophy rooted in old realities. In particular, as demonstrated by various 
studies, ethnic minorities are often reminded of their origins –real, supposed, 
hetero or self-attributed– in several social domains such as labor markets (Sil-
berman, Fournier, 2006; Beauchemin et al., 2010), real estate (Bonnet et al., 2011; 
Dietrich-Ragon, 2017) and, of course, the education system (Brinbaum, Pri-
mon, 2013; Felouzis et al., 2015). In concrete terms, it becomes a form of dis-
crimination that relegates ethnic minorities to underprivileged jobs and neigh-
borhoods and towards educational careers that open up restricted future 
perspectives. Any attempt from part of these individuals and their communi-
ties to reverse the situation and to improve social emancipation is a genuine 
challenge.
As for education only, the impact of belonging to an ethnic minority on 
school achievement has been studied expansively in France.
On the one hand, some studies have found that the impact of the ethnic 
background vanishes once controlled by the socio-economic background of 
students (Vaillet, Caille, 2001); however, it is also true that the correlation be-
tween socio-economic characteristics and ethnic origin is strong and that stu-
dents, children of immigrants, come mainly from socio-economically deprived 
backgrounds. On the other hand, more qualitative surveys draw attention to 
the fact that a significant proportion of these pupils complain of having been 
victims of some forms of discrimination related to their migratory or cultural 
origins (Santelli, 2007; 2012). According to Roussier-Fusco (2003) who complet-
ed a study in schools in the outskirts of Paris, some teachers’ attitudes and be-
haviors towards students are influenced by the ethnic origin of the latter. In a 
similar way, other variables are likely to moderate that finding, that is the pro-
portion of ethnic minorities in the class as well as the socio-economical back-
ground of the teachers (Perroton, 2000; Rayou, van Zanten, 2004; Sanselme, 
2009).
Some other research based on questionnaire surveys and big databases Tra-
jectories and Origins, have recently showed evidence that the ethnic origin of 
certain groups such as those from the Maghreb, Turkey and sub-Saharan Africa 
are associated with more problematic schooling experience (e.g. year repeti-
tion or school dropout) even after checking on the socio-economic character-
istics of the respondents (Brinbaum et al., 2012).
These findings question the capacity of the French universal citizenship 
model to approach ethnic diversity management without creating hostility 
and conflicts between the different groups. In order to illustrate the concrete 
way schools manage diversity, we present the findings of a survey completed in 
secondary schools in the South of France. The survey aimed to analyze the 
construction of social relationships among adolescents. More specifically, we 
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studied the effect of religious belonging and the way it impacts on the process 
of developing a sentiment of collective national identity as well as on their 
school experience.
5 The Present Study
Our survey was completed with 2,907 students from junior and high school in 
the fall of 2017 in south-eastern France. The average age of the respondents was 
13.4 for junior students and 16.2 for high school students. There was an equiva-
lent proportion of males and females. We asked the participants to answer 
questions on their belonging to a religion, if it played an important role in their 
life, and if they practiced. Our questionnaire also included questions meant to 
assess their feeling of belonging to the French nation which were drawn from 
the teo survey and questions on their school experience in terms of sanctions 
(how many of them and the perceived reasons behind them, such as skin color, 
religion, ethnic origin, language spoken). Finally, we tried to assess what their 
projects were in terms of further education (Blaya, 2019). In our analyses, based 
on research about the relationship between intolerance and intergroup friend-
ships (Pettigrew, Tropp, 2008), various control variables have been introduced: 
gender, school level, parents’ education level.
5.1 Descriptive Findings
We first completed a descriptive analysis of the religious practices of the par-
ticipants to the survey. Quite a few students answered they did not follow any 
religion (37%), one third stated they were Catholics and one out of five stu-
dents said they were Muslims. The other potential religions were indicated by 
under 2% of the respondents.
The effects of social stratification, measured by the parents’ level of educa-
tion, on belonging to a religion are as follows: young people who declare them-
selves to be either Christians, or of another religion or without a religion, are 
more likely to come from families with high educational capital, whereas Mus-
lim youth are concentrated mainly in culturally poorer families where parents 
gained their compulsory school certificate, vocational certificates or, at best, 
their diploma from secondary studies (p. 000 – V .18). The effects of gender are 
not significant. The importance of religion obtained an average score of 4.1 out 
of ten points but we noticed differences according to worship: Muslim respon-
dents granted significantly much more importance to religion than the Catho-
lics or the members of other religions (M=8,6 vs. M=5,1 vs. M=5,1). Religion 
proves to be more important for girls (p .000 – F 11,3) and for the younger 
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 students (p .000 – F 99,2). As for practicing, half of the students who declared 
themselves as Muslims reported to be attending a religious service at least 
once a month, while Catholics were 40.1% and 10% from the other religions. 
The most involved students are the younger ones (p. ≤.001 – phi .13), and gen-
der does not make any difference.
The belonging and practice of a religion both depend upon the school capi-
tal of the family.
The vast majority of students reported feeling French (87.3%) and that the 
others considered they were French (78.9%). The sentiment to be French is 
stronger among the high school respondents (p. ≤.001 – F 55,2) and depends on 
the level of education of their parents (p. ≤.001 – F 11,6). However, this feeling is 
weaker among the Muslim respondents (p. ≤.001 – F 115,7), among those who 
think that religion is important (p. ≤.001 – F 44,9) and who practice more 
(p. ≤.001 – F 212,2).
As for sanctions in school, boys are more involved than girls (p. ≤.001 – 
F 88,7) as well as the students of which parents have low educational back-
ground (p. ≤.001 – F 6,9). In the wake of previous studies, we found that Muslim 
students reported more sanctions than the other students (p. ≤.001 – F 21,3) as 
well as the importance they granted to religion (p. ≤.001 – F 6,1) and their level 
of practice (p. ≤.001 – F 22,1). Many students consider these sanctions reflect 
discrimination (M=5,8) mostly Muslim students (p. ≤.01 – F 5,7). The more the 
students feel religious (p. ≤.05 – F 2,9) and the more they practice, the more 
they feel they are discriminated (p. ≤.01 – F 6,9). We also analyzed the relation-
ship between further education ambitions and religion through a linear regres-
sion analysis and our findings show that students who belong to a religion have 
greater ambitions that the others (p ≤.05).
5.2 How Much Do the Young People Feel French?
It is now interesting to look at the interactions between the factors we have just 
described in a global explanatory model. More precisely, we have tried to verify 
how the feeling of being French is affected by, on the one hand, religion and, 
on the other hand, by school experiences. In that purpose, we ran a multiple 
linear regression model with stepwise method (Table 24.1). As our study is 
mainly exploratory, we thought more relevant to identify progressively what 
were the variables that lead to the model through regressive equations. (How-
ell, 2006). Our dependent variable is “the feeling of being French”, which has 
been analyzed by mobilizing three sets of independent variables:
a) religion, the importance of the feeling of religiosity, the frequency of par-
ticipation in religious services;
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Table 24.1 The feeling of being French according to the religion and school experiences -  
linear regression, stepwise method (N=2 625)
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b) the frequency of sanctions and temporary exclusions, the feeling of dis-
crimination it may generate;
c) sex, the education capital of the parents, the grade level attended by the 
student.
Findings show there are five explanatory models, all providing a supplemen-
tary and significant explanation compared to the previous model. The first 
model is based on a single variable that influences the “feeling of being French”, 
namely belonging to the Muslim religion: young people who belong to this re-
ligion feel less French compared to peers who reported no religion (p ≤.001). 
The second model includes religious practice and young people who attend 
religious service at least once a month, are characterized by a weaker “feeling 
of being French” than the students we have defined as non-practicing (p ≤.001). 
In a third model shows high school students have a stronger feeling compared 
to junior school respondents (p ≤.001). Students who reported they belonged 
to another religion that is neither Muslim nor Catholic i.e. religions that in our 
sample are very small, such as the Jewish (1.3% of participants) or the Protes-
tant (1.2% of participants), show a lower feeling of being French compared to 
young people without religion (p ≤.001).
Finally, the more being told off and temporary exclusions are frequent, the 
weaker is the “feeling of being French” (p ≤.001). The feeling of discrimination 
as a result of school sanctions and the school capital of parents are not signifi-
cantly associated to feeling French, nor being Catholic.
Table 24.1 The feeling of being French according to the religion and school experiences -  
linear regression, stepwise method (N=2 625) (cont.)
Model Standard  
error
Bêta p.
Frequency of participation in 
rites (practicing vs 
non-practicing)
,085 ,166 ,000
School level (lower second-
ary school vs high secondary 
school)
,065 -,097 ,000
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6 Discussion
By reading the findings of this survey, the thesis of the “loss of influence” does 
not seem to be in tune with the picture that is looming. At first, we have seen 
that the effects of social stratification are consistent with studies that have 
taken into account the relationship between the ethnic origin, the cultural and 
religious affiliations, the sense of identification with the national community, 
and school careers. There is a clear gap between, on the one hand, young peo-
ple who reported being Muslim and, on the other, young people of other faiths 
or without any confession at all. This gap can be explained at different levels as 
fewer cultural resources available within the family, an indicator of minor eco-
nomic affluence, greater intensity of the feeling of religiosity and a bigger in-
volvement in the religious practice. Secondly, Muslim respondents reported 
more often being in conflict with the school authority and feeling discrimi-
nated. Despite these findings, when analyzing academic ambitions, young 
people who claim to belong to one of the religions mentioned in the question-
naire, whichever those are, have higher school expectations than the young 
people who reported being “without religion”. Finally, the effects of belonging 
to the Muslim religion are also apparent in the “feeling of being French”, which 
is weaker compared to young people of either Christian religion, of another 
faith or without religion. In the same way, this feeling is weaker among the 
young people for whom religion occupies an important place in life and who 
participate in religious services at least on a monthly basis. Simon and Tiberj 
(2012) in the Trajectories and Origins survey showed that the “feeling of being 
French” fluctuates according to the migratory experiences and the cultural 
communities. They stress that it would be unfair to conclude that a weak feel-
ing of being French necessarily corresponds to a withdrawal from the main-
stream community. According to the authors, it is rather a sign of a society that 
“is challenging for immigrants and their descendants, to be considered as 
French”. This consideration raises questions and opens the door to a second 
point from our study, which is the lack of impact of belonging to the Christian 
religion on the “feeling of being French”. In other words, belonging to the Chris-
tian faith does not seem to collide with the feeling of belonging to the French 
identity. We wonder why the membership to the Catholic religion does not 
trigger the same tensions as the belonging to the Muslim religion, as far as the 
French identity is concerned. We believe this result deserves a specific analysis 
throughout history.
As stated in the introduction to this study, it is essential to bear in mind that 
today “religion plays a role of capital importance in public life and in public 
action (…) and sheds the perception of it as a vestige from the past” (Moore, 
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2007: 413). Thus, religion can be seen as the cultural expression of a given con-
text, allowing it to be presented as one of the elements that contribute to defin-
ing identity. It follows from this reading that the notion of the low status of 
religion in France on the basis of the principles of laity formalized under the 
Law of 1905 must be reformulated. In order to do this, the historical and an-
thropological aspects that led to the European process of nation-building 
should be considered. Jolly (2005) showed that the French sense of laity was 
paradoxically based on the “confessional grounds” represented by the Catholic 
faith, which imposed itself over the course of centuries as the “dominant cul-
tural sub-stratus” (Jolly, 2005), overshadowing other minority religions. In 
France, even more than in other nations, the State was born by staking a clear, 
official distance from religion. But as Detienne affirms, it is difficult to deny 
that in the course of contemporary history, Catholicism contributed to con-
solidating its identity by consecrating the idea of Nation built around a precise 
cultural memory (Detienne, 2010). According to this perspective, therefore, re-
ligion may be the one underlying elements of the social landscape and, though 
it may not be manifestly vindicated, it can be felt implicitly at precise social 
conjunctures.
In the last few years, one of the characteristics marking the French political 
debate and particularly useful to promote France’s own sense of identity has 
been the tacit mobilization of the cultural sub-stratus generated by Catholi-
cism, in its role as one of the constituent elements of “Republican living”. Tacit 
mobilization in this sense refers to the observation that belonging to the Cath-
olic religion emerges only indirectly and, in particular, in negative and con-
trasting terms with the intention of re-stating what one is not. In this sense, the 
emphasis on the respect for Republican ideals leads to “identity policies” with 
manifest effects, like the institution of the Ministère de l’Immigration et de 
l’Identité Nationale3 under Sarkozy’s presidency, which promoted the Grand 
Débat sur l’Identité Nationale4 in 2009. One of the consequences of this accent 
on identity has been to stigmatize groups that have distanced themselves from 
the principles of the République as a result of their cultural specificity or behav-
ior in the public sphere (Bergamaschi, Santagati, 2019). The group which most 
often comes “under fire” in these identity policies are Muslims as the results of 
our study underlined in a sharply way. The incompatibilities in the worldviews 
characterizing Islam and the Republican model are in fact among the main 
3 This Ministry was removed, however, during the government reshuffle in November 2010.
4 The history of the Grand Débat sur l’Identité Nationale can be found on the French Govern-
ment’s web portal: http://www.debatidentitenationale.fr/.
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nodes of French political integration, especially in the last few years. Accord-
ing to Lapeyronnie (2008: 527), the core of the “fight” against Islam involves all 
sectors of public opinion, since it is associated with “the non-modern or anti-
modern world of the Other”.
In the Fifties, Gordon Allport emphasized the ambivalent role of religion in 
the process of forming prejudice and stereotypes: “while Faith in the world’s 
major religions is universal and emphasizes the brotherhood of all mankind, in 
practice it often engenders divisions, which can sometimes be brutal” (Allport, 
1954: 609). More complex results emerged from Valasik’s (2010) analysis of a 
French sample from the Welfare and Values in Europe survey. In this case, the 
effects of religion on social and ethical questions appeared to be multi- 
dimensional. Depending on the topic under discussion, religion “appears si-
multaneously as a factor of solidarity and/or discrimination, of tolerance and/
or intolerance, integration and/or xenophobia” (Valasik, 2010: 199). The con-
tours of a multi-dimensional image of religion have become more clearly de-
fined, and the effects appear to take on the guise of a mental map which, ac-
cording to Willaime (2010: 122), helps to “express a certain conception of man 
and the world in a given society”.
Given these contextual factors, what are the resources French schools have 
in order to avoid contributing to widening the social gap among young people? 
We have seen that religious affiliation and the importance attached to it are 
associated with more chaotic school careers. At the same time, we also know 
that religious denominations are associated with each other’s social hierarchy 
and, as we have seen, the pisa data point to the difficulties of the Republican 
school in neutralizing the effects of social stratification on the school experi-
ence of students from the most socio-economically deprived backgrounds.
Moreover, young people often consider school difficulties as the result of 
unequal and discriminatory treatments due to their cultural-religious back-
ground. The education system seems to be at the service of one unique and 
dominant national culture in a perspective of egalitarianism. Nevertheless, the 
French nation and its education system continue to widen the gap between a 
so-called majority population –whose profile is in perfect harmony with its 
principles, even to the point that, in this case, religious affiliation is not a 
source of tension– and a so-called minority population, increasingly marginal-
ized, and whose basic cultural traits are singled out as the difference par 
excellence.
<UN>
©  NÚRIA LLEVOT-CALVET, OLGA BERNAD-CAVERO and JORDI GARRETA-BOCHACA, 
���� | doi:10.1163/97890044�9604_0�6
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
Chapter 25
Religious Education in Schools as a Necessity in a 
Secular State: the Perspective in Catalonia
Núria Llevot-Calvet, Olga Bernad-Cavero and Jordi Garreta-Bochaca
1 Introduction
The international migrations of the end of the twentieth and beginning of the 
twenty-first centuries have generated fundamental changes in the social real-
ity of Spain and Catalonia. The latter was one of the first of the Autonomous 
Communities of Spain to receive, and have to respond to, foreign immigra-
tion from a greater diversity of origins from the earliest years of this phenom-
enon. The inclusion of new cultures and religions into the pre-existing Catalan 
social fabric and the guarantee of good reception for the new communities 
by Catalan society have been the two most important axes of the policies of 
the Catalan autonomous administration (Generalitat de Catalonia) in recent 
years.
In this context, schools have found themselves faced with the necessity to 
transform and innovate (Sanuy et al., 2017a), both in their theoretical ap-
proaches and in their teaching methodology, with the aim of dealing with this 
new reality in the schools. In this sense, since the mid-1990s, pre-schools (peo-
ple aged 3–6) and primary schools (6–12) have become a fundamental tool to 
manage cultural and religious diversity in Catalonia from a local setting within 
the working framework established by the Generalitat de Catalunya (Garreta, 
2006; Llevot et al., 2016 and 2017). This has meant relative experience in draw-
ing up discourses and designing policies regarding cultural and religious diver-
sity within the Spanish framework.
Education has become one of the capital elements of modern society. The 
process of training deals with educating people in becoming part of a complex 
and changing society; the latter needs to be prepared to assimilate the novel-
ties of cultural, social and technical evolution. Education is also a tool that can 
be very useful for generating understanding, respect and coexistence and for 
favoring social cohesion among people and groups with different cultural and 
religious traditions. It must be borne in mind that, throughout its history, Cata-
lan society has been enriched by the reception of various migratory flows. 
However, in recent decades, the nature of this influx of immigrants has 
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changed. The fact that they come from varied origins implies the incorpora-
tion of a cultural, linguistic and religious diversity that was unthinkable a few 
years ago (Garreta, 2011; Garreta, Llevot, 2011; Llevot et al., 2017). Thus, the edu-
cation system has had to respond, with a positive outlook, to the increase in 
diversity and its political and social recognition (Garreta, 2003; Bernad, 2016; 
Giró, Andrés, 2018).
In Spain, educational decentralization has led to policies in this field devel-
oping in diverse ways. However, the results are not very different, given that 
these are always in the framework of the idea of interculturality and under the 
general directives of the ministerial educational administration (see cide, 
2005; Fernández, García, 2015; Santos, 2017). J. Garreta (2003 and 2006) showed 
that, at the start of the new century, the dynamics of implantation of intercul-
tural education (a dominant focus in that moment principally through the in-
fluence of the European Union) was slow. Consequently, it was not easy to put 
the discourse into practice as there was no general proposal or specific focus 
on how to do it (the teaching staff were not given adequate orientation or re-
sources, nor were they obliged to define themselves and act accordingly). De-
spite this, one can state that important steps had been taken (even though 
more should have been done) to incorporate the students and families of for-
eign origin or gypsies into the education system. The few studies that have 
compared different Autonomous Communities (especially the work of the 
cide (2005)) have shown the following. Work has been done to incorporate 
students at different moments of their school path and the academic year; the 
teaching of the school’s vehicular language (in some cases, support has also 
been given to the learning of the languages of origin) has been taken into con-
sideration; plans have been drawn up for the reception of families and stu-
dents; the training of the teaching staff has been enhanced; initiatives for 
translation and/or intercultural mediation have been set up; specific materials 
have been prepared and included in the curriculum; etc. It is also true that it 
was not until very recently that the aspect of religious diversity started being 
given consideration when dealing with cultural diversity. It seems to us that, 
after being scarcely considered, the discourse and the actions regarding cul-
tural diversity have been consolidating; relevant issues are now emerging, such 
as the afore-mentioned mediators and translators, the specific materials, the 
adaptation of the curriculum to cultural diversity, etc. However, despite this 
development, the research still indicates that it is necessary to better articulate 
the necessities through actions and the discourse through practice, as well as 
to provide a more advanced training for everyone involved in the schools (see, 
among others: Llevot, 2006; Aguado, 2011; Márquez-Lepe, García-Cano, 2014; 
Escarbajal, Leiva, 2017). Moreover, it is common to believe it is necessary to 
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continue to study in order to better know, in a comparative and methodologi-
cally plural way, what has been done, what evaluation this has received by the 
different agents involved and how this could be improved. As shown above, 
Spain has taken steps in the valuation of cultural diversity in the classroom and 
has evolved, in just a few years, from a centralized educational system (where 
cultural diversity, focused on gypsies, was undervalued) to a decentralized au-
tonomous system, much closer to an intercultural pedagogical model (Essom-
ba, 2014) and in which the cultural pluralism of the State has been accentuated. 
This intercultural education has gradually incorporated a more general ap-
proach to seeking social cohesion and inclusion.
Thus, the growing cultural and religious diversity in Catalan society has 
highlighted the limitations of a social and educational model. These have 
become more notable with this demographic evolution (Griera, 2016). In 
fact, this debate has been ongoing since the start of the democratic transition 
and has placed the school at the center of attention, as a microcosm of what 
the society produces (Sanuy et al., 2017b). In this line, one of the challenges 
the school faces is how to respond to not only the cultural diversity but also to 
the religious diversity in our society and in schools – a debate from which the 
teacher-training faculties are not excluded (Bernad, Llevot, 2018a).
Focusing on the religious question, the Spanish Constitution recognizes the 
right of families to choose the religious and moral training for their children in 
accordance with their own beliefs. This right has been upheld by the succes-
sive education laws that have been implemented since the advent of democ-
racy. Thus, in the Spanish educational system, the subject of religion is manda-
tory for the school and optative for the students. When the latter opt to study 
religion, they can choose between those religions that have signed cooperation 
agreements with the State (Catholic, Evangelical, Muslim and Jewish). How-
ever, various studies (Tarrés, Roson, 2009; Viñao, 2014; Llevot et al., 2017) show 
the hegemonic role of the Catholic religion and the scant implantation of the 
other three.
In this general setting, we present what happens in the pre-schools and the 
primary schools of the Catalan territory; specifically, how religious diversity is 
dealt with, and which actions are being carried out in the schools. To this end, 
we use two approaches.1 First, we present the results of a survey of representa-
tives of the management teams from 380 public schools in Catalonia. This is 
1 The data used are from the Proyecto Recercaixa 2015 and the subvention of the relig pro-
gramme of the Generalitat de Catalunya for university research projects in the field of reli-
gious diversity. To extend this, one can consult Garreta et al., 2018.
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complemented with in-depth interviews (qualitative methodology) of a sam-
ple from 16 schools who stand out in the survey for their actions and manage-
ment regarding the treatment of cultural and/or religious diversity.2
2 The School and Cultural and Religious Diversity
The survey is useful for a first approach to the schools, and it shows that the 
average number of pupils of foreign origin is 19.76%, the largest proportion of 
whom are of Maghrebi origin. A characteristic of the education system is that 
despite having a general framework –established by the legislation– within 
which educational action is developed, each school adapts the elements it has 
available to its circumstances. Regarding the arrival of pupils with characteris-
tics initially not envisaged by the legal framework, the schools have had to 
adapt their resources and seek other new ones to tackle these necessities. 
Teachers have been impelled to prepare new strategies to involve the students 
and their families, and have prioritized transversal work and, in short, have 
had to improvise and experiment faced in an unexpected situation.
The survey shows that the cultural diversity in society is analyzed with the 
pupils in many centers. Specifically, only 15.5% do nothing about this. As could 
be expected, the response that said they acted was more frequent in schools 
that have a higher presence of foreign-origin students. The most common ac-
tions are working on cultural diversity in the curriculum (60.3%) and organiz-
ing intercultural days (32.6%). Other less frequent actions are (in this order) 
the adaptation of menus, projects and activities in the classroom, specific ac-
tions of communication and training of family members, and work on reli-
gious diversity.
In more detail, we can see that, among those surveyed, the ones responding 
that they take cultural diversity into consideration in the curriculum indicate 
that this is mainly introduced in the subjects of social and natural environ-
ment (42.9%), also in tutoring (12.2%), ethics/values (25.3%) and religion 
(22%). It is true that 36.3% of the schools receive external support to act on 
cultural diversity (from the Generalitat de Catalunya, especially from the De-
partment of Education’s teams of Language and Social Cohesion (elic), see: 
http://xtec.gencat.cat/ca/serveis/sez/elic/), a percentage that increases in line 
with the rise in the proportion of foreign-origin students in the school.
2 Taking the concept of good practices proposed by Ritacco (2011) as a reference, these good 
practices could be understood as convex and convergent actions within the same framework 
of action (Sanuy et al., 2017b).
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On focusing interest on the presence/absence of cultural and religious diver-
sity in the documents from the schools, we can observe that cultural diversity 
receives more attention than religious diversity (and is taken more into consid-
eration as the number of foreign origin pupils increases) in the Centre Curricu-
lar Projects (pcc)3 and Centre Educational Projects (pec).4 A minority does 
3 The pec is made up of the pedagogical and organisational principles that should run all the 
educational actions, while the pcc is an eminently pedagogical document that constitutes a 
basic instrument for defining the approaches developed in the educational project respect-
ing the prescriptions of the official curriculum.
4 Document that defines how the school works: guiding principles that differentiate it from 
other centres, actions for adaptation to the surroundings; lines of attention to diversity and 
Source: Proyecto Recercaixa 2015; Garreta et al., 2018.
Table 25.1  Actions/activities carried out while working on cultural diversity
Actions mentioned spontaneously Percentage
Working on the curriculum 60.3
Intercultural days 32.6
Training of teachers 4.7
Training for the families 14.2
Specific communication activities 16.1





Human rights’ days 5.8
Projects specific center 8.4
Working on religious diversity 10.5
Tutoring 6.8
Classes language of origin 2.1
Intercultural mediation 1.6
Organization groups 7.4
Specific to classroom 16.8
Activities for foreign families 8.7
Others 4.2
None 15.5
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not contemplate cultural diversity in its plans – the Plan for coexistence being 
where these themes are most frequently reflected. In contrast, when we refer 
to religious diversity, the reality is different. Moreover, in the majority of 
schools, no one is responsible for managing religious diversity. Although 28.4% 
claim there is someone in charge of this, they are often referring to the teacher 
of Catholic religion and, to a lesser degree, to the management team or the 
commission for coexistence.
Regarding the teaching of religion, in primary schools, “the areas of religion 
and education in social and civic values are mandatory for the schools and 
optative for the families” (Departament d’Ensenyament, 2015). In other words, 
when enrolling their children, families can choose whether their offspring 
study the subject of religion or an alternative. Currently, in line with the Or-
ganic Law for the Improvement of Educational Quality (lomce in its Spanish 
initials, 2013),5 the latter option means social and civic values. Previously, the 
alternative subject had a wider spectrum according to the criteria of the school 
(another change introduced by the lomce is that both subjects are evaluable 
and have the same teaching hours). Regarding the area of religion, the Law 
stipulates there is a choice between the Catholic, Evangelical, Jewish and Mus-
lim religions. However, in practice, as the results of the survey show, in public 
schools, possibly conditioned by the demand of the families, alternative edu-
cational attention and Catholic religion are taught mostly, the presence of the 
Evangelical religion being almost imperceptible and the other two religions, 
null. However, in some centers, on their own initiative, the Catholic religion 
teachers introduce a view of other religions into their subject as religious cul-
ture (see Garreta et al., 2019). On the other hand, and for various reasons, either 
due to the ideas of the center or the choice of the families, we also find centers 
that only teach the subject of religion and others that only teach the alterna-
tive subject.
However, the answers from those surveyed mainly indicate that religions 
should be taught outside the school (75%). 85.5% of the people interviewed 
consider that it is important to work with the religious diversity of pupils that 
exists in society (approximately half of the schools indicate that they have 
opted for a transversal approach, focusing on objects other than religion/val-
ues, such as social environment, music or tutoring). However, only a minority 
the mid-term objectives; breakdown of the main lines of organisation that are defined in the 
curricular project, etc.
5 For more details about this law, consult http://www.educacionyfp.gob.es/educacion/mc/
lomce/lomce.html.
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of centers (1.8%) have received external support to work on it, and this is main-
ly in those that have a higher presence of foreign-origin pupils.
The representatives of the management teams surveyed indicate that cul-
tural and religious diversity has become “normalized” nowadays. Does this 
mean, perhaps, that it has ceased to be a “problem” in their schools? Do they 
now have enough experience and training to know how to deal with it and re-
spond adequately to the needs of their students? Do they work on and respect 
the differences? According to our study, professionals’ knowledge about pupils 
of foreign origin, their countries and their cultures of origin, the different reli-
gions (one of the training requirements in the early years of this immigration 
(see Garreta, 2003 and 2006)) is no longer a priority in the training plans. How-
ever, coexistence in the centers, among pupils from different cultural and eth-
nic groups and their scholarly and social integration, continues to be an evi-
dent necessity. Some of the new demands for training are education in values, 
management of emotions, organization of the classroom, and, especially, prac-
tical resources (like a “recipe book”). In general, they think they have already 
received sufficient theoretical training, and what is needed now are strategies 
and practical activities to be able to implant in the classroom immediately. In 
fact, 21.8% of those surveyed believe they need strategies for conflict resolu-
tion to improve their response to cultural diversity.
Thus, the training of teachers to work on cultural and religious diversity is 
considered sufficient, but less so when referring to religious diversity (77.9% 
consider their training adequate for cultural diversity and 50% for religious 
diversity). In some cases, they allege that, since they do not have diversity in 
the school, they do not consider this necessary. This option is in line with what 
has already been pointed out: the opinion, shared by many professionals, that 
it is the level of cultural diversity in the classroom (presence of foreign-origin 
students or gypsies) that justifies initiatives in this field. In other words, the 
greater the presence of foreign-origin pupils (or gypsies), the more the actions 
that are put into movement and the more it is frequent to believe that it is not 
necessary to take them in schools without diversity, where the idea that society 
is diverse culturally is taken less into consideration, and where this question 
has to be dealt with for all the pupils.
3 Experiences Regarding Religious Diversity in the Schools
As indicated above, Catalan schools nowadays have much experience in the 
reception of pupils from other cultures and in the treatment of cultural diver-
sity, but do not have the same degree of experience as far as religious diversity 
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is concerned. Probably because of that, this subject is not considered as a pri-
ority in the training plans or among the necessities expressed by the manage-
ment teams. Factors like the training received, the teaching experience, the 
school culture, the organization, the context, the resources and the materials 
they have, play an important role in the school’s micro-politics, and they are 
reflected in the way this topic is approached in the projects and actions.
The influence of socio-economic and educational factors is highlighted, es-
pecially in the schools in depressed neighborhoods. These factors imply great 
social differentials in a group labelled uniformly as of “immigrant origin”. In 
this sense, differentiated responses are designed to contemplate the multiple 
realities. Thinking that their function must go beyond the purely instructive 
aspects, and faced with the evidence of some families’ serious socio-economic 
difficulties, teachers are impelled to seek solutions to palliate the necessities 
manifested by the children – needs that greatly hinder normal schooling. Giv-
en the fall in financial and human resources from the educational administra-
tion (especially due to the economic crisis), the schools request financial sup-
port from some foundations and also undertake synergies by working with 
entities in their surroundings. As a differential trait, some privately owned 
schools with grant-aid agreements with the public administration (known as 
“concertadas” in Spain) receive help and resources from their own foundations 
and from other schools. Therefore, besides requesting resources such as grants, 
they implement actions such as opening the school library after school hours 
to facilitate the children in doing their homework, or organize summer camps 
and activities. Generally, they do so with the support of volunteers or associa-
tions, including Save the Children.
The models of management relating to diversity does not follow uniformed 
models valid for all cases, as each school has to build its own model, adapted to 
its specific situation. Diversity is considered a “normal” trait in the school, 
where equality is built from the recognition of differences. Some schools that 
have transformed their way of being, doing and relating to others, seek a defin-
ing trait that brings together and gives sense to the different activities, curricu-
lar or not, that are carried out, and choose to create a great school project 
shared with the community as a “stamp” of identity. In contrast, other centers 
opt to weave a network of small actions and of small projects that give sense to 
what they do from day to day, thus creating a school culture.
Other schools with a trajectory of community work seek the involvement of 
the community by networking with the neighborhood entities. They under-
take participative processes to convert the school into a space for learning, par-
ticipation and communication, where everyone learns and at the same time 
teaches the other and feels to be listened to. However, the grant-aided schools 
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that have been visited (which belong to a religious order with a number of 
schools scattered around Catalonia) have a shared project ideal for all the cen-
ters, which dictates (and unifies) the guidelines that must be followed and in-
cludes the peculiarities of each center. All these schools define themselves as 
inclusive, but some work more on the aim of extending the equality of oppor-
tunities to all the families that make up the community. They work basing on 
the understanding that we are different and that this difference makes the real-
ity as rich and complex as it is.
To encourage mutual respect, cooperation and knowledge of the other cul-
tures present in the school, as well as to choose the most adequate teaching 
activities, it is common for them to work in cooperation with each other (with 
the help of volunteers or family members and having established the same 
objectives) on other aspects that characterize the everyday life of the school. 
For example, the cleaning of the dining room, the attention for the school veg-
etable garden, and other extra-scholar reinforcement activities.
Generally, families do not get involved with the education of their children, 
as indicated by the interviewees from the schools that carry out the cited good 
practices regarding the cultural and religious diversity. On the other hand, vari-
ous studies indicate the involvement of parents (which mainly covers these 
three aspects: school-family communication, participation of the families in 
the school and participation of the families at home) as one of the determining 
factors for success at school (Bernad, 2016). Given the pressing need to improve 
this aspect, all the centers visited have implemented actions to improve school-
family communication, incentivize the participation of families in the school’s 
activities and facilitate the follow-up of their children’s progress in the school. 
Among others, the families are invited to enter the classrooms to see what the 
children do and to attend workshops designed to show how the school works 
and what the methodologies used are. They are also encouraged to participate 
in such teaching-learning activities as class projects or interactive groups. Last-
ly, some schools offer the families the possibility of participating in running 
the center through mixed commissions, besides making the mothers and fa-
thers class delegates, creating a family council, scheduling meetings with 
teachers, etc. These actions relate to the working dynamics of the centers and 
the attitudes of the professionals who work in them.
The mentioned interviews enable us to analyze what teachers think about 
the issue of cultural and religious diversity, and what is their position regarding 
the official curriculum. When the focus is on education policies regarding 
these themes, reference is quickly made to what they believe to be condition-
ing their work, namely the series of education laws in Spain, parallel to the 
changes in the ruling parties, as the application of each of these laws implies 
curricular changes in different subjects. Secondly, the interviewees focus on 
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religious diversity in schools, which they currently place in a multi-cultural 
and globalized context in which cultural and religious diversity is managed 
depending on a wide range of factors, as shown below.
Although the law states that teaching the subject of Religion is mandatory 
for the centers and optional for the pupils, in public schools we can detect a 
wide spectrum (possibly conditioned by the choice of the families) of school 
provisions that range from schools that only teach Catholicism to schools that 
only offer an alternative subject, while some others offer both options. The 
majority of the public schools that have been visited, given their successful 
experiences, often do not work on the religious component besides the subject 
of Religion. In contrast, the question of values and ethics is dealt with transver-
sally or through various specific actions such as the 3–12 philosophy program 
or in tutorials. If the subject of religion is not taught, religious culture is dealt 
with transversally in other subjects like social environment and tutoring.
One must be more specific, given that when looking at Catholicism (which, 
we recall, is the most habitual of the optional religions in the survey presented 
above) and although the curriculum for religion is established at the state level 
by the Spanish Episcopal Conference, most have adapted the program to the 
current situation by including knowledge of other religions, emphasizing val-
ues and relegating religious practices to the family sphere. At this point, it is 
notable that, despite their Catholic confessional ideology, the grant-aided cen-
ters visited tend to offer a mandatory subject called Religious Cultures to all 
pupils. It has its own specific content, it includes the study of the other major-
ity religions and the study of the values shared by the different confessions 
(based on universal human rights).
Independently of whether they choose to attend the Religion class or the 
alternative, a good part of the foreign-origin pupils tends to go to places of wor-
ship after school hours or at the weekend. There, as well as following the reli-
gious practices, they can attend classes of religion and culture. Even if the leg-
islation contemplates that it is possible to teach four religions in educational 
centers, in practice only Catholicism is taught (or religious culture in another 
case) and, in a few centers, the Evangelical religion. One of the reasons ad-
duced for this is the lack of teachers who fulfil the requisites regarding training 
(especially the need to have a teaching qualification).
4 Open Discussion and Some Conclusions
The response to cultural and religious diversity in schools in Catalonia shows a 
diversity of answers and approaches – a fact that reaffirms that we are witness-
ing a process of defining and situating these subjects, which have to adapt to 
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the changing laws and to the context and actors who intervene, as Garreta 
(2006 and 2011) and Rey (2012) indicated previously. The analysis of these data 
shows a set of paradoxical aspects, which are detailed below:
– The legal framework of the education system provokes certain tensions. In a 
way, the preferential treatment of Catholicism in a non-denominational 
State is contrary to the teaching of religious diversity and intercultural dia-
logue. Besides the policies that can evolve with the changes in educational 
legislation, this preferential treatment converts the subject of religion into 
an “anomaly” within the school curriculum, and even more so bearing in 
mind the cultural and religious diversity that has entered into our school 
environment (Llevot et al., 2016 and 2017). Nevertheless, the efforts made by 
Religion teachers, in consonance with the school management teams, in or-
der to incorporate cultural and religious diversity into their subject, some-
times even contravening the guidelines of the bishopric, must be 
recognized.
– Religious diversity is covered by the legislation of the educational adminis-
tration. However, in reality, this is never really complied with (Llevot et al., 
2017). This is partly due to the lack of specialist teachers that meet the estab-
lished training requisites to teach other religions (Tarrés, Rosón, 2009). We 
can also observe that the concept of religious diversity is assimilated to the 
fact of differentiating the subject according to the different recognized reli-
gious confessions (Griera, 2016). This favors religious freedom but, at the 
same time, hinders interculturality and the interreligious dialogue.
– It must also be added that, as a consequence of this legislation that frames 
the application of religions in schools, it is often the teachers of Catholic 
religion who attempt to incorporate knowledge of other religions and 
shared universal values into their subject (of course, from a clearly Christian 
viewpoint). This initiative, which should be valued as positive and innova-
tive for the religion that is taught this way, inevitably produces a filter that 
limits the visibility of other possibilities when religious diversity is reduced 
to this (Llevot et al., 2017). In summary, we cannot have religious diversity if 
we only teach the subject of Catholic religion.
Public school faces a great challenge regarding cultural diversity, and that is 
why this diversity is approached as a joint task and projects are undertaken 
from the schools and the parents’ associations (Garreta, 2003; Garreta, Llevot, 
2011; Bernad, Llevot, 2016 and 2018a; Sanuy et al., 2017b). Here, we highlight the 
extraordinary efforts made by the teaching staff to incorporate these aspects 
into their everyday routines. The study by Garreta (2003) highlighted the orga-
nization of intercultural days above all else. However, this activity has now 
fallen by almost half in this present study. In fact, there is now a high response 
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(60.3%) about working on the curriculum, which indicates that the legacy of 
performing specific actions (special meetings) without modifying anything 
else is being overcome. Teachers have had to prepare new strategies to involve 
the pupils and families, transversal work has been prioritized and in short, they 
have had to improvise and experiment when faced with an unexpected situa-
tion. From this initial process, which starts from a positive professional atti-
tude, new experiences applicable to the working of the schools are accumu-
lated, and these undergo a process of constant revision (Garreta, 2011; Llevot et 
al., 2017; Giró, Andrés, 2018).
It must not be forgotten that education in cultural and religious diversity 
does not depend only on the centers, on the families or on the teaching staff. It 
is unthinkable that themes involving the differences and the coexistence of 
cultures and religions can be dealt with in the schools idyllically, without any 
problem, when these are in a context of an increasingly conflictive growing 
world, in the midst of administrative cutbacks, with a greater or lesser under-
standing between governments (State and autonomous region) and the differ-
ent options of public and grant-aided schools, and in situations of injustice 
and poverty. In this scenario, education in diversity is currently one of the 
greatest educational challenges, for which the responsibility must necessarily 
fall on the different social agents. If the problems are generated in relation to 
movements and conflicts, both local and global, it is unlikely that the solution 
to these will depend on the values and dynamics of an isolated school or com-
munity, although some values and some policies can help more than others to 
facilitate a good coexistence (see actual experiences in Bernad, Llevot, 2018b). 
However, given that coexistence is not a synonym for harmony or easiness, re-
thinking the meaning of this term will help us understand some attitudes that 
express the willingness to avoid involvement in this debate.
All these are aspects that must be re-thought in the training of future teach-
ers (Bernad, Llevot, 2018a). It is not possible to envisage diversity in schools 
without taking into consideration the globalized society in which they are 
rooted, nor the tensions that the subject of differences can originate. One of 
the most tenacious uncertainties of our times, the one studied by De Sousa 
(2016), is the difficulty of combining the right to equality and the right to 
difference.
Returning to the concept of good practices proposed by Ritacco (2011), this 
is precisely in the common framework of action that our study emphasizes. It 
is also the will to integrate the existing diversity into the projects, bearing in 
mind aspects such as cohesion and interculturality, as well as the functionality 
of the learning. A school “for everyone”, that is democratic, open to the com-
munity, and which works in a network where teachers, families and pupils feel 
Llevot-Calvet, Bernad-Cavero and Garreta-Bochaca782
<UN>
recognized as participants, are other defining aspects. Some factors to take into 
account are the leadership of the management team, the intercultural climate, 
the role of religion, the channels of communication and participation, the at-
titudes of teachers and families and networking, among others. The type of 
response to religious diversity that has been carried out in schools shows a di-
versity of reactions and approaches, which reaffirms that we are in the process 
of defining and locating this subject, one that must adapt to changing laws and 
the context and actors who intervene (Llevot et al., 2017).
A certain contrast is observed between the experience of religiosity among 
many recently arrived groups and the increasingly agnostic manifestation of 
the indigenous population. We believe that the gap that opens in this sense 
hinders intercultural relations and dialogue and, at the same time, the dynam-
ics inside the educational community and society as a whole. However, some 
cases have managed to turn the school into a space for understanding and mu-
tual recognition.
A basic premise is actively listening to the necessities and demands, togeth-
er with sharing one’s own, and a shared design and application of the initia-
tives. The atmosphere in the center cannot be unlinked from mutual trust and 
the feeling of belonging to the community. To create a real link, it is necessary 
to make it very strong, solid and, for that reason, the center cannot ignore the 
social and economic needs of the families, nor even the problems of disloca-
tion and rootlessness. In truth, the school cannot solve many of the social 
problems that affect them, but they can listen to them and accompany them, 
and a way to do so is to understand the importance that learning the religion 
of origin has for some communities. To this end, beyond the single mind-set, it 
is essential that the school allows the differences to arise and be expressed. It 
must be given space and time to learn how to think about them, and especially 
to converse in a space inside the school, which allows to be open to philosophi-
cal questions, to religious themes, etc.
Lastly, we have to mention Carlos Skliar (2010), who invites us to consider 
education as the place that opens a possibility and responsibility towards the 
existence of the other, of all humankind. Education consists of meeting the 
specific other, face to face. This meeting is with a specific and singular face, 
name, word, language, situation, emotion and knowledge. This must be the 
way to be open to what is different and to learn from each other.
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